166 ideas
9199 | Wisdom for one instant is as good as wisdom for eternity [Chrysippus] |
Full Idea: If a person has wisdom for one instant, he is no less happy than he who possesses it for eternity. | |
From: Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]), quoted by Pierre Hadot - Philosophy as a way of life 8 | |
A reaction: [Hadot quotes Plutarch 'On Common Conceptions' 8,1062a] This makes it sound awfully like some sort of Buddhist 'enlightenment', which strikes like lightning. He does wisdom recognise itself - by a warm glow, or by the cautious thought that got you there? |
20853 | Wise men should try to participate in politics, since they are a good influence [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: The wise man will participate in politics unless something prevents him, for he will restrain vice and promote virtue. | |
From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 07.121 | |
A reaction: [from lost On Ways of Life Bk 1] We have made modern politics so hostile for its participants, thanks to cruel media pressure, that the best people now run a mile from it. Disastrous. |
5361 | Philosophers must get used to absurdities [Russell] |
Full Idea: Whoever wishes to become a philosopher must learn not to be frightened by absurdities. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch. 2) | |
A reaction: He says this jokingly, but it is obviously true. Philosophy requires extreme imagination, and it also requires taking seriously possibilities that are dismissed by others. It would be a catastrophe if we all dismissed the truth as self-evidently false. |
5368 | Philosophy verifies that our hierarchy of instinctive beliefs is harmonious and consistent [Russell] |
Full Idea: Philosophy should show us the hierarchy of our instinctive beliefs, ..and show that they do not clash, but form a harmonious system. There is no reason to reject an instinctive belief, except that it clashes with others. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch. 2) | |
A reaction: This is open to the standard objections to the coherence theory of truth (as explained by Russell!), but I like this view of philosophy. Somewhere behind it is the rationalist dream that the final set of totally consistent beliefs will have to be true. |
20772 | Three branches of philosophy: first logic, second ethics, third physics (which ends with theology) [Chrysippus] |
Full Idea: There are three kinds of philosophical theorems, logical, ethical, and physical; of these the logic should be placed first, ethics second, and physics third (and theology is the final topic in physics). | |
From: Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]), quoted by Plutarch - 70: Stoic Self-contradictions 1035a | |
A reaction: [in his lost 'On Lives' Bk 4] 'Theology is the final topic in physics'! That should create a stir in theology departments. Is this an order of study, or of importance? You come to theology right at the end of your studies. |
5432 | Metaphysics cannot give knowledge of the universe as a whole [Russell] |
Full Idea: It would seem that knowledge concerning the universe as a whole is not to be obtained by metaphysics. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch.14) | |
A reaction: Although Russell is strongly attracted to rationalism and platonism, this remark puts him firmly in the camp of Hume, and makes him godfather to the logical positivists. I regard metaphysics as extremely speculative attempts at explanation. |
16943 | Philosophy is continuous with science, and has no external vantage point [Quine] |
Full Idea: I see philosophy not as an a priori propaedeutic or groundwork for science, but as continuous with science. I see philosophy and science as in the same boat. …There is no external vantage point, no first philosophy. | |
From: Willard Quine (Natural Kinds [1969], p.126) | |
A reaction: Philosophy is generalisation. Science holds the upper hand, because it settles the subject-matter to be generalised. |
5434 | Philosophy is similar to science, and has no special source of wisdom [Russell] |
Full Idea: Philosophical knowledge does not differ essentially from scientific knowledge; there is no special source of wisdom which is open to philosophy but not to science. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch.14) | |
A reaction: I agree. I take Plato's Theory of Forms, for example, to be a scientific theory, for which no one can devise an empirical test (just like string theory). Personally I consider philosophy to be the senior partner, and regard scientists as servants. |
5405 | The law of contradiction is not a 'law of thought', but a belief about things [Russell] |
Full Idea: The law of contradiction is not a 'law of thought' ..because it is a belief about things, not only about thoughts. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch. 9) | |
A reaction: The principle is a commitment about things, but it is inconceivable that any experience, no matter how weird, could ever contradict it. It would be better to assume that we had gone insane, than that a contradiction had occurred in the world. |
5396 | Three Laws of Thought: identity, contradiction, and excluded middle [Russell] |
Full Idea: For no very good reason, three principles have been singled out by tradition under the name of 'Laws of Thought': the laws of identity ('what is, is'), contradiction ('never be and not be'), and excluded middle ('always be or not be'). | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch. 7) | |
A reaction: 'For no very good reason' seems a bit unfair, probably to medieval logicians, who deserve more respect. Russell suggests that the concept of implication deserves to be on the list. Presumably optimism about thinking is a presupposition of thought. |
5969 | Chrysippus said the uncaused is non-existent [Chrysippus, by Plutarch] |
Full Idea: Chrysippus said that the uncaused is altogether non-existent. | |
From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Plutarch - 70: Stoic Self-contradictions 1045c | |
A reaction: The difficulty is to see what empirical basis there can be for such a claim, or what argument of any kind other than an intuition. Induction is the obvious answer, but Hume teaches us scepticism about any claim that 'there can be no exceptions'. |
5420 | Truth is a property of a belief, but dependent on its external relations, not its internal qualities [Russell] |
Full Idea: Although truth and falsehood are properties of beliefs, they are properties dependent upon the relations of the beliefs to other things, not upon any internal quality of the beliefs. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch.12) | |
A reaction: Beliefs can have an intrinsic property of subjective certainty, but Russell is right that that is not enough. So is truth a property or a relation? |
5419 | Truth and falsehood are properties of beliefs and statements [Russell] |
Full Idea: Truth and falsehood are properties of beliefs and statements, so a world of mere matter would contain no truth or falsehood. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch.12) | |
A reaction: Can it be beliefs AND statements? What about propositions? All that matters here is to establish that truth is a feature of certain mental states. This makes possible my slogan that "the brain is a truth-machine". Out there are the 'facts'. |
5417 | A good theory of truth must make falsehood possible [Russell] |
Full Idea: A good theory of truth must be such as to admit of its opposite, falsehood. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch.12) |
21388 | The causes of future true events must exist now, so they will happen because of destiny [Chrysippus, by Cicero] |
Full Idea: True future events cannot be such as do not possess causes on account of which they will happen; therefore that which is true must possess causes: and so, when the [true future events] happen they will have happened as a result of destiny. | |
From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by M. Tullius Cicero - On Fate ('De fato') 9.23-8 | |
A reaction: [exact ref unclear] Presumably the current causes are the truthmakers for the future events, and so the past is the truthmaker of the future, if you are a determinist. |
7395 | Truth as congruence may work for complex beliefs, but not for simple beliefs about existence [Joslin on Russell] |
Full Idea: If truth is congruence between a complex belief and a complex relation between objects in the world, this may work for Othello's belief about Desdemona, but it doesn't seem to work for the simple belief that an object exists. | |
From: comment on Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch.12) by Jack Joslin - talk | |
A reaction: Though Russell has an interesting and persuasive theory, this seems like a big problem. To have a complex belief about a complex of objects, you must first have beliefs about the objects (and that can't be acquaintance, because error is possible). |
5428 | Beliefs are true if they have corresponding facts, and false if they don't [Russell] |
Full Idea: A belief is true when there is a corresponding fact, and is false when there is no corresponding fact. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch.12) | |
A reaction: Russell tries to explain a 'fact' as a complex unity of constituents with a certain order among them. There is an obvious problem that some of the 'orders' in the world are imposed on it by the mind. But we don't invent 'D's love for C'. |
20780 | Graspable presentations are criteria of facts, and are molded according to their objects [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Of presentations, some are graspable, some non-graspable. The graspable presentation, which they say is the criterion of facts [pragmata], is that which comes from an existing object and is stamped and molded in accordance wth the existing object itself. | |
From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 07.46 | |
A reaction: [in lost Physics Bk 2] The big modern anguish over truth-as-correspondence is how you are supposed to verify the 'accordance'. This idea seems to blur the ideas of truth and justification (the 'criterion'), and you can't have both as accordance. |
20793 | How could you ever know that the presentation is similar to the object? [Sext.Empiricus on Chrysippus] |
Full Idea: One cannot say that the soul grasps the externally existing objects by means of the states of the senses on the basis of the similarity of these states to the externally existing objects. For on what basis will it know the similarity? | |
From: comment on Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Sextus Empiricus - Outlines of Pyrrhonism 2.74 | |
A reaction: This exactly the main modern reason for rejecting the correspondence theory of truth. You are welcome to affirm a robust view of truth, but supporting it by claiming a correspondence or resemblance is dubious. |
5421 | The coherence theory says falsehood is failure to cohere, and truth is fitting into a complete system of Truth [Russell] |
Full Idea: The coherence theory of truth says falsehood is a failure to cohere in the body of our beliefs, and that it is the essence of a truth to form part of the completely rounded system which is The Truth. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch.12) | |
A reaction: One could embrace the idea of coherence without accepting the extravagant ninenteenth century Idealists' dream of an ultimate complete Truth (or Absolute). The theory needs a decent account of coherence to get off the ground. |
5424 | Coherence is not the meaning of truth, but an important test for truth [Russell] |
Full Idea: Coherence cannot be accepted as the meaning of truth, though it is often a most important test of truth after a certain amount of truth has become known. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch.12) | |
A reaction: The coherence theory is in fact a confusion of epistemology and ontology. Compare Idea 1364, where Reid charges Locke with confusing the test for personal identity with the thing itself. I wonder if refusal to accept essences causes this problem? |
5423 | If we suspend the law of contradiction, nothing will appear to be incoherent [Russell] |
Full Idea: If the law of contradiction itself were subjected to the test of coherence, we should find that, if we choose to suppose it false, nothing will any longer be incoherent with anything else. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch.12) | |
A reaction: Russell is in error in treating coherence as if it was merely non-contradiction. If I see you as four feet tall today and six feet tall tomorrow, that is incoherent (to me) but not an actual contradiction. All accounts of truth need presuppositions. |
5422 | More than one coherent body of beliefs seems possible [Russell] |
Full Idea: There is no reason to suppose that only one coherent body of beliefs is possible. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch.12) | |
A reaction: Presumably this possibility would not be accepted for the ultimate ideal body of beliefs, but it seems undeniable that limited humanity will be stuck with several coherent possibilities. Coherence, though, is within our grasp, unlike correspondence. |
5401 | The mortality of Socrates is more certain from induction than it is from deduction [Russell] |
Full Idea: We would do better to go straight from the evidence that some men have died to the mortality of Socrates, than to go via 'all men are mortal', for the probability that Socrates is mortal is greater than the probability that all men are mortal. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch. 7) | |
A reaction: Russell claims that deduction should stick to a priori truth, and induction is best for the real world. Interesting. To show that something is a member of a set (e.g. planets) you need an awful lot of knowledge of the set. |
8077 | Stoic propositional logic is like chemistry - how atoms make molecules, not the innards of atoms [Chrysippus, by Devlin] |
Full Idea: In Stoic logic propositions are treated the way atoms are treated in present-day chemistry, where the focus is on the way atoms fit together to form molecules, rather than on the internal structure of the atoms. | |
From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Keith Devlin - Goodbye Descartes Ch.2 | |
A reaction: A nice analogy to explain the nature of Propositional Logic, which was invented by the Stoics (N.B. after Aristotle had invented predicate logic). |
20791 | Chrysippus has five obvious 'indemonstrables' of reasoning [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Chrysippus has five indemonstrables that do not need demonstration:1) If 1st the 2nd, but 1st, so 2nd; 2) If 1st the 2nd, but not 2nd, so not 1st; 3) Not 1st and 2nd, the 1st, so not 2nd; 4) 1st or 2nd, the 1st, so not 2nd; 5) 1st or 2nd, not 2nd, so 1st. | |
From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 07.80-81 | |
A reaction: [from his lost text 'Dialectics'; squashed to fit into one quote] 1) is Modus Ponens, 2) is Modus Tollens. 4) and 5) are Disjunctive Syllogisms. 3) seems a bit complex to be an indemonstrable. |
8078 | Modus ponens is one of five inference rules identified by the Stoics [Chrysippus, by Devlin] |
Full Idea: Modus ponens is just one of the five different inference rules identified by the Stoics. | |
From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Keith Devlin - Goodbye Descartes Ch.2 | |
A reaction: Modus ponens strikes me as being more like a definition of implication than a 'rule'. Implication is what gets you from one truth to another. All the implications of a truth must also be true. |
5395 | Demonstration always relies on the rule that anything implied by a truth is true [Russell] |
Full Idea: All demonstrations involve the principle that 'anything implied by a true proposition is true', or 'whatever follows from a true proposition is true'. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch. 7) | |
A reaction: This is modus ponens, a broad principle of rationality, rather than of strict logicality, because it covers practical inferences and vague propositions. Presumably truth is a prior concept to implication, and therefore more metaphysically basic. |
6023 | Every proposition is either true or false [Chrysippus, by Cicero] |
Full Idea: We hold fast to the position, defended by Chrysippus, that every proposition is either true or false. | |
From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by M. Tullius Cicero - On Fate ('De fato') 38 | |
A reaction: I am intrigued to know exactly how you defend this claim. It may depend what you mean by a proposition. A badly expressed proposition may have indeterminate truth, quite apart from the vague, the undecidable etc. |
5386 | Proper names are really descriptions, and can be replaced by a description in a person's mind [Russell] |
Full Idea: Common words, even proper names, are usually really descriptions; that is, the thought in the mind of a person using a proper name correctly can generally only be expressed explicitly if we replace the proper name by a description. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch. 5) | |
A reaction: This is open to challenge, and the modern idea is that they are more like baptisms, but it all comes down to the debate about internal and external content. Russell would appear to be voicing the internalist theory of names. |
5385 | The phrase 'a so-and-so' is an 'ambiguous' description'; 'the so-and-so' (singular) is a 'definite' description [Russell] |
Full Idea: A phrase of the form 'a so-and-so' I shall call an 'ambiguous' description, and a phrase of the form 'the so-and-so' (in the singular) I shall call a 'definite' description. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch. 5) | |
A reaction: This leaves the problem of those definite descriptions which succeed in referring ('the present Prime Minister'), those which haven't succeeded yet ('the person who will get the most votes'), and those which won't refer ('the present King of France'). |
16949 | Klein summarised geometry as grouped together by transformations [Quine] |
Full Idea: Felix Klein's so-called 'Erlangerprogramm' in geometry involved characterizing the various branches of geometry by what transformations were irrelevant to each. | |
From: Willard Quine (Natural Kinds [1969], p.137) |
5399 | Maths is not known by induction, because further instances are not needed to support it [Russell] |
Full Idea: If induction was the source of our mathematical knowledge, we should proceed differently. In fact, a certain number of instances make us think of two abstractly, and we then see the general principle, and further instances become unnecessary. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch. 7) | |
A reaction: In practice, of course, we stop checking whether the sun has come up yet again this morning. Russell's point is better expressed as: if contradictory evidence were observed, we would believe the arithmetic and doubt the experience. |
5992 | Chrysippus says action is the criterion for existence, which must be physical [Chrysippus, by Tieleman] |
Full Idea: Chrysippus regarded power to act and be acted upon as the criterion for existence or being - a test satisfied by bodies alone. | |
From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Teun L. Tieleman - Chrysippus | |
A reaction: This defines existence in terms of causation. Is he ruling out a priori a particle (say) which exists, but never interacts with anything? If so, he is inclining towards anti-realism. |
16939 | Mass terms just concern spread, but other terms involve both spread and individuation [Quine] |
Full Idea: 'Yellow' and 'water' are mass terms, concerned only with spread; 'apple' and 'square' are terms of divided reference, concerned with both spread and individuation. | |
From: Willard Quine (Natural Kinds [1969], p.124) | |
A reaction: Would you like some apple? Pass me that water. It is helpful to see that it is a requirement of 'individuation' that is missing from terms for stuff. |
5370 | Space is neutral between touch and sight, so it cannot really be either of them [Russell] |
Full Idea: The space of science is neutral as between touch and sight; thus it cannot be either the space of touch or the space of sight. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch. 3) | |
A reaction: I find this persuasive, although it is hardly a knock-down argument. It is a very simple problem for anti-realists, that if you say reality IS sensations (à la Berkeley), then you have conflicting sensations of what seems to be one reality. |
21673 | There are simple and complex facts; the latter depend on further facts [Chrysippus, by Cicero] |
Full Idea: Chrysippus says there are two classes of facts, simple and complex. An instance of a simple fact is 'Socrates will die at a given date', ...but 'Milo will wrestle at Olympia' is a complex statement, because there can be no wrestling without an opponent. | |
From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by M. Tullius Cicero - On Fate ('De fato') 13.30 | |
A reaction: We might say that there are atomic and complex facts, but our atomic facts tend to be much simpler, usually just saying some object has some property. |
5418 | In a world of mere matter there might be 'facts', but no truths [Russell] |
Full Idea: If we imagine a world of mere matter, there would be no room for falsehood, and although it would contain what may be called 'facts', it would not contain any truths. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch.12) | |
A reaction: Only a realist will buy a concept of mind-independent 'facts', but I am with Russell all the way here. We should not say "the truth is out there", but "the facts are out there". Facts are the target of thought, and truth is a relationship to the facts. |
16652 | Stoics categories are Substrate, Quality, Disposition, and Relation [Chrysippus, by Pasnau] |
Full Idea: The Stoics proposed a rather modest categorisation of Substrate, Quality, Disposition, and Relation. | |
From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 12.1 |
5371 | Because we depend on correspondence, we know relations better than we know the items that relate [Russell] |
Full Idea: We can know the properties of the relations required to preserve the correspondence between sense-data and reality, but we cannot know the nature of the terms between which the relations hold. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch. 3) | |
A reaction: Thus Russell always puts great emphasis on relations in his metaphysics. I would say that he is right, and that what he calls the 'nature of the terms' are essences, and that these are knowable, by inference and explanation. |
5407 | That Edinburgh is north of London is a non-mental fact, so relations are independent universals [Russell] |
Full Idea: Nothing mental is presupposed in the fact that Edinburgh is north of London, but this involves the universal 'north of', so we must admit that relations are not dependent upon thought, but belong to the independent world which thought apprehends. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch. 9) | |
A reaction: We cannot deny that Edinburgh being north of London is independent of our minds, but we might deny that 'north of' is a universal. 'North' is clearly a human convention, but 'nearer a pole' isn't. Distances exist in space, rather than as relations. |
16948 | Once we know the mechanism of a disposition, we can eliminate 'similarity' [Quine] |
Full Idea: Once we can legitimize a disposition term by defining the relevant similarity standard, we are apt to know the mechanism of the disposition, and so by-pass the similarity. | |
From: Willard Quine (Natural Kinds [1969], p.135) | |
A reaction: I love mechanisms, but can we characterise mechanisms without mentioning powers and dispositions? Quine's dream is to eliminate 'similarity'. |
16945 | We judge things to be soluble if they are the same kind as, or similar to, things that do dissolve [Quine] |
Full Idea: Intuitively, what qualifies a thing as soluble though it never gets into water is that it is of the same kind as the things that actually did or will dissolve; it is similar to them. | |
From: Willard Quine (Natural Kinds [1969], p.130) | |
A reaction: If you can judge that the similar things 'will' dissolve, you can cut to the chase and judge that this thing will dissolve. |
5383 | Every complete sentence must contain at least one word (a verb) which stands for a universal [Russell] |
Full Idea: Every complete sentence must contain at least one word which stands for a universal, since all verbs have a meaning which is universal. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch. 5) | |
A reaction: Not all meaningful statements are sentences. One could try a programme of eliminating from discourse all words which imply universals. Daily physical life would survive all right, but universities would close down. |
4428 | Propositions express relations (prepositions and verbs) as well as properties (nouns and adjectives) [Russell] |
Full Idea: In general, adjectives and nouns express properties of things, whereas prepositions and verbs express relations between things, so neglect of the latter led to the belief that every proposition attributes properties rather than relations. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch. 9) | |
A reaction: A simple point on which Russell was very keen to insist, and which seems right. It invites the question whether there are further universals, beyond properties and relations. |
5406 | Confused views of reality result from thinking that only nouns and adjectives represent universals [Russell] |
Full Idea: The monism of Spinoza and Bradley, and the monadism of Leibniz, result, in my opinion, from an undue attention to one sort of universals, namely the sort represented by adjectives and substantives rather than by verbs and prepositions. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch. 9) | |
A reaction: The 'linguistic turn' of 20th century philosophy, which should be treated with caution, but I agree that if we are going to accept universals, we need a wide vision of what categories they might fall into. I would prefer an ontology without 'relations'. |
4479 | All universals are like the relation "is north of", in having no physical location at all [Russell, by Loux] |
Full Idea: Russell denies that universals have any location at all. ..He is generalising from the case of "is north of", which does not exist any more in Edinburgh than in London. | |
From: report of Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch. 9) by Michael J. Loux - Metaphysics: contemporary introduction p.55 | |
A reaction: Russell may claim that the relation "is north of" is natural, but I suspect that it is a convention, mapped onto a physical situation. Reifying relations invite charges of a regress (as Bradley noted). |
4030 | Russell claims that universals are needed to explain a priori knowledge (as their relations) [Russell, by Mellor/Oliver] |
Full Idea: Russell's positive argument for universals is that they explain how we can have a priori knowledge, which 'deals exclusively with the relations of universals'. | |
From: report of Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch. 9) by DH Mellor / A Oliver - Introduction to 'Properties' §3 | |
A reaction: Unfortunately we can invent the universals, and then delude ourselves that we have a priori knowledge |
4427 | Every sentence contains at least one word denoting a universal, so we need universals to know truth [Russell] |
Full Idea: No sentence can be made up without at least one word which denotes a universal. ..Thus all truths involve universals, and all knowledge of truths involves acquaintance with universals. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch. 9) | |
A reaction: Sounds right, and is a beautifully neat way of showing the connection between metaphysics and life. |
5409 | Normal existence is in time, so we must say that universals 'subsist' [Russell] |
Full Idea: We think of things existing when they are in time (though possibly at all times), but universals do not exist in this sense, so we shall say that they 'subsist' or 'have being'. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch. 9) | |
A reaction: Russell picked up the word 'subsist' from medieval philosophy. This idea brings the full Platonic metaphysics with it, which is tricky, to say the least. But what can you do? Admitting the content of thought brings baggage with it. |
5408 | If we identify whiteness with a thought, we can never think of it twice; whiteness is the object of a thought [Russell] |
Full Idea: If whiteness were the thought as opposed to its object no two different men could think of it, and no one man could think of it twice. What many different thoughts of whiteness have in common is their object, and this object is different from all of them. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch. 9) | |
A reaction: This seems to me a powerful argument in favour of thinking of universals as in some sense real - but in what sense? The crux is that Russell shows that we must find a place in our ontology for the content of thoughts, as well as of thoughts. |
4441 | 'Resemblance Nominalism' won't work, because the theory treats resemblance itself as a universal [Russell] |
Full Idea: To be a universal, a resemblance must hold between many pairs of white things. We can't say there is a different resemblance between each pair, since the resemblances must resemble each other, so we are forced to admit that resemblance is a universal. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch. 9) | |
A reaction: Apparently this objection is much discussed and controversial. It looks like a threat to any theory of universals (involving 'sets', or 'concepts', or 'predicates'). We seem to need 'basic' and 'derivative' universals. Cf Idea 7956. |
4429 | If we consider whiteness to be merely a mental 'idea', we rob it of its universality [Russell] |
Full Idea: If we come to regard an 'idea' like whiteness as an act of thought, then we come to think of whiteness as mental, but in doing so we rob it of its essential quality of universality. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch. 9) | |
A reaction: Presumably we need an ontological commitment to the existence of universals, which is very Platonic. Fatherhood might be a better example, since whiteness is a quale. |
16058 | Dion and Theon coexist, but Theon lacks a foot. If Dion loses a foot, he ousts Theon? [Chrysippus, by Philo of Alexandria] |
Full Idea: If two individuals occupied one substance …let one individual (Dion) be thought of as whole-limbed, the other (Theon) as minus one foot. Then let one of Dion's feet be amputated. Theon is the stronger candidate to have perished. | |
From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Philo (Alex) - On the Eternity of the World 48 | |
A reaction: [SVF 2.397 - from Chrysippus's lost 'On the Growing Argument'] This is the original of Tibbles the Cat. Dion must persist to change, and then ousts Theon (it seems). Philo protests at Theon ceasing to exist when nothing has happened to him. |
16059 | Change of matter doesn't destroy identity - in Dion and Theon change is a condition of identity [Chrysippus, by Long/Sedley] |
Full Idea: The Growing Argument said any change of matter is a change of identity. Chrysippus presents it with a case (Dion and Theon) where material diminution is the necessary condition of enduring identity, since the diminished footless Dion survives. | |
From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by AA Long / DN Sedley - Hellenic Philosophers commentary 28:175 | |
A reaction: [The example, in Idea 16058, is the original of Tibbles the Cat] This is a lovely bold idea which I haven't met in the modern discussions - that identity actually requires change. The concept of identity is meaningless without change? |
5400 | In any possible world we feel that two and two would be four [Russell] |
Full Idea: In any possible world we feel that two and two would be four. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch. 7) | |
A reaction: Thinking of necessity in terms of possible worlds is not a new invention, but then Russell was a keen fan of Leibniz. Suppose there were no world at all, and only one truth, namely that two and two make five? (No, I can't make sense of that!) |
5431 | Knowledge cannot be precisely defined, as it merges into 'probable opinion' [Russell] |
Full Idea: 'Knowledge' is not a precise conception: it merges into 'probable opinion', and so a very precise definition should not be sought. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch.13) | |
A reaction: This announcement comes as a relief, after endless attempts (mainly by American academics) to give watertight, carefully worded definitions. It seems to me undeniable that what we will accept as knowledge is partly a matter of social negotiation. |
5426 | Belief relates a mind to several things other than itself [Russell] |
Full Idea: A belief or judgement relates a mind to several things other than itself. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch.12) | |
A reaction: Presumably we must say that if I believe that (say) 'x exists', this is relating x to the universal 'exists'. If so, Russell's point becomes a bit of a tautology. We believe propositions, which are combinations of concepts, so are multiple. |
5366 | We have an 'instinctive' belief in the external world, prior to all reflection [Russell] |
Full Idea: We find a belief in an independent external world ready in ourselves as soon as we begin to reflect: it is what may be called an 'instinctive' belief. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch. 2) | |
A reaction: Somewhere Hume calls this a 'natural belief', and it is fairly central to his idea that most of our beliefs are built up fairly mechanically by associations. I am tempted to ask whether such things even count as beliefs, if they are so uncritical. |
5359 | Descartes showed that subjective things are the most certain [Russell] |
Full Idea: By showing that subjective things are the most certain, Descartes performed a great service to philosophy. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch. 2) | |
A reaction: This praise comes from an empiricist, who has just said that 'sense-data' are the most certain things. I presume that animals are more certain of the world than they are of subjective things. In fact, probably on philosophers agree with Russell. |
5377 | 'Acquaintance' is direct awareness, without inferences or judgements [Russell] |
Full Idea: We shall say we have 'acquaintance' with anything of which we are directly aware, without the intermediary of any process of inference or any knowledge of truths. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch. 5) | |
A reaction: Although Russell understands the difficulty of precise distinctions here, he implies that some knowledge is directly knowable, although truth only enters at the stage of judgement. Personally I would suggest that pure acquaintance is not knowledge. |
6510 | Russell (1912) said phenomena only resemble reality in abstract structure [Russell, by Robinson,H] |
Full Idea: Russell held in 'Problems of Philosophy' that the physical world resembles the phenomenal only in abstract structure. | |
From: report of Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912]) by Howard Robinson - Perception VII.5 | |
A reaction: Russell's problem is that he then requires full-blown and elaborate 'inferences' to get from the abstract structure to some sort of 'theory' of reality, but our experience seems much more direct, even if it isn't actually 'naïve'. |
5372 | There is no reason to think that objects have colours [Russell] |
Full Idea: It is quite gratuitous to suppose that physical objects have colours. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch. 3) | |
A reaction: This has always seemed to me self-evident, from the day I started to study philosophy. I cannot make sense of serious attempts to defend direct (naïve) realism. Colour is a brilliant trick of natural selection for extracting environmental information. |
5373 | 'Idealism' says that everything which exists is in some sense mental [Russell] |
Full Idea: We shall understand 'idealism' to be the doctrine that whatever exists, or at any rate whatever can be known to exist, must be in some sense mental. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch. 4) | |
A reaction: The interesting thing here is the phrase 'in some sense', which takes on a new light when we begin once against to take seriously ideas such as panpsychism. If the boundary between mind and brain is blurred, so is that between realism and idealism. |
5362 | It is not illogical to think that only myself and my mental events exist [Russell] |
Full Idea: No logical absurdity results from the hypothesis that the world consists of myself and my thoughts and feelings and sensations, and that everything else is mere fancy. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch. 2) | |
A reaction: The only real attempt to meet this challenge is Wittgenstein's Private Language Argument, which tried to show that it would be a logical impossibility to speak a language if there were no other minds. Personally, I am with Russell. |
5412 | Some propositions are self-evident, but their implications may also be self-evident [Russell] |
Full Idea: When a certain number of logical principles have been admitted as self-evident, the rest can be deduced from them; but the propositions deduced are often just as self-evident as those that were assumed without proof. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch.11) | |
A reaction: This seems an important corrective to the traditional rationalist dream, based on Euclid, that all knowledge is self-evident axioms followed by proofs of the rest. But Russell here endorses a more sensible sort of rationalism. |
5413 | Particular instances are more clearly self-evident than any general principles [Russell] |
Full Idea: Particular instances are more self-evident than general principles; for example, the law of contradiction is evident as soon as it is understood, but it is not as evident as that a particular rose cannot be both red and not red. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch.11) | |
A reaction: This seems to true about nearly all reasoning, because whenever we are faced with a general principle for assessment, we check it by testing it against a series of particular instances, and try to think of contradictory particular counterexamples. |
5415 | As shown by memory, self-evidence comes in degrees [Russell] |
Full Idea: It is clear from the case of memory that self-evidence has degrees, and is present in gradations ranging from absolute certainty down to an almost imperceptible faintness. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch.11) | |
A reaction: I am beginning to see Russell as the 'father of modern rationalism'. His relaxation of notions of an all-or-nothing a priori, and of a sharp distinction between axioms and proofs, lead to a sensible rationalism which even a Humean sceptic might buy. |
5416 | If self-evidence has degrees, we should accept the more self-evident as correct [Russell] |
Full Idea: If propositions can have some degree of self-evidence without being true, we must say, where there is a conflict, that the more self-evident proposition is to be retained and the less self-evident rejected. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch.11) | |
A reaction: This is a key part of Russell's 'moderate rationalism'. Presumably the rejected propositions were therefore not self-evident, and can be used as training for intuitions, by seeing why we got it wrong. Fools find absurd falsehoods self-evidently true. |
5397 | The rationalists were right, because we know logical principles without experience [Russell] |
Full Idea: In the most important point of the controversy between empiricists and rationalist, the rationalists were right, since logical principles are known to us, but cannot be proved by experience, since all proof presupposes them | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch. 7) | |
A reaction: Russell initially presents this as the answer to 'innate ideas'. I would prefer to say, in the style of Descartes, that logic is self-evident to the natural light of reason. The debate isn't over. A Turing machine may be able to do logic. |
4430 | All a priori knowledge deals with the relations of universals [Russell] |
Full Idea: All a priori knowledge deals with the relations of universals. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch.10) | |
A reaction: A nice bold proposition, and remarkably Platonic for a famous empiricist. But then a priori knowledge of particulars sounds unlikely. |
5411 | We can know some general propositions by universals, when no instance can be given [Russell] |
Full Idea: The general proposition 'All products of two integers, which never have been and never will be thought of by any human being, are over 100' is undeniably true, and yet we can never give an instance of it; ..only a knowledge of the universals is required. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch.10) | |
A reaction: A nice example which it seems to be impossible to contradict. But maybe we can explain our knowledge of it in terms of rules, instead of mentioning universals. Can a rule be stated without recourse to universals? Sounds unlikely. |
6514 | Russell's representationalism says primary qualities only show the structure of reality [Russell, by Robinson,H] |
Full Idea: The weakest version of representationalism, found in Russell, asserts that there is no resemblance to reality on the level of secondary qualities, and also that primary qualities exhibit only a structural isomorphism. | |
From: report of Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912]) by Howard Robinson - Perception IX.2 | |
A reaction: This seems a plausible thing to say about, say, shape, but it is not clear how the idea works for hardness or mass. The sense of touch seems to be much more directly in contact with actual primary qualities than visions does (let alone smell or hearing). |
6415 | After 1912, Russell said sense-data are last in analysis, not first in experience [Russell, by Grayling] |
Full Idea: During the decade after 'Problems of Philosophy' Russell points our repeatedly that specifications of sense-data come last in analysis, not first in experience. | |
From: report of Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912]) by A.C. Grayling - Russell Ch.2 | |
A reaction: This was a symptom of Russell losing faith in sense-data, and he eventually abandoned them. There is a possible position where we deny any such item as sense-data in a scientific account, but allow them in our metaphysics. |
5358 | 'Sense-data' are what are immediately known in sensation, such as colours or roughnesses [Russell] |
Full Idea: Let us give the name 'sense-data' to the things that are immediately known in sensation: such things as colours, sounds, smells, hardnesses, roughnesses, and so on. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch. 1) | |
A reaction: This idea gradually became notorious, because it seems to create a new ontological category unnecessarily, and it creates problems, such as how the intermediary interacts with us and with things. Are sense-data totally non-conceptual? |
7290 | If Russell rejects innate ideas and direct a priori knowledge, he is left with a tabula rasa [Russell, by Thompson] |
Full Idea: If Russell rejects innate ideas, and he even thinks the laws of thought must by triggered by experiences (e.g. of a beech tree), and he doesn't embrace associations, this implies that he thinks the mind begins as a tabula rasa. | |
From: report of Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912]) by George Thompson - talk | |
A reaction: This nice observation places Russell as (in my view) a rather old-fashioned empiricist, who ignores Hume and Kant, and is not willing to speculate about how the mind can turn acquaintances with sense-data into knowledge |
5357 | It is natural to begin from experience, and presumably that is the basis of knowledge [Russell] |
Full Idea: In the search for certainty, it is natural to begin with our present experiences, and in some sense, no doubt, knowledge is to be derived from them. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch. 1) | |
A reaction: Is experience the 'natural' place to begin? It didn't seem to strike Descartes that way. It seems better to say that philosophy begins when we are not quite satisfied with experience, and the natural place to begin is 'dissatisfaction'. |
5382 | We are acquainted with outer and inner sensation, memory, Self, and universals [Russell, by PG] |
Full Idea: We have acquaintance with outer senses, with inner sense (by introspection), with memory (of outer or inner sensations), with a Self (probably), and also with universals (general ideas). | |
From: report of Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch. 5) by PG - Db (ideas) | |
A reaction: The spectacular odd one out in a basic empiricist theory is, of course, universals, when one expects some sort of nominalist reduction of those into sense-data. I am very sympathetic to the Russell line, though it spells big ontological trouble. |
5389 | Knowledge by descriptions enables us to transcend private experience [Russell] |
Full Idea: The chief importance of knowledge by descriptions is that it enables us to pass beyond the limits of our private experience. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch. 5) | |
A reaction: The most basic question for empiricism concerns how we can know things beyond immediate experience. Russell is right, though this doesn't tell us much. We need to know the rules for valid descriptions, explanation, speculations etc. |
5376 | I can know the existence of something with which nobody is acquainted [Russell] |
Full Idea: There is no reason why I should not know of the existence of something with which nobody is acquainted. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch. 4) | |
A reaction: This sort of realist claim (which he goes on to say results from inferences from descriptions) is needed to save empiricism from the absurdities of Berkeley and (dare I say it?) Quine. The Kantian Ego is a candidate. |
5414 | Images are not memory, because they are present, and memories are of the past [Russell] |
Full Idea: An image cannot constitute a memory, because we notice that the image is in the present, whereas what is remembered is known to be in the past. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch.11) | |
A reaction: This sounds a bit glib, and maybe makes the mistake for which he criticises Berkeley, of confusing a thought and its content. The puzzle is how we know that some images represent the past, others the present, others predictions, and others fantasy. |
5430 | A true belief is not knowledge if it is reached by bad reasoning [Russell] |
Full Idea: A true belief cannot be called knowledge when it is deduced by a fallacious process of reasoning. If I know all Greeks are men, and Socrates was a man, I cannot know that Socrates was a Greek, even if I falsely infer it. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch.13) | |
A reaction: Another very nice 'Gettier' example, fifty years before Gettier. There is a danger of circularity here, between knowledge, fallacy and truth. Giving them three independent definitions does not look promising. |
5429 | True belief is not knowledge when it is deduced from false belief [Russell] |
Full Idea: A true belief is not knowledge when it is deduced from a false belief (as when deducing that the late Prime Minister's name began with B, believing it was Balfour, when actually it was Bannerman). | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch.13) | |
A reaction: Correct me if I am wrong, but isn't this the 'Gettier Problem'? It raises the central question of modern epistemology, which is what will be counted as adequate justification to make a true belief qualify as knowledge. How high do we set the bar? |
5378 | All knowledge (of things and of truths) rests on the foundations of acquaintance [Russell] |
Full Idea: All our knowledge, both knowledge of things and knowledge of truths, rests upon acquaintance as its foundations. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch. 5) | |
A reaction: Russell here allies himself with Hume, and with the empiricist version of foundationalism. 'Acquaintance' plays the role which 'impressions' played for Hume. He is eliminating any possible cognitive content from the Hume idea, implying pure sense-data. |
5365 | Dreams can be explained fairly scientifically if we assume a physical world [Russell] |
Full Idea: Dreams are more or less suggested by what we call waking life, and are capable of being more or less accounted for on scientific principles if we assume that there really is a physical world. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch. 2) | |
A reaction: This sounds a bit circular, since scientific principles depend entirely on the assumption that there is a physical world. No doubt if we assume fairies, 'fairy lore' will explain everything. 'Explanation' is the basic concept here. |
16944 | Science is common sense, with a sophisticated method [Quine] |
Full Idea: Sciences differ from common sense only in the degree of methodological sophistication. | |
From: Willard Quine (Natural Kinds [1969], p.129) | |
A reaction: Science is normal thinking about the world, but it is teamwork, with the bar set very high. |
5391 | Science aims to find uniformities to which (within the limits of experience) there are no exceptions [Russell] |
Full Idea: The business of science is to find uniformities, such as the laws of motion and the law of gravitation, to which, so far as our experience extends, there are no exceptions. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch. 6) | |
A reaction: This seems nicely stated, based on the Humean 'regularity' view of scientific laws. When we discover such uniformities (such as the gravitational equation), we are still faced with the metaphysical question of their status. Necessity, or pattern? |
16941 | Induction relies on similar effects following from each cause [Quine] |
Full Idea: Induction expresses our hopes that similar causes will have similar effects. | |
From: Willard Quine (Natural Kinds [1969], p.125) | |
A reaction: Some top philosophers are also top teachers, and Quine was one of them, in his writings. He boils it down for the layman. Once again, he is pointing to the fundamental role of the similarity relation. |
16940 | Induction is just more of the same: animal expectations [Quine] |
Full Idea: Induction is essentially only more of the same: animal expectation or habit formation. | |
From: Willard Quine (Natural Kinds [1969], p.125) | |
A reaction: My working definition of induction is 'learning from experience', but that doesn't disagree with Quine. Lipton has a richer account of different types of induction. Quine's point is that it rests on resemblance. |
5390 | Chickens are not very good at induction, and are surprised when their feeder wrings their neck [Russell] |
Full Idea: The man who has fed his chicken every day throughout its life at last wrings its neck instead, showing that more refined views as to the uniformity of nature would have been useful to the chicken. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch. 6) | |
A reaction: A justly famous illustration of Hume's problem of induction, that a vast amount of evidence could still support a false conclusion. If we say 'the future will be like the past', this depends on understanding what was happening in the past. |
5392 | It doesn't follow that because the future has always resembled the past, that it always will [Russell] |
Full Idea: We have experience of past futures, but not of future futures, and the question is: Will future futures resemble past futures? This question is not to be answered by an argument which starts from past futures alone. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch. 6) | |
A reaction: This nicely makes the problem of induction unavoidable, for anyone who preferred not to face the problem. The simple solution is to recognise that the future may NOT resemble the past, for all we know. Actually I think it will, but what was the past like? |
5394 | We can't prove induction from experience without begging the question [Russell] |
Full Idea: We can never use experience to prove the inductive principle without begging the question. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch. 6) | |
A reaction: This highlights why induction is such a big problem for hard-line empiricists, who are reduced to saying that it is a 'dogma', or an unsupported 'natural belief'. And that seems right. All creatures which evolve in a stable universe will do induction. |
16933 | Grue is a puzzle because the notions of similarity and kind are dubious in science [Quine] |
Full Idea: What makes Goodman's example a puzzle is the dubious scientific standing of a general notion of similarity, or of kind. | |
From: Willard Quine (Natural Kinds [1969], p.116) | |
A reaction: Illuminating. It might be best expressed as revealing a problem with sortal terms, as employed by Geach, or by Wiggins. Grue is a bit silly, but sortals are subject to convention and culture. 'Natural' properties seem needed. |
5363 | If the cat reappears in a new position, presumably it has passed through the intermediate positions [Russell] |
Full Idea: If the cat appears at one moment in one part of the room, and at another in another part, it is natural to suppose that it has moved from the one to the other, passing over a series of intermediate positions. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch. 2) | |
A reaction: This example seems perfect as an illustration of inference to the best explanation (now called 'abduction'), and that seems to me the absolute key to human knowledge. The cat example is what made me a devotee of Bertrand Russell. |
5367 | Belief in real objects makes our account of experience simpler and more systematic [Russell] |
Full Idea: The belief that there are objects corresponding to our sense-data tends to simplify and systematize our account of our experiences, so there seems no good reason for rejecting it. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch. 2) | |
A reaction: This hardly counts as a good argument against the logical possibility of global scepticism, but it is a nice statement of the concept of 'best explanation', which obviously requires some sort of rational criteria if it is to provide a theory of knowledge. |
5364 | It is hard not to believe that speaking humans are expressing thoughts, just as we do ourselves [Russell] |
Full Idea: When human beings speak, it is very difficult to suppose that what we hear is not the expression of a thought, as we know it would be if we emitted the same sounds. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch. 2) | |
A reaction: This is partly the 'argument from analogy', which seems a bit suspect (induction from a single instance), but it is also the rather undeniable Humean idea that we have a 'natural belief' in other minds, which we could never disbelieve. |
5379 | If we didn't know our own minds by introspection, we couldn't know that other people have minds [Russell] |
Full Idea: But for our acquaintance with the contents of our own minds, we should be unable to imagine the minds of others, and therefore we could never arrive at the knowledge that they have minds. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch. 5) | |
A reaction: Not only does this depend on the notorious 'argument from analogy', but it actually strikes me as false. If a robot observed a human to be writhing in pain, it would be mystified, until it inferred that we have minds in which we actually 'feel' damage. |
1875 | Dogs show reason in decisions made by elimination [Chrysippus, by Sext.Empiricus] |
Full Idea: A dog makes use of the fifth complex indemonstrable syllogism when, arriving at a spot where three ways meet, after smelling at two roads by which the quarry did not pass, he rushes off at once by the third without pausing to smell. | |
From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Sextus Empiricus - Outlines of Pyrrhonism I.69 | |
A reaction: As we might say: either A or B or C; not A; not B; therefore C. I wouldn't want to trust this observation without a lot of analysis of slow-motion photography of dogs as crossroads. Even so, it is a nice challenge to Descartes' view of animals. |
16934 | General terms depend on similarities among things [Quine] |
Full Idea: The usual general term, whether a common noun or a verb or an adjective, owes its generality to some resemblance among the things referred to. | |
From: Willard Quine (Natural Kinds [1969], p.116) | |
A reaction: Quine has a nice analysis of the basic role of similarity in a huge amount of supposedly strict scientific thought. |
5410 | I learn the universal 'resemblance' by seeing two shades of green, and their contrast with red [Russell] |
Full Idea: If I see simultaneously two shades of green, I can see that they resemble each other, and I see that they resemble each other more than they resemble a shade of red; in this way I become acquainted with the universal 'resemblance'. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch.10) | |
A reaction: This is strikingly different from the account of Hume, who seemed to regard resemblance as a fairly mechanical, computer-like activity of the brain, whereas Russell (an empiricist) responds by inclining towards Platonism. Hume sounds better here. |
16938 | To learn yellow by observation, must we be told to look at the colour? [Quine] |
Full Idea: According to the 'respects' view, our learning of yellow by ostension would have depended on our first having been told or somehow apprised that it was going to be a question of color. | |
From: Willard Quine (Natural Kinds [1969], p.122) | |
A reaction: Quine suggests there is just one notion of similarity, and respects can be 'abstracted' afterwards. Even the ontologically ruthless Quine admits psychological abstraction! |
8486 | Standards of similarity are innate, and the spacing of qualities such as colours can be mapped [Quine] |
Full Idea: A standard of similarity is in some sense innate. The spacing of qualities (such as red, pink and blue) can be explored and mapped in the laboratory by experiments. They are needed for all learning. | |
From: Willard Quine (Natural Kinds [1969], p.123) | |
A reaction: This reasserts Hume's original point in more scientific terms. It is one of the undeniable facts about our perceptions of qualities and properties, no matter how platonist your view of universals may be. |
16947 | Similarity is just interchangeability in the cosmic machine [Quine] |
Full Idea: Things are similar to the extent that they are interchangeable parts of the cosmic machine. | |
From: Willard Quine (Natural Kinds [1969], p.134) | |
A reaction: This is a major idea for Quine, because it is a means to gradually eliminate the fuzzy ideas of 'resemblance' or 'similarity' or 'natural kind' from science. I love it! Two tigers are same insofar as they are substitutable. |
5381 | In seeing the sun, we are acquainted with our self, but not as a permanent person [Russell] |
Full Idea: When I see the sun, it does not seem necessary to suppose that we are acquainted with a more or less permanent person, but we must be acquainted with that thing which sees the sun and has acquaintance with sense-data. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch. 5) | |
A reaction: I think this is exactly right. I personally believe that I have a very clear personal identity as I write this, but I do not believe that there is a strict identity with the person who wrote similar comments three years ago. So how do I change 'my' mind? |
5380 | In perceiving the sun, I am aware of sun sense-data, and of the perceiver of the data [Russell] |
Full Idea: When I am acquainted with 'my seeing the sun', it seems plain that on the one hand there is the sense-datum which represents the sun to me, on the other hand there is that which sees this sense-datum. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch. 5) | |
A reaction: This appears to flatly contradict Hume's scepticism about seeing his 'self', but maybe Russell is only aware of his body, and then fictionalises a 'self' as the controller of this body. But I agree with Russell. I am the thing that cares about the sun. |
20834 | Chrysippus allows evil to say it is fated, or even that it is rational and natural [Plutarch on Chrysippus] |
Full Idea: Chrysippus gives vice blatant freedom to say not only that it is necessary and according to fate, but even that it occurs according to god's reason and the best nature. | |
From: comment on Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Plutarch - 70: Stoic Self-contradictions 1050c | |
A reaction: This is Plutarch's criticism of stoic determinism or fatalism. Zeno replied that the punishment for vice may also be fated. It seems that Chysippus did believe that punishments were too harsh, given that vices are fated [p.109]. |
20833 | A swerve in the atoms would be unnatural, like scales settling differently for no reason [Chrysippus, by Plutarch] |
Full Idea: Chrysippus argues against the 'swerve' of the Epicureans, on the grounds that they are doing violence to nature by positing something which is uncaused, and cites dice or scales, which can't settle differently without some cause or difference. | |
From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Plutarch - 70: Stoic Self-contradictions 1045c | |
A reaction: That is, the principle of sufficient reason (or of everything having a cause) is derived from observation, not a priori understanding. Pace Leibniz. As in modern discussion, free will or the swerve only occur in our minds, and not elsewhere. |
20808 | Everything is fated, either by continuous causes or by a supreme rational principle [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Chrysippus says (in his 'On Fate') that everything happens by fate. Fate is a continuous string of causes of things which exist or a rational principle according to which the cosmos is managed. | |
From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 07.148 |
20835 | Chrysippus is wrong to believe in non-occurring future possibilities if he is a fatalist [Plutarch on Chrysippus] |
Full Idea: Chrysippus's accounts of possibility and fate are in conflict. If he is right that 'everything that permits of occurring even if it is not going to occur is possible', then many things are possible which are not according to fate. | |
From: comment on Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Plutarch - 70: Stoic Self-contradictions 1055e | |
A reaction: A palpable hit, I think. Plutarch refers to Chrysippus's rejection of Diodorus Cronus's Master Argument. Fatalism seems to entail that the only future possibilities are the ones that actually occur. |
20836 | The Lazy Argument responds to fate with 'why bother?', but the bothering is also fated [Chrysippus, by Cicero] |
Full Idea: Chrysippus responded to the Lazy Argument (that the outcome of an illness is fated, so there is no point in calling the doctor) by saying 'calling the doctor is fated just as much as recovering', which he calls 'co-fated'. | |
From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by M. Tullius Cicero - On Fate ('De fato') 28-30 | |
A reaction: From a pragmatic point of view, this idea also nullifies fatalism, since you can plausibly fight against your fate to your last breath. No evidence could ever be offered in support of fatalism, not even the most unlikely events. |
21679 | When we say events are fated by antecedent causes, do we mean principal or auxiliary causes? [Chrysippus] |
Full Idea: Some causes are perfect and principal, others auxiliary and proximate. Hence when we say that everything takes place by fate owing to antecedent causes, what we wish to be understood is not perfect and principal causes but auxiliary and proximate causes. | |
From: Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]), quoted by M. Tullius Cicero - On Fate ('De fato') 18.41 | |
A reaction: This move is described by Cicero as enabling Chrysippus to 'escape necessity and to retain fate'. |
20837 | Fate is an eternal and fixed chain of causal events [Chrysippus] |
Full Idea: Fate is a sempiternal and unchangeable series and chain of things, rolling and unravelling itself through eternal sequences of cause and effect, of which it is composed and compounded. | |
From: Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]), quoted by Aulus Gellius - Noctes Atticae 7.2.01 | |
A reaction: It seems that Chrysippus (called by Aulus Gellius 'the chief Stoic philosopher') had a rather grandly rhetorical prose style. |
5971 | Destiny is only a predisposing cause, not a sufficient cause [Chrysippus, by Plutarch] |
Full Idea: Chrysippus considered destiny to be not a cause sufficient of itself but only a predisposing cause. | |
From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE], fr 997) by Plutarch - 70: Stoic Self-contradictions 1056b | |
A reaction: This appears to be a rejection of determinism, and is the equivalent of Epicurus' introduction of the 'swerve' in atoms. They had suddenly become bothered about the free will problem in about 305 BCE. There must be other non-destiny causes? |
5369 | It is rational to believe in reality, despite the lack of demonstrative reasons for it [Russell] |
Full Idea: In the preceding chapter we agreed, though without being able to find demonstrative reasons, that it is rational to believe that our sense-data are signs of an independent reality. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch. 3) | |
A reaction: I wonder if Russell was the first to grasp this essential distinction. I suspect that three hundred years (1600-1900) were wasted in philosophy because they thought that everything rational had to be demonstrable. E.g. Hume on induction. |
5375 | Knowledge of truths applies to judgements; knowledge by acquaintance applies to sensations and things [Russell] |
Full Idea: The word 'know' has two senses: the first is 'knowledge of truths', which is opposed to error, applies to judgements, and is knowing that something; the second is 'acquaintance', and is knowledge of things, particularly of sense-data. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch. 4) | |
A reaction: We can also add procedural knowledge ('knowing how'). The question for Russell is whether his 'knowledge by acquaintance' can ever qualify as knowledge on its own, without the intrusion of judgements. Does perception necessarily have content? |
21711 | Russell's 'multiple relations' theory says beliefs attach to ingredients, not to propositions [Russell, by Linsky,B] |
Full Idea: The basic idea of Russell's new 'multiple relations' theory of belief was that belief does not relate an individual to a proposition composed of various individuals and universals, but rather relates the believer directly to those constituents. | |
From: report of Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch.12) by Bernard Linsky - Russell's Metaphysical Logic 3.1 | |
A reaction: Russell abandoned his commitment to propositions in 1908, and retained this new view until 1918. Wittgenstein gave Russell hell over this theory. This view made his 'congruence' account of the correspondence theory of truth possible. |
5427 | Truth is when a mental state corresponds to a complex unity of external constituents [Russell] |
Full Idea: Judging or believing is a certain complex unity of which a mind is a constituent; if the remaining constituents, taken in the order which they have in the belief, form a complex unity, then the belief is true. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch.12) | |
A reaction: The modern label of 'congruence' for this view of truth makes it clearer. We aim to get a complex unity of constituents in our minds which are in the same 'order' as the constituents in the world. It is a good proposal, but leaves 'facts' as a problem. |
5425 | In order to explain falsehood, a belief must involve several terms, not two [Russell] |
Full Idea: The relation involved in judging or believing must, if falsehood is to be duly allowed for, be taken to be a relation between several terms, not between two. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch.12) | |
A reaction: His point is that if a belief relates to one object ('D's love for C') it will always be true. Russell is trying to explain what goes wrong when we believe a falsehood. It is not clear how the judgement 'x exists' involves several terms. |
5384 | A universal of which we are aware is called a 'concept' [Russell] |
Full Idea: A universal of which we are aware is called a 'concept'. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch. 5) | |
A reaction: I am doubtful about this. Do children, and even animals, have a concept of 'my mother', without ever grasping the generalisation to 'his mother'? Is the word 'this' a non-universal concept? |
13468 | Russell started philosophy of language, by declaring some plausible sentences to be meaningless [Russell, by Hart,WD] |
Full Idea: Russell inadvertently started the philosophy of language by declaring that some sentences (like "Everything is identical with itself") that seem utterly in order are meaningless and express no proposition. | |
From: report of Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912]) by William D. Hart - The Evolution of Logic 2 | |
A reaction: The normal candidate for this honour would be Frege, with the sense/reference distinction, but this idea sounds right to me. Declaring that some sentences are 'meaningless' really gets people excited and interested. I like the example! |
5388 | Every understood proposition is composed of constituents with which we are acquainted [Russell] |
Full Idea: Every proposition which we can understand must be composed wholly of constituents with which we are acquainted. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch. 6) | |
A reaction: This is somewhere between Hume and logical positivism, but it concerns understanding (not meaning) of propositions (not sentences), and its acquaintance can be of universals as well as of sense experience. I like Russell's version more than Ayer's. |
5387 | It is pure chance which descriptions in a person's mind make a name apply to an individual [Russell] |
Full Idea: It is a matter of chance which characteristics of a man's appearance will come into a friend's mind when he thinks of Bismarck; thus the description in the friend's mind is accidental; he knows the various descriptions all apply to the same entity. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch. 5) | |
A reaction: This seems to be an internalist account of reference, later called the 'bundle' theory of reference and associated with John Searle. It was attacked by Kripke. Personally I side, unfashionably, with Russell. |
16932 | Projectible predicates can be universalised about the kind to which they refer [Quine] |
Full Idea: 'Projectible' predicates are predicates F and G whose shared instances all do count, for whatever reason, towards confirmation of 'All F are G'. ….A projectible predicate is one that is true of all and only the things of a kind. | |
From: Willard Quine (Natural Kinds [1969], p.115-6) | |
A reaction: Both Quine and Goodman are infuriatingly brief about the introduction of this concept. 'Red' is true of all ripe tomatoes, but not 'only' of them. Hardly any predicates are true only of one kind. Is that a scholastic 'proprium'? |
20787 | A proposition is what can be asserted or denied on its own [Chrysippus] |
Full Idea: A proposition is what can be asserted or denied on its own, for example, 'It is day' or 'Dion is walking'. | |
From: Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]), quoted by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 07.65 | |
A reaction: Note the phrase 'on its own'. If you say 'it is day and Dion is walking', that can't be denied on its own, because first the two halves must each be evaluated, so presumably that doesn't count as a stoic proposition. |
21724 | The main aim of the multiple relations theory of judgement was to dispense with propositions [Russell, by Linsky,B] |
Full Idea: While the multiple relation theory (of belief, or of judgement) is nominally an account of belief and judgement, the emphasis in the account is on eliminating the need for propositions as objects of rational belief or judgement. | |
From: report of Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912]) by Bernard Linsky - Russell's Metaphysical Logic 7.2 | |
A reaction: The idea is that the mind relates directly with the ingredients of the proposition, and with the universals (such as relations) which connect them. He cuts out the middle man, just as he cut out sense-data, for similar reasons of economy. |
20850 | Passions are judgements; greed thinks money is honorable, and likewise drinking and lust [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Chrysippus says (in his On Passions) that the passions are judgements; for greed is a supposition that money is honorable, and similarly for drunkennes and wantonness and others. | |
From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 07.111 | |
A reaction: This is an endorsement of Socrates's intellectualist reading of weakness of will, as against Aristotle's assigning it to overpowering passions. |
20869 | The highest degree of morality performs all that is appropriate, omitting nothing [Chrysippus] |
Full Idea: He who makes moral progress to the highest degree performs all the appropriate actions in all circumstances, and omits none. | |
From: Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]), quoted by Sophocles - Sophocles' Electra 4.39.22 | |
A reaction: Hence concerns about omission as well as commission in the practice of ethics can be seen in the light of character and virtue. The world is fully of nice people who act well, but don't do so well on omissions. Car drivers, for example. |
3044 | Stoics say that beauty and goodness are equivalent and linked [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Stoics say the beautiful is the only good. Good is an equivalent term to the beautiful; since a thing is good, it is beautiful; and it is beautiful, therefore it is good. | |
From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 07.1.59 |
20838 | Fate initiates general causes, but individual wills and characters dictate what we do [Chrysippus] |
Full Idea: The order and reason of fate set in motion the general types and starting points of the causes, but each person's own will [or decisions] and the character of his mind govern the impulses of our thoughts and minds and our very actions. | |
From: Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]), quoted by Aulus Gellius - Noctes Atticae 7.2.11 | |
A reaction: So if you try and fail it was fate, but if you try and succeed it was you? |
20813 | Human purpose is to contemplate and imitate the cosmos [Chrysippus] |
Full Idea: The human being was born for the sake of contemplating and imitating the cosmos. | |
From: Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]), quoted by M. Tullius Cicero - On the Nature of the Gods ('De natura deorum') 2.37 | |
A reaction: [This seems to be an idea of Chrysippus] Remind me how to imitate the cosmos. Presumably this is living according to nature, but that becomes more obscure when express like this. |
3045 | Stoics say justice is a part of nature, not just an invented principle [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Stoics say that justice exists by nature, and not because of any definition or principle. | |
From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 07.1.66 | |
A reaction: cf Idea 3024. Stoics thought that nature is intrinsically rational, and therein lies its justice. 'King Lear' enacts this drama about whether nature is just. |
20774 | Only nature is available to guide action and virtue [Chrysippus] |
Full Idea: What am I to take as the principle of appropriate action and raw material for virtue if I give up nature and what is according to nature? | |
From: Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]), quoted by Plutarch - On Common Conceptions 1069e | |
A reaction: 'Nature' is awfully vague as a guideline, even when we are told nature is rational. I can only make sense of it as 'human nature', which is more Aristotelian than stoic. 'Go with the flow' and 'lay the cards you are dealt' might capture it. |
20864 | Live in agreement, according to experience of natural events [Chrysippus] |
Full Idea: The goal of life is to live in agreement, which is according to experience of the things which happen by nature. | |
From: Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 2.06a | |
A reaction: Cleanthes added 'with nature' to Zeno's slogan, and Chyrisppus added this variation. At least it gives you some idea of what the consistent rational principle should be. You still have to assess which aspects of nature should influence us. |
5972 | Living happily is nothing but living virtuously [Chrysippus, by Plutarch] |
Full Idea: According to Chrysippus, living happily consists solely in living virtuously. | |
From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE], fr139) by Plutarch - 72: Against Stoics on common Conceptions 1060d | |
A reaction: This, along with 'live according to nature', is the essential doctrine of stoicism. This is 'eudaimonia', not the modern idea of feeling nice. Is it possible to admire another person for anything other than virtue? (Yes! Looks, brains, strength, wealth). |
1777 | Pleasure is not the good, because there are disgraceful pleasures [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Pleasure is not the good, because there are disgraceful pleasures, and nothing disgraceful is good. | |
From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 07.Ze.60 | |
A reaction: I certainly approve of the idea that not all pleasure is intrinsically good. Indeed, I think good has probably got nothing to do with pleasure. 'Disgraceful' is hardly objective though. |
5973 | Justice can be preserved if pleasure is a good, but not if it is the goal [Chrysippus, by Plutarch] |
Full Idea: Chrysippus thinks that, while justice could not be preserved if one should set up pleasure as the goal, it could be if one should take pleasure to be not a goal but simply a good. | |
From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE], fr 23) by Plutarch - 72: Against Stoics on common Conceptions 1070d | |
A reaction: This is an interesting and original contribution to the ancient debate about pleasure. It shows Aristotle's moderate criticism of pleasure (e.g. Idea 84), but attempts to pinpoint where the danger is. Aristotle says it thwarts achievement of the mean. |
20845 | There are shameful pleasures, and nothing shameful is good, so pleasure is not a good [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Chrysippus (in his On Pleasure) denies even of pleasure that it is a good; for there are also shameful pleasures, and nothing shameful is good. | |
From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 07.103 | |
A reaction: Socrates seems to have started this line of the thought, to argue that pleasure is not The Good. Stoics are more puritanical. Nothing counts as good if it is capable of being bad. Thus good pleasures are not good, which sounds odd. |
5967 | People need nothing except corn and water [Chrysippus, by Plutarch] |
Full Idea: Chrysippus praises ad nauseam the lines "For what need mortals save two things alone,/ Demeter's grain and draughts of water clear". | |
From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Plutarch - 70: Stoic Self-contradictions 1043e | |
A reaction: "Oh, reason not the need!" says King Lear. The remark shows the close affinity of stoicism and cynicism, as the famous story of Diogenes is that he threw away his drinking cup when he realised you could drink with your hands. |
5966 | All virtue is good, but not always praised (as in not lusting after someone ugly) [Chrysippus] |
Full Idea: Although deeds done in accordance with virtue are congenial, not all are cited as examples, such as courageously extending one's finger, or continently abstaining from a half-dead old woman, or not immediately agreeing that three is four. | |
From: Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE], fr 211), quoted by Plutarch - 70: Stoic Self-contradictions 1038f | |
A reaction: Presumably the point (so elegantly expressed - what a shame we have lost most of Chrysippus) is that virtue comes in degrees, even though its value is an absolute. The same has been said (by Russell and Bonjour) about self-evidence. |
20855 | Chrysippus says virtue can be lost (though Cleanthes says it is too secure for that) [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Chrysippus says that virtue can be lost, owing to drunkenness and excess of black bile, whereas Cleanthes says it cannot, because it consists in secure intellectual grasps, and it is worth choosing for its own sake. | |
From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 07.127 | |
A reaction: Succumbing to drunkenness looks like evidence that you were not truly virtuous. Mental illness is something else. On the whole I agree the Cleanthes. |
5970 | Chrysippus says nothing is blameworthy, as everything conforms with the best nature [Chrysippus, by Plutarch] |
Full Idea: Chrysippus has often written on the theme that there is nothing reprehensible or blameworthy in the universe since all things are accomplished in conformity with the best nature. | |
From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Plutarch - 70: Stoic Self-contradictions 1051b | |
A reaction: This is Leibniz's "best of all possible worlds", but deriving the idea from the rightness of nature rather than the perfection of God. Chrysippus has a more plausible ground than Leibniz, as for him nasty things follow from conscious choice. |
5398 | Judgements of usefulness depend on judgements of value [Russell] |
Full Idea: All judgements as to what is useful depend upon some judgement as to what has value on its own account. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch. 7) | |
A reaction: This is a beautifully simple point to be made about utilitarianism. The notion that pleasure is the sole good is prior, and the first two sentences in Bentham totally beg that question. What is the value of pleasure? Is it wicked to turn down a pleasure? |
20842 | Rational animals begin uncorrupted, but externals and companions are bad influences [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: The rational animal is corrupted, sometimes because of the persuasiveness of external activities and sometimes because of the influence of companions. For the starting points provided by nature are uncorrupted. | |
From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 07.89 | |
A reaction: If companions corrupt us, what corrupted the companions? Aren't we all in this together? And where do the 'external activities' originate? |
20856 | Justice, the law, and right reason are natural and not conventional [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Chrysippus says (in On the Honourable) that justice is natural and not conventional, as are the law and right reason. | |
From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 07.128 | |
A reaction: How does he explain variations in the law between different states? Presumably some of them have got it wrong. What is the criterion for deciding which laws are natural? |
1779 | We don't have obligations to animals as they aren't like us [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: We have no obligations of justice to other animals, because they are dissimilar to us. | |
From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 07.Ze.66 | |
A reaction: "Dissimilar" begs questions. Some human beings don't seem much like me. How are we going to treat visiting aliens? |
20857 | Justice is irrelevant to animals, because they are too unlike us [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: There is no justice between us and other animals because of the dissimilarity between us and them. | |
From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 07.129 | |
A reaction: [from lost On Justice Bk 1] What would he make of modern revelations about bonobos and chimpanzees? If there is great dissimilarity between some peoples, does that invalidate justice between them? He also said animals exist for our use. |
20812 | Covers are for shields, and sheaths for swords; likewise, all in the cosmos is for some other thing [Chrysippus] |
Full Idea: Just as the cover was made for the sake of the shield, and the sheath for the sword, in the same way everything else except the cosmos was made for the sake of other things. | |
From: Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]), quoted by M. Tullius Cicero - On the Nature of the Gods ('De natura deorum') 2.37 | |
A reaction: Chrysippus was wise to stop at the cosmos. Similarly, religious teleology had better not ask about the purpose of God. What does he think pebbles are for? Nature is the source of stoic value, so it needs to be purposeful. |
21403 | The later Stoics identified the logos with an air-fire compound, called 'pneuma' [Chrysippus, by Long] |
Full Idea: From Chrysippus onwards, the Stoics identified the logos throughout each world-cycle not with pure fire, but with a compound of fire and air, 'pneuma'. | |
From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by A.A. Long - Hellenistic Philosophy 4.4.2 | |
A reaction: I suspect this was because breath is so vital to the human body. |
20828 | Fire is a separate element, not formed with others (as was previously believed) [Chrysippus, by Stobaeus] |
Full Idea: In his theory fire is said independently to be an element, since it is not formed together with another one, whereas according to the earlier theory fire is formed with other elements. | |
From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by John Stobaeus - Anthology 1.10.16c | |
A reaction: The point is that fire precedes the other elements, and is superior to them. |
5975 | Stoics say earth, air, fire and water are the primary elements [Chrysippus, by Plutarch] |
Full Idea: The Stoics call the four bodies - earth and water and air and fire - primary elements. | |
From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE], fr 444) by Plutarch - 72: Against Stoics on common Conceptions 1085c | |
A reaction: Elsewhere (fr 413) Chrysippus denies that they are all 'primary'. Essentially, though, he seems to be adopting the doctrine of Empedocles and Aristotle, in specific opposition to Epicurus' atomism. |
7375 | Quine probably regrets natural kinds now being treated as essences [Quine, by Dennett] |
Full Idea: The concept of natural kinds was reintroduced by Quine, who may now regret the way it has become a stand-in for the dubious but covertly popular concept of essences. | |
From: report of Willard Quine (Natural Kinds [1969]) by Daniel C. Dennett - Consciousness Explained 12.2 n2 | |
A reaction: He is right that Quine would regret it, and he is right that we can't assume that there are necessary essences just because there seem to be stable natural kinds, but personally I am an essentialist, so I'm not that bothered. |
16935 | If similarity has no degrees, kinds cannot be contained within one another [Quine] |
Full Idea: If similarity has no degrees there is no containing of kinds within broader kinds. If colored things are a kind, they are similar, but red things are too narrow for a kind. If red things are a kind, colored things are not similar, and it's too broad. | |
From: Willard Quine (Natural Kinds [1969], p.118) | |
A reaction: [compressed] I'm on Quine's side with this. We glibly talk of 'kinds', but the criteria for sorting things into kinds seems to be a mess. Quine goes on to offer a better account than the (diadic, yes-no) one rejected here. |
16936 | Comparative similarity allows the kind 'colored' to contain the kind 'red' [Quine] |
Full Idea: With the triadic relation of comparative similarity, kinds can contain one another, as well as overlapping. Red and colored things can both count as kinds. Colored things all resemble one another, even though less than red things do. | |
From: Willard Quine (Natural Kinds [1969], p.119) | |
A reaction: [compressed] Quine claims that comparative similarity is necessary for kinds - that there be some 'foil' in a similarity - that A is more like C than B is. |
16937 | You can't base kinds just on resemblance, because chains of resemblance are a muddle [Quine] |
Full Idea: If kinds are based on similarity, this has the Imperfect Community problem. Red round, red wooden and round wooden things all resemble one another somehow. There may be nothing outside the set resembling them, so it meets the definition of kind. | |
From: Willard Quine (Natural Kinds [1969], p.120) | |
A reaction: [ref. to Goodman 'Structure' 2nd 163- , which attacks Carnap on this] This suggests an invocation of Wittgenstein's family resemblance, which won't be much help for natural kinds. |
16942 | It is hard to see how regularities could be explained [Quine] |
Full Idea: Why there have been regularities is an obscure question, for it is hard to see what would count as an answer. | |
From: Willard Quine (Natural Kinds [1969], p.126) | |
A reaction: This is the standard pessimism of the 20th century Humeans, but it strikes me as comparable to the pessimism about science found in Locke and Hume. Regularities are explained all the time by scientists, though the lowest level may be hopeless. |
5393 | We can't know that our laws are exceptionless, or even that there are any laws [Russell] |
Full Idea: If some law which has no exceptions applies to a case, we can never be sure that we have discovered that law and not one to which there are exceptions; also the reign of law would seem to be itself only probable. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch. 6) | |
A reaction: None of this can be denied. In modern physics, several supposed laws have come up for question. Is the proton stable? Are the gravitational constant or the speed of light necessarily fixed? Russell is doing epistemology. How do we conceive the laws? |
20819 | The past and the future subsist, but only the present exists [Chrysippus, by Plutarch] |
Full Idea: When he wished to be subtle, Chrysippus wrote that the past part of time and the future part do not exist but subsist, and only the present exists. | |
From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Plutarch - On Common Conceptions 1081f | |
A reaction: [from lost On Void] I think I prefer the ontology of Idea 20818. Idea 20819 does not offer an epistemology. Is the present substantial enough to be known? The word 'subsist' is an ontological evasion (even though Russell briefly relied on it). |
20818 | The present does not exist, so our immediate experience is actually part past and part future [Chrysippus, by Plutarch] |
Full Idea: Stoics do not allow a minimal time to exist, and do not want to have a partless 'now'; so what one thinks one has grasped as present is in part future and in part past. | |
From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Plutarch - On Common Conceptions 1081c | |
A reaction: [from lost On Parts Bk3-5] I agree with the ontology here, but I take our grasp of the present to be very short-term memory of the past. I ignore special relativity. Chrysippus expressed two views about this; in the other one he was a Presentist. |
20821 | Time is continous and infinitely divisible, so there cannot be a wholly present time [Chrysippus, by Stobaeus] |
Full Idea: Chrysippus says most clearly that no time is wholly present; for since the divisibility of continuous things is infinite, time as a whole is also subject to infinite divisibility by this method of division. | |
From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by John Stobaeus - Anthology 1.08.42 | |
A reaction: But what is his reason for thinking that time is a continuous thing? There is a minimum time in quantum mechanics (the Planck Time), but do these quantum intervals overlap? Compare Idea 20819. |
3048 | Stoics say that God the creator is the perfection of all animals [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Stoics say that God is an animal immortal, rational, perfect, and intellectual in his happiness, unsusceptible of any kind of evil, having a foreknowledge of the world; however, he is not the figure of a man, and is the creator of the universe. | |
From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 07.1.72 |
20773 | The origin of justice can only be in Zeus, and in nature [Chrysippus] |
Full Idea: One can find no other starting point or origin for justice except the one derived from Zeus and that derived from the common nature; for everything like this must have that starting point, if we are going to say anything at all about good and bad things. | |
From: Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]), quoted by Plutarch - 70: Stoic Self-contradictions 1035c | |
A reaction: [in lost 'On Gods' bk 3] This appears to offer two starting points, in the mind of Zeus, and in nature, though since nature is presumed to be rational the two may run together. Is Zeus the embodiment, or the unconscious source, or the maker of decrees? |
3042 | Stoics teach that law is identical with right reason, which is the will of Zeus [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Stoics teach that common law is identical with that right reason which pervades everything, being the same with Zeus, who is the regulator and chief manager of all existing things. | |
From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 07.1.53 |
5965 | The source of all justice is Zeus and the universal nature [Chrysippus] |
Full Idea: It is not possible to discover any other beginning of justice or any source for it other than that from Zeus and from the universal nature. | |
From: Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE], fr 326), quoted by Plutarch - 70: Stoic Self-contradictions 1035c | |
A reaction: If the source is 'universal nature', that could agree with Plato, but if the source is Zeus, then stoicism is a religion rather than a philosophy. |
1782 | Stoics teach that God is a unity, variously known as Mind, or Fate, or Jupiter [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Stoics teach that God is unity, and that he is called Mind, and Fate, and Jupiter, and by many names besides. | |
From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 07.Ze.68 |
20830 | Death can't separate soul from body, because incorporeal soul can't unite with body [Chrysippus] |
Full Idea: Death is a separation of soul from body. But nothing incorporeal can be separated from a body. For neither does anything incorporeal touch a body, and the soul touches and is separated from the body. Therefore the soul is not incorporeal. | |
From: Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]), quoted by Tertullian - The Soul as an 'Astral Body' 5.3 | |
A reaction: This is the classic interaction difficulty for substance dualist theories of mind. |
21404 | There is a rationale in terrible disasters; they are useful to the whole, and make good possible [Chrysippus] |
Full Idea: The evil which occurs in terrible disasters has a rationale [logos] peculiar to itself: for in a sense it occurs in accordance with universal reason, and is not without usefulness in relation to the whole. For without it there could be no good. | |
From: Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]), quoted by A.A. Long - Hellenistic Philosophy 4.4.5 | |
A reaction: [a quotation from Chrysippus. Plutarch, Comm Not 1065b] A nice question about any terrible disaster is whether it is in some way 'useful', if we take a broader view of things. Almost everything has a good aspect, from that perspective. |