34 ideas
13258 | The 'aggregative' objections says mereology gets existence and location of objects wrong [Koslicki] |
Full Idea: The 'aggregative' objection to classical extensional mereology is that it assigns simply the wrong, set-like conditions of existence and spatio-temporal location to ordinary material objects. | |
From: Kathrin Koslicki (The Structure of Objects [2008], 5.1) | |
A reaction: [She attributes this to Kit Fine] The point is that there is more to a whole than just some parts, otherwise you could scatter the parts across the globe (or even across time) and claim that the object still existed. It's obvious really. |
13288 | Consequence is truth-preserving, either despite substitutions, or in all interpretations [Koslicki] |
Full Idea: Two conceptions of logical consequence: a substitutional account, where no substitution of non-logical terms for others (of the right syntactic category) produce true premises and false conclusions; and model theory, where no interpretation can do it. | |
From: Kathrin Koslicki (The Structure of Objects [2008], 9.3.2 n8) | |
A reaction: [compressed] |
14506 | 'Roses are red; therefore, roses are colored' seems truth-preserving, but not valid in a system [Koslicki] |
Full Idea: 'Roses are red; therefore, roses are colored' may be necessarily truth-preserving, but it would not be classified as logically valid by standard systems of logic. | |
From: Kathrin Koslicki (The Structure of Objects [2008], 9.3.2) |
14505 | Some questions concern mathematical entities, rather than whole structures [Koslicki] |
Full Idea: Those who hold that not all mathematical questions can be concerned with structural matters can point to 'why are π or e transcendental?' or 'how are the prime numbers distributed?' as questions about particular features in the domain. | |
From: Kathrin Koslicki (The Structure of Objects [2008], 9.3.1 n6) | |
A reaction: [She cites Mac Lane on this] The reply would have to be that we only have those particular notions because we have abstracted them from structures, as in deriving π for circles. |
13289 | Structures have positions, constituent types and number, and some invariable parts [Koslicki] |
Full Idea: Structures make available positions or places for objects, and place restraints on the type of constituent, and on their configuration. ...These lead to restrictions on the number of objects, and on which parts of the structure are invariable. | |
From: Kathrin Koslicki (The Structure of Objects [2008], 9.6) | |
A reaction: [compressed] That's a pretty good first shot at saying what a structure is, which I have so far not discovered any other writer willing to do. I take this to be an exploration of what Aristotle meant by 'form'. |
14501 | 'Categorical' properties exist in the actual world, and 'hypothetical' properties in other worlds [Koslicki] |
Full Idea: The 'categorical' properties are roughly those that concern what goes on in the actual world; the properties excluded from that family are the 'hypothetical' ones, which concern what goes on in other worlds. | |
From: Kathrin Koslicki (The Structure of Objects [2008], 3.2.3.1) | |
A reaction: The awkward guest at this little party is the 'dispositional' properties, which are held to exist in the actual world, but have implications for other worlds. I'm a fan of them. |
14495 | I aim to put the notion of structure or form back into the concepts of part, whole and object [Koslicki] |
Full Idea: My project is to put the notion of structure or form squarely back at the center of any adequate account of the notion of part, whole and object. | |
From: Kathrin Koslicki (The Structure of Objects [2008], Intro) | |
A reaction: Excellent. It is the fault of logicians, who presumably can't cope with such elusive and complex concepts, that we have ended up with objects as lists of things or properties, or quantifications over them. |
13264 | If a whole is just a structure, a dinner party wouldn't need the guests to turn up [Koslicki] |
Full Idea: If a whole is just a structure, we wonder how the guests could really be part of the dinner party seating structure, when the complex whole is fully exhausted by the structure that specifies the slots. | |
From: Kathrin Koslicki (The Structure of Objects [2008], 4.2.2) | |
A reaction: This cuts both ways. A dinner party may necessarily require guests, but the seating plan can be specified in the absence of any guests, who may never turn up. A seating plan is not a dinner party. Perhaps we have two objects here. |
14497 | The clay is just a part of the statue (its matter); the rest consists of its form or structure [Koslicki] |
Full Idea: That objects are compounds of matter and form yields a solution to the Problem of Constitution: the clay is merely a proper part of the statue (viz. its matter); the 'remainder' of the statue is its formal or structural components which distinguish it. | |
From: Kathrin Koslicki (The Structure of Objects [2008], Info) | |
A reaction: Thus philosophers have thought that it might consist of two objects because they have failed to grasp what an 'object' is. I would add that we need to mention 'essence', so that the statue can survive minor modifications. This is the solution! |
13280 | Statue and clay differ in modal and temporal properties, and in constitution [Koslicki] |
Full Idea: The statue and the clay appear to differ in modal properties (such as being able to survive squashing), and temporal properties (coming into existence after the lump of clay), and in constitution (only the statue is constituted of the clay). | |
From: Kathrin Koslicki (The Structure of Objects [2008], 7.2.7.2) | |
A reaction: I think the modal properties are the biggest problem here. You can't say a thing and its constitution are different objects, as they are necessarily connected. Structure comes into existence at t, but the structure isn't the whole object. |
14496 | Structure or form are right at the centre of modern rigorous modes of enquiry [Koslicki] |
Full Idea: The notion of structure or form, far from being a mysterious and causally inert invention of philosophers, lies at the very center of many scientific and other rigorous endeavours, such as mathematics, logic, linguistics, chemistry and music. | |
From: Kathrin Koslicki (The Structure of Objects [2008], Intro) | |
A reaction: This echoes my own belief exactly, and places Aristotle at the centre of the modern stage. Her list of subjects is intriguing, and will need a bit of thought. |
13279 | There are at least six versions of constitution being identity [Koslicki] |
Full Idea: The view that constitution is identity has many versions: eliminativism (van Inwagen), identity relative to time (Gallois), identity relativized to sort (Geach), four-dimensionalism (Lewis, Sider), contingent identity (Gibbard), dominant kinds (Burke). | |
From: Kathrin Koslicki (The Structure of Objects [2008], 7.2.7.2 n17) | |
A reaction: [she offers other names- useful footnote] Eliminativism says there is no identity. Gallois's view is Heraclitus. Geach seems to deny nature, since sorts are partly conventional. 4-D, nah! Gibbard: it could be the thing but lack its identity? Kinds wrong. |
14498 | For three-dimensionalist parthood must be a three-place relation, including times [Koslicki] |
Full Idea: Parthood (for the three-dimensionalist) must be a three-place relation between pairs of objects and times, not the timeless two-place relation at work in the original Calculus of Individuals. | |
From: Kathrin Koslicki (The Structure of Objects [2008], 2.2) |
13283 | The parts may be the same type as the whole, like a building made of buildings [Koslicki] |
Full Idea: A building may be composed of proper parts which are themselves buildings; a particular pattern may be composed of proper parts which are themselves patterns (even the same pattern, on a smaller scale). | |
From: Kathrin Koslicki (The Structure of Objects [2008], 7.2.12) | |
A reaction: This strikes me as a rather important observation, if you are (erroneously) trying to establish the identity of a thing simply by categorising its type. |
13266 | Wholes in modern mereology are intended to replace sets, so they closely resemble them [Koslicki] |
Full Idea: The modern theory of parts and wholes was intended primarily to replace set theory; in this way, wholes came out looking as much like sets as they possibly could, without set theory's commitment to an infinite hierarchy of abstract objects. | |
From: Kathrin Koslicki (The Structure of Objects [2008], Intro) | |
A reaction: A very nice clarificatory remark, which explains well this rather baffling phenomenon of people who think there is nothing more to a whole than a pile of parts, as if a scrap heap were the same as a fleet of motor cars. |
14500 | Wholes are entities distinct from their parts, and have different properties [Koslicki] |
Full Idea: A commitment to wholes is a commitment to entities that are numerically distinct from their parts (by Leibniz's Law, they don't share all of their properties - the parts typically exist, but the whole doesn't, prior to its creation). | |
From: Kathrin Koslicki (The Structure of Objects [2008], 3.1) | |
A reaction: Presumably in classical mereology no act of 'creation' is needed, since all the parts in the universe already form all the possible wholes into which they might combine, however bizarrely. |
13281 | Wholes are not just their parts; a whole is an entity distinct from the proper parts [Koslicki] |
Full Idea: In my approach (as in that of Plato and Aristotle), wholes are in no way identified with parts; rather, a commitment to wholes is a commitment to entities numerically distinct from their proper parts. | |
From: Kathrin Koslicki (The Structure of Objects [2008], 7.2.11) | |
A reaction: Calling the whole an 'entity' doesn't seem to capture it. She seems to think there are some extra parts, in addition to the material parts, that make something a whole. I think this might be a category mistake. A structure is an abstraction. |
17722 | The concept 'red' is tied to what actually individuates red things [Peacocke] |
Full Idea: The possession conditions for the concept 'red' of the colour red are tied to those very conditions which individuate the colour red. | |
From: Christopher Peacocke (Explaining the A Priori [2000], p.267), quoted by Carrie Jenkins - Grounding Concepts 2.5 | |
A reaction: Jenkins reports that he therefore argues that we can learn something about the word 'red' from thinking about the concept 'red', which is his new theory of the a priori. I find 'possession conditions' and 'individuation' to be very woolly concepts. |
23814 | Every human yearns for an unattainable transcendent good [Weil] |
Full Idea: There is a reality outside the world …outside any sphere that is accessible to human faculties. Corresponding to this reality, at the centre of the human heart, is the longing for an absolute good, which is always there and never appeased by this world. | |
From: Simone Weil (Draft Statement of Human Obligations [1943], p.221) | |
A reaction: I don't believe in any sort of transcendent reality, but I can identify with this. Even if you have a highly naturalistic view of what is valuable (see late Philippa Foot), there is this indeterminate yearning for that value. |
23824 | Where human needs are satisfied we find happiness, friendship and beauty [Weil] |
Full Idea: Any place where the needs of human beings are satisfied can be recognised by the fact that there is a flowering of fraternity, joy, beauty, and happiness. | |
From: Simone Weil (Draft Statement of Human Obligations [1943], p.230) | |
A reaction: Weil writes a lengthy analysis of what she sees as the basic human needs, beyond the obvious food, water etc. An excellent place to start a line of political thought. |
23815 | We cannot equally respect what is unequal, so equal respect needs a shared ground [Weil] |
Full Idea: It is impossible to feel equal respect for things that are in fact unequal unless the respect is given to something that is identical in all of them. Men are all unequal in all their relations with things of this world. | |
From: Simone Weil (Draft Statement of Human Obligations [1943], p.223) | |
A reaction: Weil votes for some link to transcendence in each of us, but I would prefer some more naturalistic proposal for what we all have in common. There are plenty of aspects which unite all human beings, which grounds this unconditional respect. |
23823 | Life needs risks to avoid sickly boredom [Weil] |
Full Idea: The boredom produced by a complete absence of risk is a sickness of the human soul. | |
From: Simone Weil (Draft Statement of Human Obligations [1943], p.229) | |
A reaction: An unusual analysis of boredom. I think it is probably purposeful activity that we need, rather than actual risk, with all the stresses that involves. Risks are justified by their rewards. |
23822 | We all need to partipate in public tasks, and take some initiative [Weil] |
Full Idea: The human soul has need of disciplined participation in a common task of public value, and it has need of personal initiative within this participation. | |
From: Simone Weil (Draft Statement of Human Obligations [1943], p.229) | |
A reaction: The intrusion of competitive capitalism into almost every area of modern life has more or less eliminated such activities. Only state employees now have such satisfactions, on the whole. I admire Weil's approach here. |
23817 | We need both equality (to attend to human needs) and hierarchy (as a scale of responsibilities) [Weil] |
Full Idea: The human soul has need of equality and of hierarchy. Equality is the public recognition …of the principal that an equal degree of attention is due to the needs of all human beings. Hierarchy is the scale of responsibilities. | |
From: Simone Weil (Draft Statement of Human Obligations [1943], p.228) | |
A reaction: This is the conservative aspect of Weil's largely radical political thinking. Presumably what we respect in these people is their responsibilies, and not their mere rank. Idle members of the British House of Lords have no rank in this hierarchy. |
23819 | Deliberate public lying should be punished [Weil] |
Full Idea: Every avoidable material falsehood publicly asserted should become a punishable offence. | |
From: Simone Weil (Draft Statement of Human Obligations [1943], p.228) | |
A reaction: Yes please! The early 21st century has become the time when truth lost all value in public life. Lying to the House of Commons in the UK required instant resignation 50 years ago. Now it is just a source of laughter. No freedom to lie! |
23818 | We have liberty in the space between nature and accepted authority [Weil] |
Full Idea: Liberty is the power of choice within the latitude left between the direct constraint of natural forces and the authority accepted as legitimate. | |
From: Simone Weil (Draft Statement of Human Obligations [1943], p.228) | |
A reaction: Accepting legitimate authority is a nicely softened version of the social contract. We often find that the office and rank are accepted as legitimate, but then are unable to accept the appalling individual who holds the office. |
23820 | People need personal and collective property, and a social class lacking property is shameful [Weil] |
Full Idea: The human soul has need of both personal property and collective property. …The existence of a social class defined by the lack of personal and collective property is as shameful as slavery. | |
From: Simone Weil (Draft Statement of Human Obligations [1943], p.229) | |
A reaction: Nice. Particularly the idea that we all need collective property, such as parks and beaches and public buildings. |
23821 | Crime should be punished, to bring the perpetrator freely back to morality [Weil] |
Full Idea: The human soul needs punishment and honour. A committer of crime has become exiled from good, and needs to be reintegrated with it through suffering. This aims to bring the soul to recognise freely some day that is infliction was just. | |
From: Simone Weil (Draft Statement of Human Obligations [1943], p.229) | |
A reaction: The Scanlon contractualist approach to punishment - that the victim of it accepts its justice. Given her saintly character, Simone had a very tough view of this issue. |
14504 | The Kripke/Putnam approach to natural kind terms seems to give them excessive stability [Koslicki] |
Full Idea: Theoretical terms such as 'mass', 'force', 'motion', 'species' and 'phlogiston' seem to indicate that the Kripke/Putnam approach to natural kind terms is committed to an excessive amount of stability in the meaning and reference of such expressions. | |
From: Kathrin Koslicki (The Structure of Objects [2008], 8.6.2) | |
A reaction: This sounds right to me. The notion of 'rigid' designation gives a nice framework for modal logic, but it doesn't seem to fit the shifting patterns of scientific thought. |
13285 | Natural kinds support inductive inferences, from previous samples to the next one [Koslicki] |
Full Idea: Natural kinds are said to stand out from other classifications because they support legitimate inductive inferences ...as when we observe that past samples of copper conduct electricity and infer that the next sample will too. | |
From: Kathrin Koslicki (The Structure of Objects [2008], 8.3.1) | |
A reaction: A slightly more precise version of the Upanishad definition of natural kinds which I favour (Idea 8153). If you can't predict the next one from the previous one, it isn't a natural kind. You can't quite predict the next tiger from the previous one. |
13287 | Concepts for species are either intrinsic structure, or relations like breeding or ancestry [Koslicki] |
Full Idea: Candidate species concepts can be intrinsic: morphological, physiological or genetic similarity; or relational: biology such as interbreeding and reproductive isolation, ecology, such as mate recognition in a niche, or phylogenetics (ancestor relations). | |
From: Kathrin Koslicki (The Structure of Objects [2008], 8.4.1) | |
A reaction: She says the relational ones are more popular, but I gather they all hit problems. See John Dupré on the hopelessness of the whole task. |
13284 | Should vernacular classifications ever be counted as natural kind terms? [Koslicki] |
Full Idea: It is controversial whether classificatory expressions from the vernacular should ever really be counted as genuine natural kind terms. | |
From: Kathrin Koslicki (The Structure of Objects [2008], 8.2) | |
A reaction: This is a similar confrontation between the folk and the scientific specialist as we find in folk psychology. There are good defences of folk psychology, and it looks plausible to defend the folk classifications as having priority. |
13286 | There are apparently no scientific laws concerning biological species [Koslicki] |
Full Idea: It has been observed that there are apparently no scientific laws concerning biological species. | |
From: Kathrin Koslicki (The Structure of Objects [2008], 8.4.1) | |
A reaction: The central concept of biology I take to be a 'mechanism'. and I suspect that this view of science is actually applicable in physics and chemistry, with so-called 'laws' being a merely superficial description of what is going on. |
23816 | Attention to a transcendent reality motivates a duty to foster the good of humanity [Weil] |
Full Idea: Anyone whose attention and love are directed towards the reality outside the world recognises that he is bound by the permanent obligation to remedy …all the privations of soul and body which are liable to destroy or damage any human being whatsoever. | |
From: Simone Weil (Draft Statement of Human Obligations [1943], p.225) | |
A reaction: [abridged] An interesting attempt to articulate the religious motivation of morality. The Euthyphro question remains - of why this vision of a wholly good higher morality should motivate anyone, unless they already possess a desire for that good. |