3 ideas
| 21681 | Given all true atomic propositions, in theory every other truth can thereby be deduced [Russell] |
| Full Idea: Given all true atomic propositions, together with the fact that they are all, every other true proposition can theoretically be deduced by logical methods. | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (Intro to 2nd ed of Principia Mathematica [1925], p.xv) | |
| A reaction: This is evidently his strongest statement of the ideal underlying logical atomism. The atoms were initially sense-date, but then became atomic propositions saying an object has a property. |
| 17722 | The concept 'red' is tied to what actually individuates red things [Peacocke] |
| Full Idea: The possession conditions for the concept 'red' of the colour red are tied to those very conditions which individuate the colour red. | |
| From: Christopher Peacocke (Explaining the A Priori [2000], p.267), quoted by Carrie Jenkins - Grounding Concepts 2.5 | |
| A reaction: Jenkins reports that he therefore argues that we can learn something about the word 'red' from thinking about the concept 'red', which is his new theory of the a priori. I find 'possession conditions' and 'individuation' to be very woolly concepts. |
| 23609 | I act justly if I follow my Prince in an apparently unjust war, and refusing to fight would be injustice [Hobbes] |
| Full Idea: If I wage war at the commandment of my Prince, conceiving the war to be justly undertaken, I do not therefore do unjustly, but rather if I refuse to do it, arrogating to myself the knowledge of what is just and unjust, which pertains only to my Prince. | |
| From: Thomas Hobbes (De Cive [1642], 12.II), quoted by Jeff McMahan - Killing in War 2.6 | |
| A reaction: Hobbes early says that Princes make things just by commanding them. This presumably assumes divine authority in the Prince. This is, of course, ancient pernicious nonsense. |