33 ideas
1848 | We are coerced into assent to a truth by reason's violence [Aquinas] |
Full Idea: We are coerced into assent to a truth by reason's violence. | |
From: Thomas Aquinas (Quaestiones Disputatae de Malo [1271], Q6.10) |
1858 | The mind is compelled by necessary truths, but not by contingent truths [Aquinas] |
Full Idea: Mind is compelled by necessary truths that can't be regarded as false, but not by contingent ones that might be false. | |
From: Thomas Aquinas (Quaestiones Disputatae de Malo [1271], Q6.h to 12) |
2098 | The principle of sufficient reason is needed if we are to proceed from maths to physics [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: In order to proceed from mathematics to physics the principle of sufficient reason is necessary, that nothing happens without there being a reason why it should be thus rather than otherwise. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Samuel Clarke [1716], §2) |
3646 | There is always a reason why things are thus rather than otherwise [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: Nothing happens without a sufficient reason why it should be thus rather than otherwise. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Samuel Clarke [1716], 3.2) |
2104 | No reason could limit the quantity of matter, so there is no limit [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: There is no possible reason which could limit the quantity of matter; therefore there cannot in fact be any such limitation. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Samuel Clarke [1716], 4.21) |
1852 | For the mind Good is one truth among many, and Truth is one good among many [Aquinas] |
Full Idea: Good itself as taken in by mind is one truth among others, and truth itself as goal of mind's activity is one good among others. | |
From: Thomas Aquinas (Quaestiones Disputatae de Malo [1271], Q6.reply) |
19385 | All simply substances are in harmony, because they all represent the one universe [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: All simple substances will always have a harmony among themselves, because they always represent the same universe. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Samuel Clarke [1716], V §91), quoted by Richard T.W. Arthur - Leibniz | |
A reaction: We can accept that the universe itself does not contain contradictions (how could it), but it is a leap of faith to say that all monads represent the universe well enough to avoid contradictions. Maps can contradict one another. |
21346 | The ratio between two lines can't be a feature of one, and cannot be in both [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: If the ratio of two lines L and M is conceived as abstracted from them both, without considering which is the subject and which the object, which will then be the subject? We cannot say both, for then we should have an accident in two subjects. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Samuel Clarke [1716], 5th Paper, §47), quoted by John Heil - Relations 'External' | |
A reaction: [compressed] Leibniz is rejecting external relations as having any status in ontology. It looks like a mistake (originating in Aristotle) to try to shoehorn the ontology of relations into the substance-properties framework. |
1860 | Knowledge may be based on senses, but we needn't sense all our knowledge [Aquinas] |
Full Idea: All our knowledge comes through our senses, but that doesn't mean that everything we know is sensed. | |
From: Thomas Aquinas (Quaestiones Disputatae de Malo [1271], Q6.h to 18) |
1855 | If we saw something as totally and utterly good, we would be compelled to will it [Aquinas] |
Full Idea: Something apprehended to be good and appropriate in any and every circumstance that could be thought of would compel us to will it. | |
From: Thomas Aquinas (Quaestiones Disputatae de Malo [1271], Q6.reply) |
1856 | Nothing can be willed except what is good, but good is very varied, and so choices are unpredictable [Aquinas] |
Full Idea: Nothing can be willed except good, but many and various things are good, and you can't conclude from this that wills are compelled to choose this or that one. | |
From: Thomas Aquinas (Quaestiones Disputatae de Malo [1271], Q6.h to 05) |
1862 | However habituated you are, given time to ponder you can go against a habit [Aquinas] |
Full Idea: However habituated you are, given time to ponder you can go against a habit. | |
From: Thomas Aquinas (Quaestiones Disputatae de Malo [1271], Q6.h to 24) |
1849 | Since will is a reasoning power, it can entertain opposites, so it is not compelled to embrace one of them [Aquinas] |
Full Idea: Reasoning powers can entertain opposite objects. Now will is a reasoning power, so will can entertain opposites and is not compelled to embrace one of them. | |
From: Thomas Aquinas (Quaestiones Disputatae de Malo [1271], Q6.x2) |
1861 | The will is not compelled to move, even if pleasant things are set before it [Aquinas] |
Full Idea: The will is not compelled to move, for it doesn't have to want the pleasant things set before it. | |
From: Thomas Aquinas (Quaestiones Disputatae de Malo [1271], Q6.h to 21) |
1853 | Because the will moves by examining alternatives, it doesn't compel itself to will [Aquinas] |
Full Idea: Because will moves itself by deliberation - a kind of investigation which doesn't prove some one way correct but examines the alternatives - will doesn't compel itself to will. | |
From: Thomas Aquinas (Quaestiones Disputatae de Malo [1271], Q6.reply) |
1854 | We must admit that when the will is not willing something, the first movement to will must come from outside the will [Aquinas] |
Full Idea: We are forced to admit that, in any will that is not always willing, the very first movement to will must come from outside, stimulating the will to start willing. | |
From: Thomas Aquinas (Quaestiones Disputatae de Malo [1271], Q6.reply) | |
A reaction: cf Nietzsche |
17722 | The concept 'red' is tied to what actually individuates red things [Peacocke] |
Full Idea: The possession conditions for the concept 'red' of the colour red are tied to those very conditions which individuate the colour red. | |
From: Christopher Peacocke (Explaining the A Priori [2000], p.267), quoted by Carrie Jenkins - Grounding Concepts 2.5 | |
A reaction: Jenkins reports that he therefore argues that we can learn something about the word 'red' from thinking about the concept 'red', which is his new theory of the a priori. I find 'possession conditions' and 'individuation' to be very woolly concepts. |
1847 | The will must aim at happiness, but can choose the means [Aquinas] |
Full Idea: The will is compelled by its ultimate goal (to achieve happiness), but not by the means to achieve it. | |
From: Thomas Aquinas (Quaestiones Disputatae de Malo [1271], Q6.07) |
1857 | We don't have to will even perfect good, because we can choose not to think of it [Aquinas] |
Full Idea: The will can avoid actually willing something by avoiding thinking of it, since mental activity is subject to will. In this respect we aren't compelled to will even total happiness, which is the only perfect good. | |
From: Thomas Aquinas (Quaestiones Disputatae de Malo [1271], Q6.h to 07) |
1846 | The will can only want what it thinks is good [Aquinas] |
Full Idea: Will's object is what is good, and so it cannot will anything but what is good. | |
From: Thomas Aquinas (Quaestiones Disputatae de Malo [1271], Q6.06) |
1850 | Without free will not only is ethical action meaningless, but also planning, commanding, praising and blaming [Aquinas] |
Full Idea: If we are not free to will in any way, but are compelled, everything that makes up ethics vanishes: pondering action, exhorting, commanding, punishing, praising, condemning. | |
From: Thomas Aquinas (Quaestiones Disputatae de Malo [1271], Q6.reply) | |
A reaction: If doesn't require some magical 'free will' to avoid compulsions. All that is needed is freedom to enact your own willing, rather than someone else's. |
1851 | Good applies to goals, just as truth applies to ideas in the mind [Aquinas] |
Full Idea: Good applies to all goals, just as truth applies to all forms mind takes in. | |
From: Thomas Aquinas (Quaestiones Disputatae de Malo [1271], Q6.reply) | |
A reaction: In danger of being tautological, if good is understood as no more than the goal of actions. It seems perfectly possibly to pursue a wicked end, and perhaps feel guilty about it. |
2106 | The only simple things are monads, with no parts or extension [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: According to me there is nothing simple except true monads, which have no parts and no extensions. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Samuel Clarke [1716], 5.24) |
2102 | Atomism is irrational because it suggests that two atoms can be indistinguishable [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: There are no two individuals indiscernible from one another - leaves, or drops of water, for example. This is an argument against atoms, which, like the void, are opposed to the principles of a true metaphysic. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Samuel Clarke [1716], 4.04) |
2105 | Things are infinitely subdivisible and contain new worlds, which atoms would make impossible [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: The least corpuscle is actually subdivided ad infinitum and contains a world of new created things, which this universe would lack if this corpuscle were an atom. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Samuel Clarke [1716], 4.PS) |
1859 | Even a sufficient cause doesn't compel its effect, because interference could interrupt the process [Aquinas] |
Full Idea: Even a sufficient cause doesn't always compel its effect, since it can sometimes be interfered with so that its effect doesn't happen | |
From: Thomas Aquinas (Quaestiones Disputatae de Malo [1271], Q6.h to 15) |
20965 | Leibniz upheld conservations of momentum and energy [Leibniz, by Papineau] |
Full Idea: In place of Descartes's conservation of 'quantity of motion', Leibniz upheld both the conservation of linear momentum and the conservation of kinetic energy. | |
From: report of Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Samuel Clarke [1716], 5th paper) by David Papineau - Thinking about Consciousness App 2 | |
A reaction: The point is that momentum involves velocity (which includes direction) rather than speed. Leibniz more or less invented the concept of 'energy' ('vis viva'). Papineau says these two leave no room for causation by mental substance. |
2103 | The idea that the universe could be moved forward with no other change is just a fantasy [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: To say that God could cause the universe to move forward in a straight line or otherwise without changing it in any other way is another fanciful supposition. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Samuel Clarke [1716], 4.14) |
2100 | Space and time are purely relative [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: I have more than once stated that I held space to be something purely relative, like time. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Samuel Clarke [1716], 3.4) |
2107 | No time exists except instants, and instants are not even a part of time, so time does not exist [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: How could a thing exist, no part of which ever exists? In the case of time, nothing exists but instants, and an instant is not even a part of time. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Samuel Clarke [1716], 5.49) |
2101 | If everything in the universe happened a year earlier, there would be no discernible difference [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: To ask why God did not make everything a year sooner would be reasonable if time were something apart from temporal things, but time is just the succession of things, which remains the same if the universe is created a year sooner. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Samuel Clarke [1716], 3.6) |
22894 | If time were absolute that would make God's existence dependent on it [Leibniz, by Bardon] |
Full Idea: Leibniz argues that if time is a thing in itself, and God is 'in' time, then God would be dependent for His existence on the existence of time. | |
From: report of Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Samuel Clarke [1716]) by Adrian Bardon - Brief History of the Philosophy of Time 3 'Newton' | |
A reaction: Hence Leibniz says time is merely relations between events. Not sure what he thinks an event is. What is God made of? Is there some divine matter upon which God's existence must depend? |
2099 | The existence of God, and all metaphysics, follows from the Principle of Sufficient Reason [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: By this principle alone, that there must be a sufficient reason why things are thus rather than otherwise, I prove the existence of the Divinity, and all the rest of metaphysics or natural theology. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Samuel Clarke [1716], §2) |