Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Explaining the A Priori', 'Sententia on 'Posterior Analytics'' and 'Difference and Repetition'

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7 ideas

1. Philosophy / H. Continental Philosophy / 1. Continental Philosophy

21901	'Difference' refers to that which eludes capture [Deleuze, by May]
	Full Idea: 'Difference' is a term which Deleuze uses to refer to that which eludes capture.
	From: report of Gilles Deleuze (Difference and Repetition [1968]) by Todd May - Gilles Deleuze 3.03
	A reaction: Presumably its ancestor is Kant's noumenon. This is one of his concepts used to 'palpate' our ossified conceptual scheme.

7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / a. Nature of Being

21902	'Being' is univocal, but its subject matter is actually 'difference' [Deleuze]
	Full Idea: Being is said in a single and same sense of everything of which it is said, but that of which it is said differs: it is said of difference itself.
	From: Gilles Deleuze (Difference and Repetition [1968], p.36), quoted by Todd May - Gilles Deleuze 3.03
	A reaction: This is an attempt to express the Heraclitean view of reality, as process, movement, multiplicity - something which always eludes our attempts to pin it down.

21908	Ontology can be continual creation, not to know being, but to probe the unknowable [Deleuze]
	Full Idea: Ontology can be an ontology of difference ....where what is there is not the same old things but a process of continual creation, an ontology that does not seek to reduce being to the knowable, but widens thought to palpate the unknowable.
	From: Gilles Deleuze (Difference and Repetition [1968]), quoted by Todd May - Gilles Deleuze 5.05
	A reaction: I'm inclined to think that the first duty of ontology is to face up to the knowable. I'm not sure that probing the unknowable, with no success or prospect of it, is a good way to spend a life. Probing ('palpating') can sometimes discover things.

7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / i. Deflating being

21903	Ontology does not tell what there is; it is just a strange adventure [Deleuze, by May]
	Full Idea: In Deleuze's hands ontology is not a matter of telling us what there is, but of taking us on strange adventures.
	From: report of Gilles Deleuze (Difference and Repetition [1968]) by Todd May - Gilles Deleuze 3.03
	A reaction: Presumably you only indulge in the strange adventure because you have no idea how to specify what there is. This sounds like the essence of post-modernism, in which life is just a game.

21904	Being is a problem to be engaged, not solved, and needs a new mode of thinking [Deleuze, by May]
	Full Idea: In Deleuze, Being is not a puzzle to be solved but a problem to be engaged. It is to be engaged by a thought that moves as comfortably among problems as it does among solutions, as fluidly among differences as it does among identities.
	From: report of Gilles Deleuze (Difference and Repetition [1968]) by Todd May - Gilles Deleuze 4.01
	A reaction: This sounds like what I've always known as 'negative capability' (thanks to Keats). Is philosophy just a hobby, like playing darts? It seems that the aim of the process is 'liberation', about which I would like to know more.

13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / a. Coherence as justification

22109	The fullest knowledge places a conclusion within an accurate theory [Aquinas, by Kretzmann/Stump]
	Full Idea: Having 'scientia' is the fullest possible human cognition, by which one situates the fact expressed by a conclusion in an explanatory theory that accurately maps metaphysical or physical reality.
	From: report of Thomas Aquinas (Sententia on 'Posterior Analytics' [1269], 1.2.9, 1.5.7) by Kretzmann/Stump - Aquinas, Thomas 11
	A reaction: That is a perfect statement of my concept of knowledge. Explanatory theories must specify the essential natures of the entities involved. We don't aim for 'knowledge', we aim for the 'fullest possible cognition'. This account extend's Aristotle's.

18. Thought / D. Concepts / 2. Origin of Concepts / a. Origin of concepts

17722	The concept 'red' is tied to what actually individuates red things [Peacocke]
	Full Idea: The possession conditions for the concept 'red' of the colour red are tied to those very conditions which individuate the colour red.
	From: Christopher Peacocke (Explaining the A Priori [2000], p.267), quoted by Carrie Jenkins - Grounding Concepts 2.5
	A reaction: Jenkins reports that he therefore argues that we can learn something about the word 'red' from thinking about the concept 'red', which is his new theory of the a priori. I find 'possession conditions' and 'individuation' to be very woolly concepts.