142 ideas
9199 | Wisdom for one instant is as good as wisdom for eternity [Chrysippus] |
Full Idea: If a person has wisdom for one instant, he is no less happy than he who possesses it for eternity. | |
From: Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]), quoted by Pierre Hadot - Philosophy as a way of life 8 | |
A reaction: [Hadot quotes Plutarch 'On Common Conceptions' 8,1062a] This makes it sound awfully like some sort of Buddhist 'enlightenment', which strikes like lightning. He does wisdom recognise itself - by a warm glow, or by the cautious thought that got you there? |
20853 | Wise men should try to participate in politics, since they are a good influence [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: The wise man will participate in politics unless something prevents him, for he will restrain vice and promote virtue. | |
From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 07.121 | |
A reaction: [from lost On Ways of Life Bk 1] We have made modern politics so hostile for its participants, thanks to cruel media pressure, that the best people now run a mile from it. Disastrous. |
20772 | Three branches of philosophy: first logic, second ethics, third physics (which ends with theology) [Chrysippus] |
Full Idea: There are three kinds of philosophical theorems, logical, ethical, and physical; of these the logic should be placed first, ethics second, and physics third (and theology is the final topic in physics). | |
From: Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]), quoted by Plutarch - 70: Stoic Self-contradictions 1035a | |
A reaction: [in his lost 'On Lives' Bk 4] 'Theology is the final topic in physics'! That should create a stir in theology departments. Is this an order of study, or of importance? You come to theology right at the end of your studies. |
5969 | Chrysippus said the uncaused is non-existent [Chrysippus, by Plutarch] |
Full Idea: Chrysippus said that the uncaused is altogether non-existent. | |
From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Plutarch - 70: Stoic Self-contradictions 1045c | |
A reaction: The difficulty is to see what empirical basis there can be for such a claim, or what argument of any kind other than an intuition. Induction is the obvious answer, but Hume teaches us scepticism about any claim that 'there can be no exceptions'. |
21388 | The causes of future true events must exist now, so they will happen because of destiny [Chrysippus, by Cicero] |
Full Idea: True future events cannot be such as do not possess causes on account of which they will happen; therefore that which is true must possess causes: and so, when the [true future events] happen they will have happened as a result of destiny. | |
From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by M. Tullius Cicero - On Fate ('De fato') 9.23-8 | |
A reaction: [exact ref unclear] Presumably the current causes are the truthmakers for the future events, and so the past is the truthmaker of the future, if you are a determinist. |
20780 | Graspable presentations are criteria of facts, and are molded according to their objects [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Of presentations, some are graspable, some non-graspable. The graspable presentation, which they say is the criterion of facts [pragmata], is that which comes from an existing object and is stamped and molded in accordance wth the existing object itself. | |
From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 07.46 | |
A reaction: [in lost Physics Bk 2] The big modern anguish over truth-as-correspondence is how you are supposed to verify the 'accordance'. This idea seems to blur the ideas of truth and justification (the 'criterion'), and you can't have both as accordance. |
20793 | How could you ever know that the presentation is similar to the object? [Sext.Empiricus on Chrysippus] |
Full Idea: One cannot say that the soul grasps the externally existing objects by means of the states of the senses on the basis of the similarity of these states to the externally existing objects. For on what basis will it know the similarity? | |
From: comment on Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Sextus Empiricus - Outlines of Pyrrhonism 2.74 | |
A reaction: This exactly the main modern reason for rejecting the correspondence theory of truth. You are welcome to affirm a robust view of truth, but supporting it by claiming a correspondence or resemblance is dubious. |
13439 | Venn Diagrams map three predicates into eight compartments, then look for the conclusion [Bostock] |
Full Idea: Venn Diagrams are a traditional method to test validity of syllogisms. There are three interlocking circles, one for each predicate, thus dividing the universe into eight possible basic elementary quantifications. Is the conclusion in a compartment? | |
From: David Bostock (Intermediate Logic [1997], 3.8) |
8077 | Stoic propositional logic is like chemistry - how atoms make molecules, not the innards of atoms [Chrysippus, by Devlin] |
Full Idea: In Stoic logic propositions are treated the way atoms are treated in present-day chemistry, where the focus is on the way atoms fit together to form molecules, rather than on the internal structure of the atoms. | |
From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Keith Devlin - Goodbye Descartes Ch.2 | |
A reaction: A nice analogy to explain the nature of Propositional Logic, which was invented by the Stoics (N.B. after Aristotle had invented predicate logic). |
13422 | 'Conjunctive Normal Form' is ensuring that no disjunction has a conjunction within its scope [Bostock] |
Full Idea: 'Conjunctive Normal Form' (CNF) is rearranging the occurrences of ∧ and ∨ so that no disjunction sign has any conjunction in its scope. This is achieved by applying two of the distribution laws. | |
From: David Bostock (Intermediate Logic [1997], 2.6) |
13421 | 'Disjunctive Normal Form' is ensuring that no conjunction has a disjunction within its scope [Bostock] |
Full Idea: 'Disjunctive Normal Form' (DNF) is rearranging the occurrences of ∧ and ∨ so that no conjunction sign has any disjunction in its scope. This is achieved by applying two of the distribution laws. | |
From: David Bostock (Intermediate Logic [1997], 2.6) |
13355 | 'Disjunction' says that Γ,φ∨ψ|= iff Γ,φ|= and Γ,ψ|= [Bostock] |
Full Idea: The Principle of Disjunction says that Γ,φ∨ψ |= iff Γ,φ |= and Γ,ψ |=. | |
From: David Bostock (Intermediate Logic [1997], 2.5.G) | |
A reaction: That is, a disjunction leads to a contradiction if they each separately lead to contradictions. |
13356 | The 'conditional' is that Γ|=φ→ψ iff Γ,φ|=ψ [Bostock] |
Full Idea: The Conditional Principle says that Γ |= φ→ψ iff Γ,φ |= ψ. With the addition of negation, this implies φ,φ→ψ |= ψ, which is 'modus ponens'. | |
From: David Bostock (Intermediate Logic [1997], 2.5.H) | |
A reaction: [Second half is in Ex. 2.5.4] |
13350 | 'Assumptions' says that a formula entails itself (φ|=φ) [Bostock] |
Full Idea: The Principle of Assumptions says that any formula entails itself, i.e. φ |= φ. The principle depends just upon the fact that no interpretation assigns both T and F to the same formula. | |
From: David Bostock (Intermediate Logic [1997], 2.5.A) | |
A reaction: Thus one can introduce φ |= φ into any proof, and then use it to build more complex sequents needed to attain a particular target formula. Bostock's principle is more general than anything in Lemmon. |
13351 | 'Thinning' allows that if premisses entail a conclusion, then adding further premisses makes no difference [Bostock] |
Full Idea: The Principle of Thinning says that if a set of premisses entails a conclusion, then adding further premisses will still entail the conclusion. It is 'thinning' because it makes a weaker claim. If γ|=φ then γ,ψ|= φ. | |
From: David Bostock (Intermediate Logic [1997], 2.5.B) | |
A reaction: It is also called 'premise-packing'. It is the characteristic of a 'monotonic' logic - where once something is proved, it stays proved, whatever else is introduced. |
13352 | 'Cutting' allows that if x is proved, and adding y then proves z, you can go straight to z [Bostock] |
Full Idea: The Principle of Cutting is the general point that entailment is transitive, extending this to cover entailments with more than one premiss. Thus if γ |= φ and φ,Δ |= ψ then γ,Δ |= ψ. Here φ has been 'cut out'. | |
From: David Bostock (Intermediate Logic [1997], 2.5.C) | |
A reaction: It might be called the Principle of Shortcutting, since you can get straight to the last conclusion, eliminating the intermediate step. |
13353 | 'Negation' says that Γ,¬φ|= iff Γ|=φ [Bostock] |
Full Idea: The Principle of Negation says that Γ,¬φ |= iff Γ |= φ. We also say that φ,¬φ |=, and hence by 'thinning on the right' that φ,¬φ |= ψ, which is 'ex falso quodlibet'. | |
From: David Bostock (Intermediate Logic [1997], 2.5.E) | |
A reaction: That is, roughly, if the formula gives consistency, the negation gives contradiction. 'Ex falso' says that anything will follow from a contradiction. |
13354 | 'Conjunction' says that Γ|=φ∧ψ iff Γ|=φ and Γ|=ψ [Bostock] |
Full Idea: The Principle of Conjunction says that Γ |= φ∧ψ iff Γ |= φ and Γ |= ψ. This implies φ,ψ |= φ∧ψ, which is ∧-introduction. It is also implies ∧-elimination. | |
From: David Bostock (Intermediate Logic [1997], 2.5.F) | |
A reaction: [Second half is Ex. 2.5.3] That is, if they are entailed separately, they are entailed as a unit. It is a moot point whether these principles are theorems of propositional logic, or derivation rules. |
20791 | Chrysippus has five obvious 'indemonstrables' of reasoning [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Chrysippus has five indemonstrables that do not need demonstration:1) If 1st the 2nd, but 1st, so 2nd; 2) If 1st the 2nd, but not 2nd, so not 1st; 3) Not 1st and 2nd, the 1st, so not 2nd; 4) 1st or 2nd, the 1st, so not 2nd; 5) 1st or 2nd, not 2nd, so 1st. | |
From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 07.80-81 | |
A reaction: [from his lost text 'Dialectics'; squashed to fit into one quote] 1) is Modus Ponens, 2) is Modus Tollens. 4) and 5) are Disjunctive Syllogisms. 3) seems a bit complex to be an indemonstrable. |
13610 | A logic with ¬ and → needs three axiom-schemas and one rule as foundation [Bostock] |
Full Idea: For ¬,→ Schemas: (A1) |-φ→(ψ→φ), (A2) |-(φ→(ψ→ξ)) → ((φ→ψ)→(φ→ξ)), (A3) |-(¬φ→¬ψ) → (ψ→φ), Rule:DET:|-φ,|-φ→ψ then |-ψ | |
From: David Bostock (Intermediate Logic [1997], 5.2) | |
A reaction: A1 says everything implies a truth, A2 is conditional proof, and A3 is contraposition. DET is modus ponens. This is Bostock's compact near-minimal axiom system for proposition logic. He adds two axioms and another rule for predicate logic. |
13846 | A 'free' logic can have empty names, and a 'universally free' logic can have empty domains [Bostock] |
Full Idea: A 'free' logic is one in which names are permitted to be empty. A 'universally free' logic is one in which the domain of an interpretation may also be empty. | |
From: David Bostock (Intermediate Logic [1997], 8.6) |
13346 | Truth is the basic notion in classical logic [Bostock] |
Full Idea: The most fundamental notion in classical logic is that of truth. | |
From: David Bostock (Intermediate Logic [1997], 1.1) | |
A reaction: The opening sentence of his book. Hence the first half of the book is about semantics, and only the second half deals with proof. Compare Idea 10282. The thought seems to be that you could leave out truth, but that makes logic pointless. |
13545 | Elementary logic cannot distinguish clearly between the finite and the infinite [Bostock] |
Full Idea: In very general terms, we cannot express the distinction between what is finite and what is infinite without moving essentially beyond the resources available in elementary logic. | |
From: David Bostock (Intermediate Logic [1997], 4.8) | |
A reaction: This observation concludes a discussion of Compactness in logic. |
13822 | Fictional characters wreck elementary logic, as they have contradictions and no excluded middle [Bostock] |
Full Idea: Discourse about fictional characters leads to a breakdown of elementary logic. We accept P or ¬P if the relevant story says so, but P∨¬P will not be true if the relevant story says nothing either way, and P∧¬P is true if the story is inconsistent. | |
From: David Bostock (Intermediate Logic [1997], 8.5) | |
A reaction: I really like this. Does one need to invent a completely new logic for fictional characters? Or must their logic be intuitionist, or paraconsistent, or both? |
13623 | The syntactic turnstile |- φ means 'there is a proof of φ' or 'φ is a theorem' [Bostock] |
Full Idea: The syntactic turnstile |- φ means 'There is a proof of φ' (in the system currently being considered). Another way of saying the same thing is 'φ is a theorem'. | |
From: David Bostock (Intermediate Logic [1997], 5.1) |
13349 | Γ|=φ is 'entails'; Γ|= is 'is inconsistent'; |=φ is 'valid' [Bostock] |
Full Idea: If we write Γ |= φ, with one formula to the right, then the turnstile abbreviates 'entails'. For a sequent of the form Γ |= it can be read as 'is inconsistent'. For |= φ we read it as 'valid'. | |
From: David Bostock (Intermediate Logic [1997], 1.3) |
13347 | Validity is a conclusion following for premises, even if there is no proof [Bostock] |
Full Idea: The classical definition of validity counts an argument as valid if and only if the conclusion does in fact follow from the premises, whether or not the argument contains any demonstration of this fact. | |
From: David Bostock (Intermediate Logic [1997], 1.2) | |
A reaction: Hence validity is given by |= rather than by |-. A common example is 'it is red so it is coloured', which seems true but beyond proof. In the absence of formal proof, you wonder whether validity is merely a psychological notion. |
13348 | It seems more natural to express |= as 'therefore', rather than 'entails' [Bostock] |
Full Idea: In practice we avoid quotation marks and explicitly set-theoretic notation that explaining |= as 'entails' appears to demand. Hence it seems more natural to explain |= as simply representing the word 'therefore'. | |
From: David Bostock (Intermediate Logic [1997], 1.3) | |
A reaction: Not sure I quite understand that, but I have trained myself to say 'therefore' for the generic use of |=. In other consequences it seems better to read it as 'semantic consequence', to distinguish it from |-. |
8078 | Modus ponens is one of five inference rules identified by the Stoics [Chrysippus, by Devlin] |
Full Idea: Modus ponens is just one of the five different inference rules identified by the Stoics. | |
From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Keith Devlin - Goodbye Descartes Ch.2 | |
A reaction: Modus ponens strikes me as being more like a definition of implication than a 'rule'. Implication is what gets you from one truth to another. All the implications of a truth must also be true. |
13617 | MPP is a converse of Deduction: If Γ |- φ→ψ then Γ,φ|-ψ [Bostock] |
Full Idea: Modus Ponens is equivalent to the converse of the Deduction Theorem, namely 'If Γ |- φ→ψ then Γ,φ|-ψ'. | |
From: David Bostock (Intermediate Logic [1997], 5.3) | |
A reaction: See 13615 for details of the Deduction Theorem. See 13614 for Modus Ponens. |
13614 | MPP: 'If Γ|=φ and Γ|=φ→ψ then Γ|=ψ' (omit Γs for Detachment) [Bostock] |
Full Idea: The Rule of Detachment is a version of Modus Ponens, and says 'If |=φ and |=φ→ψ then |=ψ'. This has no assumptions. Modus Ponens is the more general rule that 'If Γ|=φ and Γ|=φ→ψ then Γ|=ψ'. | |
From: David Bostock (Intermediate Logic [1997], 5.3) | |
A reaction: Modus Ponens is actually designed for use in proof based on assumptions (which isn't always the case). In Detachment the formulae are just valid, without dependence on assumptions to support them. |
6023 | Every proposition is either true or false [Chrysippus, by Cicero] |
Full Idea: We hold fast to the position, defended by Chrysippus, that every proposition is either true or false. | |
From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by M. Tullius Cicero - On Fate ('De fato') 38 | |
A reaction: I am intrigued to know exactly how you defend this claim. It may depend what you mean by a proposition. A badly expressed proposition may have indeterminate truth, quite apart from the vague, the undecidable etc. |
13799 | The sign '=' is a two-place predicate expressing that 'a is the same thing as b' (a=b) [Bostock] |
Full Idea: We shall use 'a=b' as short for 'a is the same thing as b'. The sign '=' thus expresses a particular two-place predicate. Officially we will use 'I' as the identity predicate, so that 'Iab' is as formula, but we normally 'abbreviate' this to 'a=b'. | |
From: David Bostock (Intermediate Logic [1997], 8.1) |
13800 | |= α=α and α=β |= φ(α/ξ ↔ φ(β/ξ) fix identity [Bostock] |
Full Idea: We usually take these two principles together as the basic principles of identity: |= α=α and α=β |= φ(α/ξ) ↔ φ(β/ξ). The second (with scant regard for history) is known as Leibniz's Law. | |
From: David Bostock (Intermediate Logic [1997], 8.1) |
13803 | If we are to express that there at least two things, we need identity [Bostock] |
Full Idea: To say that there is at least one thing x such that Fx we need only use an existential quantifier, but to say that there are at least two things we need identity as well. | |
From: David Bostock (Intermediate Logic [1997], 8.1) | |
A reaction: The only clear account I've found of why logic may need to be 'with identity'. Without it, you can only reason about one thing or all things. Presumably plural quantification no longer requires '='? |
13357 | Truth-functors are usually held to be defined by their truth-tables [Bostock] |
Full Idea: The usual view of the meaning of truth-functors is that each is defined by its own truth-table, independently of any other truth-functor. | |
From: David Bostock (Intermediate Logic [1997], 2.7) |
13811 | A 'total' function ranges over the whole domain, a 'partial' function over appropriate inputs [Bostock] |
Full Idea: Usually we allow that a function is defined for arguments of a suitable kind (a 'partial' function), but we can say that each function has one value for any object whatever, from the whole domain that our quantifiers range over (a 'total' function). | |
From: David Bostock (Intermediate Logic [1997], 8.2) | |
A reaction: He points out (p.338) that 'the father of..' is a functional expression, but it wouldn't normally take stones as input, so seems to be a partial function. But then it doesn't even take all male humans either. It only takes fathers! |
13812 | A 'zero-place' function just has a single value, so it is a name [Bostock] |
Full Idea: We can talk of a 'zero-place' function, which is a new-fangled name for a familiar item; it just has a single value, and so it has the same role as a name. | |
From: David Bostock (Intermediate Logic [1997], 8.2) |
13360 | In logic, a name is just any expression which refers to a particular single object [Bostock] |
Full Idea: The important thing about a name, for logical purposes, is that it is used to make a singular reference to a particular object; ..we say that any expression too may be counted as a name, for our purposes, it it too performs the same job. | |
From: David Bostock (Intermediate Logic [1997], 3.1) | |
A reaction: He cites definite descriptions as the most notoriously difficult case, in deciding whether or not they function as names. I takes it as pretty obvious that sometimes they do and sometimes they don't (in ordinary usage). |
13361 | An expression is only a name if it succeeds in referring to a real object [Bostock] |
Full Idea: An expression is not counted as a name unless it succeeds in referring to an object, i.e. unless there really is an object to which it refers. | |
From: David Bostock (Intermediate Logic [1997], 3.1) | |
A reaction: His 'i.e.' makes the existence condition sound sufficient, but in ordinary language you don't succeed in referring to 'that man over there' just because he exists. In modal contexts we presumably refer to hypothetical objects (pace Lewis). |
13813 | Definite descriptions don't always pick out one thing, as in denials of existence, or errors [Bostock] |
Full Idea: It is natural to suppose one only uses a definite description when one believes it describes only one thing, but exceptions are 'there is no such thing as the greatest prime number', or saying something false where the reference doesn't occur. | |
From: David Bostock (Intermediate Logic [1997], 8.3) |
13814 | Definite desciptions resemble names, but can't actually be names, if they don't always refer [Bostock] |
Full Idea: Although a definite description looks like a complex name, and in many ways behaves like a name, still it cannot be a name if names must always refer to objects. Russell gave the first proposal for handling such expressions. | |
From: David Bostock (Intermediate Logic [1997], 8.3) | |
A reaction: I take the simple solution to be a pragmatic one, as roughly shown by Donnellan, that sometimes they are used exactly like names, and sometimes as something else. The same phrase can have both roles. Confusing for logicians. Tough. |
13816 | Because of scope problems, definite descriptions are best treated as quantifiers [Bostock] |
Full Idea: Because of the scope problem, it now seems better to 'parse' definition descriptions not as names but as quantifiers. 'The' is to be treated in the same category as acknowledged quantifiers like 'all' and 'some'. We write Ix - 'for the x such that..'. | |
From: David Bostock (Intermediate Logic [1997], 8.3) | |
A reaction: This seems intuitively rather good, since quantification in normal speech is much more sophisticated than the crude quantification of classical logic. But the fact is that they often function as names (but see Idea 13817). |
13817 | Definite descriptions are usually treated like names, and are just like them if they uniquely refer [Bostock] |
Full Idea: In practice, definite descriptions are for the most part treated as names, since this is by far the most convenient notation (even though they have scope). ..When a description is uniquely satisfied then it does behave like a name. | |
From: David Bostock (Intermediate Logic [1997], 8.3) | |
A reaction: Apparent names themselves have problems when they wander away from uniquely picking out one thing, as in 'John Doe'. |
13848 | We are only obliged to treat definite descriptions as non-names if only the former have scope [Bostock] |
Full Idea: If it is really true that definite descriptions have scopes whereas names do not, then Russell must be right to claim that definite descriptions are not names. If, however, this is not true, then it does no harm to treat descriptions as complex names. | |
From: David Bostock (Intermediate Logic [1997], 8.8) |
13815 | Names do not have scope problems (e.g. in placing negation), but Russell's account does have that problem [Bostock] |
Full Idea: In orthodox logic names are not regarded as having scope (for example, in where a negation is placed), whereas on Russell's theory definite descriptions certainly do. Russell had his own way of dealing with this. | |
From: David Bostock (Intermediate Logic [1997], 8.3) |
13438 | 'Prenex normal form' is all quantifiers at the beginning, out of the scope of truth-functors [Bostock] |
Full Idea: A formula is said to be in 'prenex normal form' (PNF) iff all its quantifiers occur in a block at the beginning, so that no quantifier is in the scope of any truth-functor. | |
From: David Bostock (Intermediate Logic [1997], 3.7) | |
A reaction: Bostock provides six equivalences which can be applied to manouevre any formula into prenex normal form. He proves that every formula can be arranged in PNF. |
13818 | If we allow empty domains, we must allow empty names [Bostock] |
Full Idea: We can show that if empty domains are permitted, then empty names must be permitted too. | |
From: David Bostock (Intermediate Logic [1997], 8.4) |
13801 | An 'informal proof' is in no particular system, and uses obvious steps and some ordinary English [Bostock] |
Full Idea: An 'informal proof' is not in any particular proof system. One may use any rule of proof that is 'sufficiently obvious', and there is quite a lot of ordinary English in the proof, explaining what is going on at each step. | |
From: David Bostock (Intermediate Logic [1997], 8.1) |
13619 | Quantification adds two axiom-schemas and a new rule [Bostock] |
Full Idea: New axiom-schemas for quantifiers: (A4) |-∀ξφ → φ(α/ξ), (A5) |-∀ξ(ψ→φ) → (ψ→∀ξφ), plus the rule GEN: If |-φ the |-∀ξφ(ξ/α). | |
From: David Bostock (Intermediate Logic [1997], 5.6) | |
A reaction: This follows on from Idea 13610, where he laid out his three axioms and one rule for propositional (truth-functional) logic. This Idea plus 13610 make Bostock's proposed axiomatisation of first-order logic. |
13622 | Axiom systems from Frege, Russell, Church, Lukasiewicz, Tarski, Nicod, Kleene, Quine... [Bostock] |
Full Idea: Notably axiomatisations of first-order logic are by Frege (1879), Russell and Whitehead (1910), Church (1956), Lukasiewicz and Tarski (1930), Lukasiewicz (1936), Nicod (1917), Kleene (1952) and Quine (1951). Also Bostock (1997). | |
From: David Bostock (Intermediate Logic [1997], 5.8) | |
A reaction: My summary, from Bostock's appendix 5.8, which gives details of all of these nine systems. This nicely illustrates the status and nature of axiom systems, which have lost the absolute status they seemed to have in Euclid. |
13615 | 'Conditonalised' inferences point to the Deduction Theorem: If Γ,φ|-ψ then Γ|-φ→ψ [Bostock] |
Full Idea: If a group of formulae prove a conclusion, we can 'conditionalize' this into a chain of separate inferences, which leads to the Deduction Theorem (or Conditional Proof), that 'If Γ,φ|-ψ then Γ|-φ→ψ'. | |
From: David Bostock (Intermediate Logic [1997], 5.3) | |
A reaction: This is the rule CP (Conditional Proof) which can be found in the rules for propositional logic I transcribed from Lemmon's book. |
13620 | Proof by Assumptions can always be reduced to Proof by Axioms, using the Deduction Theorem [Bostock] |
Full Idea: By repeated transformations using the Deduction Theorem, any proof from assumptions can be transformed into a fully conditionalized proof, which is then an axiomatic proof. | |
From: David Bostock (Intermediate Logic [1997], 5.6) | |
A reaction: Since proof using assumptions is perhaps the most standard proof system (e.g. used in Lemmon, for many years the standard book at Oxford University), the Deduction Theorem is crucial for giving it solid foundations. |
13621 | The Deduction Theorem and Reductio can 'discharge' assumptions - they aren't needed for the new truth [Bostock] |
Full Idea: Like the Deduction Theorem, one form of Reductio ad Absurdum (If Γ,φ|-[absurdity] then Γ|-¬φ) 'discharges' an assumption. Assume φ and obtain a contradiction, then we know ¬&phi, without assuming φ. | |
From: David Bostock (Intermediate Logic [1997], 5.7) | |
A reaction: Thus proofs from assumption either arrive at conditional truths, or at truths that are true irrespective of what was initially assumed. |
13616 | The Deduction Theorem greatly simplifies the search for proof [Bostock] |
Full Idea: Use of the Deduction Theorem greatly simplifies the search for proof (or more strictly, the task of showing that there is a proof). | |
From: David Bostock (Intermediate Logic [1997], 5.3) | |
A reaction: See 13615 for details of the Deduction Theorem. Bostock is referring to axiomatic proof, where it can be quite hard to decide which axioms are relevant. The Deduction Theorem enables the making of assumptions. |
13753 | Natural deduction takes proof from assumptions (with its rules) as basic, and axioms play no part [Bostock] |
Full Idea: Natural deduction takes the notion of proof from assumptions as a basic notion, ...so it will use rules for use in proofs from assumptions, and axioms (as traditionally understood) will have no role to play. | |
From: David Bostock (Intermediate Logic [1997], 6.1) | |
A reaction: The main rules are those for introduction and elimination of truth functors. |
13755 | Excluded middle is an introduction rule for negation, and ex falso quodlibet will eliminate it [Bostock] |
Full Idea: Many books take RAA (reductio) and DNE (double neg) as the natural deduction introduction- and elimination-rules for negation, but RAA is not a natural introduction rule. I prefer TND (tertium) and EFQ (ex falso) for ¬-introduction and -elimination. | |
From: David Bostock (Intermediate Logic [1997], 6.2) |
13758 | In natural deduction we work from the premisses and the conclusion, hoping to meet in the middle [Bostock] |
Full Idea: When looking for a proof of a sequent, the best we can do in natural deduction is to work simultaneously in both directions, forward from the premisses, and back from the conclusion, and hope they will meet in the middle. | |
From: David Bostock (Intermediate Logic [1997], 6.5) |
13754 | Natural deduction rules for → are the Deduction Theorem (→I) and Modus Ponens (→E) [Bostock] |
Full Idea: Natural deduction adopts for → as rules the Deduction Theorem and Modus Ponens, here called →I and →E. If ψ follows φ in the proof, we can write φ→ψ (→I). φ and φ→ψ permit ψ (→E). | |
From: David Bostock (Intermediate Logic [1997], 6.2) | |
A reaction: Natural deduction has this neat and appealing way of formally introducing or eliminating each connective, so that you know where you are, and you know what each one means. |
13611 | Tableau proofs use reduction - seeking an impossible consequence from an assumption [Bostock] |
Full Idea: A tableau proof is a proof by reduction ad absurdum. One begins with an assumption, and one develops the consequences of that assumption, seeking to derive an impossible consequence. | |
From: David Bostock (Intermediate Logic [1997], 4.1) |
13757 | Unlike natural deduction, semantic tableaux have recipes for proving things [Bostock] |
Full Idea: With semantic tableaux there are recipes for proof-construction that we can operate, whereas with natural deduction there are not. | |
From: David Bostock (Intermediate Logic [1997], 6.5) |
13762 | Tableau rules are all elimination rules, gradually shortening formulae [Bostock] |
Full Idea: In their original setting, all the tableau rules are elimination rules, allowing us to replace a longer formula by its shorter components. | |
From: David Bostock (Intermediate Logic [1997], 7.3) |
13756 | A tree proof becomes too broad if its only rule is Modus Ponens [Bostock] |
Full Idea: When the only rule of inference is Modus Ponens, the branches of a tree proof soon spread too wide for comfort. | |
From: David Bostock (Intermediate Logic [1997], 6.4) |
13613 | A completed open branch gives an interpretation which verifies those formulae [Bostock] |
Full Idea: An open branch in a completed tableau will always yield an interpretation that verifies every formula on the branch. | |
From: David Bostock (Intermediate Logic [1997], 4.7) | |
A reaction: In other words the open branch shows a model which seems to work (on the available information). Similarly a closed branch gives a model which won't work - a counterexample. |
13612 | Non-branching rules add lines, and branching rules need a split; a branch with a contradiction is 'closed' [Bostock] |
Full Idea: Rules for semantic tableaus are of two kinds - non-branching rules and branching rules. The first allow the addition of further lines, and the second requires splitting the branch. A branch which assigns contradictory values to a formula is 'closed'. | |
From: David Bostock (Intermediate Logic [1997], 4.1) | |
A reaction: [compressed] Thus 'and' stays on one branch, asserting both formulae, but 'or' splits, checking first one and then the other. A proof succeeds when all the branches are closed, showing that the initial assumption leads only to contradictions. |
13761 | In a tableau proof no sequence is established until the final branch is closed; hypotheses are explored [Bostock] |
Full Idea: In a tableau system no sequent is established until the final step of the proof, when the last branch closes, and until then we are simply exploring a hypothesis. | |
From: David Bostock (Intermediate Logic [1997], 7.3) | |
A reaction: This compares sharply with a sequence calculus, where every single step is a conclusive proof of something. So use tableaux for exploring proofs, and then sequence calculi for writing them up? |
13760 | A sequent calculus is good for comparing proof systems [Bostock] |
Full Idea: A sequent calculus is a useful tool for comparing two systems that at first look utterly different (such as natural deduction and semantic tableaux). | |
From: David Bostock (Intermediate Logic [1997], 7.2) |
13759 | Each line of a sequent calculus is a conclusion of previous lines, each one explicitly recorded [Bostock] |
Full Idea: A sequent calculus keeps an explicit record of just what sequent is established at each point in a proof. Every line is itself the sequent proved at that point. It is not a linear sequence or array of formulae, but a matching array of whole sequents. | |
From: David Bostock (Intermediate Logic [1997], 7.1) |
13364 | Interpretation by assigning objects to names, or assigning them to variables first [Bostock, by PG] |
Full Idea: There are two approaches to an 'interpretation' of a logic: the first method assigns objects to names, and then defines connectives and quantifiers, focusing on truth; the second assigns objects to variables, then variables to names, using satisfaction. | |
From: report of David Bostock (Intermediate Logic [1997], 3.4) by PG - Db (lexicon) | |
A reaction: [a summary of nine elusive pages in Bostock] He says he prefers the first method, but the second method is more popular because it handles open formulas, by treating free variables as if they were names. |
13821 | Extensionality is built into ordinary logic semantics; names have objects, predicates have sets of objects [Bostock] |
Full Idea: Extensionality is built into the semantics of ordinary logic. When a name-letter is interpreted as denoting something, we just provide the object denoted. All that we provide for a one-place predicate-letter is the set of objects that it is true of.. | |
From: David Bostock (Intermediate Logic [1997]) | |
A reaction: Could we keep the syntax of ordinary logic, and provide a wildly different semantics, much closer to real life? We could give up these dreadful 'objects' that Frege lumbered us with. Logic for processes, etc. |
13362 | If an object has two names, truth is undisturbed if the names are swapped; this is Extensionality [Bostock] |
Full Idea: If two names refer to the same object, then in any proposition which contains either of them the other may be substituted in its place, and the truth-value of the proposition of the proposition will be unaltered. This is the Principle of Extensionality. | |
From: David Bostock (Intermediate Logic [1997], 3.1) | |
A reaction: He acknowledges that ordinary language is full of counterexamples, such as 'he doesn't know the Morning Star and the Evening Star are the same body' (when he presumably knows that the Morning Star is the Morning Star). This is logic. Like maths. |
13540 | A set of formulae is 'inconsistent' when there is no interpretation which can make them all true [Bostock] |
Full Idea: 'Γ |=' means 'Γ is a set of closed formulae, and there is no (standard) interpretation in which all of the formulae in Γ are true'. We abbreviate this last to 'Γ is inconsistent'. | |
From: David Bostock (Intermediate Logic [1997], 4.5) | |
A reaction: This is a semantic approach to inconsistency, in terms of truth, as opposed to saying that we cannot prove both p and ¬p. I take this to be closer to the true concept, since you need never have heard of 'proof' to understand 'inconsistent'. |
13541 | For 'negation-consistent', there is never |-(S)φ and |-(S)¬φ [Bostock] |
Full Idea: Any system of proof S is said to be 'negation-consistent' iff there is no formula such that |-(S)φ and |-(S)¬φ. | |
From: David Bostock (Intermediate Logic [1997], 4.5) | |
A reaction: Compare Idea 13542. This version seems to be a 'strong' version, as it demands a higher standard than 'absolute consistency'. Both halves of the condition would have to be established. |
13542 | A proof-system is 'absolutely consistent' iff we don't have |-(S)φ for every formula [Bostock] |
Full Idea: Any system of proof S is said to be 'absolutely consistent' iff it is not the case that for every formula we have |-(S)φ. | |
From: David Bostock (Intermediate Logic [1997], 4.5) | |
A reaction: Bostock notes that a sound system will be both 'negation-consistent' (Idea 13541) and absolutely consistent. 'Tonk' systems can be shown to be unsound because the two come apart. |
13544 | Inconsistency or entailment just from functors and quantifiers is finitely based, if compact [Bostock] |
Full Idea: Being 'compact' means that if we have an inconsistency or an entailment which holds just because of the truth-functors and quantifiers involved, then it is always due to a finite number of the propositions in question. | |
From: David Bostock (Intermediate Logic [1997], 4.8) | |
A reaction: Bostock says this is surprising, given the examples 'a is not a parent of a parent of b...' etc, where an infinity seems to establish 'a is not an ancestor of b'. The point, though, is that this truth doesn't just depend on truth-functors and quantifiers. |
13618 | Compactness means an infinity of sequents on the left will add nothing new [Bostock] |
Full Idea: The logic of truth-functions is compact, which means that sequents with infinitely many formulae on the left introduce nothing new. Hence we can confine our attention to finite sequents. | |
From: David Bostock (Intermediate Logic [1997], 5.5) | |
A reaction: This makes it clear why compactness is a limitation in logic. If you want the logic to be unlimited in scope, it isn't; it only proves things from finite numbers of sequents. This makes it easier to prove completeness for the system. |
13358 | Ordinary or mathematical induction assumes for the first, then always for the next, and hence for all [Bostock] |
Full Idea: The principle of mathematical (or ordinary) induction says suppose the first number, 0, has a property; suppose that if any number has that property, then so does the next; then it follows that all numbers have the property. | |
From: David Bostock (Intermediate Logic [1997], 2.8) | |
A reaction: Ordinary induction is also known as 'weak' induction. Compare Idea 13359 for 'strong' or complete induction. The number sequence must have a first element, so this doesn't work for the integers. |
13359 | Complete induction assumes for all numbers less than n, then also for n, and hence for all numbers [Bostock] |
Full Idea: The principle of complete induction says suppose that for every number, if all the numbers less than it have a property, then so does it; it then follows that every number has the property. | |
From: David Bostock (Intermediate Logic [1997], 2.8) | |
A reaction: Complete induction is also known as 'strong' induction. Compare Idea 13358 for 'weak' or mathematical induction. The number sequence need have no first element. |
5992 | Chrysippus says action is the criterion for existence, which must be physical [Chrysippus, by Tieleman] |
Full Idea: Chrysippus regarded power to act and be acted upon as the criterion for existence or being - a test satisfied by bodies alone. | |
From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Teun L. Tieleman - Chrysippus | |
A reaction: This defines existence in terms of causation. Is he ruling out a priori a particle (say) which exists, but never interacts with anything? If so, he is inclining towards anti-realism. |
3523 | Shadows are supervenient on their objects, but not reducible [Maslin] |
Full Idea: Shadows are distinct from the physical objects casting the shadows and irreducible to them; any attempt at reduction would be incoherent, as it would entail identifying a shadow with the object of which it is a shadow. | |
From: Keith T. Maslin (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2001], 6.3) | |
A reaction: Another failure to find a decent analogy for what is claimed in property dualism. A 'shadow' is a reification of the abstract concept of an absence of light. Objects lose their shadows at dusk, but the object itself doesn't change. |
3517 | 'Ontology' means 'study of things which exist' [Maslin] |
Full Idea: The word 'ontology' is derived from the Greek word 'ontia', which means 'things which exist'. | |
From: Keith T. Maslin (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2001], 1.1) |
21673 | There are simple and complex facts; the latter depend on further facts [Chrysippus, by Cicero] |
Full Idea: Chrysippus says there are two classes of facts, simple and complex. An instance of a simple fact is 'Socrates will die at a given date', ...but 'Milo will wrestle at Olympia' is a complex statement, because there can be no wrestling without an opponent. | |
From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by M. Tullius Cicero - On Fate ('De fato') 13.30 | |
A reaction: We might say that there are atomic and complex facts, but our atomic facts tend to be much simpler, usually just saying some object has some property. |
16652 | Stoics categories are Substrate, Quality, Disposition, and Relation [Chrysippus, by Pasnau] |
Full Idea: The Stoics proposed a rather modest categorisation of Substrate, Quality, Disposition, and Relation. | |
From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 12.1 |
13543 | A relation is not reflexive, just because it is transitive and symmetrical [Bostock] |
Full Idea: It is easy to fall into the error of supposing that a relation which is both transitive and symmetrical must also be reflexive. | |
From: David Bostock (Intermediate Logic [1997], 4.7) | |
A reaction: Compare Idea 14430! Transivity will take you there, and symmetricality will get you back, but that doesn't entitle you to take the shortcut? |
13802 | Relations can be one-many (at most one on the left) or many-one (at most one on the right) [Bostock] |
Full Idea: A relation is 'one-many' if for anything on the right there is at most one on the left (∀xyz(Rxz∧Ryz→x=y), and is 'many-one' if for anything on the left there is at most one on the right (∀xyz(Rzx∧Rzy→x=y). | |
From: David Bostock (Intermediate Logic [1997], 8.1) |
16058 | Dion and Theon coexist, but Theon lacks a foot. If Dion loses a foot, he ousts Theon? [Chrysippus, by Philo of Alexandria] |
Full Idea: If two individuals occupied one substance …let one individual (Dion) be thought of as whole-limbed, the other (Theon) as minus one foot. Then let one of Dion's feet be amputated. Theon is the stronger candidate to have perished. | |
From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Philo (Alex) - On the Eternity of the World 48 | |
A reaction: [SVF 2.397 - from Chrysippus's lost 'On the Growing Argument'] This is the original of Tibbles the Cat. Dion must persist to change, and then ousts Theon (it seems). Philo protests at Theon ceasing to exist when nothing has happened to him. |
16059 | Change of matter doesn't destroy identity - in Dion and Theon change is a condition of identity [Chrysippus, by Long/Sedley] |
Full Idea: The Growing Argument said any change of matter is a change of identity. Chrysippus presents it with a case (Dion and Theon) where material diminution is the necessary condition of enduring identity, since the diminished footless Dion survives. | |
From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by AA Long / DN Sedley - Hellenic Philosophers commentary 28:175 | |
A reaction: [The example, in Idea 16058, is the original of Tibbles the Cat] This is a lovely bold idea which I haven't met in the modern discussions - that identity actually requires change. The concept of identity is meaningless without change? |
13847 | If non-existent things are self-identical, they are just one thing - so call it the 'null object' [Bostock] |
Full Idea: If even non-existent things are still counted as self-identical, then all non-existent things must be counted as identical with one another, so there is at most one non-existent thing. We might arbitrarily choose zero, or invent 'the null object'. | |
From: David Bostock (Intermediate Logic [1997], 8.6) |
13820 | The idea that anything which can be proved is necessary has a problem with empty names [Bostock] |
Full Idea: The common Rule of Necessitation says that what can be proved is necessary, but this is incorrect if we do not permit empty names. The most straightforward answer is to modify elementary logic so that only necessary truths can be proved. | |
From: David Bostock (Intermediate Logic [1997], 8.4) |
3538 | Analogy to other minds is uncheckable, over-confident and chauvinistic [Maslin] |
Full Idea: The argument from analogy makes it impossible to check my inductive inferences because of the privacy of other minds; it also seems irresponsible to generalise from a single case; and it seems like a case of human chauvinism. | |
From: Keith T. Maslin (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2001], 8.2) | |
A reaction: Privacy of other minds need not imply scepticism about them. I'm a believer, so I have no trouble checking my theories. Solipsists can't 'check' anything. It isn't 'irresponsible' to generalise from one case if that is all you have. |
1875 | Dogs show reason in decisions made by elimination [Chrysippus, by Sext.Empiricus] |
Full Idea: A dog makes use of the fifth complex indemonstrable syllogism when, arriving at a spot where three ways meet, after smelling at two roads by which the quarry did not pass, he rushes off at once by the third without pausing to smell. | |
From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Sextus Empiricus - Outlines of Pyrrhonism I.69 | |
A reaction: As we might say: either A or B or C; not A; not B; therefore C. I wouldn't want to trust this observation without a lot of analysis of slow-motion photography of dogs as crossroads. Even so, it is a nice challenge to Descartes' view of animals. |
3540 | If we are brains then we never meet each other [Maslin] |
Full Idea: If I am my brain this leads to the odd result that you have never met me because you have never seen my brain. | |
From: Keith T. Maslin (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2001], 10.7) | |
A reaction: 'Star Trek' is full of aliens who appear beautiful, and turn out to be ugly grey lumps. 'I am my face' would be just as odd, particularly if I were in a coma, or dead. |
3518 | I'm not the final authority on my understanding of maths [Maslin] |
Full Idea: I may be the final authority on whether my shoe pinches, but I am manifestly not the final authority on whether I understand some mathematical theorem. | |
From: Keith T. Maslin (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2001], 1.7) | |
A reaction: However, it doesn't follow that his teachers are the final authority either, because he may get correct answers by an algorithm, and bluff his way when demonstrating his understanding. Who knows whether anyone really understands anything? |
20834 | Chrysippus allows evil to say it is fated, or even that it is rational and natural [Plutarch on Chrysippus] |
Full Idea: Chrysippus gives vice blatant freedom to say not only that it is necessary and according to fate, but even that it occurs according to god's reason and the best nature. | |
From: comment on Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Plutarch - 70: Stoic Self-contradictions 1050c | |
A reaction: This is Plutarch's criticism of stoic determinism or fatalism. Zeno replied that the punishment for vice may also be fated. It seems that Chysippus did believe that punishments were too harsh, given that vices are fated [p.109]. |
20833 | A swerve in the atoms would be unnatural, like scales settling differently for no reason [Chrysippus, by Plutarch] |
Full Idea: Chrysippus argues against the 'swerve' of the Epicureans, on the grounds that they are doing violence to nature by positing something which is uncaused, and cites dice or scales, which can't settle differently without some cause or difference. | |
From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Plutarch - 70: Stoic Self-contradictions 1045c | |
A reaction: That is, the principle of sufficient reason (or of everything having a cause) is derived from observation, not a priori understanding. Pace Leibniz. As in modern discussion, free will or the swerve only occur in our minds, and not elsewhere. |
20808 | Everything is fated, either by continuous causes or by a supreme rational principle [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Chrysippus says (in his 'On Fate') that everything happens by fate. Fate is a continuous string of causes of things which exist or a rational principle according to which the cosmos is managed. | |
From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 07.148 |
20835 | Chrysippus is wrong to believe in non-occurring future possibilities if he is a fatalist [Plutarch on Chrysippus] |
Full Idea: Chrysippus's accounts of possibility and fate are in conflict. If he is right that 'everything that permits of occurring even if it is not going to occur is possible', then many things are possible which are not according to fate. | |
From: comment on Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Plutarch - 70: Stoic Self-contradictions 1055e | |
A reaction: A palpable hit, I think. Plutarch refers to Chrysippus's rejection of Diodorus Cronus's Master Argument. Fatalism seems to entail that the only future possibilities are the ones that actually occur. |
20836 | The Lazy Argument responds to fate with 'why bother?', but the bothering is also fated [Chrysippus, by Cicero] |
Full Idea: Chrysippus responded to the Lazy Argument (that the outcome of an illness is fated, so there is no point in calling the doctor) by saying 'calling the doctor is fated just as much as recovering', which he calls 'co-fated'. | |
From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by M. Tullius Cicero - On Fate ('De fato') 28-30 | |
A reaction: From a pragmatic point of view, this idea also nullifies fatalism, since you can plausibly fight against your fate to your last breath. No evidence could ever be offered in support of fatalism, not even the most unlikely events. |
20837 | Fate is an eternal and fixed chain of causal events [Chrysippus] |
Full Idea: Fate is a sempiternal and unchangeable series and chain of things, rolling and unravelling itself through eternal sequences of cause and effect, of which it is composed and compounded. | |
From: Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]), quoted by Aulus Gellius - Noctes Atticae 7.2.01 | |
A reaction: It seems that Chrysippus (called by Aulus Gellius 'the chief Stoic philosopher') had a rather grandly rhetorical prose style. |
21679 | When we say events are fated by antecedent causes, do we mean principal or auxiliary causes? [Chrysippus] |
Full Idea: Some causes are perfect and principal, others auxiliary and proximate. Hence when we say that everything takes place by fate owing to antecedent causes, what we wish to be understood is not perfect and principal causes but auxiliary and proximate causes. | |
From: Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]), quoted by M. Tullius Cicero - On Fate ('De fato') 18.41 | |
A reaction: This move is described by Cicero as enabling Chrysippus to 'escape necessity and to retain fate'. |
5971 | Destiny is only a predisposing cause, not a sufficient cause [Chrysippus, by Plutarch] |
Full Idea: Chrysippus considered destiny to be not a cause sufficient of itself but only a predisposing cause. | |
From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE], fr 997) by Plutarch - 70: Stoic Self-contradictions 1056b | |
A reaction: This appears to be a rejection of determinism, and is the equivalent of Epicurus' introduction of the 'swerve' in atoms. They had suddenly become bothered about the free will problem in about 305 BCE. There must be other non-destiny causes? |
3530 | Denial of purely mental causation will lead to epiphenomenalism [Maslin] |
Full Idea: If mental events are causally efficacious only by virtue of their physical features and not their mental ones, …then anomalous monism leads straight to ephiphenomenalism. | |
From: Keith T. Maslin (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2001], 7.6) | |
A reaction: As epiphenomenalism strikes me as being incoherent (see Idea 7379), what this amounts to is that either mental effects are causally efficacious, or they are not worth mentioning. I take them to be causally efficacious because they are brain events. |
3520 | Token-identity removes the explanatory role of the physical [Maslin] |
Full Idea: In token-identity mental and physical features seem as unrelated as colour and shape, which is very weak physicalism because it does not allow physical states an explanatory role in accounting for mental states. | |
From: Keith T. Maslin (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2001], 3.8.6) | |
A reaction: Colour and shape are not totally unrelated, as they can both be totally explained by a full knowledge of the physical substance involved. ...But maybe if we fully understood Spinoza's single substance...? See Idea 4834. |
13363 | A (modern) predicate is the result of leaving a gap for the name in a sentence [Bostock] |
Full Idea: A simple way of approaching the modern notion of a predicate is this: given any sentence which contains a name, the result of dropping that name and leaving a gap in its place is a predicate. Very different from predicates in Aristotle and Kant. | |
From: David Bostock (Intermediate Logic [1997], 3.2) | |
A reaction: This concept derives from Frege. To get to grips with contemporary philosophy you have to relearn all sorts of basic words like 'predicate' and 'object'. |
20787 | A proposition is what can be asserted or denied on its own [Chrysippus] |
Full Idea: A proposition is what can be asserted or denied on its own, for example, 'It is day' or 'Dion is walking'. | |
From: Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]), quoted by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 07.65 | |
A reaction: Note the phrase 'on its own'. If you say 'it is day and Dion is walking', that can't be denied on its own, because first the two halves must each be evaluated, so presumably that doesn't count as a stoic proposition. |
20850 | Passions are judgements; greed thinks money is honorable, and likewise drinking and lust [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Chrysippus says (in his On Passions) that the passions are judgements; for greed is a supposition that money is honorable, and similarly for drunkennes and wantonness and others. | |
From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 07.111 | |
A reaction: This is an endorsement of Socrates's intellectualist reading of weakness of will, as against Aristotle's assigning it to overpowering passions. |
20869 | The highest degree of morality performs all that is appropriate, omitting nothing [Chrysippus] |
Full Idea: He who makes moral progress to the highest degree performs all the appropriate actions in all circumstances, and omits none. | |
From: Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]), quoted by Sophocles - Sophocles' Electra 4.39.22 | |
A reaction: Hence concerns about omission as well as commission in the practice of ethics can be seen in the light of character and virtue. The world is fully of nice people who act well, but don't do so well on omissions. Car drivers, for example. |
3044 | Stoics say that beauty and goodness are equivalent and linked [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Stoics say the beautiful is the only good. Good is an equivalent term to the beautiful; since a thing is good, it is beautiful; and it is beautiful, therefore it is good. | |
From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 07.1.59 |
20838 | Fate initiates general causes, but individual wills and characters dictate what we do [Chrysippus] |
Full Idea: The order and reason of fate set in motion the general types and starting points of the causes, but each person's own will [or decisions] and the character of his mind govern the impulses of our thoughts and minds and our very actions. | |
From: Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]), quoted by Aulus Gellius - Noctes Atticae 7.2.11 | |
A reaction: So if you try and fail it was fate, but if you try and succeed it was you? |
20813 | Human purpose is to contemplate and imitate the cosmos [Chrysippus] |
Full Idea: The human being was born for the sake of contemplating and imitating the cosmos. | |
From: Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]), quoted by M. Tullius Cicero - On the Nature of the Gods ('De natura deorum') 2.37 | |
A reaction: [This seems to be an idea of Chrysippus] Remind me how to imitate the cosmos. Presumably this is living according to nature, but that becomes more obscure when express like this. |
3045 | Stoics say justice is a part of nature, not just an invented principle [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Stoics say that justice exists by nature, and not because of any definition or principle. | |
From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 07.1.66 | |
A reaction: cf Idea 3024. Stoics thought that nature is intrinsically rational, and therein lies its justice. 'King Lear' enacts this drama about whether nature is just. |
20774 | Only nature is available to guide action and virtue [Chrysippus] |
Full Idea: What am I to take as the principle of appropriate action and raw material for virtue if I give up nature and what is according to nature? | |
From: Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]), quoted by Plutarch - On Common Conceptions 1069e | |
A reaction: 'Nature' is awfully vague as a guideline, even when we are told nature is rational. I can only make sense of it as 'human nature', which is more Aristotelian than stoic. 'Go with the flow' and 'lay the cards you are dealt' might capture it. |
20864 | Live in agreement, according to experience of natural events [Chrysippus] |
Full Idea: The goal of life is to live in agreement, which is according to experience of the things which happen by nature. | |
From: Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 2.06a | |
A reaction: Cleanthes added 'with nature' to Zeno's slogan, and Chyrisppus added this variation. At least it gives you some idea of what the consistent rational principle should be. You still have to assess which aspects of nature should influence us. |
5972 | Living happily is nothing but living virtuously [Chrysippus, by Plutarch] |
Full Idea: According to Chrysippus, living happily consists solely in living virtuously. | |
From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE], fr139) by Plutarch - 72: Against Stoics on common Conceptions 1060d | |
A reaction: This, along with 'live according to nature', is the essential doctrine of stoicism. This is 'eudaimonia', not the modern idea of feeling nice. Is it possible to admire another person for anything other than virtue? (Yes! Looks, brains, strength, wealth). |
1777 | Pleasure is not the good, because there are disgraceful pleasures [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Pleasure is not the good, because there are disgraceful pleasures, and nothing disgraceful is good. | |
From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 07.Ze.60 | |
A reaction: I certainly approve of the idea that not all pleasure is intrinsically good. Indeed, I think good has probably got nothing to do with pleasure. 'Disgraceful' is hardly objective though. |
5973 | Justice can be preserved if pleasure is a good, but not if it is the goal [Chrysippus, by Plutarch] |
Full Idea: Chrysippus thinks that, while justice could not be preserved if one should set up pleasure as the goal, it could be if one should take pleasure to be not a goal but simply a good. | |
From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE], fr 23) by Plutarch - 72: Against Stoics on common Conceptions 1070d | |
A reaction: This is an interesting and original contribution to the ancient debate about pleasure. It shows Aristotle's moderate criticism of pleasure (e.g. Idea 84), but attempts to pinpoint where the danger is. Aristotle says it thwarts achievement of the mean. |
20845 | There are shameful pleasures, and nothing shameful is good, so pleasure is not a good [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Chrysippus (in his On Pleasure) denies even of pleasure that it is a good; for there are also shameful pleasures, and nothing shameful is good. | |
From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 07.103 | |
A reaction: Socrates seems to have started this line of the thought, to argue that pleasure is not The Good. Stoics are more puritanical. Nothing counts as good if it is capable of being bad. Thus good pleasures are not good, which sounds odd. |
5967 | People need nothing except corn and water [Chrysippus, by Plutarch] |
Full Idea: Chrysippus praises ad nauseam the lines "For what need mortals save two things alone,/ Demeter's grain and draughts of water clear". | |
From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Plutarch - 70: Stoic Self-contradictions 1043e | |
A reaction: "Oh, reason not the need!" says King Lear. The remark shows the close affinity of stoicism and cynicism, as the famous story of Diogenes is that he threw away his drinking cup when he realised you could drink with your hands. |
5966 | All virtue is good, but not always praised (as in not lusting after someone ugly) [Chrysippus] |
Full Idea: Although deeds done in accordance with virtue are congenial, not all are cited as examples, such as courageously extending one's finger, or continently abstaining from a half-dead old woman, or not immediately agreeing that three is four. | |
From: Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE], fr 211), quoted by Plutarch - 70: Stoic Self-contradictions 1038f | |
A reaction: Presumably the point (so elegantly expressed - what a shame we have lost most of Chrysippus) is that virtue comes in degrees, even though its value is an absolute. The same has been said (by Russell and Bonjour) about self-evidence. |
20855 | Chrysippus says virtue can be lost (though Cleanthes says it is too secure for that) [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Chrysippus says that virtue can be lost, owing to drunkenness and excess of black bile, whereas Cleanthes says it cannot, because it consists in secure intellectual grasps, and it is worth choosing for its own sake. | |
From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 07.127 | |
A reaction: Succumbing to drunkenness looks like evidence that you were not truly virtuous. Mental illness is something else. On the whole I agree the Cleanthes. |
5970 | Chrysippus says nothing is blameworthy, as everything conforms with the best nature [Chrysippus, by Plutarch] |
Full Idea: Chrysippus has often written on the theme that there is nothing reprehensible or blameworthy in the universe since all things are accomplished in conformity with the best nature. | |
From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Plutarch - 70: Stoic Self-contradictions 1051b | |
A reaction: This is Leibniz's "best of all possible worlds", but deriving the idea from the rightness of nature rather than the perfection of God. Chrysippus has a more plausible ground than Leibniz, as for him nasty things follow from conscious choice. |
20842 | Rational animals begin uncorrupted, but externals and companions are bad influences [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: The rational animal is corrupted, sometimes because of the persuasiveness of external activities and sometimes because of the influence of companions. For the starting points provided by nature are uncorrupted. | |
From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 07.89 | |
A reaction: If companions corrupt us, what corrupted the companions? Aren't we all in this together? And where do the 'external activities' originate? |
20856 | Justice, the law, and right reason are natural and not conventional [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Chrysippus says (in On the Honourable) that justice is natural and not conventional, as are the law and right reason. | |
From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 07.128 | |
A reaction: How does he explain variations in the law between different states? Presumably some of them have got it wrong. What is the criterion for deciding which laws are natural? |
1779 | We don't have obligations to animals as they aren't like us [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: We have no obligations of justice to other animals, because they are dissimilar to us. | |
From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 07.Ze.66 | |
A reaction: "Dissimilar" begs questions. Some human beings don't seem much like me. How are we going to treat visiting aliens? |
20857 | Justice is irrelevant to animals, because they are too unlike us [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: There is no justice between us and other animals because of the dissimilarity between us and them. | |
From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 07.129 | |
A reaction: [from lost On Justice Bk 1] What would he make of modern revelations about bonobos and chimpanzees? If there is great dissimilarity between some peoples, does that invalidate justice between them? He also said animals exist for our use. |
20812 | Covers are for shields, and sheaths for swords; likewise, all in the cosmos is for some other thing [Chrysippus] |
Full Idea: Just as the cover was made for the sake of the shield, and the sheath for the sword, in the same way everything else except the cosmos was made for the sake of other things. | |
From: Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]), quoted by M. Tullius Cicero - On the Nature of the Gods ('De natura deorum') 2.37 | |
A reaction: Chrysippus was wise to stop at the cosmos. Similarly, religious teleology had better not ask about the purpose of God. What does he think pebbles are for? Nature is the source of stoic value, so it needs to be purposeful. |
21403 | The later Stoics identified the logos with an air-fire compound, called 'pneuma' [Chrysippus, by Long] |
Full Idea: From Chrysippus onwards, the Stoics identified the logos throughout each world-cycle not with pure fire, but with a compound of fire and air, 'pneuma'. | |
From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by A.A. Long - Hellenistic Philosophy 4.4.2 | |
A reaction: I suspect this was because breath is so vital to the human body. |
20828 | Fire is a separate element, not formed with others (as was previously believed) [Chrysippus, by Stobaeus] |
Full Idea: In his theory fire is said independently to be an element, since it is not formed together with another one, whereas according to the earlier theory fire is formed with other elements. | |
From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by John Stobaeus - Anthology 1.10.16c | |
A reaction: The point is that fire precedes the other elements, and is superior to them. |
5975 | Stoics say earth, air, fire and water are the primary elements [Chrysippus, by Plutarch] |
Full Idea: The Stoics call the four bodies - earth and water and air and fire - primary elements. | |
From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE], fr 444) by Plutarch - 72: Against Stoics on common Conceptions 1085c | |
A reaction: Elsewhere (fr 413) Chrysippus denies that they are all 'primary'. Essentially, though, he seems to be adopting the doctrine of Empedocles and Aristotle, in specific opposition to Epicurus' atomism. |
3528 | Causality may require that a law is being followed [Maslin] |
Full Idea: The principle of nomological causality says that if two events are intrinsically causally related, there must be a strict physical law under which they can be subsumed. | |
From: Keith T. Maslin (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2001], 7.5) |
3525 | Strict laws make causation logically necessary [Maslin] |
Full Idea: 'Deductive-nomological' explanation consists of two premises - a strict law with no exceptions and supporting deterministic counterfactuals, and a statement of an event which falls under the law - which together logically require the effect. | |
From: Keith T. Maslin (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2001], 7.4) |
3527 | Strict laws allow no exceptions and are part of a closed system [Maslin] |
Full Idea: 'Strict' laws of nature contain no ceteris paribus clauses ('all things being equal'), and are part of a closed system (so that whatever affects the system must be included within the system). | |
From: Keith T. Maslin (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2001], 7.5) |
20819 | The past and the future subsist, but only the present exists [Chrysippus, by Plutarch] |
Full Idea: When he wished to be subtle, Chrysippus wrote that the past part of time and the future part do not exist but subsist, and only the present exists. | |
From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Plutarch - On Common Conceptions 1081f | |
A reaction: [from lost On Void] I think I prefer the ontology of Idea 20818. Idea 20819 does not offer an epistemology. Is the present substantial enough to be known? The word 'subsist' is an ontological evasion (even though Russell briefly relied on it). |
20818 | The present does not exist, so our immediate experience is actually part past and part future [Chrysippus, by Plutarch] |
Full Idea: Stoics do not allow a minimal time to exist, and do not want to have a partless 'now'; so what one thinks one has grasped as present is in part future and in part past. | |
From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Plutarch - On Common Conceptions 1081c | |
A reaction: [from lost On Parts Bk3-5] I agree with the ontology here, but I take our grasp of the present to be very short-term memory of the past. I ignore special relativity. Chrysippus expressed two views about this; in the other one he was a Presentist. |
20821 | Time is continous and infinitely divisible, so there cannot be a wholly present time [Chrysippus, by Stobaeus] |
Full Idea: Chrysippus says most clearly that no time is wholly present; for since the divisibility of continuous things is infinite, time as a whole is also subject to infinite divisibility by this method of division. | |
From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by John Stobaeus - Anthology 1.08.42 | |
A reaction: But what is his reason for thinking that time is a continuous thing? There is a minimum time in quantum mechanics (the Planck Time), but do these quantum intervals overlap? Compare Idea 20819. |
3048 | Stoics say that God the creator is the perfection of all animals [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Stoics say that God is an animal immortal, rational, perfect, and intellectual in his happiness, unsusceptible of any kind of evil, having a foreknowledge of the world; however, he is not the figure of a man, and is the creator of the universe. | |
From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 07.1.72 |
20773 | The origin of justice can only be in Zeus, and in nature [Chrysippus] |
Full Idea: One can find no other starting point or origin for justice except the one derived from Zeus and that derived from the common nature; for everything like this must have that starting point, if we are going to say anything at all about good and bad things. | |
From: Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]), quoted by Plutarch - 70: Stoic Self-contradictions 1035c | |
A reaction: [in lost 'On Gods' bk 3] This appears to offer two starting points, in the mind of Zeus, and in nature, though since nature is presumed to be rational the two may run together. Is Zeus the embodiment, or the unconscious source, or the maker of decrees? |
5965 | The source of all justice is Zeus and the universal nature [Chrysippus] |
Full Idea: It is not possible to discover any other beginning of justice or any source for it other than that from Zeus and from the universal nature. | |
From: Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE], fr 326), quoted by Plutarch - 70: Stoic Self-contradictions 1035c | |
A reaction: If the source is 'universal nature', that could agree with Plato, but if the source is Zeus, then stoicism is a religion rather than a philosophy. |
3042 | Stoics teach that law is identical with right reason, which is the will of Zeus [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Stoics teach that common law is identical with that right reason which pervades everything, being the same with Zeus, who is the regulator and chief manager of all existing things. | |
From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 07.1.53 |
1782 | Stoics teach that God is a unity, variously known as Mind, or Fate, or Jupiter [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Stoics teach that God is unity, and that he is called Mind, and Fate, and Jupiter, and by many names besides. | |
From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 07.Ze.68 |
20830 | Death can't separate soul from body, because incorporeal soul can't unite with body [Chrysippus] |
Full Idea: Death is a separation of soul from body. But nothing incorporeal can be separated from a body. For neither does anything incorporeal touch a body, and the soul touches and is separated from the body. Therefore the soul is not incorporeal. | |
From: Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]), quoted by Tertullian - The Soul as an 'Astral Body' 5.3 | |
A reaction: This is the classic interaction difficulty for substance dualist theories of mind. |
21404 | There is a rationale in terrible disasters; they are useful to the whole, and make good possible [Chrysippus] |
Full Idea: The evil which occurs in terrible disasters has a rationale [logos] peculiar to itself: for in a sense it occurs in accordance with universal reason, and is not without usefulness in relation to the whole. For without it there could be no good. | |
From: Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]), quoted by A.A. Long - Hellenistic Philosophy 4.4.5 | |
A reaction: [a quotation from Chrysippus. Plutarch, Comm Not 1065b] A nice question about any terrible disaster is whether it is in some way 'useful', if we take a broader view of things. Almost everything has a good aspect, from that perspective. |