Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Explaining the A Priori', 'Interview with Baggini and Stangroom' and 'Nietzsche: a philosophical biography'

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5 ideas

1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 4. Later European Philosophy / d. Nineteenth century philosophy

20110	Hegel, Fichte and Schelling wanted to know Kant's thing-in-itself, as ego, or nature, or spirit [Safranski]
	Full Idea: The 'thing in iself' acted on Kant's successors like a hole in the closed world of knowledge...Hegel, Fichte and Schelling wanted to penetrate into what they presumed to be the heart of things, by the invention of means of 'ego', or 'nature', or 'spirit.,
	From: Rüdiger Safranski (Nietzsche: a philosophical biography [2000], 07)
	A reaction: [a bit compressed] Although no scientist claims to know the ultimate essence of matter, the authority of science largely comes from persuasively moving us several steps closer to the thing in itself (more persuasively than these three).

18. Thought / D. Concepts / 2. Origin of Concepts / a. Origin of concepts

17722	The concept 'red' is tied to what actually individuates red things [Peacocke]
	Full Idea: The possession conditions for the concept 'red' of the colour red are tied to those very conditions which individuate the colour red.
	From: Christopher Peacocke (Explaining the A Priori [2000], p.267), quoted by Carrie Jenkins - Grounding Concepts 2.5
	A reaction: Jenkins reports that he therefore argues that we can learn something about the word 'red' from thinking about the concept 'red', which is his new theory of the a priori. I find 'possession conditions' and 'individuation' to be very woolly concepts.

22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / e. Death

6866	It is disturbing if we become unreal when we die, but if time is unreal, then we remain real after death [Le Poidevin]
	Full Idea: For the A-theorists called 'presentists' the past is as unreal as the future, and reality leaves us behind once we die, which is disturbing; but B-theorists, who see time as unreal, say we are just as real after our deaths as we were beforehand.
	From: Robin Le Poidevin (Interview with Baggini and Stangroom [2001], p.174)
	A reaction: See Idea 6865 for A and B theories. I wonder if this problem is only superficially 'disturbing'. Becoming unreal may sound more drastic than becoming dead, but they both sound pretty terminal to me.

23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 1. Existentialism

6867	Existentialism focuses on freedom and self-making, and insertion into the world [Le Poidevin]
	Full Idea: I take existentialism to be the focus on the freedom and self-making of the human being, and his or her insertion into the world.
	From: Robin Le Poidevin (Interview with Baggini and Stangroom [2001], p.222)
	A reaction: I take 'self-making' to be the key here. If neuroscientists somehow 'proved' that there was no free will, I don't see that making any difference to existentialism. 'Insertion' seems odd, unless it refers to growing up.

27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / d. Time series

6865	A-theory says past, present, future and flow exist; B-theory says this just reports our perspective [Le Poidevin]
	Full Idea: The A-theory regards our intuitive distinction of time into past, present and future as objective, and takes seriously the idea that time flows; the B-theory says this just reflects our perspective, like the spatial distinction between here and there.
	From: Robin Le Poidevin (Interview with Baggini and Stangroom [2001], p.174)
	A reaction: The distinction comes from McTaggart. Physics seems to be built on an objective view of time, and yet Einstein makes time relative. What possible evidence could decide between the two theories?