Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Explaining the A Priori', 'Remarks on the forces of inorganic Nature' and 'Lectures on the Philosophy of (World) History'

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4 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / e. Philosophy as reason
If we look at the world rationally, the world assumes a rational aspect [Hegel]
     Full Idea: Whoever looks at the world rationally will find that it in turn assumes a rational aspect; the two exist in a reciprocal relationship.
     From: Georg W.F.Hegel (Lectures on the Philosophy of (World) History [1837], p.29), quoted by Stephen Houlgate - An Introduction to Hegel 01
     A reaction: What happens when I look at irrationality rationally?
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 1. On Reason
The world seems rational to those who look at it rationally [Hegel]
     Full Idea: To him who looks at the world rationally, the world looks rationally back; the two exist in reciprocal relationship.
     From: Georg W.F.Hegel (Lectures on the Philosophy of (World) History [1837], Intro p.29), quoted by A.W. Moore - The Evolution of Modern Metaphysics 07.4
     A reaction: This is a nice variation on the stoic idea that nature is essentially rational. If we are capable of rationality, then nature has made us that way. Romantics seem to prefer looking at nature less rationally, so what do they see in nature?
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 2. Origin of Concepts / a. Origin of concepts
The concept 'red' is tied to what actually individuates red things [Peacocke]
     Full Idea: The possession conditions for the concept 'red' of the colour red are tied to those very conditions which individuate the colour red.
     From: Christopher Peacocke (Explaining the A Priori [2000], p.267), quoted by Carrie Jenkins - Grounding Concepts 2.5
     A reaction: Jenkins reports that he therefore argues that we can learn something about the word 'red' from thinking about the concept 'red', which is his new theory of the a priori. I find 'possession conditions' and 'individuation' to be very woolly concepts.
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / d. Gravity
Gravity isn't a force, because it produces effects without diminishing [Mayer]
     Full Idea: If gravity be called a force, a cause is supposed which produces effects without itself diminishing, and incorrect conceptions of the causal connexions of things are thereby fostered.
     From: J.R. Mayer (Remarks on the forces of inorganic Nature [1842], p.199), quoted by Brian Ellis - Scientific Essentialism 8.03
     A reaction: This seems like a brilliant prelude to the proposal that gravity is actually the 'curvature' of space (whatever that is!).