Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'There Are No Abstract Objects', 'Queries to the 'Opticks'' and 'Presupposition'

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6 ideas

4. Formal Logic / A. Syllogistic Logic / 3. Term Logic

19053	Logic would be more natural if negation only referred to predicates [Dummett]
	Full Idea: A better proposal for a formal logic closer to natural language would be one that had a negation-operator only for (simple) predicates.
	From: Michael Dummett (Presupposition [1960], p.27)
	A reaction: Dummett observes that classical formal logic was never intended to be close to natural language. Term logic does have that aim, but the meta-question is whether that end is desirable, and why.

5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / c. not

19052	Natural language 'not' doesn't apply to sentences [Dummett]
	Full Idea: Natural language does not possess a sentential negation-operator.
	From: Michael Dummett (Presupposition [1960], p.27)
	A reaction: This is a criticism of Strawson, who criticises logic for not following natural language, but does it himself with negation. In the question of how language and logic connect, this idea seems important. Term Logic aims to get closer to natural language.

8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / c. Nominalism about abstracta

14596	Call 'nominalism' the denial of numbers, properties, relations and sets [Dorr]
	Full Idea: Just as there are no numbers or properties, there are no relations (like 'being heavier than' or 'betweenness'), or sets. I will provisionally use 'nominalism' for the conjunction of these four claims.
	From: Cian Dorr (There Are No Abstract Objects [2008], 1)
	A reaction: If you are going to be a nominalist, do it properly! My starting point in metaphysics is strong sympathy with this view. Right now [Tues 22nd Nov 2011, 10:57 am GMT] I think it is correct.

8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 5. Class Nominalism

14597	Natural Class Nominalism says there are primitive classes of things resembling in one respect [Dorr]
	Full Idea: Natural Class Nominalists take as primitive the notion of a 'natural' class - a class of things that all resemble one another in some one respect and resemble nothing else in that respect.
	From: Cian Dorr (There Are No Abstract Objects [2008], 4)
	A reaction: Dorr rejects this view because he doesn't believe in 'classes'. How committed to classes do you have to be before you are permitted to talk about them? All vocabulary (such as 'resemble') seems metaphysically tainted in this area.

10. Modality / A. Necessity / 11. Denial of Necessity

14598	Abstracta imply non-logical brute necessities, so only nominalists can deny such things [Dorr]
	Full Idea: If there are abstract objects, there are necessary truths about these things that cannot be reduced to truths of logic. So only the nominalist, who denies that there are any such things, can adequately respect the idea that there are no brute necessities.
	From: Cian Dorr (There Are No Abstract Objects [2008], 4)
	A reaction: This is where two plates of my personal philosophy grind horribly against one another. I love nominalism, and I love natural necessities. They meet like a ring-species in evolution. I'll just call it a 'paradox', and move on (swiftly).

26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 1. Laws of Nature

16746	Principles of things are not hidden features of forms, but the laws by which they were formed [Newton]
	Full Idea: The (active) principles I consider not as occult qualities, supposed to result from the specific forms of things, but as general laws of nature, by which the things themselves are formed.
	From: Isaac Newton (Queries to the 'Opticks' [1721], q 31), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 23.6
	A reaction: This is the external, 'imposed' view of laws (with the matter passive) at its most persuasive. If laws arise out the stuff (as I prefer to think), what principles went into the formulation of the stuff?