6 ideas
22334 | Analysis must include definitions, search for simples, concept analysis, and Kant's analysis [Glock] |
Full Idea: Under 'analysis' a minimum would include the Socratic quest for definitions, Descartes' search for simple natures, the empiricists' psychological resolution of complex ideas, and Kant's 'transcendental' analysis of our cognitive capacities. | |
From: Hans-Johann Glock (What is Analytic Philosophy? [2008], 6.1) | |
A reaction: This has always struck me, and I find the narrow focus on modern logic a very distorted idea of the larger project. The aim, I think, is to understand by taking things apart, in the spirit of figuring out how a watch works. |
13132 | A snowball's haecceity is the property of being identical with itself [Plantinga, by Westerhoff] |
Full Idea: Plantinga assumes that being identical with that snowball names a property which is that snowball's haecceity. | |
From: report of Alvin Plantinga (De Essentia [1979]) by Jan Westerhoff - Ontological Categories §52 | |
A reaction: Only a philosopher would suggest such a bizarre way of establishing the unique individuality of a given snowball. You could hardly keep track of the snowball with just that criterion. How do you decide whether something has Plantinga's property? |
22332 | German and British idealism is not about individual ideas, but the intelligibility of reality [Glock] |
Full Idea: Neither German nor British Idealism reduced reality to episodes in the minds of individuals. Instsead, they insisted that reality is intelligible only because it is a manifestation of a divine spirit or rational principle. | |
From: Hans-Johann Glock (What is Analytic Philosophy? [2008], 5.2) | |
A reaction: They standardly reject Berkeley. Such Idealism seems either to be the design argument for God's existence, or neo-Stoicism (in its claim that nature is rational). Why not just say that nature seems to be intelligible, and stop there? |
17722 | The concept 'red' is tied to what actually individuates red things [Peacocke] |
Full Idea: The possession conditions for the concept 'red' of the colour red are tied to those very conditions which individuate the colour red. | |
From: Christopher Peacocke (Explaining the A Priori [2000], p.267), quoted by Carrie Jenkins - Grounding Concepts 2.5 | |
A reaction: Jenkins reports that he therefore argues that we can learn something about the word 'red' from thinking about the concept 'red', which is his new theory of the a priori. I find 'possession conditions' and 'individuation' to be very woolly concepts. |
22336 | We might say that the family resemblance is just a consequence of meaning-as-use [Glock] |
Full Idea: Against Wittgenstein's family resemblance view one might evoke his own idea that the meaning of a word is its use, and that diversity of use entails diversity of meaning. | |
From: Hans-Johann Glock (What is Analytic Philosophy? [2008], 8.2) | |
A reaction: Wittgenstein might just accept the point. Diversity of concepts reflects diversity of usage. But how do you distinguish 'football is a game' from 'oy, what's your game?'. How does usage distinguish metaphorical from literal (if it does)? |
22335 | The variety of uses of 'game' may be that it has several meanings, and isn't a single concept [Glock] |
Full Idea: The proper conclusion to draw from the fact that we explain 'game' in a variety of different ways is that it is not a univocal term, but has different, albeit related, meanings. | |
From: Hans-Johann Glock (What is Analytic Philosophy? [2008], 8.2) | |
A reaction: [He cites Rundle 1990] Potter says Wittgenstein insisted that 'game' is a single concept. 'Game' certainly slides off into metaphor, as in 'are you playing games with me?'. The multivocal view would still meet family resemblance on a narrower range. |