3 ideas
| 14289 | There are some assertable conditionals one would reject if one learned the antecedent [Jackson, by Edgington] |
| Full Idea: Jackson came to realise that there are assertable conditionals which one would not continue to believe if one learned the antecedent, such as Lewis's "If Reagan worked for the KGB, I'll never find out". | |
| From: report of Frank Jackson (Conditionals [1987]) by Dorothy Edgington - Conditionals (Stanf) 4.2 | |
| A reaction: That pesky David Lewis made trouble for everybody. Edgington agrees that his earlier formulation (Idea 14288) holds good for nearly all cases. There is a self-referential element in Lewis's example. |
| 23559 | We have the concept of 'knowledge' as a label for good informants [Craig, by Fricker,M] |
| Full Idea: Craig's explanation of why we have the concept of knowledge is that it arises from our fundamental need to distinguish good informants. | |
| From: report of Edward Craig (Knowledge and the State of Nature [1990]) by Miranda Fricker - Epistemic Injustice 6.1 | |
| A reaction: That is, why do we have the label 'knowledge', in addition to 'true belief'? This strikes me as a good explanation which had never occurred to me. Every social group needs to identify members who have some authority in knowledge of various areas of life. |
| 17722 | The concept 'red' is tied to what actually individuates red things [Peacocke] |
| Full Idea: The possession conditions for the concept 'red' of the colour red are tied to those very conditions which individuate the colour red. | |
| From: Christopher Peacocke (Explaining the A Priori [2000], p.267), quoted by Carrie Jenkins - Grounding Concepts 2.5 | |
| A reaction: Jenkins reports that he therefore argues that we can learn something about the word 'red' from thinking about the concept 'red', which is his new theory of the a priori. I find 'possession conditions' and 'individuation' to be very woolly concepts. |