72 ideas
| 6052 | Definitions identify two concepts, so they presuppose identity [McGinn] |
| Full Idea: Any definition must presuppose the notion of identity precisely because a definition affirms the identity of two concepts. | |
| From: Colin McGinn (Logical Properties [2000], Ch.1) | |
| A reaction: McGinn is arguing that identity is fundamental to thought, and this seems persuasive. It may be, though, that while identities are inescapable, definitions are impossible. |
| 21699 | Russell offered a paraphrase of definite description, to avoid the commitment to objects [Quine] |
| Full Idea: Russell's theory involved defining a term not by presenting a direct equivalent of it, but by 'paraphrasis', providing equivalents of the sentences. In this way, reference to fictitious objects can be simulated without our being committed to the objects. | |
| From: Willard Quine (Russell's Ontological Development [1966], p.75) | |
| A reaction: I hadn't quite grasped that the modern strategy of paraphrase tracks back to Russell - though it now looks obvious, thanks to Quine. Paraphrase is a beautiful way of sidestepping ontological problems. See Frege on the moons of Jupiter. |
| 6064 | Regresses are only vicious in the context of an explanation [McGinn] |
| Full Idea: Regresses are only vicious in the context of some explanatory aim, not in themselves. | |
| From: Colin McGinn (Logical Properties [2000], Ch.2 n11) | |
| A reaction: A nice point. It is not quite clear how 'pure' reason could ever be vicious, or charming, or sycophantic. The problem about a vicious regress is precisely that it fails to explain anything. Now benign regresses are something else… (see Idea 2523) |
| 6088 | Truth is a method of deducing facts from propositions [McGinn] |
| Full Idea: Truth is essentially a method of deducing facts from propositions. | |
| From: Colin McGinn (Logical Properties [2000], Ch.5) | |
| A reaction: Very persuasive. McGinn is offering a disquotational account of truth, but in a robust form. Of course, deduction normally takes the form of moving infallibly from one truth to another, but that model of deduction won't fit this particular proposal. |
| 6084 | 'Snow does not fall' corresponds to snow does fall [McGinn] |
| Full Idea: We can say that the proposition that snow does not fall from the sky corresponds to the fact that snow does fall from the sky - in the sense that there is a mapping from fact to proposition. | |
| From: Colin McGinn (Logical Properties [2000], Ch.5) | |
| A reaction: A very nice difficulty for the correspondence theory. It becomes essential to say how the two things correspond before it can offer any sort of account of the truth-relation. |
| 6085 | The idea of truth is built into the idea of correspondence [McGinn] |
| Full Idea: The correspondence theory has an air of triviality, and hence undeniability, but this is because it implicitly builds the idea of truth into the notion of correspondence. | |
| From: Colin McGinn (Logical Properties [2000], Ch.5) | |
| A reaction: If this is accepted, it is a really fatal objection to the theory. Russell tried to use the idea of 'congruency' between beliefs and reality, but that may be open to the same objection. McGinn is claiming that truth is essentially indefinable. |
| 6083 | The coherence theory of truth implies idealism, because facts are just coherent beliefs [McGinn] |
| Full Idea: If 'snow falls from the sky' is true iff it coheres with other beliefs, this is a form of idealism; snow could surely fall from sky even if there were no beliefs in the world to cohere with each other. | |
| From: Colin McGinn (Logical Properties [2000], Ch.5) | |
| A reaction: The coherence theory of truth strikes me as yet another blunder involving a confusion of ontology and epistemology. Of course, idealism may be true, but I have yet to hear a good reason why I should abandon commonsense realism. |
| 6086 | Truth is the property of propositions that makes it possible to deduce facts [McGinn] |
| Full Idea: Truth is a property of a proposition from which one can deduce the fact stated by the proposition. | |
| From: Colin McGinn (Logical Properties [2000], Ch.5) | |
| A reaction: This is McGinn's explanation of the disquotational account of truth ('p' is true iff p). The redundancy theorist would reply that you can deduce p from 'p' without mentioning truth, but it remains to ask why this deduction is possible. |
| 6087 | Without the disquotation device for truth, you could never form beliefs from others' testimony [McGinn] |
| Full Idea: Imagine being in a community which had no concept of truth; ..you cannot disquote on p and hence form beliefs about the world as a result of testimony, since you lack the device of disquotation that is the essence of truth. | |
| From: Colin McGinn (Logical Properties [2000], Ch.5) | |
| A reaction: Whether his theory is right or not, the observation that testimony is the really crucial area where we must have a notion of truth is very good. How about 'truth is what turns propositions into beliefs'? |
| 6051 | In 'x is F and x is G' we must assume the identity of x in the two statements [McGinn] |
| Full Idea: If we say 'for some x, x is F and x is G' we are making tacit appeal to the idea of identity in using 'x' twice here: it has to be the same object that is both F and G. | |
| From: Colin McGinn (Logical Properties [2000], Ch.1) | |
| A reaction: This may well be broadened to any utterances whatsoever. The only remaining question is to speculate about whether it is possible to think without identities. The Hopi presumably gave identity to processes rather objects. How does God think? |
| 6055 | Both non-contradiction and excluded middle need identity in their formulation [McGinn] |
| Full Idea: To formulate the law of non-contradiction ('nothing can be both F and non-F') and the law of excluded middle ('everything is either F or it is not-F'), we need the concept of identity (in 'nothing' and 'everything'). | |
| From: Colin McGinn (Logical Properties [2000], Ch.1) | |
| A reaction: Two good examples in McGinn's argument that identity is basic to all thinking. But the argument also works to say that necessity is basic (since both laws claim it) and properties are basic. Let's just declare everything 'basic', and we can all go home. |
| 6059 | Identity is unitary, indefinable, fundamental and a genuine relation [McGinn] |
| Full Idea: I have endorsed four main theses about identity: it is unitary, it is indefinable, it is fundamental, and it is a genuine relation | |
| From: Colin McGinn (Logical Properties [2000], Ch.1) | |
| A reaction: That it is fundamental to our thinking seems certain (but to all possible thought?). That it is a relation looks worth questioning. One might challenge unitary by comparing the identity of numbers, values, electrons and continents. I can't define it. |
| 6042 | The quantifier is overrated as an analytical tool [McGinn] |
| Full Idea: The quantifier has been overrated as a tool of logical and linguistic analysis. | |
| From: Colin McGinn (Logical Properties [2000], Pref) | |
| A reaction: I find this proposal quite thrilling. Twentieth century analytical philosophy has been in thrall to logic, giving the upper hand in philosophical discussion to the logicians, who are often not very good at philosophy. |
| 6067 | Existential quantifiers just express the quantity of things, leaving existence to the predicate 'exists' [McGinn] |
| Full Idea: What the existential quantifier does is indicate the quantity of things in question - it says that some are; it is left up to the predicate 'exists' to express existence. | |
| From: Colin McGinn (Logical Properties [2000], Ch.2) | |
| A reaction: This seems right. The whole quantification business seems like a conjuring trick to conceal the embarrassingly indefinable and 'metaphysical' notion of 'existence'. Cf Idea 7697. |
| 6069 | 'Partial quantifier' would be a better name than 'existential quantifier', as no existence would be implied [McGinn] |
| Full Idea: We would do much better to call 'some' the 'partial quantifier' (rather than the 'existential quantifier'), on analogy with the universal quantifier - as neither of them logically implies existence. | |
| From: Colin McGinn (Logical Properties [2000], Ch.2) | |
| A reaction: Like McGinn's other suggestions in this chapter, this strikes me as a potentially huge clarification in linguistic analysis. I wait with interest to see whether the philosophical logicians take it up. I bet they don't. |
| 6068 | We need an Intentional Quantifier ("some of the things we talk about.."), so existence goes into the proposition [McGinn] |
| Full Idea: We could introduce an 'intentional quantifier' (Ix) which means 'some of the things we talk about..'; we could then say 'some of the things we talk about are F and exist' (Ix, x is F and x exists). | |
| From: Colin McGinn (Logical Properties [2000], Ch.2) | |
| A reaction: This immediately strikes me as a promising contribution to the analytical toolkit. McGinn is supporting his view that existence is a predicate, and so belongs inside the proposition, not outside. |
| 6070 | Existence is a primary quality, non-existence a secondary quality [McGinn] |
| Full Idea: Existence is like a primary quality; non-existence is like a secondary quality. | |
| From: Colin McGinn (Logical Properties [2000], Ch.2 n29) | |
| A reaction: Since McGinn thinks existence really is a property, and hence, presumably, a predicate, I don't quite see why he uses the word "like". A nicely pithy and thought-provoking remark. |
| 6062 | Existence can't be analysed as instantiating a property, as instantiation requires existence [McGinn] |
| Full Idea: Paraphrasing existence statements into statements about the instantiation of a property does not establish that existence is not a predicate, since the notion of instantiation must be taken to have existence built into it. | |
| From: Colin McGinn (Logical Properties [2000], Ch.2) | |
| A reaction: Thank you, Colin McGinn! This now strikes me as so obvious that it is astonishing that for the whole of the twentieth century no one seems to have said it. For a century philosophers had swept the ontological dirt under the mat. |
| 6065 | We can't analyse the sentence 'something exists' in terms of instantiated properties [McGinn] |
| Full Idea: The problems of the orthodox view are made vivid by analysis of the sentence 'something exists'; this is meaningful and true, but what property are we saying is instantiated here? | |
| From: Colin McGinn (Logical Properties [2000], Ch.2) | |
| A reaction: A very nice point. McGinn claims that existence is a property, a very generalised one. Personally I don't think anyone is even remotely clear what a property is, so the whole discussion is a bit premature. Must properties have causal powers? |
| 6082 | If causal power is the test for reality, that will exclude necessities and possibilities [McGinn] |
| Full Idea: Whether my body weight is necessary or contingent makes no difference at all to my causal powers, so modality is epiphenomenal; if you took causal potential as a test of reality you would have to declare modes unreal. | |
| From: Colin McGinn (Logical Properties [2000], Ch.4) | |
| A reaction: We could try analysing modality into causal terms, as Lewis proposes with quantification across worlds, or as Quine proposes by reduction to natural regularities. I am not sure what it would mean to declare that modes are 'real'. |
| 6075 | Facts are object-plus-extension, or property-plus-set-of-properties, or object-plus-property [McGinn] |
| Full Idea: A fact may be an object and an extension (Quine's view), or a property and a set of properties, or an object and a property; the view I favour is the third one, which seems the most natural. | |
| From: Colin McGinn (Logical Properties [2000], Ch.3) | |
| A reaction: Personally I tend to use the word 'fact' in a realist and non-linguistic way. There must be innumerable inexpressible facts, such as the single pattern made by all the particles of the universe. McGinn seems to be talking of 'atomic facts'. See Idea 6111. |
| 6058 | Identity propositions are not always tautological, and have a key epistemic role [McGinn] |
| Full Idea: Identity propositions are not always analytic or a priori (as Frege long ago taught us) so there is nothing trivial about such propositions; the claim of redundancy ignores the epistemic role that the concept of identity plays. | |
| From: Colin McGinn (Logical Properties [2000], Ch.1) | |
| A reaction: He is referring to Frege's Morning Star/Evening Star distinction (Idea 4972). Wittgenstein wanted to eliminate our basic metaphysics by relabelling it as analytic or tautological, but his project failed. Long live metaphysics! |
| 6053 | Identity is as basic as any concept could ever be [McGinn] |
| Full Idea: Identity has a universality and basicness that is hard to overstate; concepts don't get more basic than this - or more indispensable. | |
| From: Colin McGinn (Logical Properties [2000], Ch.1) | |
| A reaction: I agree with this. It seems to me to follow that the natural numbers are just as basic, because they are entailed by the separateness of the identities of things. And the whole of mathematics is the science of the patterns within these numbers. |
| 6043 | Type-identity is close similarity in qualities [McGinn] |
| Full Idea: Two things are said to be type-identical when they are similar enough to be declared qualitatively identical. | |
| From: Colin McGinn (Logical Properties [2000], Ch.1) | |
| A reaction: A simple point which brings out the fact that type-identity is unlikely to be any sort of true identity (unless there is absolutely no different at all between two electrons, say). |
| 6044 | Qualitative identity is really numerical identity of properties [McGinn] |
| Full Idea: A statement of so-called qualitative identity is really a statement of numerical identity (that is, identity tout court) about the properties of the objects in question - assuming that there are genuine universals. | |
| From: Colin McGinn (Logical Properties [2000], Ch.1) | |
| A reaction: We might agree that two cars are type-identical, even though (under the microscope) we decided that none of their properties were absolutely identical. |
| 6046 | Qualitative identity can be analysed into numerical identity of the type involved [McGinn] |
| Full Idea: We can analyse qualitative identity in terms of numerical identity, by saying that x and y are type-identical if there is a single type T that x and y both are, i.e. they both exemplify the same type. | |
| From: Colin McGinn (Logical Properties [2000], Ch.1) | |
| A reaction: This just seems to shift the problem onto the words 'are' and 'exemplify'. This takes us back to the problem of things 'partaking' of Plato's Forms. Better to say that qualitative identity isn't identity - it is resemblance (see Idea 6045). |
| 6045 | It is best to drop types of identity, and speak of 'identity' or 'resemblance' [McGinn] |
| Full Idea: It would be better to drop talk of 'numerical' and 'qualitative' identity altogether, speaking instead simply of identity and resemblance. | |
| From: Colin McGinn (Logical Properties [2000], Ch.1 n4) | |
| A reaction: This is the kind of beautifully simple proposal I pay analytical philosophers to come up with. I will attempt in future to talk either of 'identity' (which is strict), or 'resemblance' (which comes in degrees). |
| 6054 | Sherlock Holmes does not exist, but he is self-identical [McGinn] |
| Full Idea: Sherlock Holmes does not exist, but he is self-identical (he is certainly not indentical to Dr Watson). | |
| From: Colin McGinn (Logical Properties [2000], Ch.1) | |
| A reaction: Most significant. Identity does not entail existence; identity is necessary for existence (I think) but not sufficient. But the notion of existence might be prior to the notion of identity, and the creation of Holmes be parasitic on real existence. |
| 6066 | Existence is a property of all objects, but less universal than self-identity, which covers even conceivable objects [McGinn] |
| Full Idea: Existence is a property universal to all objects that exist, somewhat like self-identity, but less universal, because self-identity holds of all conceivable objects, not merely those that happen to exist. | |
| From: Colin McGinn (Logical Properties [2000], Ch.2) | |
| A reaction: This is a splendidly defiant response to the Kantian slogan that 'existence is not a predicate', and I find McGinn persuasive. I can still not find anyone to explain to me exactly what a property is, so I will reserve judgement. |
| 6047 | All identity is necessary, though identity statements can be contingently true [McGinn] |
| Full Idea: All identity is necessary, although there can be contingently true identity statements - those that contain non-rigid designators. | |
| From: Colin McGinn (Logical Properties [2000], Ch.1 n5) | |
| A reaction: A nice case of the need to keep epistemology and ontology separate. An example might be 'The Prime Minister wears a wig', where 'Prime Minister' may not be a rigid designator. 'Winston wears a wig' will be necessary, if true (which it wasn't). |
| 6050 | Leibniz's Law presupposes the notion of property identity [McGinn] |
| Full Idea: Leibniz's Law presupposes the notion of property identity. | |
| From: Colin McGinn (Logical Properties [2000], Ch.1) | |
| A reaction: A very important observation, because it leads to recognition of the way in which basic concepts and categories of thought interconnect. Which is more metaphysically basic, identity or properties? It is not easy to say… |
| 6048 | Leibniz's Law is so fundamental that it almost defines the concept of identity [McGinn] |
| Full Idea: Leibniz's Law, which a defender of relative identity might opt to reject, is so fundamental to the notion of identity that rejecting it amounts to changing the subject. | |
| From: Colin McGinn (Logical Properties [2000], Ch.1 n8) | |
| A reaction: The Law here is the 'indiscernibility of identicals'. I agree with McGinn, and anyone who loses their grip on this notion of identity strikes me as losing all grip on reality, and threatening their own sanity (well, call it their 'philosophical sanity'). |
| 6049 | Leibniz's Law says 'x = y iff for all P, Px iff Py' [McGinn] |
| Full Idea: Leibniz's Law says 'x = y iff for all P, Px iff Py'. | |
| From: Colin McGinn (Logical Properties [2000], Ch.1) | |
| A reaction: That is, two things are the same if when we say that one thing (x) has a property (P), then we are saying that the other thing (y) also has the property. A usefully concise statement of the Law. |
| 6080 | Modality is not objects or properties, but the type of binding of objects to properties [McGinn] |
| Full Idea: Modality has a special ontological category: it consists neither in objects (possible worlds theory) nor in properties (predicate modifier view), but items I have called 'modes', ..which can be hard/soft/rigid/pliable binding of objects to properties. | |
| From: Colin McGinn (Logical Properties [2000], Ch.4) | |
| A reaction: As so often, McGinn is very persuasive. Essentially he is proposing that modality is adverbial. He associates the middle view with David Wiggins. |
| 6079 | If 'possible' is explained as quantification across worlds, there must be possible worlds [McGinn] |
| Full Idea: If we replace modal words like 'possible' with quantification across worlds, clearly the notion of 'world' must exclude impossible worlds, otherwise 'possibly p' will be true if 'p' holds in an impossible world. | |
| From: Colin McGinn (Logical Properties [2000], Ch.4) | |
| A reaction: The point here, of course, is that the question is being begged of what 'possible' and 'impossible' actually mean. |
| 6081 | Necessity and possibility are big threats to the empiricist view of knowledge [McGinn] |
| Full Idea: It is clear that modality is a prima-facie threat to the usual kind of naturalistic-causal-empiricist theory of knowledge. | |
| From: Colin McGinn (Logical Properties [2000], Ch.4) | |
| A reaction: This is why modern empiricists spend of a lot of energy on trying to analyse counterfactuals and laws of nature. Rationalists are much happier to assert necessities a priori, but then they often don't have much basis for their claims. |
| 6071 | Scepticism about reality is possible because existence isn't part of appearances [McGinn] |
| Full Idea: Scepticism about the external world is possible because you can never build existence into the appearances, so it must always be inferred or assumed. | |
| From: Colin McGinn (Logical Properties [2000], Ch.2) | |
| A reaction: When McGinn's claim that existence is a very universal property begins to produce interesting observations like this, I think we should take it very seriously. |
| 18658 | The 'Kantian' self steps back from commitment to its social situation [Kymlicka] |
| Full Idea: The 'Kantian' view of the self strongly defends the view that the self is prior to its socially given roles and relationships, and is free only if it is capable of holding these features of its social situation at a distance, and judging them by reason. | |
| From: Will Kymlicka (Contemporary Political Philosophy (1st edn) [1990], 6.3) | |
| A reaction: There is no correct answer here, because I am capable of Kantian distancing, and also capable of submersing myself in the social constructions around me. If society fosters rebellion (1810s, 1960s) then we become more Kantian. |
| 21700 | Taking sentences as the unit of meaning makes useful paraphrasing possible [Quine] |
| Full Idea: The new freedom that Russell confers by paraphrasis (of definite descriptions) is our reward for recognising that the unit of communication is the sentence and not the word. | |
| From: Willard Quine (Russell's Ontological Development [1966], p.75) | |
| A reaction: Since many people hardly ever speak a properly formed sentence, I take propositions to be better candidates for this. However, I don't see how we can reject the compositional view (the meanings are assembled). |
| 21701 | Knowing a word is knowing the meanings of sentences which contain it [Quine] |
| Full Idea: We can say that knowing words is knowing how to work out the meanings of sentences containing them. Dictionary definitions are mere clauses in a recursive definition of the meanings of sentences. | |
| From: Willard Quine (Russell's Ontological Development [1966], p.76) | |
| A reaction: Do you have to recursively define all the sentences that might contain the word, before you can fully know the meaning of the word? He seems to credit Russell with the holistic view of sentences (though I think that starts with Frege). |
| 6077 | Semantics should not be based on set-membership, but on instantiation of properties in objects [McGinn] |
| Full Idea: Semantics should not employ the relationship of set-membership between objects and extensions, but rather the relation of instantiation between objects and properties. | |
| From: Colin McGinn (Logical Properties [2000], Ch.3) | |
| A reaction: At least this means that philosophers won't be required to read fat books on set theory, but they will have to think very carefully about 'instantiation'. A good start is the ideas on 'Partaking' of Platonic Forms in this database (in 'Universals'). |
| 6074 | Clearly predicates have extensions (applicable objects), but are the extensions part of their meaning? [McGinn] |
| Full Idea: We are taught that predicates have extensions - the class of objects of which the predicate is true - which seems hard to deny; but a stronger claim is also made - that extensions are semantically relevant features of predicates. | |
| From: Colin McGinn (Logical Properties [2000], Ch.3) | |
| A reaction: He cites Quine as a spokesman for this view. McGinn is going on to challenge it, by defending universals. It seems to fit in with other externalist theories of concepts and meanings, none of which seems very appealing to me. |
| 18650 | Teleological theories give the good priority over concern for people [Kymlicka] |
| Full Idea: Teleological theories take concern for the good (e.g. freedom or utility) as fundamental, and concern for people as derivative. | |
| From: Will Kymlicka (Contemporary Political Philosophy (1st edn) [1990], 2.4.a.ii) | |
| A reaction: There's a nice fundamental question with which to begin a discussion of value: which matters most - abstract values, or individual people? Placing a collective of people first (Stalinism?) seems to fall between them. |
| 18664 | Maybe the particularist moral thought of women is better than the impartial public thinking of men [Kymlicka] |
| Full Idea: There is a significant strand of contemporary feminism which argues that we should take seriously women's different morality. ...The particularistic thought women employ is a better morality than the impartial thought men employ in the public sphere. | |
| From: Will Kymlicka (Contemporary Political Philosophy (1st edn) [1990], 7.3) | |
| A reaction: I had taken Particularism to be an offshoot of virtue theory, as promulgated by Jonathan Dancy. Evidently the influence of feminism is strong. Personally I think the world would be a better place if it was run by women. |
| 18624 | Utilitarianism is not a decision-procedure; choice of the best procedure is an open question [Kymlicka] |
| Full Idea: Utilitarianism is essentially a 'standard of rightness', not a 'decision-procedure'. ...It is an open question whether we should employ a utilitarian decision-procedure - indeed, this question itself is to be answered by examining its consequences. | |
| From: Will Kymlicka (Contemporary Political Philosophy (1st edn) [1990], 2.3.b) | |
| A reaction: The point is that the aim is to maximise happiness, and you might do that by just maximising baked bean consumption, and not even thinking about happiness. This idea is labelled 'indirect utilitarianism'. Happiness does seem to be a by-product. |
| 18626 | One view says start with equality, and infer equal weight to interests, and hence maximum utility [Kymlicka] |
| Full Idea: The first main argument for utilitarianism is that people matter equally, and hence each person's interests should be given equal weight, and hence morally right acts will maximise utility. | |
| From: Will Kymlicka (Contemporary Political Philosophy (1st edn) [1990], 2.4.a) | |
| A reaction: The point is that this starts from the aim of equality, and infers maximum utility as its consequence. Equality has a primitive value. Whenever you dig down to a primitive value in a theory, I just find myself puzzled. What can justify basic equality? |
| 18627 | A second view says start with maximising the good, implying aggregation, and hence equality [Kymlicka] |
| Full Idea: The second main argument for utilitarianism defines the right in terms of maximising the good, which leads to the utilitarian aggregation standard, which as a mere consequence treats people's interests equally. | |
| From: Will Kymlicka (Contemporary Political Philosophy (1st edn) [1990], 2.4.b) | |
| A reaction: This takes maximum good as a primitive, and arrives at equality as the way to achieve it. So which is more morally fundamental, a maximum of goodness, or human equality? Kymlicka says this idea is too impersonal. |
| 18625 | To maximise utility should we double the population, even if life somewhat deteriorates? [Kymlicka] |
| Full Idea: Morally, should we double the population, even if it means reducing each person's welfare by almost half (since that will still increase overall utility)? | |
| From: Will Kymlicka (Contemporary Political Philosophy (1st edn) [1990], 2.4.b) | |
| A reaction: [He cites Derek Parfit for this] The key word is 'almost', which ensures a small increase in overall utility. I think this is a particularly good objection to utilitarianism, which aims to maximise an abstraction called 'utility'. |
| 18638 | The difference principles says we must subsidise the costs of other people's choices [Kymlicka] |
| Full Idea: The difference principle does not make any distinction between chosen and unchosen inequalities, ....but the difference principle requires that some people subsidise the costs of other people's choices. | |
| From: Will Kymlicka (Contemporary Political Philosophy (1st edn) [1990], 3.3.b.2) | |
| A reaction: We do this in education, allowing people to study things in which we can see little point. We subsidise public ceremonies which strike us as ridiculous. |
| 18635 | Social contract theories are usually rejected because there never was such a contract [Kymlicka] |
| Full Idea: Social contract theories have all been subjected to the same criticism - that there never was such a state of nature, or such a contract. Hence neither citizens nor government are bound by it. Contracts only create obligations if they are actually agreed. | |
| From: Will Kymlicka (Contemporary Political Philosophy (1st edn) [1990], 3.3) | |
| A reaction: Even if they have been agreed in the past, why should subsequent generations be bound to them? Modern Germans aren't bound by their grandparents' oaths of allegiance to fascism. |
| 18630 | Utilitarianism is no longer a distinctive political position [Kymlicka] |
| Full Idea: Modern utilitarianism, despite its radical heritage, no longer defines a distinctive political position. | |
| From: Will Kymlicka (Contemporary Political Philosophy (1st edn) [1990], 2.6) | |
| A reaction: This is his final sentence on the topic. I suppose utilitarianism exists as a moral theory at too high a level of generality to count as a political theory. |
| 18623 | The quest of the general good is partly undermined by people's past entitlements [Kymlicka] |
| Full Idea: The existence of past entitlements on the part of particular people partially pre-empts, or constrains, the utilitarian quest to maximise the general good. | |
| From: Will Kymlicka (Contemporary Political Philosophy (1st edn) [1990], 2.3.a) | |
| A reaction: In other words, there is never a clean slate in politics (except in some hideously violent revolution). You might be able to justify to someone a withdrawal of their past entitlements. E.g. confiscating a stolen painting that was bought in ignorance. |
| 18628 | We shouldn't endorse preferences which reject equality, and show prejudice and selfishness [Kymlicka] |
| Full Idea: Equality should enter into the very formation of our preferences. ....Prejudiced and selfish preferences should be excluded from the start, for they already reflect a failure to show equal consideration. | |
| From: Will Kymlicka (Contemporary Political Philosophy (1st edn) [1990], 2.5.b) | |
| A reaction: This is meant to block utilitarian summing of preferences like racism, but it feels like a rather desperate attempt to get righteous liberal values in at the beginning, where they can't be questioned. How can you justify equal respect and treatment? |
| 18629 | Using utilitarian principles to make decisions encourages cold detachment from people [Kymlicka] |
| Full Idea: Acting directly on utilitarian grounds is counter-productive, for it encourages a contingent and detached attitude towards what should be whole-hearted personal and political commitments. | |
| From: Will Kymlicka (Contemporary Political Philosophy (1st edn) [1990], 2.7) | |
| A reaction: I've always seen this as an objection to utilitarianism, but I now see that it is only an objection to the decision procedure. We should be warm-hearted and committed, in the knowledge that this will increase benefits to all. Hm. A bit schizoid. |
| 18637 | Utilitarianism is irrational if it tells you to trade in your rights and resources just for benefits [Kymlicka] |
| Full Idea: Utilitarianism is an irrational choice, for it is rational to ensure your basic rights and resources are protected, even if you thereby lessen your chance of receiving benefits above and beyond the basic goods that you seek to protect. | |
| From: Will Kymlicka (Contemporary Political Philosophy (1st edn) [1990], 3.3) | |
| A reaction: [He's discussing Rawls] Utilitarians would obviously respond to this by saying that the rights and resources are needed to protect future benefits, so it would be short-termism to trade them in now. |
| 18663 | Modern liberalism has added personal privacy to our personal social lives [Kymlicka] |
| Full Idea: Modern liberalism is concerned not only to protect the private sphere of social life, but also to carve out a realm within the private sphere where individuals can have privacy. | |
| From: Will Kymlicka (Contemporary Political Philosophy (1st edn) [1990], 7.2.b) | |
| A reaction: Interestingly, he associates this development with the romantic movement, which designated social interaction as public and political, creating a need for true privacy. Privacy is the blessing and blight of the modern world. |
| 18632 | Liberalism tends to give priority to basic liberties [Kymlicka] |
| Full Idea: One way of differentiating liberalism is that it gives priority to the basic liberties. | |
| From: Will Kymlicka (Contemporary Political Philosophy (1st edn) [1990], 3.1.b) | |
| A reaction: [He is citing Rawls for this] This is not the same as extreme libertarianism, which makes liberty the only priority. The issue would be over which liberties count as 'basic'. Taxation would be a good test case. |
| 18656 | Marxists say liberalism is unjust, because it allows exploitation in the sale of labour [Kymlicka] |
| Full Idea: The fundamental flaw of liberal justice, Marxists claim, is that it licences the continuation of the worker by the capitalist, since it licences the buying and selling labour. | |
| From: Will Kymlicka (Contemporary Political Philosophy (1st edn) [1990], 5.2.a) | |
| A reaction: I can't see that all sale of labour is exploitation, if (for example) the wage paid was extremely high (maybe even higher than the employer's wage, which is possible). So exploitation involves something more. |
| 18659 | The 'Kantian' view of the self misses the way it is embedded or situated in society [Kymlicka] |
| Full Idea: Communitarians believe that the 'Kantian' view of the self is false, because it ignores the fact that the self is 'embedded' or 'situated' in existing social practices, so that we cannot always stand back and opt out of them. | |
| From: Will Kymlicka (Contemporary Political Philosophy (1st edn) [1990], 6.3) | |
| A reaction: [Hegel and Charles Taylor 1979 seem to be the sources for this] I have several times been told that I am so typical of the culture I arose in that it is almost comical. This was quite disconcerting, but I got used to it, and now I love it. |
| 18660 | Communitarians say we should pay more attention to our history [Kymlicka] |
| Full Idea: Communitarians like to say that political theory should pay more attention to the history of each culture. | |
| From: Will Kymlicka (Contemporary Political Philosophy (1st edn) [1990], 6.4.c) | |
| A reaction: I like this. Kylicka says communitarians tend not to do this, partly because history might reveal an unpleasant basis for present society (such as English country house life benefiting from slavery). The ignorance of history among politicians appals me. |
| 18657 | Communitarian states only encourage fairly orthodox ideas of the good life [Kymlicka] |
| Full Idea: A communitarian state can and should encourage people to adopt conceptions of the good that conform to the community's way of life, while discouraging conceptions of the good that conflict with it. | |
| From: Will Kymlicka (Contemporary Political Philosophy (1st edn) [1990], 6.2) | |
| A reaction: This is the conservative aspect of communitarianism which many people (notably liberals) find uncongenial. This conservatism is implicit in Aristotle's account of virtue. I have become more conservative to accommodate it. |
| 18649 | If everyone owned himself, that would prevent slavery [Kymlicka] |
| Full Idea: The best way to prevent enslavement of one person to another is to give each person ownership over himself. | |
| From: Will Kymlicka (Contemporary Political Philosophy (1st edn) [1990], 4.2.c) | |
| A reaction: [The idea comes from Nozick, but Kymlicka is assessing how it should be understood] The best way to block any social evil like slavery is to make it unthinkable. Legislation is second best. Presumably I could sell myself into slavery (like Faust)? |
| 18640 | Libertarians like the free market, but they also think that the free market is just [Kymlicka] |
| Full Idea: Not everyone who favours the free market is a libertarian, for they do not all share the libertarian view that the free market is inherently just. | |
| From: Will Kymlicka (Contemporary Political Philosophy (1st edn) [1990], 4.1.a) | |
| A reaction: Illuminating. It would appear that exploitation is possible within a strictly free market, so it seems unlikely that free markets are inherently just (unless you don't acknowledge that 'exploitation' is wrong). |
| 18651 | The most valuable liberties to us need not be the ones with the most freedom [Kymlicka] |
| Full Idea: Different liberties promote different interests for many different reasons, and there is no reason to assume that the liberties which are most valuable to us are the ones with the most freedom. | |
| From: Will Kymlicka (Contemporary Political Philosophy (1st edn) [1990], 2.4.a.iii) | |
| A reaction: As I grow older I come more and more to think that freedom is overvalued. But have you tried the other thing? We complacently take huge freedoms for granted. Be passionate about fundamental freedoms, and relaxed about the rest. |
| 18661 | Ancient freedom was free participation in politics, not private independence of life [Kymlicka] |
| Full Idea: The liberty of the ancients was their active participation in the exercise of political power, not the peaceful enjoyment of personal independence. | |
| From: Will Kymlicka (Contemporary Political Philosophy (1st edn) [1990], 7.2.a) | |
| A reaction: Interesting. It takes a feat of imagination to grasp a world where the desire for freedom to sit at home and compile a database of philosophical ideas never even crossed anyone's mind. |
| 18633 | Equal opportunities seems fair, because your fate is from your choices, not your circumstances [Kymlicka] |
| Full Idea: The ideology of equal opportunity seems fair to many people in our society because it ensures that people's fate is determined by their choices, rather than their circumstances. | |
| From: Will Kymlicka (Contemporary Political Philosophy (1st edn) [1990], 3.2) | |
| A reaction: Is it that we surmise that people have 'free will', and then engineer a situation where it can be exercised? Is it that the rest of us don't want to feel guilty when someone else's life goes awry (because it was 'their fault')? |
| 18634 | Equal opportunity arbitrarily worries about social circumstances, but ignores talents [Kymlicka] |
| Full Idea: The prevailing view [of equal opportunity] only recognises differences in social circumstances, while ignoring differences in natural talents (or treating them as if they were a choice). This is an arbitrary limit on the theory's central intuition. | |
| From: Will Kymlicka (Contemporary Political Philosophy (1st edn) [1990], 3.2) | |
| A reaction: Of course we (society) can do a lot about your social circumstances, but very little about your talents, other than to develop them or thwart them. Talented children need more than mere 'opportunity'. |
| 18654 | Marxists say justice is unneeded in the truly good community [Kymlicka] |
| Full Idea: Marxists believe that justice, far from being the first virtue of social institutions, is something that the truly good community has no need for. | |
| From: Will Kymlicka (Contemporary Political Philosophy (1st edn) [1990], 5.1) | |
| A reaction: This seems to imply that in the truly good community there are nothing but truly good individuals, which is taking social determinism to its limits. Are all the citizens of a bad community inherently bad? |
| 18652 | The Lockean view of freedom depends on whether you had a right to what is restricted [Kymlicka] |
| Full Idea: The Lockean camp defines freedom in terms of the exercise of our rights. Whether or not a restriction decreases our freedom depends on whether or not we had a right to do the restricted thing. | |
| From: Will Kymlicka (Contemporary Political Philosophy (1st edn) [1990], 2.4.a.iii) | |
| A reaction: My first instinct is to be sympathetic to this, since a detached and general notion of 'freedom' strikes me as suspect. He offers the rival 'Spenserian' view of freedom as just having the choice. |
| 18655 | Justice corrects social faults, but also expresses respect to individuals as ends [Kymlicka] |
| Full Idea: Justice is more than a remedial virtue. It does remedy defects in social co-ordination, ...but it also expresses the respect individuals are owed as ends in themselves, not as mean's to someone's good, or even to the common good. | |
| From: Will Kymlicka (Contemporary Political Philosophy (1st edn) [1990], 5.1) | |
| A reaction: That is, I take it, that justice operates at two different levels in our theoretical social thinking. |
| 6072 | If Satan is the most imperfect conceivable being, he must have non-existence [McGinn] |
| Full Idea: Satan cannot exist because he is the most imperfect conceivable being, and existence is one of the perfections. | |
| From: Colin McGinn (Logical Properties [2000], Ch.2) | |
| A reaction: The logic of this seems right to me. Presumably the theologians would hastily deny this as a definition of Satan; he must have some positive qualities (like power) in order to enact his supreme moral imperfections. NIce, though. |
| 6073 | I think the fault of the Ontological Argument is taking the original idea to be well-defined [McGinn] |
| Full Idea: My own suspicion about the Ontological Argument is that the fault lies in taking notions like 'the most perfect, impressive and powerful being conceivable' to be well-defined. | |
| From: Colin McGinn (Logical Properties [2000], Ch.2) | |
| A reaction: I'm tempted to put it more strongly: the single greatest challenge for the theist with intellectual integrity is to give a clear and coherent definition of God. There must be no internal contradictions, and it must be within the bounds of possibility. |