3 ideas
| 15143 | Kind essences are the categorical bases of a thing's causal powers [Bhaskar, by Chakravartty] |
| Full Idea: Bhaskar identifies kind essences with underlying properties, often called 'categorical bases', of the causal powers of things. | |
| From: report of Roy Bhaskar (A Realist Theory of Science [1975], p.212) by Anjan Chakravarrty - Inessential Aristotle: Powers without Essences 1 | |
| A reaction: The problem with this, it always seems to me, is the something inherently passive is said to give rise to something which is inherently active. Couldn't two individuals with a kind have slightly different categorical bases? |
| 20618 | Persons must be conscious, reasoning, motivated, communicative, self-aware [Warren, by Tuckness/Wolf] |
| Full Idea: Suggested characteristics of personhood: consciousness (esp. of pain); reasoning and problem solving; self-motivated activity; varied communication on many topics; self-concepts and self-awareness. | |
| From: report of Mary Anne Warren (On the Moral and Legal State of Abortion [1973], p.55) by Tuckness,A/Wolf,C - This is Political Philosophy 8 'Standing' | |
| A reaction: [a 'famous' article] A number of non-human animals come very close to passing these tests. I suspect the complex communication is only in there to disqualify them from getting the full certificate. (But she wrote on animal rights). |
| 17722 | The concept 'red' is tied to what actually individuates red things [Peacocke] |
| Full Idea: The possession conditions for the concept 'red' of the colour red are tied to those very conditions which individuate the colour red. | |
| From: Christopher Peacocke (Explaining the A Priori [2000], p.267), quoted by Carrie Jenkins - Grounding Concepts 2.5 | |
| A reaction: Jenkins reports that he therefore argues that we can learn something about the word 'red' from thinking about the concept 'red', which is his new theory of the a priori. I find 'possession conditions' and 'individuation' to be very woolly concepts. |