12 ideas
12219 | Whether a modal claim is true depends on how the object is described [Quine, by Fine,K] |
Full Idea: Quine says if ∃x□(x>7) makes sense, then for which object x is the condition rendered true? Specify it as '9' and it is apparently rendered true, specify it as 'the number of planets' and it is apparently rendered false. | |
From: report of Willard Quine (Three Grades of Modal Involvement [1953]) by Kit Fine - Quine on Quantifying In p.105 | |
A reaction: This is normally characterised as Quine saying that only de dicto involvement is possible, and not de re involvement. Or that that all essences are nominal, and cannot be real. |
10922 | Objects are the values of variables, so a referentially opaque context cannot be quantified into [Quine] |
Full Idea: The objects of a theory are not properly describable as the things named by the singular terms; they are the values, rather, of the variables of quantification. ..So a referentially opaque context is one that cannot properly be quantified into. | |
From: Willard Quine (Three Grades of Modal Involvement [1953], p.174) | |
A reaction: The point being that you cannot accurately pick out the objects in the domain |
10923 | Aristotelian essentialism says a thing has some necessary and some non-necessary properties [Quine] |
Full Idea: What Aristotelian essentialism says is that you can have open sentences Fx and Gx, such that ∃x(nec Fx.Gx.Źnec Gx). For example, ∃x(nec(x>5). there are just x planets. Źnec(there are just x planets)). | |
From: Willard Quine (Three Grades of Modal Involvement [1953], p.176) | |
A reaction: This is a denial of 'maximal essentialism', that all of a things properties might be essential. Quine is thus denying necessity, except under a description. He may be equivocating over the reference of 'there are just 9 planets'. |
10921 | Necessity can attach to statement-names, to statements, and to open sentences [Quine] |
Full Idea: Three degrees necessity in logic or semantics: first and least is attaching a semantical predicate to the names of statements (as Nec '9>5'); second and more drastic attaches to statements themselves; third and gravest attaches to open sentences. | |
From: Willard Quine (Three Grades of Modal Involvement [1953], p.158) |
10924 | Necessity is in the way in which we say things, and not things themselves [Quine] |
Full Idea: Necessity resides in the way in which we say things, and not in the things we talk about. | |
From: Willard Quine (Three Grades of Modal Involvement [1953], p.176) | |
A reaction: This is a culminating idea of Quine's thoroughgoing empiricism, as filtered through logical positivism. I would hardly dare to accuse Quine of a use/mention confusion (his own bęte noir), but one seems to me to be lurking here. |
12608 | Concepts are distinguished by roles in judgement, and are thus tied to rationality [Peacocke] |
Full Idea: 'Concept' is a notion tied, in the classical Fregean manner, to cognitive significance. Concepts are distinct if we can judge rationally of one, without the other. Concepts are constitutively and definitionally tied to rationality in this way. | |
From: Christopher Peacocke (Truly Understood [2008], 2.2) | |
A reaction: It seems to a bit optimistic to say, more or less, that thinking is impossible if it isn't rational. Rational beings have been selected for. As Quine nicely observed, duffers at induction have all been weeded out - but they may have existed, briefly. |
3115 | Are meaning and expressed concept the same thing? [Burge, by Segal] |
Full Idea: It is Burge's view that what a word means should be distinguished from the concept it expresses. | |
From: report of Tyler Burge (Frege on Extensions from Concepts [1984]) by Gabriel M.A. Segal - A Slim Book about Narrow Content 3.2 | |
A reaction: Presumably the immediate meaning (e.g. of 'arthritis') is socially determined, while the concept is fixed by history? Or what? |
12605 | A sense is individuated by the conditions for reference [Peacocke] |
Full Idea: My basic Fregean idea is that a sense is individuated by the fundamental condition for something to be its reference. | |
From: Christopher Peacocke (Truly Understood [2008], Intro) | |
A reaction: For something to actually be its reference (as opposed to imagined reference), truth must be involved. This needs the post-1891 Frege view of such things, and not just the view of concepts as functions which he started with. |
12607 | Fregean concepts have their essence fixed by reference-conditions [Peacocke] |
Full Idea: The Fregean view is that the essence of a concept is given by the fundamental condition for something to be its reference. | |
From: Christopher Peacocke (Truly Understood [2008], 2.1) | |
A reaction: Peacocke is a supporter of the Fregean view. How does this work for concepts of odd creatures in a fantasy novel? Or for mistaken or confused concepts? For Burge's 'arthritis in my thigh'? I don't reject the Fregean view. |
12609 | Concepts have distinctive reasons and norms [Peacocke] |
Full Idea: For each concept, there will be some reasons or norms distinctive of that concept. | |
From: Christopher Peacocke (Truly Understood [2008], 2.3) | |
A reaction: This is Peacocke's bold Fregean thesis (and it sounds rather Kantian to me). I dislike the word 'norms' (long story), but reasons are interesting. The trouble is the distinction between being a reason for something (its cause) and being a reason for me. |
12604 | Any explanation of a concept must involve reference and truth [Peacocke] |
Full Idea: For some particular concept, we can argue that some of its distinctive features are adequately explained only by a possession-condition that involves reference and truth essentially. | |
From: Christopher Peacocke (Truly Understood [2008], Intro) | |
A reaction: He reached this view via the earlier assertion that it is the role in judgement which key to understanding concepts. I like any view of such things which says that truth plays a role. |
12610 | Encountering novel sentences shows conclusively that meaning must be compositional [Peacocke] |
Full Idea: The phenomenon of understanding sentences one has never encountered before is decisive against theories of meaning which do not proceed compositionally. | |
From: Christopher Peacocke (Truly Understood [2008], 4.3) | |
A reaction: I agree entirely. It seems obvious, as soon as you begin to slowly construct a long and unusual sentence, and follow the mental processes of the listener. |