Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Explaining the A Priori', 'Has Philosophy Lost Contact with People?' and 'Minds, Brains and Science'

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6 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 3. Wisdom Deflated

9764	Inspiration and social improvement need wisdom, but not professional philosophy [Quine]
	Full Idea: Professional philosophers have no peculiar fitness for inspirational and edifying writing, or helping to get society on an even keel (though we should do what we can). Wisdom may fulfil these crying needs: 'sophia' yes, but 'philosophia' not necessarily.
	From: Willard Quine (Has Philosophy Lost Contact with People? [1979], p.193)
	A reaction: This rather startlingly says that philosophy is unlikely to lead to wisdom, which is rather odd when it is defined as love of that very thing. Does love of horticulture lead to good gardening. I can't agree. Philosophy is the best hope of 'sophia'.

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 6. Hopes for Philosophy

9763	For a good theory of the world, we must focus on our flabby foundational vocabulary [Quine]
	Full Idea: Our traditional introspective notions - of meaning, idea, concept, essence, all undisciplined and undefined - afford a hopelessly flabby and unmanageable foundation for a theory of the world. Control is gained by focusing on words.
	From: Willard Quine (Has Philosophy Lost Contact with People? [1979], p.192)
	A reaction: A very nice statement of the aim of modern language-centred philosophy, though the task offered appears to be that of an under-labourer, when the real target, even according to Quine, is supposed to be a 'theory of the world'.

17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 7. Chinese Room

2427	Maybe understanding doesn't need consciousness, despite what Searle seems to think [Searle, by Chalmers]
	Full Idea: Searle originally directed the Chinese Room against machine intentionality rather than consciousness, arguing that it is "understanding" that the room lacks,….but on Searle's view intentionality requires consciousness.
	From: report of John Searle (Minds, Brains and Science [1984]) by David J.Chalmers - The Conscious Mind 4.9.4
	A reaction: I doubt whether 'understanding' is a sufficiently clear and distinct concept to support Searle's claim. Understanding comes in degrees, and we often think and act with minimal understanding.

7389	A program won't contain understanding if it is small enough to imagine [Dennett on Searle]
	Full Idea: There is nothing remotely like genuine understanding in any hunk of programming small enough to imagine readily.
	From: comment on John Searle (Minds, Brains and Science [1984]) by Daniel C. Dennett - Consciousness Explained 14.1
	A reaction: We mustn't hide behind 'complexity', but I think Dennett is right. It is important to think of speed as well as complexity. Searle gives the impression that he knows exactly what 'understanding' is, but I doubt if anyone else does.

7390	If bigger and bigger brain parts can't understand, how can a whole brain? [Dennett on Searle]
	Full Idea: The argument that begins "this little bit of brain activity doesn't understand Chinese, and neither does this bigger bit..." is headed for the unwanted conclusion that even the activity of the whole brain won't account for understanding Chinese.
	From: comment on John Searle (Minds, Brains and Science [1984]) by Daniel C. Dennett - Consciousness Explained 14.1
	A reaction: In other words, Searle is guilty of a fallacy of composition (in negative form - parts don't have it, so whole can't have it). Dennett is right. The whole shebang of the full brain will obviously do wonderful (and commonplace) things brain bits can't.

18. Thought / D. Concepts / 2. Origin of Concepts / a. Origin of concepts

17722	The concept 'red' is tied to what actually individuates red things [Peacocke]
	Full Idea: The possession conditions for the concept 'red' of the colour red are tied to those very conditions which individuate the colour red.
	From: Christopher Peacocke (Explaining the A Priori [2000], p.267), quoted by Carrie Jenkins - Grounding Concepts 2.5
	A reaction: Jenkins reports that he therefore argues that we can learn something about the word 'red' from thinking about the concept 'red', which is his new theory of the a priori. I find 'possession conditions' and 'individuation' to be very woolly concepts.