Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'There Are No Abstract Objects', 'comedies (frags)' and 'The Idea of the Brain'

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6 ideas

8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / c. Nominalism about abstracta
14596 Call 'nominalism' the denial of numbers, properties, relations and sets [Dorr]
     Full Idea: Just as there are no numbers or properties, there are no relations (like 'being heavier than' or 'betweenness'), or sets. I will provisionally use 'nominalism' for the conjunction of these four claims.
     From: Cian Dorr (There Are No Abstract Objects [2008], 1)
     A reaction: If you are going to be a nominalist, do it properly! My starting point in metaphysics is strong sympathy with this view. Right now [Tues 22nd Nov 2011, 10:57 am GMT] I think it is correct.
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 5. Class Nominalism
14597 Natural Class Nominalism says there are primitive classes of things resembling in one respect [Dorr]
     Full Idea: Natural Class Nominalists take as primitive the notion of a 'natural' class - a class of things that all resemble one another in some one respect and resemble nothing else in that respect.
     From: Cian Dorr (There Are No Abstract Objects [2008], 4)
     A reaction: Dorr rejects this view because he doesn't believe in 'classes'. How committed to classes do you have to be before you are permitted to talk about them? All vocabulary (such as 'resemble') seems metaphysically tainted in this area.
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 11. Denial of Necessity
14598 Abstracta imply non-logical brute necessities, so only nominalists can deny such things [Dorr]
     Full Idea: If there are abstract objects, there are necessary truths about these things that cannot be reduced to truths of logic. So only the nominalist, who denies that there are any such things, can adequately respect the idea that there are no brute necessities.
     From: Cian Dorr (There Are No Abstract Objects [2008], 4)
     A reaction: This is where two plates of my personal philosophy grind horribly against one another. I love nominalism, and I love natural necessities. They meet like a ring-species in evolution. I'll just call it a 'paradox', and move on (swiftly).
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 8. Brain
23226 There is a single mouse neuron which has 862 inputs and 626 outputs [Cobb]
     Full Idea: Researchers have recently described a single inhibitory neuron in a region called the visual thalamus of the mouse - it has 862 input synapses and 626 output synapses.
     From: Matthew Cobb (The Idea of the Brain [2020], 11)
     A reaction: This is the kind of fact which philosophers of mind must be aware of when offering accounts of thought which are in danger of being simplistic.
23216 The brain is not passive, and merely processing inputs; it is active, and intervenes in the world [Cobb]
     Full Idea: A number of scientists are now realising that, by viewing the brain as a computer that passively responds ot inputs and processes data, we forget that it is an active organ, part of the body intervening in the world.
     From: Matthew Cobb (The Idea of the Brain [2020], Intro)
     A reaction: I like any idea which reminds us that nature is intrinsically active, and not merely passive. Laws are in nature, not imposed on it. My preferred ontology, based on powers as fundamental, applies to the brain, as well as to physics. No free will needed.
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / a. Form of the Good
3032 I can form no notion of what the good is [Amphis]
     Full Idea: What the good is I no more can form a notion of, than of the good of Plato.
     From: Amphis (comedies (frags) [c.350 BCE]), quoted by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 03.1.22
     A reaction: It was evidently a running joke in the ancient world that no one could define Plato's Form of the Good. He was said to have written a book on it, now lost.