211 ideas
9199 | Wisdom for one instant is as good as wisdom for eternity [Chrysippus] |
Full Idea: If a person has wisdom for one instant, he is no less happy than he who possesses it for eternity. | |
From: Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]), quoted by Pierre Hadot - Philosophy as a way of life 8 | |
A reaction: [Hadot quotes Plutarch 'On Common Conceptions' 8,1062a] This makes it sound awfully like some sort of Buddhist 'enlightenment', which strikes like lightning. He does wisdom recognise itself - by a warm glow, or by the cautious thought that got you there? |
20853 | Wise men should try to participate in politics, since they are a good influence [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: The wise man will participate in politics unless something prevents him, for he will restrain vice and promote virtue. | |
From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 07.121 | |
A reaction: [from lost On Ways of Life Bk 1] We have made modern politics so hostile for its participants, thanks to cruel media pressure, that the best people now run a mile from it. Disastrous. |
11421 | 427: Gorgias visited Athens as ambassador for Leontini [PG] |
Full Idea: In 427 BCE Gorgias of Leontini visited Athens as an ambassador for his city | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0573) |
11425 | 399: Socrates executed (with Plato absent through ill health) [PG] |
Full Idea: In 399 BCE Plato was unwell, and was not present at the death of Socrates | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0601) |
11432 | 387 (roughly): Plato returned to Athens, and founded the Academy [PG] |
Full Idea: In about 387 BCE Plato returned to Athens and founded his new school at the Academy | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0613) |
11433 | 387 (roughly): Aristippus the Elder founder a hedonist school at Cyrene [PG] |
Full Idea: In around 387 BCE a new school was founded at Cyrene by Aristippus the elder | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0613) |
11440 | 367: the teenaged Aristotle came to study at the Academy [PG] |
Full Idea: In 367 BCE the seventeen-year-old Aristotle came south to study at the Academy | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0633) |
11443 | 360 (roughly): Diogenes of Sinope lives in a barrel in central Athens [PG] |
Full Idea: In around 360 BCE Diogenes of Sinope was living in a barrel in the Agora in Athens | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0640) |
11445 | 347: death of Plato [PG] |
Full Idea: In 347 BCE Plato died | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0653) |
11454 | 343: Aristotle becomes tutor to 13 year old Alexander (the Great) [PG] |
Full Idea: In 343 BCE at Stagira Aristotle became personal tutor to the thirteen-year-old Alexander (the Great) | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0657) |
11456 | 335: Arisotle founded his school at the Lyceum in Athens [PG] |
Full Idea: In 335 BCE Aristotle founded the Lyceum in Athens | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0665) |
11459 | 330 (roughly): Chuang Tzu wrote his Taoist book [PG] |
Full Idea: In around 330 BCE Chuang Tzu wrote a key work in the Taoist tradition | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0670) |
11465 | 322: Aristotle retired to Chalcis, and died there [PG] |
Full Idea: In 322 BCE Aristotle retired to Chalcis in Euboea, where he died | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0678) |
11468 | 307 (roughly): Epicurus founded his school at the Garden in Athens [PG] |
Full Idea: In about 307 BCE Epicurus founded his school at the Garden in Athens | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0693) |
11470 | 301 (roughly): Zeno of Citium founded Stoicism at the Stoa Poikile in Athens [PG] |
Full Idea: In about 301 BCE the Stoic school was founded by Zeno of Citium in the Stoa Poikile in Athens | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0699) |
11483 | 261: Cleanthes replaced Zeno as head of the Stoa [PG] |
Full Idea: In 261 BCE Cleanthes took over from Zeno as head of the Stoa. | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0739) |
11486 | 229 (roughly): Chrysippus replaced Cleanthes has head of the Stoa [PG] |
Full Idea: In about 229 BCE Chrysippus took over from Cleanthes as the head of the Stoic school | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0771) |
11492 | 157 (roughly): Carneades became head of the Academy [PG] |
Full Idea: In around 157 BCE Carneades took over as head of the Academy from Hegesinus | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0843) |
11509 | 85: most philosophical activity moves to Alexandria [PG] |
Full Idea: In around 85 BCE Athens went into philosophical decline, and leadership moved to Alexandria | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0915) |
11513 | 78: Cicero visited the stoic school on Rhodes [PG] |
Full Idea: In around 78 BCE Cicero visited the school of Posidonius in Rhodes. | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0922) |
11516 | 60 (roughly): Lucretius wrote his Latin poem on epicureanism [PG] |
Full Idea: In around 60 BCE Lucretius wrote his Latin poem on Epicureanism | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0940) |
11528 | 65: Seneca forced to commit suicide by Nero [PG] |
Full Idea: In 65 CE Seneca was forced to commit suicide by the Emperor Nero. | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 1065) |
11531 | 80: the discourses of the stoic Epictetus are written down [PG] |
Full Idea: In around 80 CE the 'Discourses' of the freed slave Epictetus were written down in Rome. | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 1080) |
11461 | 323 (roughly): Euclid wrote 'Elements', summarising all of geometry [PG] |
Full Idea: Euclid: In around 323 BCE Euclid wrote his 'Elements', summarising all of known geometry. | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030]) |
11390 | 1000 (roughly): Upanishads written (in Sanskrit); religious and philosophical texts [PG] |
Full Idea: In around 1000 BCE the Upanishads were written, the most philosophical of ancient Hindu texts | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0001) |
11391 | 750 (roughly): the Book of Genesis written by Hebrew writers [PG] |
Full Idea: In around 750 BCE the Book of Genesis was written by an anonymous jewish writer | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0250) |
11392 | 586: eclipse of the sun on the coast of modern Turkey was predicted by Thales of Miletus [PG] |
Full Idea: In 585 BCE there was an eclipse of the sun, which Thales of Miletus is said to have predicted | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0415) |
11395 | 570: Anaximander flourished in Miletus [PG] |
Full Idea: Anaximander: In around 570 BCE the philosopher and astronomer Anaximander flourished in Miletus | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0430) |
11396 | 563: the Buddha born in northern India [PG] |
Full Idea: In around 563 BCE Siddhartha Gautama, the Buddha, was born in northern India | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0437) |
11398 | 540: Lao Tzu wrote 'Tao Te Ching', the basis of Taoism [PG] |
Full Idea: In around 540 BCE Lao Tzu wrote the 'Tao Te Ching', the basis of Taoism | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0460) |
11400 | 529: Pythagoras created his secretive community at Croton in Sicily [PG] |
Full Idea: In around 529 BCE Pythagoras set up a community in Croton, with strict and secret rules and teachings | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0471) |
11403 | 500: Heraclitus flourishes at Ephesus, in modern Turkey [PG] |
Full Idea: In around 500 BCE Heraclitus flourished in the city of Ephesus in Ionia | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0500) |
11404 | 496: Confucius travels widely, persuading rulers to be more moral [PG] |
Full Idea: In 496 BCE Confucius began a period of wandering, to persuade rulers to be more moral | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0504) |
11408 | 472: Empedocles persuades his city (Acragas in Sicily) to become a democracy [PG] |
Full Idea: In 472 BCE Empedocles helped his city of Acragas change to democracy | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0528) |
11412 | 450 (roughly): Parmenides and Zeno visit Athens from Italy [PG] |
Full Idea: In around 450 BCE Parmenides and Zeno visited the festival in Athens | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0550) |
11414 | 445: Protagoras helps write laws for the new colony of Thurii [PG] |
Full Idea: In 443 BCE Protagoras helped write the laws for the new colony of Thurii | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0557) |
11417 | 436 (roughly): Anaxagoras is tried for impiety, and expelled from Athens [PG] |
Full Idea: In about 436 BCE Anaxagoras was tried on a charge of impiety and expelled from Athens | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0564) |
11535 | 170 (roughly): Marcus Aurelius wrote his private stoic meditations [PG] |
Full Idea: In around 170 CE the Emperor Marcus Aurelius wrote his 'Meditations' for private reading. | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 1170) |
11537 | -200 (roughly): Sextus Empiricus wrote a series of books on scepticism [PG] |
Full Idea: In around 200 CE Sextus Empiricus wrote a series of books (which survive) defending scepticism | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 1200) |
11541 | 263: Porphyry began to study with Plotinus in Rome [PG] |
Full Idea: In 263 CE Porphyry joined Plotinus' classes in Rome | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 1263) |
11545 | 310: Christianity became the official religion of the Roman empire [PG] |
Full Idea: In 310 CE Christianity became the official religion of the Roman Empire | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 1310) |
11549 | 387: Ambrose converts Augustine to Christianity [PG] |
Full Idea: In 387 CE Augustine converted to Christianity in Milan, guided by St Ambrose | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 1387) |
11555 | 523: Boethius imprisoned at Pavia, and begins to write [PG] |
Full Idea: In 523 CE Boethius was imprisoned in exile at Pavia, and wrote 'Consolations of Philosophy' | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 1523) |
11557 | 529: the emperor Justinian closes all the philosophy schools in Athens [PG] |
Full Idea: In 529 CE the Emperor Justinian closed all the philosophy schools in Athens | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 1529) |
11558 | 622 (roughly): Mohammed writes the Koran [PG] |
Full Idea: Mohammed: In about 622 CE Muhammed wrote the basic text of Islam, the Koran. | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 1622) |
11559 | 642: Arabs close the philosophy schools in Alexandria [PG] |
Full Idea: In 642 CE Alexandria was captured by the Arabs, and the philosophy schools were closed | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 1642) |
11560 | 910 (roughly): Al-Farabi wrote Arabic commentaries on Aristotle [PG] |
Full Idea: Alfarabi: In around 910 CE Al-Farabi explained and expanded Aristotle for the Islamic world. | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 1910) |
11562 | 1015 (roughly): Ibn Sina (Avicenna) writes a book on Aristotle [PG] |
Full Idea: In around 1015 Avicenna produced his Platonised version of Aristotle in 'The Healing' | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2015) |
11564 | 1090: Anselm publishes his proof of the existence of God [PG] |
Full Idea: Anselm: In about 1090 St Anselm of Canterbury publishes his Ontological Proof of God's existence | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2090) |
11566 | 1115: Abelard is the chief logic teacher in Paris [PG] |
Full Idea: In around 1115 Abelard became established as the chief logic teacher in Paris | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2115) |
11573 | 1166: Ibn Rushd (Averroes) wrote extensive commentaries on Aristotle [PG] |
Full Idea: In around 1166 Averroes (Ibn Rushd), in Seville, wrote extensive commentaries on Aristotle | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2166) |
11581 | 1266: Aquinas began writing 'Summa Theologica' [PG] |
Full Idea: In 1266 Aquinas began writing his great theological work, the 'Summa Theologica' | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2266) |
11586 | 1280: after his death, the teaching of Aquinas becomes official Dominican doctrine [PG] |
Full Idea: In around 1280 Aquinas's teaching became the official theology of the Dominican order | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2280) |
11591 | 1328: William of Ockham decides the Pope is a heretic, and moves to Munich [PG] |
Full Idea: In 1328 William of Ockham decided the Pope was a heretic, and moved to Munich | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2328) |
17916 | 1347: the Church persecutes philosophical heresies [PG] |
Full Idea: In 1347 the Church began extensive persecution of unorthodox philosophical thought | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2347) |
11593 | 1470: Marsilio Ficino founds a Platonic Academy in Florence [PG] |
Full Idea: In around 1470 Marsilio Ficino founded a Platonic Academy in Florence | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2470) |
11596 | 1513: Machiavelli wrote 'The Prince' [PG] |
Full Idea: In 1513 Machiavelli wrote 'The Prince', a tough view of political theory. | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2513) |
11599 | 1543: Copernicus publishes his heliocentric view of the solar system [PG] |
Full Idea: In 1543 Nicholas Copernicus, a Polish monk, publishes his new theory of the solar system. | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2543) |
11601 | 1580: Montaigne publishes his essays [PG] |
Full Idea: In 1580 Montaigne published a volume of his 'Essays' | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2580) |
11607 | 1600: Giordano Bruno was burned at the stake in Rome [PG] |
Full Idea: In 1600 Giordano Bruno was burnt at the stake in Rome, largely for endorsing Copernicus | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2600) |
11613 | 1619: Descartes's famous day of meditation inside a stove [PG] |
Full Idea: In 1619 Descartes had a famous day of meditation in a heated stove at Ulm | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2619) |
11614 | 1620: Bacon publishes 'Novum Organum' [PG] |
Full Idea: Francis Bacon: In 1620 Bacon published his 'Novum Organon', urging the rise of experimental science | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2620) |
11619 | 1633: Galileo convicted of heresy by the Inquisition [PG] |
Full Idea: In 1633 Galileo was condemned to life emprisonment for contradicting church teachings. | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2633) |
11623 | 1641: Descartes publishes his 'Meditations' [PG] |
Full Idea: In 1641 Descartes published his well-known 'Meditations', complete with Objections and Replies | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2641) |
11626 | 1650: death of Descartes, in Stockholm [PG] |
Full Idea: In 1650 Descartes died in Stockholm, after stressful work for Queen Christina | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2650) |
11627 | 1651: Hobbes publishes 'Leviathan' [PG] |
Full Idea: In 1651 Hobbes published his great work on politics and contract morality, 'Leviathan' | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2651) |
11633 | 1662: the Port Royal Logic is published [PG] |
Full Idea: Antoine Arnauld: In 1662 Arnauld and Nicole published their famous text, the 'Port-Royal Logic' | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2662) |
11634 | 1665: Spinoza writes his 'Ethics' [PG] |
Full Idea: In 1665 the first draft of Spinoza's 'Ethics', his major work, was finished, and published posthumously | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2665) |
11643 | 1676: Leibniz settled as librarian to the Duke of Brunswick [PG] |
Full Idea: In 1676 Leibniz became librarian to the Duke of Brunswick, staying for the rest of his life | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2676) |
11649 | 1687: Newton publishes his 'Principia Mathematica' [PG] |
Full Idea: In 1687 Newton published his 'Principia', containing his theory of gravity. | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2687) |
11652 | 1690: Locke publishes his 'Essay' [PG] |
Full Idea: In 1690 Locke published his 'Essay', his major work on empiricism | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2690) |
11654 | 1697: Bayle publishes his 'Dictionary' [PG] |
Full Idea: Pierre Bayle: In about 1697 Pierre Bayle published his 'Historical and Critical Dictionary' | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2697) |
11659 | 1713: Berkeley publishes his 'Three Dialogues' [PG] |
Full Idea: In 1713 Berkeley published a popular account of his empiricist idealism in 'Three Dialogues' | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2713) |
11666 | 1734: Voltaire publishes his 'Philosophical Letters' [PG] |
Full Idea: Francois-Marie Voltaire: In 1734 Voltaire's 'Lettres Philosophiques' praised liberalism and empiricism | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2734) |
11667 | 1739: Hume publishes his 'Treatise' [PG] |
Full Idea: In 1739 Hume returned to Edinburgh and published his 'Treatise', but it sold very few copies | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2739) |
11675 | 1762: Rousseau publishes his 'Social Contract' [PG] |
Full Idea: In 1762 Rousseau published his 'Social Contract', basing politics on the popular will | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2762) |
11682 | 1781: Kant publishes his 'Critique of Pure Reason' [PG] |
Full Idea: In 1781 Kant published his first great work, the 'Critique of Pure Reason' | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2781) |
11683 | 1785: Reid publishes his essays defending common sense [PG] |
Full Idea: In 1785 Thomas Reid, based in Glasgow, published essays defending common sense. | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2785) |
11687 | 1798: the French Revolution [PG] |
Full Idea: In 1789 the French Revolution gave strong impetus to the anti-rational 'Romantic' movement | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2789) |
11694 | 1807: Hegel publishes his 'Phenomenology of Spirit' [PG] |
Full Idea: In 1807 Hegel published his first major work, the 'Phenomenology of Spirit' | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2807) |
11701 | 1818: Schopenhauer publishes his 'World as Will and Idea' [PG] |
Full Idea: In 1818 Schopenhauer published 'The World as Will and Idea', his major work | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2818) |
11710 | 1840: Kierkegaard is writing extensively in Copenhagen [PG] |
Full Idea: In around 1840 Kierkegaard lived a quiet life as a writer in Copenhagen | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2840) |
11713 | 1843: Mill publishes his 'System of Logic' [PG] |
Full Idea: In 1843 Mill published his 'System of Logic' | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2843) |
11715 | 1848: Marx and Engels publis the Communist Manifesto [PG] |
Full Idea: Karl Marx: In 1848 Marx and Engels published their 'Communist Manifesto' | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2848) |
11717 | 1859: Darwin publishes his 'Origin of the Species' [PG] |
Full Idea: Charles Darwin: In 1859 Charles Darwin published his theory of natural selection in 'Origin of the Species'. | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2859) |
11721 | 1861: Mill publishes 'Utilitarianism' [PG] |
Full Idea: In 1861 Mill published his book 'Utilitarianism' | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2861) |
11724 | 1867: Marx begins publishing 'Das Kapital' [PG] |
Full Idea: Karl Marx: In 1867 Karl Marx began publishing his political work 'Das Kapital' | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2867) |
11733 | 1879: Peirce taught for five years at Johns Hopkins University [PG] |
Full Idea: In 1879 Peirce began five years of teaching at Johns Hopkins University | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2879) |
17907 | 1879: Frege invents predicate logic [PG] |
Full Idea: In 1879 Frege published his 'Concept Script', which created predicate logic | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2879) |
17909 | 1892: Frege's essay 'Sense and Reference' [PG] |
Full Idea: In 1892 Frege published his famous essay 'Sense and Reference' (Sinn und Bedeutung) | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2882) |
17908 | 1884: Frege publishes his 'Foundations of Arithmetic' [PG] |
Full Idea: In 1884 Frege published his 'Foundations of Arithmetic', the beginning of logicism | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2884) |
11735 | 1885: Nietzsche completed 'Thus Spake Zarathustra' [PG] |
Full Idea: In about 1885 Nietzsche completed his book 'Also Sprach Zarathustra' | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2885) |
17911 | 1888: Dedekind publishes axioms for arithmetic [PG] |
Full Idea: In 1888 Dedekind created simple axioms for arithmetic (the Peano Axioms) | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2888) |
11740 | 1890: James published 'Principles of Psychology' [PG] |
Full Idea: In 1890 James published his 'Principles of Psychology' | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2890) |
11742 | 1895 (roughly): Freud developed theories of the unconscious [PG] |
Full Idea: In around 1895 Sigmund Freud developed his theories of the unconscious mind | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2895) |
11745 | 1900: Husserl began developing Phenomenology [PG] |
Full Idea: In 1900 Edmund Husserl began presenting his new philosophy of Phenomenology | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2900) |
11746 | 1903: Moore published 'Principia Ethica' [PG] |
Full Idea: In 1903 G.E. Moore published his 'Principia Ethica', attacking naturalistic ethics. | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2903) |
11747 | 1904: Dewey became professor at Columbia University [PG] |
Full Idea: In 1904 Dewey moved to Columbia University in New York. | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2904) |
17910 | 1908: Zermelo publishes axioms for set theory [PG] |
Full Idea: In 1908 Zermelo published an axiomatisation of the new set theory | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2908) |
11752 | 1910: Russell and Whitehead begin publishing 'Principia Mathematica' [PG] |
Full Idea: In 1910 Russell began publication of 'Principia Mathematica', with Whitehead | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2910) |
11756 | 1912: Russell meets Wittgenstein in Cambridge [PG] |
Full Idea: In 1912 Russell met Wittgenstein at Cambridge | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2912) |
11762 | 1921: Wittgenstein's 'Tractatus' published [PG] |
Full Idea: In 1921 Wittgenstein's 'Tractatus' was published | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2921) |
11765 | 1927: Heidegger's 'Being and Time' published [PG] |
Full Idea: In 1927 Heidegger's major work, 'Being and Time', was published | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2927) |
11768 | 1930: Frank Ramsey dies at 27 [PG] |
Full Idea: In 1930 Frank Ramsey died at the age of 27. | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2930) |
11770 | 1931: Gödel's Incompleteness Theorems [PG] |
Full Idea: Kurt Gödel: In 1931 the mathematician Kurt Gödel publishes his Incompleteness Theorems. | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2931) |
11773 | 1933: Tarski's theory of truth [PG] |
Full Idea: Alfred Tarski: In 1933 Alfred Tarski wrote a famous paper presenting a semantic theory of truth. | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2933) |
11783 | 1942: Camus published 'The Myth of Sisyphus' [PG] |
Full Idea: In 1942 Camus published 'The Myth of Sisyphus', exploring suicide and the absurd | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2942) |
11784 | 1943: Sartre's 'Being and Nothingness' [PG] |
Full Idea: In 1943 Jean-Paul Sartre published his major work, 'Being and Nothingness' | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2943) |
11787 | 1945: Merleau-Ponty's 'Phenomenology of Perception' [PG] |
Full Idea: Maurice Merleau-Ponty: In 1945 Maurice Merleau-Pont published 'The Phenomenology of Perception' | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2945) |
17918 | 1947: Carnap published 'Meaning and Necessity' [PG] |
Full Idea: In 1947 Carnap published 'Meaning and Necessity' | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2947) |
11794 | 1950: Quine's essay 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism' [PG] |
Full Idea: In 1950 Willard Quine published 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism', attacking analytic truth | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2950) |
17917 | 1953: Wittgenstein's 'Philosophical Investigations' [PG] |
Full Idea: In 1953 Wittgenstein's posthumous work 'Philosophical Investigations' is published | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2953) |
17919 | 1956: Place proposed mind-brain identity [PG] |
Full Idea: In 1956 U.T. Place proposed that the mind is identical to the brain | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2956) |
11804 | 1962: Kuhn's 'Structure of Scientific Revolutions' [PG] |
Full Idea: In 1962 Thomas Kuhn's 'Structure of Scientific Revolutions' questioned the authority of science | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2962) |
17921 | 1967: Putnam proposed functionalism of the mind [PG] |
Full Idea: In 1967 Putname proposed the functionalist view of the mind | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2967) |
11808 | 1971: Rawls's 'A Theory of Justice' [PG] |
Full Idea: In 1971 John Rawls published his famous defence of liberalism in 'A Theory of Justice' | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2971) |
11810 | 1972: Kripke publishes 'Naming and Necessity' [PG] |
Full Idea: In 1972 Saul Kripke's 'Naming and Necessity' revised theories about language and reality | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2972) |
11813 | 1975: Singer publishes 'Animal Rights' [PG] |
Full Idea: Peter Singer: In 1975 Peter Singer's 'Animal Rights' turned the attention of philosophers to applied ethics. | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2975) |
17920 | 1975: Putnam published his Twin Earth example [PG] |
Full Idea: In 1975 Putnam published 'The Meaning of 'Meaning'', containing his Twin Earth example | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2975) |
11820 | 1986: David Lewis publishes 'On the Plurality of Worlds' [PG] |
Full Idea: In 1986 David Lewis published 'On the Plurality of Worlds', about possible worlds. | |
From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2986) |
20772 | Three branches of philosophy: first logic, second ethics, third physics (which ends with theology) [Chrysippus] |
Full Idea: There are three kinds of philosophical theorems, logical, ethical, and physical; of these the logic should be placed first, ethics second, and physics third (and theology is the final topic in physics). | |
From: Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]), quoted by Plutarch - 70: Stoic Self-contradictions 1035a | |
A reaction: [in his lost 'On Lives' Bk 4] 'Theology is the final topic in physics'! That should create a stir in theology departments. Is this an order of study, or of importance? You come to theology right at the end of your studies. |
5969 | Chrysippus said the uncaused is non-existent [Chrysippus, by Plutarch] |
Full Idea: Chrysippus said that the uncaused is altogether non-existent. | |
From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Plutarch - 70: Stoic Self-contradictions 1045c | |
A reaction: The difficulty is to see what empirical basis there can be for such a claim, or what argument of any kind other than an intuition. Induction is the obvious answer, but Hume teaches us scepticism about any claim that 'there can be no exceptions'. |
21388 | The causes of future true events must exist now, so they will happen because of destiny [Chrysippus, by Cicero] |
Full Idea: True future events cannot be such as do not possess causes on account of which they will happen; therefore that which is true must possess causes: and so, when the [true future events] happen they will have happened as a result of destiny. | |
From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by M. Tullius Cicero - On Fate ('De fato') 9.23-8 | |
A reaction: [exact ref unclear] Presumably the current causes are the truthmakers for the future events, and so the past is the truthmaker of the future, if you are a determinist. |
20780 | Graspable presentations are criteria of facts, and are molded according to their objects [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Of presentations, some are graspable, some non-graspable. The graspable presentation, which they say is the criterion of facts [pragmata], is that which comes from an existing object and is stamped and molded in accordance wth the existing object itself. | |
From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 07.46 | |
A reaction: [in lost Physics Bk 2] The big modern anguish over truth-as-correspondence is how you are supposed to verify the 'accordance'. This idea seems to blur the ideas of truth and justification (the 'criterion'), and you can't have both as accordance. |
20793 | How could you ever know that the presentation is similar to the object? [Sext.Empiricus on Chrysippus] |
Full Idea: One cannot say that the soul grasps the externally existing objects by means of the states of the senses on the basis of the similarity of these states to the externally existing objects. For on what basis will it know the similarity? | |
From: comment on Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Sextus Empiricus - Outlines of Pyrrhonism 2.74 | |
A reaction: This exactly the main modern reason for rejecting the correspondence theory of truth. You are welcome to affirm a robust view of truth, but supporting it by claiming a correspondence or resemblance is dubious. |
22309 | An idea can only be like another idea [Berkeley] |
Full Idea: An idea can be like nothing but an idea. | |
From: George Berkeley (The Principles of Human Knowledge [1710], §08), quoted by Michael Potter - The Rise of Analytic Philosophy 1879-1930 43 'Mean' | |
A reaction: I take this to be relevant to the correspondence theory, but also to be one of Berkeley's best observations. We understand ideas, but we can't map them onto the world (because they are not maps!). ...But then how is one idea like another? Hm. |
8077 | Stoic propositional logic is like chemistry - how atoms make molecules, not the innards of atoms [Chrysippus, by Devlin] |
Full Idea: In Stoic logic propositions are treated the way atoms are treated in present-day chemistry, where the focus is on the way atoms fit together to form molecules, rather than on the internal structure of the atoms. | |
From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Keith Devlin - Goodbye Descartes Ch.2 | |
A reaction: A nice analogy to explain the nature of Propositional Logic, which was invented by the Stoics (N.B. after Aristotle had invented predicate logic). |
20791 | Chrysippus has five obvious 'indemonstrables' of reasoning [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Chrysippus has five indemonstrables that do not need demonstration:1) If 1st the 2nd, but 1st, so 2nd; 2) If 1st the 2nd, but not 2nd, so not 1st; 3) Not 1st and 2nd, the 1st, so not 2nd; 4) 1st or 2nd, the 1st, so not 2nd; 5) 1st or 2nd, not 2nd, so 1st. | |
From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 07.80-81 | |
A reaction: [from his lost text 'Dialectics'; squashed to fit into one quote] 1) is Modus Ponens, 2) is Modus Tollens. 4) and 5) are Disjunctive Syllogisms. 3) seems a bit complex to be an indemonstrable. |
8078 | Modus ponens is one of five inference rules identified by the Stoics [Chrysippus, by Devlin] |
Full Idea: Modus ponens is just one of the five different inference rules identified by the Stoics. | |
From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Keith Devlin - Goodbye Descartes Ch.2 | |
A reaction: Modus ponens strikes me as being more like a definition of implication than a 'rule'. Implication is what gets you from one truth to another. All the implications of a truth must also be true. |
6023 | Every proposition is either true or false [Chrysippus, by Cicero] |
Full Idea: We hold fast to the position, defended by Chrysippus, that every proposition is either true or false. | |
From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by M. Tullius Cicero - On Fate ('De fato') 38 | |
A reaction: I am intrigued to know exactly how you defend this claim. It may depend what you mean by a proposition. A badly expressed proposition may have indeterminate truth, quite apart from the vague, the undecidable etc. |
6717 | Abstract ideas are impossible [Berkeley] |
Full Idea: We have, I think, shown the impossibility of Abstract Ideas. | |
From: George Berkeley (The Principles of Human Knowledge [1710], Intro §21) | |
A reaction: He achieves this by an attack on universals, offering the nominalist view that there are only particulars. There seems to be a middle ground, where universals don't actually exist, but there are settled conventional abstraction, beyond particulars. |
5992 | Chrysippus says action is the criterion for existence, which must be physical [Chrysippus, by Tieleman] |
Full Idea: Chrysippus regarded power to act and be acted upon as the criterion for existence or being - a test satisfied by bodies alone. | |
From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Teun L. Tieleman - Chrysippus | |
A reaction: This defines existence in terms of causation. Is he ruling out a priori a particle (say) which exists, but never interacts with anything? If so, he is inclining towards anti-realism. |
18876 | Berkeley does believe in trees, but is confused about what trees are [Berkeley, by Cameron] |
Full Idea: I think that we should consider Berkeley as believing in trees; we should simply claim that he has false beliefs about what trees are. | |
From: report of George Berkeley (The Principles of Human Knowledge [1710]) by Ross P. Cameron - Truthmakers, Realism and Ontology 'Realism' | |
A reaction: I can be realist about spots before my eyes, or a ringing in my ears, but be (quite sensibly) unsure about what they are, so Cameron's suggestion sounds plausible. |
21673 | There are simple and complex facts; the latter depend on further facts [Chrysippus, by Cicero] |
Full Idea: Chrysippus says there are two classes of facts, simple and complex. An instance of a simple fact is 'Socrates will die at a given date', ...but 'Milo will wrestle at Olympia' is a complex statement, because there can be no wrestling without an opponent. | |
From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by M. Tullius Cicero - On Fate ('De fato') 13.30 | |
A reaction: We might say that there are atomic and complex facts, but our atomic facts tend to be much simpler, usually just saying some object has some property. |
16652 | Stoics categories are Substrate, Quality, Disposition, and Relation [Chrysippus, by Pasnau] |
Full Idea: The Stoics proposed a rather modest categorisation of Substrate, Quality, Disposition, and Relation. | |
From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 12.1 |
6715 | Universals do not have single meaning, but attach to many different particulars [Berkeley] |
Full Idea: There is no such thing as one precise and definite signification annexed to any general name, they all signifying indifferently a great number of particular ideas. | |
From: George Berkeley (The Principles of Human Knowledge [1710], Intro §18) | |
A reaction: The term 'red' may be assigned to a range of colours, but we also recognise the precision of 'that red'. For 'electron', or 'three', or 'straight', the particulars are indistinguishable. |
6719 | No one will think of abstractions if they only have particular ideas [Berkeley] |
Full Idea: He that knows he has no other than particular ideas, will not puzzle himself in vain to find out and conceive the abstract idea annexed to any name. | |
From: George Berkeley (The Principles of Human Knowledge [1710], Intro §24) | |
A reaction: A nice point against universals. Maybe gods only think in particulars. One particular on its own could never suggest a universal. How are you going to spot patterns if you don't think in universals? Maths needs patterns. |
6714 | Universals do not have any intrinsic properties, but only relations to particulars [Berkeley] |
Full Idea: Universality, so far as I can comprehend it, does not consist in the absolute, positive nature or conception of anything, but in the relation it bears to the particulars signified or represented by it. | |
From: George Berkeley (The Principles of Human Knowledge [1710], Intro §15) | |
A reaction: I always think it is a basic principle in philosophy that some sort of essence must precede relations (and functions). What is it about universals that enables them to have a relation to particulars? |
6729 | Material substance is just general existence which can have properties [Berkeley] |
Full Idea: The most accurate philosophers have no other meaning annexed to 'material substance' but the idea of being in general, together with the relative notion of its supporting accidents. | |
From: George Berkeley (The Principles of Human Knowledge [1710], §17) | |
A reaction: This is part of the attack on Aristotle's concept of 'substance', and is a nice way of dissolving the concept. 'Substance' will never reappear in physics, but modern philosopher have returned to it, as possibly inescapable in metaphysics. |
16636 | A die has no distinct subject, but is merely a name for its modes or accidents [Berkeley] |
Full Idea: To me a die seems to be nothing distinct from those things which are termed its modes or accidents. And to say a die is hard, extended and square is not to attribute those qualities to a distinct subject, but only an explication of the word 'die'. | |
From: George Berkeley (The Principles of Human Knowledge [1710], n 49) | |
A reaction: This is apparently a reaction to Locke, and a final rejection of the medieval idea of a 'substance'. Unfortunately it leaves Berkeley with a 'bundle' view of objects (a typical empiricist account), which is even worse. |
16058 | Dion and Theon coexist, but Theon lacks a foot. If Dion loses a foot, he ousts Theon? [Chrysippus, by Philo of Alexandria] |
Full Idea: If two individuals occupied one substance …let one individual (Dion) be thought of as whole-limbed, the other (Theon) as minus one foot. Then let one of Dion's feet be amputated. Theon is the stronger candidate to have perished. | |
From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Philo (Alex) - On the Eternity of the World 48 | |
A reaction: [SVF 2.397 - from Chrysippus's lost 'On the Growing Argument'] This is the original of Tibbles the Cat. Dion must persist to change, and then ousts Theon (it seems). Philo protests at Theon ceasing to exist when nothing has happened to him. |
16059 | Change of matter doesn't destroy identity - in Dion and Theon change is a condition of identity [Chrysippus, by Long/Sedley] |
Full Idea: The Growing Argument said any change of matter is a change of identity. Chrysippus presents it with a case (Dion and Theon) where material diminution is the necessary condition of enduring identity, since the diminished footless Dion survives. | |
From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by AA Long / DN Sedley - Hellenic Philosophers commentary 28:175 | |
A reaction: [The example, in Idea 16058, is the original of Tibbles the Cat] This is a lovely bold idea which I haven't met in the modern discussions - that identity actually requires change. The concept of identity is meaningless without change? |
6722 | Perception is existence for my table, but also possible perception, by me or a spirit [Berkeley] |
Full Idea: The table I write on I say exists, that is, I see and feel it; and if I were out of my study I should say it existed - meaning thereby that if I was in my study I might perceive it, or that some other spirit actually does perceive it. | |
From: George Berkeley (The Principles of Human Knowledge [1710], §3) | |
A reaction: Berkeley is always (understandably) labelled as an 'idealist', but this seems to be what we call 'phenomenalism', because it allows possible experiences as well as actual ones. See Ideas 5170 and 6522. |
6723 | The 'esse' of objects is 'percipi', and they can only exist in minds [Berkeley] |
Full Idea: The absolute existence of unthinking things with no relation to their being perceived is unintelligible to me; their 'esse' is 'percipi', nor is it possible they should have any existence out of the minds or thinking things which perceive them. | |
From: George Berkeley (The Principles of Human Knowledge [1710], §3) | |
A reaction: "Esse est percipi" (to be is to be perceived) is the well-known slogan associated with Berkeley. I cannot see how Berkeley can assert that the separate existence of things is impossible. He is the classic confuser of epistemology and ontology. |
6732 | When I shut my eyes, the things I saw may still exist, but in another mind [Berkeley] |
Full Idea: When I shut my eyes, the things I saw may still exist, but it must be in another mind. | |
From: George Berkeley (The Principles of Human Knowledge [1710], §90) | |
A reaction: This strikes me as ridiculous. What kind of theory says that a table goes out of existence when someone forgets to look at it for a moment, but is then recreated in identical form? Epistemology is not ontology. |
6724 | The only substance is spirit, or that which perceives [Berkeley] |
Full Idea: It is evident that there is not any other Substance than spirit, or that which perceives. | |
From: George Berkeley (The Principles of Human Knowledge [1710], §7) | |
A reaction: Weird. To say that this is 'evident' seems to be begging the question. Why should he assume that there is nothing more to reality than his perception of it? He seems strangely unimaginative. |
6726 | No one can, by abstraction, conceive extension and motion of bodies without sensible qualities [Berkeley] |
Full Idea: I desire any one to reflect and try whether he can, by any abstraction of thought, conceive the extension and motion of a body without any sensible qualities. | |
From: George Berkeley (The Principles of Human Knowledge [1710], §10) | |
A reaction: The rather geometrical view of objects found in Descartes and Russell is an attempt to do this. I don't think the fact that we can't really achieve it matters much. We divide primary from secondary qualities in our understanding, not in experience. |
6727 | Figure and extension seem just as dependent on the observer as heat and cold [Berkeley] |
Full Idea: If heat and cold are only affections of the mind (since the same body seems cold to one hand and warm to the other), why may we not argue that figure and extension also appear different to the same eye at different stations? | |
From: George Berkeley (The Principles of Human Knowledge [1710], §14) | |
A reaction: If the assessment of the qualities of an object is entirely a matter of our experiences of it, there is no denying Berkeley on this. However, judgement goes beyond experience, into speculations, inferences, and explanations. |
6728 | Motion is in the mind, since swifter ideas produce an appearance of slower motion [Berkeley] |
Full Idea: Is it not reasonable to say that motion is not without the mind, since if the succession of ideas in the mind become swifter the motion, it is acknowledged, shall appear slower without any alteration in any external object. | |
From: George Berkeley (The Principles of Human Knowledge [1710], §14) | |
A reaction: An intriguing argument, based on what is now the principle of slow-motion photography. Fast minds slow down movement, like great tennis players. By what right does Berkeley say that the external subject is unaltered? |
6495 | Berkeley's idealism resulted from fear of scepticism in representative realism [Robinson,H on Berkeley] |
Full Idea: It was fear of scepticism based upon representative realism that motivated Berkeley's idealism. | |
From: comment on George Berkeley (The Principles of Human Knowledge [1710]) by Howard Robinson - Perception II.1 | |
A reaction: Personally I side with Russell, who accepts representative realism, and also accepts that some degree of scepticism is unavoidable, but without getting excited about it. The key to everything is to be a 'fallibilist' about knowledge. |
6720 | Knowledge is of ideas from senses, or ideas of the mind, or operations on sensations [Berkeley] |
Full Idea: The objects of knowledge are either ideas imprinted on the senses, or passions and operations of the mind, or ideas (formed by memory and imagination) compounding, dividing or barely representing the original perceptions. | |
From: George Berkeley (The Principles of Human Knowledge [1710], §1) | |
A reaction: This is the germ of Hume's 'associations' (Idea 2189). There is not much room here for synthetic a priori knowledge, as the a priori part seems to merely know the mind. Most of Russell's epistemology is contained in the last part of the sentence. |
23636 | Berkeley's idealism gives no grounds for believing in other minds [Reid on Berkeley] |
Full Idea: I can find no principle in Berkeley's system, which affords me even probable ground to conclude that there are other intelligent beings, like myself. | |
From: comment on George Berkeley (The Principles of Human Knowledge [1710]) by Thomas Reid - Essays on Intellectual Powers 2: Senses 10 | |
A reaction: I agree, which means that Berkeley's position seems to entail solipsism, unless God is the Cartesian deus ex machina who rescues him from this wall of ignorance. |
6736 | I know other minds by ideas which are referred by me to other agents, as their effects [Berkeley] |
Full Idea: The knowledge I have of other spirits is not immediate, as is the knowledge of my ideas; but depending on the intervention of ideas, by me referred to agents or spirits distinct from myself, as effects or concomitant signs. | |
From: George Berkeley (The Principles of Human Knowledge [1710], §145) | |
A reaction: This strikes me as gross intellectual dishonesty, since the argument Berkeley uses to assert other minds could equally be used to assert the existence of tables ('by me referred to agents distinct from myself, as effects'). Be a solipsist or a realist. |
1875 | Dogs show reason in decisions made by elimination [Chrysippus, by Sext.Empiricus] |
Full Idea: A dog makes use of the fifth complex indemonstrable syllogism when, arriving at a spot where three ways meet, after smelling at two roads by which the quarry did not pass, he rushes off at once by the third without pausing to smell. | |
From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Sextus Empiricus - Outlines of Pyrrhonism I.69 | |
A reaction: As we might say: either A or B or C; not A; not B; therefore C. I wouldn't want to trust this observation without a lot of analysis of slow-motion photography of dogs as crossroads. Even so, it is a nice challenge to Descartes' view of animals. |
6713 | If animals have ideas, and are not machines, they must have some reason [Berkeley] |
Full Idea: If the brutes have any ideas at all, and are not bare machines (as some would have them), we cannot deny them to have some reason. | |
From: George Berkeley (The Principles of Human Knowledge [1710], Intro §11) | |
A reaction: It seems possible to imagine a low level of mind, where a few ideas (or concepts) float around, but hardly anything worth the name of reason. However, a Darwinian view suggests that concepts must bestow an advantage, so the two go together. |
6491 | Berkeley replaced intentionality with an anti-abstractionist imagist theory of thought [Berkeley, by Robinson,H] |
Full Idea: By Berkeley - with his anti-abstractionism and imagist theory of thought - the classical sense-datum conception was firmly established, and intentionality had disappeared as an intrinsic property, not only of perceptual states, but of all mental contents. | |
From: report of George Berkeley (The Principles of Human Knowledge [1710]) by Howard Robinson - Perception 1.6 | |
A reaction: Intentionality was originally a medieval concept, and was revived by Brentano in the late nineteenth century. Nowadays intentionality is taken for granted, but I still suspect that we could drop it, and talk of nothing but brain states caused by reality. |
6711 | The mind creates abstract ideas by considering qualities separated from their objects [Berkeley] |
Full Idea: We are told that the mind being able to consider each quality of things singly, or abstracted from those other qualities with which it is united, does by that means frame to itself abstract ideas. | |
From: George Berkeley (The Principles of Human Knowledge [1710], Intro §7) | |
A reaction: A helpful explanation of 'abstract' ideas. Berkeley gives colour and movement as examples. Fodor suggests that abstraction is the key strategy in empiricist epistemology. The difficulty is to decide whether the qualities are natural or conventional. |
10581 | I can only combine particulars in imagination; I can't create 'abstract' ideas [Berkeley] |
Full Idea: Whether others can abstract their ideas, they best can tell. For myself, I find I have a faculty of imagining, or representing to myself, only the idea of those particular things I have perceived, and of compounding and dividing them. | |
From: George Berkeley (The Principles of Human Knowledge [1710], 10) | |
A reaction: He is admitting mixing experiences, but always particulars, never abstract. His examples are 'man' and 'motion'. Compare Aristotle Idea 9067. Berkeley is, I think, trapped in a false imagistic view of thought. My image of Plato blurs young and old. |
6721 | Ideas are perceived by the mind, soul or self [Berkeley] |
Full Idea: The thing which knows or perceives ideas is what I call mind, spirit, soul or myself. | |
From: George Berkeley (The Principles of Human Knowledge [1710], §2) | |
A reaction: The interest here is in making no distinction between 'mind' and 'self', which seems to ally Berkeley with Locke's view of personal identity, as continuity of consciousness. The addition of 'soul' tries to connect Locke to Christian thought. |
20834 | Chrysippus allows evil to say it is fated, or even that it is rational and natural [Plutarch on Chrysippus] |
Full Idea: Chrysippus gives vice blatant freedom to say not only that it is necessary and according to fate, but even that it occurs according to god's reason and the best nature. | |
From: comment on Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Plutarch - 70: Stoic Self-contradictions 1050c | |
A reaction: This is Plutarch's criticism of stoic determinism or fatalism. Zeno replied that the punishment for vice may also be fated. It seems that Chysippus did believe that punishments were too harsh, given that vices are fated [p.109]. |
20833 | A swerve in the atoms would be unnatural, like scales settling differently for no reason [Chrysippus, by Plutarch] |
Full Idea: Chrysippus argues against the 'swerve' of the Epicureans, on the grounds that they are doing violence to nature by positing something which is uncaused, and cites dice or scales, which can't settle differently without some cause or difference. | |
From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Plutarch - 70: Stoic Self-contradictions 1045c | |
A reaction: That is, the principle of sufficient reason (or of everything having a cause) is derived from observation, not a priori understanding. Pace Leibniz. As in modern discussion, free will or the swerve only occur in our minds, and not elsewhere. |
20808 | Everything is fated, either by continuous causes or by a supreme rational principle [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Chrysippus says (in his 'On Fate') that everything happens by fate. Fate is a continuous string of causes of things which exist or a rational principle according to which the cosmos is managed. | |
From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 07.148 |
20835 | Chrysippus is wrong to believe in non-occurring future possibilities if he is a fatalist [Plutarch on Chrysippus] |
Full Idea: Chrysippus's accounts of possibility and fate are in conflict. If he is right that 'everything that permits of occurring even if it is not going to occur is possible', then many things are possible which are not according to fate. | |
From: comment on Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Plutarch - 70: Stoic Self-contradictions 1055e | |
A reaction: A palpable hit, I think. Plutarch refers to Chrysippus's rejection of Diodorus Cronus's Master Argument. Fatalism seems to entail that the only future possibilities are the ones that actually occur. |
20836 | The Lazy Argument responds to fate with 'why bother?', but the bothering is also fated [Chrysippus, by Cicero] |
Full Idea: Chrysippus responded to the Lazy Argument (that the outcome of an illness is fated, so there is no point in calling the doctor) by saying 'calling the doctor is fated just as much as recovering', which he calls 'co-fated'. | |
From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by M. Tullius Cicero - On Fate ('De fato') 28-30 | |
A reaction: From a pragmatic point of view, this idea also nullifies fatalism, since you can plausibly fight against your fate to your last breath. No evidence could ever be offered in support of fatalism, not even the most unlikely events. |
21679 | When we say events are fated by antecedent causes, do we mean principal or auxiliary causes? [Chrysippus] |
Full Idea: Some causes are perfect and principal, others auxiliary and proximate. Hence when we say that everything takes place by fate owing to antecedent causes, what we wish to be understood is not perfect and principal causes but auxiliary and proximate causes. | |
From: Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]), quoted by M. Tullius Cicero - On Fate ('De fato') 18.41 | |
A reaction: This move is described by Cicero as enabling Chrysippus to 'escape necessity and to retain fate'. |
20837 | Fate is an eternal and fixed chain of causal events [Chrysippus] |
Full Idea: Fate is a sempiternal and unchangeable series and chain of things, rolling and unravelling itself through eternal sequences of cause and effect, of which it is composed and compounded. | |
From: Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]), quoted by Aulus Gellius - Noctes Atticae 7.2.01 | |
A reaction: It seems that Chrysippus (called by Aulus Gellius 'the chief Stoic philosopher') had a rather grandly rhetorical prose style. |
5971 | Destiny is only a predisposing cause, not a sufficient cause [Chrysippus, by Plutarch] |
Full Idea: Chrysippus considered destiny to be not a cause sufficient of itself but only a predisposing cause. | |
From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE], fr 997) by Plutarch - 70: Stoic Self-contradictions 1056b | |
A reaction: This appears to be a rejection of determinism, and is the equivalent of Epicurus' introduction of the 'swerve' in atoms. They had suddenly become bothered about the free will problem in about 305 BCE. There must be other non-destiny causes? |
6716 | Language is presumably for communication, and names stand for ideas [Berkeley] |
Full Idea: It is a received opinion that language has no other end but the communicating our ideas, and that every significant name stands for an idea. | |
From: George Berkeley (The Principles of Human Knowledge [1710], Intro §19) | |
A reaction: This attitude to language has been widely discredited, partly by the observation that 'idea' is very ambiguous, and partly by the fans of meaning-as-use. Truth conditions seem to be ideas, and so are speaker's intentions. |
20787 | A proposition is what can be asserted or denied on its own [Chrysippus] |
Full Idea: A proposition is what can be asserted or denied on its own, for example, 'It is day' or 'Dion is walking'. | |
From: Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]), quoted by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 07.65 | |
A reaction: Note the phrase 'on its own'. If you say 'it is day and Dion is walking', that can't be denied on its own, because first the two halves must each be evaluated, so presumably that doesn't count as a stoic proposition. |
6718 | I can't really go wrong if I stick to wordless thought [Berkeley] |
Full Idea: So long as I confine my thoughts to my own ideas divested of words, I do not see how I can easily be mistaken. | |
From: George Berkeley (The Principles of Human Knowledge [1710], Intro §22) | |
A reaction: I think it was one of the great errors of twentieth century philosophy to say that Berkeley cannot do this, because thought needs language. Personally I think language lags along behind most our thinking, tidying up the mess. I believe in propositions. |
20850 | Passions are judgements; greed thinks money is honorable, and likewise drinking and lust [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Chrysippus says (in his On Passions) that the passions are judgements; for greed is a supposition that money is honorable, and similarly for drunkennes and wantonness and others. | |
From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 07.111 | |
A reaction: This is an endorsement of Socrates's intellectualist reading of weakness of will, as against Aristotle's assigning it to overpowering passions. |
20869 | The highest degree of morality performs all that is appropriate, omitting nothing [Chrysippus] |
Full Idea: He who makes moral progress to the highest degree performs all the appropriate actions in all circumstances, and omits none. | |
From: Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]), quoted by Sophocles - Sophocles' Electra 4.39.22 | |
A reaction: Hence concerns about omission as well as commission in the practice of ethics can be seen in the light of character and virtue. The world is fully of nice people who act well, but don't do so well on omissions. Car drivers, for example. |
3044 | Stoics say that beauty and goodness are equivalent and linked [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Stoics say the beautiful is the only good. Good is an equivalent term to the beautiful; since a thing is good, it is beautiful; and it is beautiful, therefore it is good. | |
From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 07.1.59 |
20838 | Fate initiates general causes, but individual wills and characters dictate what we do [Chrysippus] |
Full Idea: The order and reason of fate set in motion the general types and starting points of the causes, but each person's own will [or decisions] and the character of his mind govern the impulses of our thoughts and minds and our very actions. | |
From: Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]), quoted by Aulus Gellius - Noctes Atticae 7.2.11 | |
A reaction: So if you try and fail it was fate, but if you try and succeed it was you? |
20813 | Human purpose is to contemplate and imitate the cosmos [Chrysippus] |
Full Idea: The human being was born for the sake of contemplating and imitating the cosmos. | |
From: Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]), quoted by M. Tullius Cicero - On the Nature of the Gods ('De natura deorum') 2.37 | |
A reaction: [This seems to be an idea of Chrysippus] Remind me how to imitate the cosmos. Presumably this is living according to nature, but that becomes more obscure when express like this. |
3045 | Stoics say justice is a part of nature, not just an invented principle [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Stoics say that justice exists by nature, and not because of any definition or principle. | |
From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 07.1.66 | |
A reaction: cf Idea 3024. Stoics thought that nature is intrinsically rational, and therein lies its justice. 'King Lear' enacts this drama about whether nature is just. |
20774 | Only nature is available to guide action and virtue [Chrysippus] |
Full Idea: What am I to take as the principle of appropriate action and raw material for virtue if I give up nature and what is according to nature? | |
From: Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]), quoted by Plutarch - On Common Conceptions 1069e | |
A reaction: 'Nature' is awfully vague as a guideline, even when we are told nature is rational. I can only make sense of it as 'human nature', which is more Aristotelian than stoic. 'Go with the flow' and 'lay the cards you are dealt' might capture it. |
20864 | Live in agreement, according to experience of natural events [Chrysippus] |
Full Idea: The goal of life is to live in agreement, which is according to experience of the things which happen by nature. | |
From: Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 2.06a | |
A reaction: Cleanthes added 'with nature' to Zeno's slogan, and Chyrisppus added this variation. At least it gives you some idea of what the consistent rational principle should be. You still have to assess which aspects of nature should influence us. |
5972 | Living happily is nothing but living virtuously [Chrysippus, by Plutarch] |
Full Idea: According to Chrysippus, living happily consists solely in living virtuously. | |
From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE], fr139) by Plutarch - 72: Against Stoics on common Conceptions 1060d | |
A reaction: This, along with 'live according to nature', is the essential doctrine of stoicism. This is 'eudaimonia', not the modern idea of feeling nice. Is it possible to admire another person for anything other than virtue? (Yes! Looks, brains, strength, wealth). |
1777 | Pleasure is not the good, because there are disgraceful pleasures [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Pleasure is not the good, because there are disgraceful pleasures, and nothing disgraceful is good. | |
From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 07.Ze.60 | |
A reaction: I certainly approve of the idea that not all pleasure is intrinsically good. Indeed, I think good has probably got nothing to do with pleasure. 'Disgraceful' is hardly objective though. |
5973 | Justice can be preserved if pleasure is a good, but not if it is the goal [Chrysippus, by Plutarch] |
Full Idea: Chrysippus thinks that, while justice could not be preserved if one should set up pleasure as the goal, it could be if one should take pleasure to be not a goal but simply a good. | |
From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE], fr 23) by Plutarch - 72: Against Stoics on common Conceptions 1070d | |
A reaction: This is an interesting and original contribution to the ancient debate about pleasure. It shows Aristotle's moderate criticism of pleasure (e.g. Idea 84), but attempts to pinpoint where the danger is. Aristotle says it thwarts achievement of the mean. |
20845 | There are shameful pleasures, and nothing shameful is good, so pleasure is not a good [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Chrysippus (in his On Pleasure) denies even of pleasure that it is a good; for there are also shameful pleasures, and nothing shameful is good. | |
From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 07.103 | |
A reaction: Socrates seems to have started this line of the thought, to argue that pleasure is not The Good. Stoics are more puritanical. Nothing counts as good if it is capable of being bad. Thus good pleasures are not good, which sounds odd. |
5967 | People need nothing except corn and water [Chrysippus, by Plutarch] |
Full Idea: Chrysippus praises ad nauseam the lines "For what need mortals save two things alone,/ Demeter's grain and draughts of water clear". | |
From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Plutarch - 70: Stoic Self-contradictions 1043e | |
A reaction: "Oh, reason not the need!" says King Lear. The remark shows the close affinity of stoicism and cynicism, as the famous story of Diogenes is that he threw away his drinking cup when he realised you could drink with your hands. |
5966 | All virtue is good, but not always praised (as in not lusting after someone ugly) [Chrysippus] |
Full Idea: Although deeds done in accordance with virtue are congenial, not all are cited as examples, such as courageously extending one's finger, or continently abstaining from a half-dead old woman, or not immediately agreeing that three is four. | |
From: Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE], fr 211), quoted by Plutarch - 70: Stoic Self-contradictions 1038f | |
A reaction: Presumably the point (so elegantly expressed - what a shame we have lost most of Chrysippus) is that virtue comes in degrees, even though its value is an absolute. The same has been said (by Russell and Bonjour) about self-evidence. |
20855 | Chrysippus says virtue can be lost (though Cleanthes says it is too secure for that) [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Chrysippus says that virtue can be lost, owing to drunkenness and excess of black bile, whereas Cleanthes says it cannot, because it consists in secure intellectual grasps, and it is worth choosing for its own sake. | |
From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 07.127 | |
A reaction: Succumbing to drunkenness looks like evidence that you were not truly virtuous. Mental illness is something else. On the whole I agree the Cleanthes. |
5970 | Chrysippus says nothing is blameworthy, as everything conforms with the best nature [Chrysippus, by Plutarch] |
Full Idea: Chrysippus has often written on the theme that there is nothing reprehensible or blameworthy in the universe since all things are accomplished in conformity with the best nature. | |
From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Plutarch - 70: Stoic Self-contradictions 1051b | |
A reaction: This is Leibniz's "best of all possible worlds", but deriving the idea from the rightness of nature rather than the perfection of God. Chrysippus has a more plausible ground than Leibniz, as for him nasty things follow from conscious choice. |
20842 | Rational animals begin uncorrupted, but externals and companions are bad influences [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: The rational animal is corrupted, sometimes because of the persuasiveness of external activities and sometimes because of the influence of companions. For the starting points provided by nature are uncorrupted. | |
From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 07.89 | |
A reaction: If companions corrupt us, what corrupted the companions? Aren't we all in this together? And where do the 'external activities' originate? |
20856 | Justice, the law, and right reason are natural and not conventional [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Chrysippus says (in On the Honourable) that justice is natural and not conventional, as are the law and right reason. | |
From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 07.128 | |
A reaction: How does he explain variations in the law between different states? Presumably some of them have got it wrong. What is the criterion for deciding which laws are natural? |
1779 | We don't have obligations to animals as they aren't like us [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: We have no obligations of justice to other animals, because they are dissimilar to us. | |
From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 07.Ze.66 | |
A reaction: "Dissimilar" begs questions. Some human beings don't seem much like me. How are we going to treat visiting aliens? |
20857 | Justice is irrelevant to animals, because they are too unlike us [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: There is no justice between us and other animals because of the dissimilarity between us and them. | |
From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 07.129 | |
A reaction: [from lost On Justice Bk 1] What would he make of modern revelations about bonobos and chimpanzees? If there is great dissimilarity between some peoples, does that invalidate justice between them? He also said animals exist for our use. |
20812 | Covers are for shields, and sheaths for swords; likewise, all in the cosmos is for some other thing [Chrysippus] |
Full Idea: Just as the cover was made for the sake of the shield, and the sheath for the sword, in the same way everything else except the cosmos was made for the sake of other things. | |
From: Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]), quoted by M. Tullius Cicero - On the Nature of the Gods ('De natura deorum') 2.37 | |
A reaction: Chrysippus was wise to stop at the cosmos. Similarly, religious teleology had better not ask about the purpose of God. What does he think pebbles are for? Nature is the source of stoic value, so it needs to be purposeful. |
21403 | The later Stoics identified the logos with an air-fire compound, called 'pneuma' [Chrysippus, by Long] |
Full Idea: From Chrysippus onwards, the Stoics identified the logos throughout each world-cycle not with pure fire, but with a compound of fire and air, 'pneuma'. | |
From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by A.A. Long - Hellenistic Philosophy 4.4.2 | |
A reaction: I suspect this was because breath is so vital to the human body. |
20828 | Fire is a separate element, not formed with others (as was previously believed) [Chrysippus, by Stobaeus] |
Full Idea: In his theory fire is said independently to be an element, since it is not formed together with another one, whereas according to the earlier theory fire is formed with other elements. | |
From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by John Stobaeus - Anthology 1.10.16c | |
A reaction: The point is that fire precedes the other elements, and is superior to them. |
5975 | Stoics say earth, air, fire and water are the primary elements [Chrysippus, by Plutarch] |
Full Idea: The Stoics call the four bodies - earth and water and air and fire - primary elements. | |
From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE], fr 444) by Plutarch - 72: Against Stoics on common Conceptions 1085c | |
A reaction: Elsewhere (fr 413) Chrysippus denies that they are all 'primary'. Essentially, though, he seems to be adopting the doctrine of Empedocles and Aristotle, in specific opposition to Epicurus' atomism. |
6731 | No one can explain how matter affects mind, so matter is redundant in philosophy [Berkeley] |
Full Idea: How matter should operate on a spirit, or produce any idea in it, is what no philosopher will pretend to explain; it is therefore evident there can be no use of matter in natural philosophy. | |
From: George Berkeley (The Principles of Human Knowledge [1710], §50) | |
A reaction: An intriguing argument for idealism, which starts in Cartesian dualism, but then discards the physical world because of the notorious interaction problem. Of course, if he had thought that matter and spirit were one (Spinoza) the problem vanishes. |
6730 | We discover natural behaviour by observing settled laws of nature, not necessary connections [Berkeley] |
Full Idea: That food nourishes, sleep refreshes, and fire warms us; all this we know, not by discovering any necessary connexion between our ideas, but only by the observation of the settled laws of nature. | |
From: George Berkeley (The Principles of Human Knowledge [1710], §31) | |
A reaction: Hume is famous for this idea, but it is found in Hobbes too (Idea 2364), and is the standard empiricist view of causation. The word 'settled' I take to imply that the laws are contingent, because they could become unsettled at any time. |
15861 | The laws of nature are mental regularities which we learn by experience [Berkeley] |
Full Idea: The set rules or established methods wherein the Mind we depend on excites in us the ideas of sense, are called the 'laws of nature'; and these we learn by experience, which teaches us that such and such ideas are attended with certain other ideas. | |
From: George Berkeley (The Principles of Human Knowledge [1710], 33) | |
A reaction: He observes that the ideas of sense are more regular than other mental events, and attributes the rules to an Author. He is giving the standard empirical Humean view, with his own quirky idealist slant. |
6734 | If properties and qualities arise from an inward essence, we will remain ignorant of nature [Berkeley] |
Full Idea: An inducement to pronouncing ourselves ignorant of the nature of things is the opinion that everything includes within itself the cause of its properties; or that there is in each object an inward essence which is the source whence its qualities flow. | |
From: George Berkeley (The Principles of Human Knowledge [1710], §102) | |
A reaction: This remains a good objection to essentialism - that while it remains quite a plausible picture of how nature operates, it makes the task of understanding nature hopeless. We can grasp imposed regular laws, but not secret inner essences. |
6735 | All motion is relative, so a single body cannot move [Berkeley] |
Full Idea: There cannot be any motion other than relative; …if there was one only body in being it could not possibly move. | |
From: George Berkeley (The Principles of Human Knowledge [1710], §112) | |
A reaction: This seems to agree with with Leibniz in denying the Newton-Clarke idea of absolute space. See Idea 2100. Suppose there were two bodies racing towards one another, when one of them suddenly vanished? |
6733 | I cannot imagine time apart from the flow of ideas in my mind [Berkeley] |
Full Idea: Whenever I attempt to frame a simple idea of time, abstracted from the succession of ideas in my mind, which flows uniformly and is participated in by all beings, I am lost and embrangled in inextricable difficulties. | |
From: George Berkeley (The Principles of Human Knowledge [1710], §98) | |
A reaction: 'Embrangled'! A nice statement of the idealist view of time, as entirely mental. I know what he means. However, surely he can manage to imagine a movement which continues when he shuts he eyes? Try blinking during a horse race. |
20819 | The past and the future subsist, but only the present exists [Chrysippus, by Plutarch] |
Full Idea: When he wished to be subtle, Chrysippus wrote that the past part of time and the future part do not exist but subsist, and only the present exists. | |
From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Plutarch - On Common Conceptions 1081f | |
A reaction: [from lost On Void] I think I prefer the ontology of Idea 20818. Idea 20819 does not offer an epistemology. Is the present substantial enough to be known? The word 'subsist' is an ontological evasion (even though Russell briefly relied on it). |
20818 | The present does not exist, so our immediate experience is actually part past and part future [Chrysippus, by Plutarch] |
Full Idea: Stoics do not allow a minimal time to exist, and do not want to have a partless 'now'; so what one thinks one has grasped as present is in part future and in part past. | |
From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Plutarch - On Common Conceptions 1081c | |
A reaction: [from lost On Parts Bk3-5] I agree with the ontology here, but I take our grasp of the present to be very short-term memory of the past. I ignore special relativity. Chrysippus expressed two views about this; in the other one he was a Presentist. |
20821 | Time is continous and infinitely divisible, so there cannot be a wholly present time [Chrysippus, by Stobaeus] |
Full Idea: Chrysippus says most clearly that no time is wholly present; for since the divisibility of continuous things is infinite, time as a whole is also subject to infinite divisibility by this method of division. | |
From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by John Stobaeus - Anthology 1.08.42 | |
A reaction: But what is his reason for thinking that time is a continuous thing? There is a minimum time in quantum mechanics (the Planck Time), but do these quantum intervals overlap? Compare Idea 20819. |
3048 | Stoics say that God the creator is the perfection of all animals [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Stoics say that God is an animal immortal, rational, perfect, and intellectual in his happiness, unsusceptible of any kind of evil, having a foreknowledge of the world; however, he is not the figure of a man, and is the creator of the universe. | |
From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 07.1.72 |
20773 | The origin of justice can only be in Zeus, and in nature [Chrysippus] |
Full Idea: One can find no other starting point or origin for justice except the one derived from Zeus and that derived from the common nature; for everything like this must have that starting point, if we are going to say anything at all about good and bad things. | |
From: Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]), quoted by Plutarch - 70: Stoic Self-contradictions 1035c | |
A reaction: [in lost 'On Gods' bk 3] This appears to offer two starting points, in the mind of Zeus, and in nature, though since nature is presumed to be rational the two may run together. Is Zeus the embodiment, or the unconscious source, or the maker of decrees? |
3042 | Stoics teach that law is identical with right reason, which is the will of Zeus [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Stoics teach that common law is identical with that right reason which pervades everything, being the same with Zeus, who is the regulator and chief manager of all existing things. | |
From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 07.1.53 |
5965 | The source of all justice is Zeus and the universal nature [Chrysippus] |
Full Idea: It is not possible to discover any other beginning of justice or any source for it other than that from Zeus and from the universal nature. | |
From: Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE], fr 326), quoted by Plutarch - 70: Stoic Self-contradictions 1035c | |
A reaction: If the source is 'universal nature', that could agree with Plato, but if the source is Zeus, then stoicism is a religion rather than a philosophy. |
1782 | Stoics teach that God is a unity, variously known as Mind, or Fate, or Jupiter [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Stoics teach that God is unity, and that he is called Mind, and Fate, and Jupiter, and by many names besides. | |
From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 07.Ze.68 |
20830 | Death can't separate soul from body, because incorporeal soul can't unite with body [Chrysippus] |
Full Idea: Death is a separation of soul from body. But nothing incorporeal can be separated from a body. For neither does anything incorporeal touch a body, and the soul touches and is separated from the body. Therefore the soul is not incorporeal. | |
From: Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]), quoted by Tertullian - The Soul as an 'Astral Body' 5.3 | |
A reaction: This is the classic interaction difficulty for substance dualist theories of mind. |
6737 | Particular evils are really good when linked to the whole system of beings [Berkeley] |
Full Idea: Those particular things which, considered in themselves, appear to be evil, have the nature of good, when considered as linked with the whole system of beings. | |
From: George Berkeley (The Principles of Human Knowledge [1710], §153) | |
A reaction: This wildly contradicts the rest of Berkeley's philosophy, which is strictly empiricist, and rests wholly on actual experience. What experience does he have of the 'whole system of beings', and its making evil into actual good? |
21404 | There is a rationale in terrible disasters; they are useful to the whole, and make good possible [Chrysippus] |
Full Idea: The evil which occurs in terrible disasters has a rationale [logos] peculiar to itself: for in a sense it occurs in accordance with universal reason, and is not without usefulness in relation to the whole. For without it there could be no good. | |
From: Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]), quoted by A.A. Long - Hellenistic Philosophy 4.4.5 | |
A reaction: [a quotation from Chrysippus. Plutarch, Comm Not 1065b] A nice question about any terrible disaster is whether it is in some way 'useful', if we take a broader view of things. Almost everything has a good aspect, from that perspective. |