Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Explaining the A Priori', 'works' and 'Events and Their Names'

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4 ideas

7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / c. Reduction of events

8978	Events are made of other things, and are not fundamental to ontology [Bennett]
	Full Idea: Events are not basic items in the universe; they should not be included in any fundamental ontology...all the truths about them are entailed by and explained and made true by truths that do not involve the event concept.
	From: Jonathan Bennett (Events and Their Names [1988], p.12), quoted by Peter Simons - Events 3.1
	A reaction: Given the variable time spans of events, their ability to coincide, their ability to contain no motion, their blatantly conventional component, and their recalcitrance to individuation, I say Bennett is right.

18. Thought / D. Concepts / 2. Origin of Concepts / a. Origin of concepts

17722	The concept 'red' is tied to what actually individuates red things [Peacocke]
	Full Idea: The possession conditions for the concept 'red' of the colour red are tied to those very conditions which individuate the colour red.
	From: Christopher Peacocke (Explaining the A Priori [2000], p.267), quoted by Carrie Jenkins - Grounding Concepts 2.5
	A reaction: Jenkins reports that he therefore argues that we can learn something about the word 'red' from thinking about the concept 'red', which is his new theory of the a priori. I find 'possession conditions' and 'individuation' to be very woolly concepts.

22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / b. Defining ethics

5319	Avoid punishment, then get rewards, avoid rejection, avoid guilt, accept contracts, follow conscience [Kohlberg, by Wilson,EO]
	Full Idea: Kohlberg's six stages of ethical development are: 1) avoid punishment, 2) obtain rewards, 3) avoid rejection, 4) avoid censure and guilt, 5) recognise contracts, 6) individual conscience.
	From: report of Lawrence Kohlberg (works [1969]) by Edmund O. Wilson - On Human Nature p.166
	A reaction: This doesn't throw much light on philosophical problems, but the order of the six stages is interesting. Beware of oversimplification, because a situation can put pressure on any one of these six aspects of morality.

26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / b. Causal relata

10364	Facts are about the world, not in it, so they can't cause anything [Bennett]
	Full Idea: Facts are not the sort of item that can cause anything. A fact is a true proposition (they say); it is not something in the world but is rather something about the world.
	From: Jonathan Bennett (Events and Their Names [1988], p.22), quoted by Jonathan Schaffer - The Metaphysics of Causation 1.1
	A reaction: Compare 10361. Good argument, but maybe 'fact' is ambiguous. See Idea 10365. Events are said to be more concrete, and so can do the job, but their individuation also seems to depend on a description (as Davidson has pointed out).