115 ideas
9199 | Wisdom for one instant is as good as wisdom for eternity [Chrysippus] |
Full Idea: If a person has wisdom for one instant, he is no less happy than he who possesses it for eternity. | |
From: Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]), quoted by Pierre Hadot - Philosophy as a way of life 8 | |
A reaction: [Hadot quotes Plutarch 'On Common Conceptions' 8,1062a] This makes it sound awfully like some sort of Buddhist 'enlightenment', which strikes like lightning. He does wisdom recognise itself - by a warm glow, or by the cautious thought that got you there? |
20853 | Wise men should try to participate in politics, since they are a good influence [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: The wise man will participate in politics unless something prevents him, for he will restrain vice and promote virtue. | |
From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 07.121 | |
A reaction: [from lost On Ways of Life Bk 1] We have made modern politics so hostile for its participants, thanks to cruel media pressure, that the best people now run a mile from it. Disastrous. |
20772 | Three branches of philosophy: first logic, second ethics, third physics (which ends with theology) [Chrysippus] |
Full Idea: There are three kinds of philosophical theorems, logical, ethical, and physical; of these the logic should be placed first, ethics second, and physics third (and theology is the final topic in physics). | |
From: Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]), quoted by Plutarch - 70: Stoic Self-contradictions 1035a | |
A reaction: [in his lost 'On Lives' Bk 4] 'Theology is the final topic in physics'! That should create a stir in theology departments. Is this an order of study, or of importance? You come to theology right at the end of your studies. |
20910 | Everything happens necessarily, and for a reason [Democritus] |
Full Idea: Nothing happens at random, but everything for a reason and as the effect of necessity. | |
From: Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE], B002), quoted by Pseudo-Plutarch - On the Doctrine of the Philosophers 1.25.4 | |
A reaction: [In Aetius 'Stob'] This remark reminds us of the link between necessity and sufficient reason. Do all reasons arise for a reason? |
5969 | Chrysippus said the uncaused is non-existent [Chrysippus, by Plutarch] |
Full Idea: Chrysippus said that the uncaused is altogether non-existent. | |
From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Plutarch - 70: Stoic Self-contradictions 1045c | |
A reaction: The difficulty is to see what empirical basis there can be for such a claim, or what argument of any kind other than an intuition. Induction is the obvious answer, but Hume teaches us scepticism about any claim that 'there can be no exceptions'. |
21388 | The causes of future true events must exist now, so they will happen because of destiny [Chrysippus, by Cicero] |
Full Idea: True future events cannot be such as do not possess causes on account of which they will happen; therefore that which is true must possess causes: and so, when the [true future events] happen they will have happened as a result of destiny. | |
From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by M. Tullius Cicero - On Fate ('De fato') 9.23-8 | |
A reaction: [exact ref unclear] Presumably the current causes are the truthmakers for the future events, and so the past is the truthmaker of the future, if you are a determinist. |
20780 | Graspable presentations are criteria of facts, and are molded according to their objects [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Of presentations, some are graspable, some non-graspable. The graspable presentation, which they say is the criterion of facts [pragmata], is that which comes from an existing object and is stamped and molded in accordance wth the existing object itself. | |
From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 07.46 | |
A reaction: [in lost Physics Bk 2] The big modern anguish over truth-as-correspondence is how you are supposed to verify the 'accordance'. This idea seems to blur the ideas of truth and justification (the 'criterion'), and you can't have both as accordance. |
20793 | How could you ever know that the presentation is similar to the object? [Sext.Empiricus on Chrysippus] |
Full Idea: One cannot say that the soul grasps the externally existing objects by means of the states of the senses on the basis of the similarity of these states to the externally existing objects. For on what basis will it know the similarity? | |
From: comment on Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Sextus Empiricus - Outlines of Pyrrhonism 2.74 | |
A reaction: This exactly the main modern reason for rejecting the correspondence theory of truth. You are welcome to affirm a robust view of truth, but supporting it by claiming a correspondence or resemblance is dubious. |
8077 | Stoic propositional logic is like chemistry - how atoms make molecules, not the innards of atoms [Chrysippus, by Devlin] |
Full Idea: In Stoic logic propositions are treated the way atoms are treated in present-day chemistry, where the focus is on the way atoms fit together to form molecules, rather than on the internal structure of the atoms. | |
From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Keith Devlin - Goodbye Descartes Ch.2 | |
A reaction: A nice analogy to explain the nature of Propositional Logic, which was invented by the Stoics (N.B. after Aristotle had invented predicate logic). |
20791 | Chrysippus has five obvious 'indemonstrables' of reasoning [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Chrysippus has five indemonstrables that do not need demonstration:1) If 1st the 2nd, but 1st, so 2nd; 2) If 1st the 2nd, but not 2nd, so not 1st; 3) Not 1st and 2nd, the 1st, so not 2nd; 4) 1st or 2nd, the 1st, so not 2nd; 5) 1st or 2nd, not 2nd, so 1st. | |
From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 07.80-81 | |
A reaction: [from his lost text 'Dialectics'; squashed to fit into one quote] 1) is Modus Ponens, 2) is Modus Tollens. 4) and 5) are Disjunctive Syllogisms. 3) seems a bit complex to be an indemonstrable. |
8078 | Modus ponens is one of five inference rules identified by the Stoics [Chrysippus, by Devlin] |
Full Idea: Modus ponens is just one of the five different inference rules identified by the Stoics. | |
From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Keith Devlin - Goodbye Descartes Ch.2 | |
A reaction: Modus ponens strikes me as being more like a definition of implication than a 'rule'. Implication is what gets you from one truth to another. All the implications of a truth must also be true. |
6023 | Every proposition is either true or false [Chrysippus, by Cicero] |
Full Idea: We hold fast to the position, defended by Chrysippus, that every proposition is either true or false. | |
From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by M. Tullius Cicero - On Fate ('De fato') 38 | |
A reaction: I am intrigued to know exactly how you defend this claim. It may depend what you mean by a proposition. A badly expressed proposition may have indeterminate truth, quite apart from the vague, the undecidable etc. |
16146 | Two can't be a self-contained unit, because it would need to be one to do that [Democritus, by Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Democritus claimed that one substance could not be composed from two nor two from one. …The same will clearly go for number, on the popular assumption that number is a combination of units. Unless two is one, it cannot contain a unit in actuality. | |
From: report of Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE]) by Aristotle - Metaphysics 1039a15 | |
A reaction: Chrysippus followed this up the first part with the memorable example of Dion and Theon. The problem with the second part is that 2, 3 and 4 are three numbers, so they can count as meta-units. |
20901 | True Being only occurs when it is completely full, with atoms and no void [Democritus, by Aristotle] |
Full Idea: In response to defenders of the One, Democritus says that what is, in the proper sense, is being that is completely full, but that such a being is not one, but that they are unlimited in number and invisible because of the smallness of their masses. | |
From: report of Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE], A007) by Aristotle - Coming-to-be and Passing-away (Gen/Corr) 325a28 | |
A reaction: Democritus is in a tangle here. He says proper being has no void, having apparently conceded that motion needs void (which he admits is non-existent). So true being only occurs when everything grinds to a halt, which is not now. But Idea 20902. |
20902 | Being does not exist more than non-being [Democritus, by Aristotle] |
Full Idea: They say that being does not exist more than non-being, because neither does the void exist more than the body. | |
From: report of Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE], A006) by Aristotle - Metaphysics 0985b09 | |
A reaction: The claim that Being and Non-Being are the same thing is pretty startling. It seems to be an expedient to get Void into the picture, even though it is taken to be wholly devoid of qualities. |
20904 | The non-existent exists as much as the existent, because it has causal powers [Democritus] |
Full Idea: What exists does not exist at all more than what does not exist, and both are causes in a similar way for the things that come about. | |
From: Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE], A008), quoted by Simplicius - On Aristotle's 'Physics' p.28.4-27 | |
A reaction: [Simplicius actually attributes this to the shadowy Leucippus] You can see the point. If you drive into a pothole, that has considerable causal powers. |
20903 | The only distinctions are Configuration (shape), Disposition (order) and Turning (position) [Democritus, by Aristotle] |
Full Idea: They say that what is differs only by Configuration ([rhusmos], which is the shape), by Disposition ([diathege], which is the order), and by Turning ([tropê], which is the position. | |
From: report of Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE], A006) by Aristotle - Metaphysics 0985b16 | |
A reaction: If you give the shape, structure and position of an object, there is no much more to say. Perhaps mention time. |
5992 | Chrysippus says action is the criterion for existence, which must be physical [Chrysippus, by Tieleman] |
Full Idea: Chrysippus regarded power to act and be acted upon as the criterion for existence or being - a test satisfied by bodies alone. | |
From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Teun L. Tieleman - Chrysippus | |
A reaction: This defines existence in terms of causation. Is he ruling out a priori a particle (say) which exists, but never interacts with anything? If so, he is inclining towards anti-realism. |
20893 | Nothing comes from non-existence, or passes into it [Democritus, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Nothing comes into being from what does not exist, nor is it destroyed into what does not exist. | |
From: report of Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE], A001) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 09.44 | |
A reaction: [part of a concise summary of Democritus by DL] Probably an intuition about conservation laws, rather than a speculation about the Big Bang. |
21673 | There are simple and complex facts; the latter depend on further facts [Chrysippus, by Cicero] |
Full Idea: Chrysippus says there are two classes of facts, simple and complex. An instance of a simple fact is 'Socrates will die at a given date', ...but 'Milo will wrestle at Olympia' is a complex statement, because there can be no wrestling without an opponent. | |
From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by M. Tullius Cicero - On Fate ('De fato') 13.30 | |
A reaction: We might say that there are atomic and complex facts, but our atomic facts tend to be much simpler, usually just saying some object has some property. |
16652 | Stoics categories are Substrate, Quality, Disposition, and Relation [Chrysippus, by Pasnau] |
Full Idea: The Stoics proposed a rather modest categorisation of Substrate, Quality, Disposition, and Relation. | |
From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 12.1 |
20896 | It is not possible to know what sort each thing is [Democritus] |
Full Idea: In reality [eteé] to recognise what sort each thing is, belongs to what is impracticable [aporos]. | |
From: Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE], B008), quoted by Sextus Empiricus - Against the Logicians (two books) 7.137 | |
A reaction: On the whole modern scientists (and the rest of us) shoehorn virtually everything into a specific category. It strikes me as wildly bad metaphysics to say that everything necessarily has its category. |
15034 | Are genera and species real or conceptual? bodies or incorporeal? in sensibles or separate from them? [Porphyry] |
Full Idea: I shall beg off talking of a) whether genera and species are real or situated in bare thoughts alone, b) whether as real they are bodies or incorporeals, and c) whether they are separated or in sensibles and have their reality in connection with them. | |
From: Porphyry (Isagoge ('Introduction') [c.295], (2)) | |
A reaction: This passage, picking up on Aristotle, seems to be the original source that grew into the medievel debate about universals. It seems to rather neatly lay out the agenda for the universals debate which is still with us. |
3357 | Democritus denies reality to large objects, because atomic entities can't combine to produce new ones [Benardete,JA on Democritus] |
Full Idea: Democritus appears to rule out from his austere ontology all so-called emergent entities - even mountains and rivers - on the ground that two or more entities can never combine to produce a new one. | |
From: comment on Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE]) by José A. Benardete - Metaphysics: the logical approach Ch.24 |
598 | Democritus said that substances could never be mixed, so atoms are the substances [Democritus, by Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Democritus claimed that one substance could not be composed from two nor two from one; for him it is the atoms that are the substances. | |
From: report of Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE]) by Aristotle - Metaphysics 1039a10 |
16058 | Dion and Theon coexist, but Theon lacks a foot. If Dion loses a foot, he ousts Theon? [Chrysippus, by Philo of Alexandria] |
Full Idea: If two individuals occupied one substance …let one individual (Dion) be thought of as whole-limbed, the other (Theon) as minus one foot. Then let one of Dion's feet be amputated. Theon is the stronger candidate to have perished. | |
From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Philo (Alex) - On the Eternity of the World 48 | |
A reaction: [SVF 2.397 - from Chrysippus's lost 'On the Growing Argument'] This is the original of Tibbles the Cat. Dion must persist to change, and then ousts Theon (it seems). Philo protests at Theon ceasing to exist when nothing has happened to him. |
16059 | Change of matter doesn't destroy identity - in Dion and Theon change is a condition of identity [Chrysippus, by Long/Sedley] |
Full Idea: The Growing Argument said any change of matter is a change of identity. Chrysippus presents it with a case (Dion and Theon) where material diminution is the necessary condition of enduring identity, since the diminished footless Dion survives. | |
From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by AA Long / DN Sedley - Hellenic Philosophers commentary 28:175 | |
A reaction: [The example, in Idea 16058, is the original of Tibbles the Cat] This is a lovely bold idea which I haven't met in the modern discussions - that identity actually requires change. The concept of identity is meaningless without change? |
1532 | Sensible qualities can't be real if they appear different to different creatures [Democritus, by Theophrastus] |
Full Idea: As proof of the fact that sensible qualities have no real existence he points to the fact that they do not appear the same to all creatures. | |
From: report of Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE], A135) by Theophrastus - On the Senses 63 |
20894 | Man is separated from reality [Democritus] |
Full Idea: It is necessary to recognise that man by virtue of this criterion is separated from reality. | |
From: Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE], B006), quoted by Sextus Empiricus - Against the Logicians (two books) 7.137 | |
A reaction: I don't know what 'this criterion' is, but it strikes me as quite a good slogan for fans (like myself) of the representative theory of perception. Critics say it is the big objection to the representative theory, but I say 'get over it'. |
20897 | Obscure knowledge belongs to the five senses, and genuine knowledge is the other type [Democritus] |
Full Idea: There are two forms of knowledge [gnomé], the one genuine, the other obscure. And to the obscure one belongs all of these: sight, hearing, smell, taste, touch. The other is genuine, and is separated from this one. | |
From: Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE], B011), quoted by Sextus Empiricus - Against the Logicians (two books) 7.139 | |
A reaction: [Sextus goes on to make it clear that the 'genuine' one is knowledge acquired by thought]. I take Parmenides to be the first rationalist. It is interesting that Democritus, who devoted his life to finding causal explanations, seems to be a rationalist. |
517 | All evidence comes from senses, so they are indispensable to the mind [Democritus] |
Full Idea: Mind must never reject the senses, because that is where it gets its evidence, and it would be the mind's downfall. | |
From: Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE], B125), quoted by Galen - On Medical Experience 15.8 |
1528 | We in fact know nothing, but we each restructure our reality with beliefs [Democritus] |
Full Idea: In reality we know nothing about anything, but belief restructures things for each of us. | |
From: Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE], B007), quoted by Sextus Empiricus - Against the Professors (six books) 7.136 |
515 | We know nothing in reality; for truth lies in an abyss [Democritus] |
Full Idea: We know nothing in reality; for truth lies in an abyss. | |
From: Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE], B117), quoted by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 09.72.10 |
20895 | We actually know nothing, and opinions are mere flux [Democritus] |
Full Idea: Certainly this argument too makes it clear that in reality [eteé] we know nothing about anything, but for each person opinion is a rhythmic afflux [epirhusmié]. | |
From: Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE], B007), quoted by Sextus Empiricus - Against the Logicians (two books) 7.137 | |
A reaction: This seems to pick 'all is flux' up from Heraclitus, and make Democritus (along with aspects of Socrates) the true source of ancient scepticism. |
577 | Democritus says there is either no truth, or it is concealed from us [Democritus, by Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Democritus concludes that either there is no truth or it is concealed from us. | |
From: report of Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE], A112) by Aristotle - Metaphysics 1009b12 |
492 | It is obviously impossible to understand the reality of each thing [Democritus] |
Full Idea: It will be obvious that it is impossible to understand how in reality each thing is. | |
From: Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE], B008), quoted by Sextus Empiricus - Against the Professors (six books) 7.137 |
20892 | Democritus was devoted to discovering causal explanations [Democritus, by Eusebius] |
Full Idea: Democritus himself, as they say, stated that he would rather discover a single causal explanation [aitiologia] than become the King of the Persians. | |
From: report of Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE], B118) by Eusebius - Preparation for the Gospel 14.27.4 | |
A reaction: Democritus seems to be clearly the father of the physical sciences, because he focused single-mindedly on physical and causal explanations. David Lewis says all explanations are causal. |
5882 | Democritus says soul consists of smooth round bodies brought together in accidental collision [Democritus, by Cicero] |
Full Idea: Since Democritus makes the soul consist of minute smooth round bodies brought together in some sort of accidental collision, let us pass him over. | |
From: report of Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE]) by M. Tullius Cicero - Tusculan Disputations I.xi.23 | |
A reaction: If we accept that Democritus thought the collision of atoms 'accidental', then it doesn't sound like a very good theory. What would Cicero say if we replaced 'accidental' with 'naturally selected'? |
6034 | Atomists say soul has a rational part in the chest, and a diffused non-rational part [Democritus, by Aetius] |
Full Idea: Democritus and Epicurus say the soul has two parts, one which is rational and is situated in the chest area, and the other which is non-rational and is spread throughout the entire compound of the body. | |
From: report of Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE]) by Aetius - fragments/reports 4.4.6 | |
A reaction: The spread part corresponds to such things as feeling fear in the stomach, or excitement throughout the limbs. I can't think what grounds there would be for choosing the chest as the home of reason. I suppose you can hear reason thumping in there.. |
20912 | The soul is the same as the mind [Democritus, by Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Democritus says the soul is the same thing as the mind. | |
From: report of Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE], A101) by Aristotle - De Anima 405a10 | |
A reaction: This is not in contrast to the Christian concept of the soul, but in contrast to the normal view of psuché, which is more like the life that permeates the whole body. Democritus was more in tune than Aristotle with modern thought on this. |
20916 | Animals have a share of reason [Democritus, by Porphyry] |
Full Idea: Democritus recognised that animals have a share of reason. | |
From: report of Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE]) by Porphyry - On Abstinence 3.6.7 | |
A reaction: Since he considers thinking to be the interaction of atoms in the body, which animals evidently possess, this seems consistent. No one seems to observed animals closely before the 20th century, other than to exploit them. |
1875 | Dogs show reason in decisions made by elimination [Chrysippus, by Sext.Empiricus] |
Full Idea: A dog makes use of the fifth complex indemonstrable syllogism when, arriving at a spot where three ways meet, after smelling at two roads by which the quarry did not pass, he rushes off at once by the third without pausing to smell. | |
From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Sextus Empiricus - Outlines of Pyrrhonism I.69 | |
A reaction: As we might say: either A or B or C; not A; not B; therefore C. I wouldn't want to trust this observation without a lot of analysis of slow-motion photography of dogs as crossroads. Even so, it is a nice challenge to Descartes' view of animals. |
20914 | The directive centre is located in the whole head [Democritus, by Ps-Plutarch] |
Full Idea: Democritus says [the directive centre is located] in the whole head. | |
From: report of Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE], A105) by Pseudo-Plutarch - On the Doctrine of the Philosophers 4.5.1 | |
A reaction: The whole head is not quite the brain, but he is getting very warm indeed, and long before anyone else got so close. |
20834 | Chrysippus allows evil to say it is fated, or even that it is rational and natural [Plutarch on Chrysippus] |
Full Idea: Chrysippus gives vice blatant freedom to say not only that it is necessary and according to fate, but even that it occurs according to god's reason and the best nature. | |
From: comment on Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Plutarch - 70: Stoic Self-contradictions 1050c | |
A reaction: This is Plutarch's criticism of stoic determinism or fatalism. Zeno replied that the punishment for vice may also be fated. It seems that Chysippus did believe that punishments were too harsh, given that vices are fated [p.109]. |
20833 | A swerve in the atoms would be unnatural, like scales settling differently for no reason [Chrysippus, by Plutarch] |
Full Idea: Chrysippus argues against the 'swerve' of the Epicureans, on the grounds that they are doing violence to nature by positing something which is uncaused, and cites dice or scales, which can't settle differently without some cause or difference. | |
From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Plutarch - 70: Stoic Self-contradictions 1045c | |
A reaction: That is, the principle of sufficient reason (or of everything having a cause) is derived from observation, not a priori understanding. Pace Leibniz. As in modern discussion, free will or the swerve only occur in our minds, and not elsewhere. |
6033 | Democritus said everything happens of necessity, by natural motion of atoms [Democritus, by Cicero] |
Full Idea: Democritus, the founder of atomism, preferred to accept that all things happened by necessity than to tear from the atomic bodies their natural motions. | |
From: report of Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE]) by M. Tullius Cicero - On Fate ('De fato') §22 | |
A reaction: This is in opposition to Epicurus, who said that atoms can have a 'swerve', making free will possible. It is suggested that Epicurus was the first to really grasp the problem of free will. Democritus was just stating the (to him) obvious. |
5088 | Some say there is a determinate cause for every apparently spontaneous event [Democritus, by Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Some people (Democritus?) say there is no such thing as a chance event; they claim that there is always a determinate cause for everything which is said to be a chance or a spontaneous event. | |
From: report of Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE]) by Aristotle - Physics 195b37 | |
A reaction: This is the mutual implication of physicalism and determinism, which strikes me as unavoidable. I say: don't panic about morality because determinism is true. Embrace determinism - it is harmless and true. Its opposite is a nonsense. |
21670 | Democritus said atoms only move by their natural motions, which are therefore necessary [Democritus, by Cicero] |
Full Idea: The author of the atomic theory, Democritus, preferred to accept the view that all events are caused by necessity, rather than to deprive the atoms of their natural motions. | |
From: report of Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE]) by M. Tullius Cicero - On Fate ('De fato') 10.23 | |
A reaction: The 'deprivation' would have to be caused by mind, or by the later 'swerve' of Epicurus. |
20808 | Everything is fated, either by continuous causes or by a supreme rational principle [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Chrysippus says (in his 'On Fate') that everything happens by fate. Fate is a continuous string of causes of things which exist or a rational principle according to which the cosmos is managed. | |
From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 07.148 |
20835 | Chrysippus is wrong to believe in non-occurring future possibilities if he is a fatalist [Plutarch on Chrysippus] |
Full Idea: Chrysippus's accounts of possibility and fate are in conflict. If he is right that 'everything that permits of occurring even if it is not going to occur is possible', then many things are possible which are not according to fate. | |
From: comment on Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Plutarch - 70: Stoic Self-contradictions 1055e | |
A reaction: A palpable hit, I think. Plutarch refers to Chrysippus's rejection of Diodorus Cronus's Master Argument. Fatalism seems to entail that the only future possibilities are the ones that actually occur. |
20836 | The Lazy Argument responds to fate with 'why bother?', but the bothering is also fated [Chrysippus, by Cicero] |
Full Idea: Chrysippus responded to the Lazy Argument (that the outcome of an illness is fated, so there is no point in calling the doctor) by saying 'calling the doctor is fated just as much as recovering', which he calls 'co-fated'. | |
From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by M. Tullius Cicero - On Fate ('De fato') 28-30 | |
A reaction: From a pragmatic point of view, this idea also nullifies fatalism, since you can plausibly fight against your fate to your last breath. No evidence could ever be offered in support of fatalism, not even the most unlikely events. |
20837 | Fate is an eternal and fixed chain of causal events [Chrysippus] |
Full Idea: Fate is a sempiternal and unchangeable series and chain of things, rolling and unravelling itself through eternal sequences of cause and effect, of which it is composed and compounded. | |
From: Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]), quoted by Aulus Gellius - Noctes Atticae 7.2.01 | |
A reaction: It seems that Chrysippus (called by Aulus Gellius 'the chief Stoic philosopher') had a rather grandly rhetorical prose style. |
21679 | When we say events are fated by antecedent causes, do we mean principal or auxiliary causes? [Chrysippus] |
Full Idea: Some causes are perfect and principal, others auxiliary and proximate. Hence when we say that everything takes place by fate owing to antecedent causes, what we wish to be understood is not perfect and principal causes but auxiliary and proximate causes. | |
From: Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]), quoted by M. Tullius Cicero - On Fate ('De fato') 18.41 | |
A reaction: This move is described by Cicero as enabling Chrysippus to 'escape necessity and to retain fate'. |
5971 | Destiny is only a predisposing cause, not a sufficient cause [Chrysippus, by Plutarch] |
Full Idea: Chrysippus considered destiny to be not a cause sufficient of itself but only a predisposing cause. | |
From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE], fr 997) by Plutarch - 70: Stoic Self-contradictions 1056b | |
A reaction: This appears to be a rejection of determinism, and is the equivalent of Epicurus' introduction of the 'swerve' in atoms. They had suddenly become bothered about the free will problem in about 305 BCE. There must be other non-destiny causes? |
24041 | Democritus says spherical atoms are fire, and constitute the soul [psuche] [Democritus, by Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Democritus says the soul is a sort of fire. For the shapes and atoms are unlimitied and those that are spherical he says are fire and soul - which are like the motes in the air when sunbeams come through the window. | |
From: report of Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE], DK 67-68) by Aristotle - De Anima 403b31 | |
A reaction: It's hard to see why the spherical atoms should be fire. Maybe because they move together quickly and easily. …At 404a5 Aristotle agrees with me! |
20913 | Democritus says the soul is the body, and thinking is thus the mixture of the body [Democritus, by Theophrastus] |
Full Idea: Democritus explains thinking by the mixture of the body, which is surely in accordance with his reasoning, since he makes the soul the body. | |
From: report of Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE], A135) by Theophrastus - On the Senses 58 | |
A reaction: I agree with Democritus. |
20787 | A proposition is what can be asserted or denied on its own [Chrysippus] |
Full Idea: A proposition is what can be asserted or denied on its own, for example, 'It is day' or 'Dion is walking'. | |
From: Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]), quoted by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 07.65 | |
A reaction: Note the phrase 'on its own'. If you say 'it is day and Dion is walking', that can't be denied on its own, because first the two halves must each be evaluated, so presumably that doesn't count as a stoic proposition. |
20850 | Passions are judgements; greed thinks money is honorable, and likewise drinking and lust [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Chrysippus says (in his On Passions) that the passions are judgements; for greed is a supposition that money is honorable, and similarly for drunkennes and wantonness and others. | |
From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 07.111 | |
A reaction: This is an endorsement of Socrates's intellectualist reading of weakness of will, as against Aristotle's assigning it to overpowering passions. |
1540 | Pleasure and pain guide our choices of good and bad [Democritus] |
Full Idea: The guides to what is good and bad for people are pleasure and pain. | |
From: Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE], B188), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 3.01.46 |
20869 | The highest degree of morality performs all that is appropriate, omitting nothing [Chrysippus] |
Full Idea: He who makes moral progress to the highest degree performs all the appropriate actions in all circumstances, and omits none. | |
From: Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]), quoted by Sophocles - Sophocles' Electra 4.39.22 | |
A reaction: Hence concerns about omission as well as commission in the practice of ethics can be seen in the light of character and virtue. The world is fully of nice people who act well, but don't do so well on omissions. Car drivers, for example. |
3044 | Stoics say that beauty and goodness are equivalent and linked [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Stoics say the beautiful is the only good. Good is an equivalent term to the beautiful; since a thing is good, it is beautiful; and it is beautiful, therefore it is good. | |
From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 07.1.59 |
20838 | Fate initiates general causes, but individual wills and characters dictate what we do [Chrysippus] |
Full Idea: The order and reason of fate set in motion the general types and starting points of the causes, but each person's own will [or decisions] and the character of his mind govern the impulses of our thoughts and minds and our very actions. | |
From: Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]), quoted by Aulus Gellius - Noctes Atticae 7.2.11 | |
A reaction: So if you try and fail it was fate, but if you try and succeed it was you? |
20813 | Human purpose is to contemplate and imitate the cosmos [Chrysippus] |
Full Idea: The human being was born for the sake of contemplating and imitating the cosmos. | |
From: Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]), quoted by M. Tullius Cicero - On the Nature of the Gods ('De natura deorum') 2.37 | |
A reaction: [This seems to be an idea of Chrysippus] Remind me how to imitate the cosmos. Presumably this is living according to nature, but that becomes more obscure when express like this. |
3045 | Stoics say justice is a part of nature, not just an invented principle [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Stoics say that justice exists by nature, and not because of any definition or principle. | |
From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 07.1.66 | |
A reaction: cf Idea 3024. Stoics thought that nature is intrinsically rational, and therein lies its justice. 'King Lear' enacts this drama about whether nature is just. |
20774 | Only nature is available to guide action and virtue [Chrysippus] |
Full Idea: What am I to take as the principle of appropriate action and raw material for virtue if I give up nature and what is according to nature? | |
From: Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]), quoted by Plutarch - On Common Conceptions 1069e | |
A reaction: 'Nature' is awfully vague as a guideline, even when we are told nature is rational. I can only make sense of it as 'human nature', which is more Aristotelian than stoic. 'Go with the flow' and 'lay the cards you are dealt' might capture it. |
20864 | Live in agreement, according to experience of natural events [Chrysippus] |
Full Idea: The goal of life is to live in agreement, which is according to experience of the things which happen by nature. | |
From: Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 2.06a | |
A reaction: Cleanthes added 'with nature' to Zeno's slogan, and Chyrisppus added this variation. At least it gives you some idea of what the consistent rational principle should be. You still have to assess which aspects of nature should influence us. |
495 | Wisdom creates a healthy passion-free soul [Democritus] |
Full Idea: Medicine heals diseases of the body, wisdom frees the soul from passions. | |
From: Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE], B031), quoted by Clement - Pedagogue 1.6.2.1 | |
A reaction: The interesting concept of a healthy mind seems to have got lost in modern moral philosophy. |
5972 | Living happily is nothing but living virtuously [Chrysippus, by Plutarch] |
Full Idea: According to Chrysippus, living happily consists solely in living virtuously. | |
From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE], fr139) by Plutarch - 72: Against Stoics on common Conceptions 1060d | |
A reaction: This, along with 'live according to nature', is the essential doctrine of stoicism. This is 'eudaimonia', not the modern idea of feeling nice. Is it possible to admire another person for anything other than virtue? (Yes! Looks, brains, strength, wealth). |
1537 | Happiness is identifying and separating the pleasures [Democritus, by Stobaeus] |
Full Idea: Democritus thinks that happiness consists in the determination and separation of pleasures, and that this is what is both finest and most beneficial for people. | |
From: report of Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE], A167) by John Stobaeus - Anthology 2.07.3 | |
A reaction: A great deal of the strategy and ethics of living consists (if you are lucky) of discriminating among possible pleasures. Philosophers should produce criteria. |
1777 | Pleasure is not the good, because there are disgraceful pleasures [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Pleasure is not the good, because there are disgraceful pleasures, and nothing disgraceful is good. | |
From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 07.Ze.60 | |
A reaction: I certainly approve of the idea that not all pleasure is intrinsically good. Indeed, I think good has probably got nothing to do with pleasure. 'Disgraceful' is hardly objective though. |
5973 | Justice can be preserved if pleasure is a good, but not if it is the goal [Chrysippus, by Plutarch] |
Full Idea: Chrysippus thinks that, while justice could not be preserved if one should set up pleasure as the goal, it could be if one should take pleasure to be not a goal but simply a good. | |
From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE], fr 23) by Plutarch - 72: Against Stoics on common Conceptions 1070d | |
A reaction: This is an interesting and original contribution to the ancient debate about pleasure. It shows Aristotle's moderate criticism of pleasure (e.g. Idea 84), but attempts to pinpoint where the danger is. Aristotle says it thwarts achievement of the mean. |
20845 | There are shameful pleasures, and nothing shameful is good, so pleasure is not a good [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Chrysippus (in his On Pleasure) denies even of pleasure that it is a good; for there are also shameful pleasures, and nothing shameful is good. | |
From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 07.103 | |
A reaction: Socrates seems to have started this line of the thought, to argue that pleasure is not The Good. Stoics are more puritanical. Nothing counts as good if it is capable of being bad. Thus good pleasures are not good, which sounds odd. |
5967 | People need nothing except corn and water [Chrysippus, by Plutarch] |
Full Idea: Chrysippus praises ad nauseam the lines "For what need mortals save two things alone,/ Demeter's grain and draughts of water clear". | |
From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Plutarch - 70: Stoic Self-contradictions 1043e | |
A reaction: "Oh, reason not the need!" says King Lear. The remark shows the close affinity of stoicism and cynicism, as the famous story of Diogenes is that he threw away his drinking cup when he realised you could drink with your hands. |
5966 | All virtue is good, but not always praised (as in not lusting after someone ugly) [Chrysippus] |
Full Idea: Although deeds done in accordance with virtue are congenial, not all are cited as examples, such as courageously extending one's finger, or continently abstaining from a half-dead old woman, or not immediately agreeing that three is four. | |
From: Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE], fr 211), quoted by Plutarch - 70: Stoic Self-contradictions 1038f | |
A reaction: Presumably the point (so elegantly expressed - what a shame we have lost most of Chrysippus) is that virtue comes in degrees, even though its value is an absolute. The same has been said (by Russell and Bonjour) about self-evidence. |
20855 | Chrysippus says virtue can be lost (though Cleanthes says it is too secure for that) [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Chrysippus says that virtue can be lost, owing to drunkenness and excess of black bile, whereas Cleanthes says it cannot, because it consists in secure intellectual grasps, and it is worth choosing for its own sake. | |
From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 07.127 | |
A reaction: Succumbing to drunkenness looks like evidence that you were not truly virtuous. Mental illness is something else. On the whole I agree the Cleanthes. |
5970 | Chrysippus says nothing is blameworthy, as everything conforms with the best nature [Chrysippus, by Plutarch] |
Full Idea: Chrysippus has often written on the theme that there is nothing reprehensible or blameworthy in the universe since all things are accomplished in conformity with the best nature. | |
From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Plutarch - 70: Stoic Self-contradictions 1051b | |
A reaction: This is Leibniz's "best of all possible worlds", but deriving the idea from the rightness of nature rather than the perfection of God. Chrysippus has a more plausible ground than Leibniz, as for him nasty things follow from conscious choice. |
20917 | Contentment comes from moderation and proportion in life [Democritus, by Stobaeus] |
Full Idea: Contentment [euthumia] comes about for human beings from the moderation of enjoyment and proportion [summetria] in life. | |
From: report of Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE], B191) by John Stobaeus - Anthology 3.1.210 | |
A reaction: This is close to Aristotle's doctrine of the Mean. The majority of ethical ideas attributed to Democritus (presumably by the Epicureans) are thought to be spurious. This idea actually sounds rather stoic. |
13551 | Democritus says wealth is a burden to the virtuous mind [Democritus, by Seneca] |
Full Idea: Democritus rejected wealth, regarding it as a burden to the virtuous mind. | |
From: report of Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE]) by Seneca the Younger - On Providence §6 | |
A reaction: The rival view is that wealth empowers a virtuous person to perform more fine deeds. Democritus seems to have a rather solitary view of virtue. |
20842 | Rational animals begin uncorrupted, but externals and companions are bad influences [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: The rational animal is corrupted, sometimes because of the persuasiveness of external activities and sometimes because of the influence of companions. For the starting points provided by nature are uncorrupted. | |
From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 07.89 | |
A reaction: If companions corrupt us, what corrupted the companions? Aren't we all in this together? And where do the 'external activities' originate? |
20856 | Justice, the law, and right reason are natural and not conventional [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Chrysippus says (in On the Honourable) that justice is natural and not conventional, as are the law and right reason. | |
From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 07.128 | |
A reaction: How does he explain variations in the law between different states? Presumably some of them have got it wrong. What is the criterion for deciding which laws are natural? |
1779 | We don't have obligations to animals as they aren't like us [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: We have no obligations of justice to other animals, because they are dissimilar to us. | |
From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 07.Ze.66 | |
A reaction: "Dissimilar" begs questions. Some human beings don't seem much like me. How are we going to treat visiting aliens? |
20857 | Justice is irrelevant to animals, because they are too unlike us [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: There is no justice between us and other animals because of the dissimilarity between us and them. | |
From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 07.129 | |
A reaction: [from lost On Justice Bk 1] What would he make of modern revelations about bonobos and chimpanzees? If there is great dissimilarity between some peoples, does that invalidate justice between them? He also said animals exist for our use. |
20812 | Covers are for shields, and sheaths for swords; likewise, all in the cosmos is for some other thing [Chrysippus] |
Full Idea: Just as the cover was made for the sake of the shield, and the sheath for the sword, in the same way everything else except the cosmos was made for the sake of other things. | |
From: Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]), quoted by M. Tullius Cicero - On the Nature of the Gods ('De natura deorum') 2.37 | |
A reaction: Chrysippus was wise to stop at the cosmos. Similarly, religious teleology had better not ask about the purpose of God. What does he think pebbles are for? Nature is the source of stoic value, so it needs to be purposeful. |
21403 | The later Stoics identified the logos with an air-fire compound, called 'pneuma' [Chrysippus, by Long] |
Full Idea: From Chrysippus onwards, the Stoics identified the logos throughout each world-cycle not with pure fire, but with a compound of fire and air, 'pneuma'. | |
From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by A.A. Long - Hellenistic Philosophy 4.4.2 | |
A reaction: I suspect this was because breath is so vital to the human body. |
20828 | Fire is a separate element, not formed with others (as was previously believed) [Chrysippus, by Stobaeus] |
Full Idea: In his theory fire is said independently to be an element, since it is not formed together with another one, whereas according to the earlier theory fire is formed with other elements. | |
From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by John Stobaeus - Anthology 1.10.16c | |
A reaction: The point is that fire precedes the other elements, and is superior to them. |
5975 | Stoics say earth, air, fire and water are the primary elements [Chrysippus, by Plutarch] |
Full Idea: The Stoics call the four bodies - earth and water and air and fire - primary elements. | |
From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE], fr 444) by Plutarch - 72: Against Stoics on common Conceptions 1085c | |
A reaction: Elsewhere (fr 413) Chrysippus denies that they are all 'primary'. Essentially, though, he seems to be adopting the doctrine of Empedocles and Aristotle, in specific opposition to Epicurus' atomism. |
17542 | 'Full' and 'Void' secularised Parmenides's Being and Not-being [Democritus, by Heisenberg] |
Full Idea: In atomism, the antithesis of Being and Not-being of Parmenides is secularised into the antithesis of the 'Full' and the 'Void'. | |
From: report of Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE]) by Werner Heisenberg - Physics and Philosophy 04 |
5947 | If only atoms are real and the rest is convention, we wouldn't bother to avoid pain [Democritus, by Diogenes of Oen.] |
Full Idea: Democritus erred when he said that the atoms alone exist in truth among realities, but everything else is convention; for then, far from discovering the truth, we shall not even be able to live, since we shall avoid neither fire nor wounds. | |
From: report of Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE]) by Diogenes (Oen) - fragments/reports F2 7 | |
A reaction: The point is that we have to treat pain as a reality, not just as a convention. I suspect that Diogenes is making the same mistake made by modern attackers of 'eliminativism'. It is all about identity and reduction and levels of reality… |
13219 | When atoms touch, why don't they coalesce, like water drops? [Aristotle on Democritus] |
Full Idea: Why, when they come into contact, do they [atoms] not coalesce into one, as drops of water run together when drop touches drop? | |
From: comment on Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE]) by Aristotle - Coming-to-be and Passing-away (Gen/Corr) 326a33 | |
A reaction: Presumably we must think of atoms as having basic ontological unity, rather than as being little globules of 'stuff'. They are more like monads than they are like mud. |
1525 | Atomists say there are only three differences - in shape, arrangement and position [Democritus, by Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Democritus and Leucippus say that there are only three differences - in shape, arrangement and position. | |
From: report of Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE], A006) by Aristotle - Metaphysics 0985b15 |
1533 | Because appearance is infinitely varied, atomists assume infinitely many shapes of atom [Democritus, by Aristotle] |
Full Idea: They thought that truth lay in appearances, which they appreciated are contradictory and infinite, so they made the shapes of atoms infinite. Thus the infinite changes in compounds create the infinitely varies appearances. | |
From: report of Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE], A009) by Aristotle - Coming-to-be and Passing-away (Gen/Corr) 315b9 |
493 | Experiences are merely convention; only atoms and the void are real [Democritus] |
Full Idea: Sweet exists by convention, bitter by convention, colour by convention; atoms and void alone exist in reality. | |
From: Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE], B009), quoted by Sextus Empiricus - Against the Logicians (two books) 7.135 |
20898 | Atoms are irregular, hooked, concave, convex, and many other shapes [Democritus, by Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Some substances are irregular, others hook-shaped, other concave, other convex, others provided with innumerable other differences. | |
From: report of Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE], A037) by Aristotle - On Democritus (frag) | |
A reaction: [quoted in Simplicius, Commentary on Aristotle's On the Heavens] 'Substance' here means a fundamental object, which for Democritus is an undividable atom. |
20899 | Atoms cling together, until a stronger necessity disperses them [Democritus, by Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Democritus thinks that the substances hold on to one another and remain together for a length of time until some stronger necessity arising from their surroundings shakes and disperses them. | |
From: report of Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE], A037) by Aristotle - On Democritus (frag) | |
A reaction: [quoted in Simplicius, Commentary on Aristotle's On the Heavens] He's not wrong. This seems to provide a mechanism for the Heracltean flux. Ancient critics wanted to know where the 'stronger necessity' came from. |
20908 | There could be an atom the size of the world [Democritus, by Ps-Plutarch] |
Full Idea: Democritus say that it is possible that there exists an atom of the size of the world. | |
From: report of Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE], A047) by Pseudo-Plutarch - On the Doctrine of the Philosophers 1.12.6 | |
A reaction: The editor says this may have been a criticism of Democritus - presumably a reductio ad absurdum. But Democritus has no upper limit on the size of an atom. It challenges the imagination to treat such a huge thing as indivisible. |
1527 | There must be atoms, to avoid the absurdity of infinite division down to nothing [Democritus, by Aristotle] |
Full Idea: If everything is infinitely divided, what survives the divisions? Alternatively, division would end at points with no magnitude, in which case bodies are composed of nothing. This is the argument claiming there are atoms of some magnitude. | |
From: report of Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE], A048b) by Aristotle - Coming-to-be and Passing-away (Gen/Corr) 316a14- |
20909 | The basic atoms are without qualities - which only arise from encounters between atoms [Democritus, by Galen] |
Full Idea: Democritus and the Epicureans posit that the first element is without quality, possessing by nature neither whiteness, blackness, sweetness or bitterness, warmth or cold. ...It is from the encounter of the atoms that all the sensible qualities come about. | |
From: report of Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE], A049) by Galen - On Hippocrates and Plato 1.2 | |
A reaction: Idea 493 comes in the middle of this summary by Galen. Hence atoms play the role that substrates play in object-based metaphysics. So atoms have the same problem. Is the shape of an atom a quality of an atom. Or are qualities what atoms DO? |
1536 | If a cone is horizontally sliced the surfaces can't be equal, so it goes up in steps [Democritus] |
Full Idea: If a cone is cut parallel to the base are the two new surfaces equal or unequal? If they are unequal, the cone must have gone up in steps. If they are equal then the cone must have been a cylinder, which is absurd. | |
From: Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE], B155), quoted by Plutarch - 72: Against Stoics on common Conceptions 1079e1 |
23314 | Greeks explained regularity by intellectual design, not by laws [Democritus, by Frede,M] |
Full Idea: It is clear that Democritus had no idea of laws of nature …for in Greek thought regularity of behaviour is associated with design by an intellect. | |
From: report of Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE]) by Michael Frede - A Free Will Intro | |
A reaction: Ah. A simple realisation…! Seventeenth century laws of nature offered an explanation of natural order which didn't rely on God. Even though those scientists were all theists. |
24059 | Democritus is wrong: in a void we wouldn't see a distant ant in exact detail [Aristotle on Democritus] |
Full Idea: Democritus did not speak correctly in supposing that if the intermediate space became a void, we would see an ant in exact detail if it were up in the heaven. …If the intermediate space became a void, rather nothing would be seen at all. | |
From: comment on Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE]) by Aristotle - De Anima 419a15 | |
A reaction: Depends what you mean by void, but Aristotle is nearer the truth. Is vision clearer in outer space than in our higher atmosphere? |
5101 | Movement is impossible in a void, because nothing can decide the direction of movement [Aristotle on Democritus] |
Full Idea: Void makes it impossible for anything to move, since in a void there is nowhere for a thing to move to more or less than anywhere else, because the void by definition contains no differentiation. | |
From: comment on Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE]) by Aristotle - Physics 214b32 | |
A reaction: A lovely application of the Principle of Sufficient Reason. However this assumes that the cause of the movement is going to be in the void (telos?), rather than in the body which will move (modern causation?). |
20905 | Growth and movement would not exist if there were no void to receive them [Democritus] |
Full Idea: They say that one argument for void is that otherwise local motion (that is, locomotion and growth) would not exist: for there would not seem to be motion if there were no void, for what is full is incapable of receiving anything. | |
From: Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE], A019), quoted by Aristotle - Physics 213b03 | |
A reaction: The modern concept of a 'field' seems to have removed the possibility of a genuine 'void'. |
20819 | The past and the future subsist, but only the present exists [Chrysippus, by Plutarch] |
Full Idea: When he wished to be subtle, Chrysippus wrote that the past part of time and the future part do not exist but subsist, and only the present exists. | |
From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Plutarch - On Common Conceptions 1081f | |
A reaction: [from lost On Void] I think I prefer the ontology of Idea 20818. Idea 20819 does not offer an epistemology. Is the present substantial enough to be known? The word 'subsist' is an ontological evasion (even though Russell briefly relied on it). |
20818 | The present does not exist, so our immediate experience is actually part past and part future [Chrysippus, by Plutarch] |
Full Idea: Stoics do not allow a minimal time to exist, and do not want to have a partless 'now'; so what one thinks one has grasped as present is in part future and in part past. | |
From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Plutarch - On Common Conceptions 1081c | |
A reaction: [from lost On Parts Bk3-5] I agree with the ontology here, but I take our grasp of the present to be very short-term memory of the past. I ignore special relativity. Chrysippus expressed two views about this; in the other one he was a Presentist. |
20821 | Time is continous and infinitely divisible, so there cannot be a wholly present time [Chrysippus, by Stobaeus] |
Full Idea: Chrysippus says most clearly that no time is wholly present; for since the divisibility of continuous things is infinite, time as a whole is also subject to infinite divisibility by this method of division. | |
From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by John Stobaeus - Anthology 1.08.42 | |
A reaction: But what is his reason for thinking that time is a continuous thing? There is a minimum time in quantum mechanics (the Planck Time), but do these quantum intervals overlap? Compare Idea 20819. |
20911 | There are unlimited worlds of varying sizes, some without life or water [Democritus, by Hippolytus] |
Full Idea: Democritus says that there exist unlimited worlds and that they are different in magnitude. ...Some worlds are devoid of animals and plants and of all humidity. | |
From: report of Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE], A010, A040) by Hippolytus - Refutation of All Heresies 1.12,13.2-4 | |
A reaction: I'm not clear why Democritus came up with the idea of the Multicosmos. I don't suppose he meant the moon or planets, but another Cosmos. |
3048 | Stoics say that God the creator is the perfection of all animals [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Stoics say that God is an animal immortal, rational, perfect, and intellectual in his happiness, unsusceptible of any kind of evil, having a foreknowledge of the world; however, he is not the figure of a man, and is the creator of the universe. | |
From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 07.1.72 |
20773 | The origin of justice can only be in Zeus, and in nature [Chrysippus] |
Full Idea: One can find no other starting point or origin for justice except the one derived from Zeus and that derived from the common nature; for everything like this must have that starting point, if we are going to say anything at all about good and bad things. | |
From: Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]), quoted by Plutarch - 70: Stoic Self-contradictions 1035c | |
A reaction: [in lost 'On Gods' bk 3] This appears to offer two starting points, in the mind of Zeus, and in nature, though since nature is presumed to be rational the two may run together. Is Zeus the embodiment, or the unconscious source, or the maker of decrees? |
5965 | The source of all justice is Zeus and the universal nature [Chrysippus] |
Full Idea: It is not possible to discover any other beginning of justice or any source for it other than that from Zeus and from the universal nature. | |
From: Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE], fr 326), quoted by Plutarch - 70: Stoic Self-contradictions 1035c | |
A reaction: If the source is 'universal nature', that could agree with Plato, but if the source is Zeus, then stoicism is a religion rather than a philosophy. |
3042 | Stoics teach that law is identical with right reason, which is the will of Zeus [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Stoics teach that common law is identical with that right reason which pervades everything, being the same with Zeus, who is the regulator and chief manager of all existing things. | |
From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 07.1.53 |
1535 | Democritus said people imagined gods as the source of what awed or frightened them [Democritus, by Sext.Empiricus] |
Full Idea: Democritus thought that people imagined gods as responsible for the frightening and awesome things that happen in this world. | |
From: report of Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE], A075) by Sextus Empiricus - Against the Professors (six books) 9.24 |
1782 | Stoics teach that God is a unity, variously known as Mind, or Fate, or Jupiter [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Stoics teach that God is unity, and that he is called Mind, and Fate, and Jupiter, and by many names besides. | |
From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 07.Ze.68 |
20915 | The soul is destroyed with the body [Democritus, by Ps-Plutarch] |
Full Idea: Democritus says the soul is destructible, and is destroyed together with the whole body. | |
From: report of Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE], A109) by Pseudo-Plutarch - On the Doctrine of the Philosophers 4.7.4 | |
A reaction: This is the only belief possible for Democritus, since everything, including life and soul, is just the confluence of atoms, and they are regularly dispersed. This is the epitome of materialist philosophy. |
20830 | Death can't separate soul from body, because incorporeal soul can't unite with body [Chrysippus] |
Full Idea: Death is a separation of soul from body. But nothing incorporeal can be separated from a body. For neither does anything incorporeal touch a body, and the soul touches and is separated from the body. Therefore the soul is not incorporeal. | |
From: Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]), quoted by Tertullian - The Soul as an 'Astral Body' 5.3 | |
A reaction: This is the classic interaction difficulty for substance dualist theories of mind. |
21404 | There is a rationale in terrible disasters; they are useful to the whole, and make good possible [Chrysippus] |
Full Idea: The evil which occurs in terrible disasters has a rationale [logos] peculiar to itself: for in a sense it occurs in accordance with universal reason, and is not without usefulness in relation to the whole. For without it there could be no good. | |
From: Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]), quoted by A.A. Long - Hellenistic Philosophy 4.4.5 | |
A reaction: [a quotation from Chrysippus. Plutarch, Comm Not 1065b] A nice question about any terrible disaster is whether it is in some way 'useful', if we take a broader view of things. Almost everything has a good aspect, from that perspective. |