67 ideas
17016 | Philosophy must abstract from the senses [Newton] |
Full Idea: In philosophy abstraction from the senses is required. | |
From: Isaac Newton (Principia Mathematica [1687], Def 8 Schol) | |
A reaction: He particularly means 'natural philosophy' (i.e. science), but there is no real distinction in Newton's time, and I would say this remark is true of modern philosophy. |
18079 | Newton developed a kinematic approach to geometry [Newton, by Kitcher] |
Full Idea: The reduction of the problems of tangents, normals, curvature, maxima and minima were effected by Newton's kinematic approach to geometry. | |
From: report of Isaac Newton (Principia Mathematica [1687]) by Philip Kitcher - The Nature of Mathematical Knowledge 10.1 | |
A reaction: This approach apparently contrasts with that of Leibniz. |
18082 | Quantities and ratios which continually converge will eventually become equal [Newton] |
Full Idea: Quantities and the ratios of quantities, which in any finite time converge continually to equality, and, before the end of that time approach nearer to one another by any given difference become ultimately equal. | |
From: Isaac Newton (Principia Mathematica [1687], Lemma 1), quoted by Philip Kitcher - The Nature of Mathematical Knowledge 10.2 | |
A reaction: Kitcher observes that, although Newton relies on infinitesimals, this quotation expresses something close to the later idea of a 'limit'. |
6472 | Continuity is a sufficient criterion for the identity of a rock, but not for part of a smooth fluid [Russell] |
Full Idea: Continuity is not a sufficient criterion of material identity; it is sufficient in many cases, such as rocks and tables, where the appearances change slowly, but in others, such as the parts of an approximately homogeneous fluid, it fails us utterly. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics [1914], §XI) | |
A reaction: It might be debatable to what extent the 'parts' of a homogeneous fluid have identity. How many 'parts' are there in a glass of water? This seems, now, a problem for internalists; externalists can define the identity by the unseen molecules. |
17011 | I suspect that each particle of bodies has attractive or repelling forces [Newton] |
Full Idea: Many things lead me to a suspicion that all phenomena may depend on certain forces by which the particles of bodies, by causes not yet known, either are impelled toward one another and cohere in regular figures,or are repelled from one another and recede. | |
From: Isaac Newton (Principia Mathematica [1687], Pref) | |
A reaction: For Newton, forces are not just abstractions that are convenient for mathematics, but realities which I would say are best described as 'powers'. |
6473 | Physical things are series of appearances whose matter obeys physical laws [Russell] |
Full Idea: We may lay down the following definition: Physical things are those series of appearances whose matter obeys the laws of physics. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics [1914], §XI) | |
A reaction: We will then have to define the laws of physic without making any reference to 'physical things'. There is an obvious suspicion of circularity somewhere here. I find it very odd to define objects just in terms of their appearances. |
17028 | Particles mutually attract, and cohere at short distances [Newton] |
Full Idea: The particles of bodies attract one another at very small distances and cohere when they become contiguous. | |
From: Isaac Newton (Principia Mathematica [1687], Bk 3 Gen Schol) | |
A reaction: This is the sort of account of unity which has to be given in the corpuscular view of things, once substantial forms are given up. What is missing here is the structure of the thing. A lump of dirt is as unified as a cat in this story. |
6465 | We need not deny substance, but there seems no reason to assert it [Russell] |
Full Idea: It is not necessary to deny a substance or substratum underlying appearances; it is merely expedient (by the application of Occam's Razor) to abstain from asserting this unnecessary entity. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics [1914], §V) | |
A reaction: Russell then goes on to struggle heroically in attempts to give accounts of 'matter' and 'objects' entirely in terms of 'sense-data'. If he failed, as many think he did, should we go back to belief in Aristotelian substance? |
6471 | The assumption by physicists of permanent substance is not metaphysically legitimate [Russell] |
Full Idea: The assumption of permanent substance, which technically underlies the procedure of physics, cannot of course be regarded as metaphysically legitimate. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics [1914], §XI) | |
A reaction: It is a moot point whether physicists still thought this way after the full arrival of quantum theory in 1926. Russell raises all sorts of nice questions about the relationship between physics and philosophy here. I'm on Russell's side. |
17014 | The place of a thing is the sum of the places of its parts [Newton] |
Full Idea: The place of a whole is the same as the sum of the places of the parts, and is therefore internal and in the whole body. | |
From: Isaac Newton (Principia Mathematica [1687], Def 8 Schol) | |
A reaction: Note that Newton is talking of the sums of places, and deriving them from the parts. This is the mereology of space. |
6466 | Where possible, logical constructions are to be substituted for inferred entities [Russell] |
Full Idea: The supreme maxim in scientific philosophising is this: Wherever possible, logical constructions are to be substituted for inferred entities. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics [1914], §VI) | |
A reaction: This seems to represent Russell's first move (in 1914) into what looks like phenomenalism. One might ask what is the difference between 'logical constructions' and 'inferred entities'. The latter appear to have unity, so I prefer them. |
6483 | Russell held that we are aware of states of our own brain [Russell, by Robinson,H] |
Full Idea: Russell held that we are aware of states of our own brain. | |
From: report of Bertrand Russell (The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics [1914]) by Howard Robinson - Perception 1.1 | |
A reaction: I can't say that I had ever intepreted Russell in this way, but it is a wonderfully thought-provoking idea. All the time that I thought I was looking at a table, I was just looking at my own brain, and drawing an unspoken inference that a table caused it. |
8244 | Sense-data are qualities devoid of subjectivity, which are the basis of science [Russell, by Deleuze/Guattari] |
Full Idea: Rather than oppose sensory knowledge and scientific knowledge, we should identify the sensibilia that are peculiar to science. This is what Russell did when he evoked sense-data, qualities devoid of all subjectivity. | |
From: report of Bertrand Russell (The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics [1914]) by G Deleuze / F Guattari - What is Philosophy? 2.5 | |
A reaction: An interesting observation. Russell is striking for his lack of interest in theories of arts and ethics, and his whole work focuses on understanding the scientific view. What is involved in sensibilia is a key modern issue (e.g. McDowell). |
6462 | Sense-data are not mental, but are part of the subject-matter of physics [Russell] |
Full Idea: I regard sense-data as not mental, and as being, in fact, part of the actual subject-matter of physics. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics [1914], §III) | |
A reaction: Russell had clearly given himself an ontological problem with the introduction of sense-data, and this is his drastic solution. In 1912 his account seems ambiguous between sense-data being mental and being physical. |
6463 | Sense-data are objects, and do not contain the subject as part, the way beliefs do [Russell] |
Full Idea: Logically a sense-datum is an object, a particular of which the subject is aware; it does not contain the subject as a part, as for example beliefs and volitions do. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics [1914], §IV) | |
A reaction: This very firmly rejects any notion that a sense-datum is mental. It is a left as a strange sort of object which gets as close as it is possible to get to the 'borders' of the mind, without actually becoming part of it. |
6464 | Sense-data are usually objects within the body, but are not part of the subject [Russell] |
Full Idea: The sense-datum is an external object of which in sensation the subject is aware; it is true that the sense-datum is in many cases in the subject's body, but the subject's body is as distinct from the subject as tables and chairs are. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics [1914], §IV) | |
A reaction: This is probably Russell's clearest statement of the nature of sense-data, which are objects within the subjects body, but are not part of the mind. So once again we come up against the question of their ontology. Are they made of neurons? |
6467 | No sensibile is ever a datum to two people at once [Russell] |
Full Idea: No sensibile is ever a datum to two people at once. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics [1914], §VII) | |
A reaction: So a loud bang has to broken down into an almost infinite number of sound sensibilia - each one presumably the size of the apperture of a small ear. This is beginning to sound a bit silly. |
6459 | We do not know whether sense-data exist as objects when they are not data [Russell] |
Full Idea: We do not know, except by means of more or less precarious inferences, whether the objects which are at one time sense-data continue to exist at times when they are not data. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics [1914], §II) | |
A reaction: Note that he actually refers to sense-data as 'objects'. It shows how thoroughly reified they are in his theory if they have the possibility of independent existence. This invites the question 'what are they made of?' |
6460 | 'Sensibilia' are identical to sense-data, without actually being data for any mind [Russell] |
Full Idea: I shall give the name 'sensibilia' to those objects which have the same metaphysical and physical status as sense-data without necessarily being data to any mind. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics [1914], §III) | |
A reaction: This is his response to the problem of whether sense-data can exist independently of experience, which was unclear in 1912. Presumably sensibilia are objects which are possible sources of experience, but that seems to cover most objects. |
6461 | Ungiven sense-data can no more exist than unmarried husbands [Russell] |
Full Idea: We cannot ask, 'Can sense-data exist without being given?' for that is like asking, 'Can husbands exist without being married?' | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics [1914], §III) | |
A reaction: This follows hard on Idea 6460, which introduces the idea of 'sensibilia' for things which are like sense-data, but are not 'given'. This is a new distinction in 1914, which he had not made in 1912. |
6458 | Individuating sense-data is difficult, because they divide when closely attended to [Russell] |
Full Idea: There is some difficulty in deciding what is to be considered one sense-datum: often attention causes divisions to appear where, so far as can be discovered, there were no divisions before. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics [1914], §II) | |
A reaction: This was, I suspect, why Russell had dropped the idea of sense-data by 1921. He does, however, say that they are the last unit in analysis, rather than being the most basic unit of perception. In other words, they are purely theoretical. |
6469 | Sense-data may be subjective, if closing our eyes can change them [Russell] |
Full Idea: One reason often alleged for the subjectivity of sense-data is that the appearance of a thing itself may change when we find it hard to suppose that the thing itself has changed - as when we shut our eyes, or screw them up to make things look double. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics [1914], §VIII) | |
A reaction: Russell firmly denies that they are subjective. These examples are also said to support to proposed existence of sense-data in the first place, since they show the gap between appearance and reality. |
17546 | If you changed one of Newton's concepts you would destroy his whole system [Heisenberg on Newton] |
Full Idea: The connection between the different concept in [Newton's] system is so close that one could generally not change any one of the concepts without destroying the whole system | |
From: comment on Isaac Newton (Principia Mathematica [1687]) by Werner Heisenberg - Physics and Philosophy 06 | |
A reaction: This holistic situation would seem to count against Newton's system, rather than for it. A good system should depend on nature, not on other parts of the system. Compare changing a rule of chess. |
17027 | Science deduces propositions from phenomena, and generalises them by induction [Newton] |
Full Idea: In experimental philosophy, propositions are deduced from the phenomena and are made general by induction. | |
From: Isaac Newton (Principia Mathematica [1687], Bk 3 Gen Schol) | |
A reaction: Sounds easy, but generalising by induction requires all sorts of assumptions about the stability of natural kinds. Since the kinds are only arrived at by induction, it is not easy to give a proper account here. |
17022 | We should admit only enough causes to explain a phenomenon, and no more [Newton] |
Full Idea: No more causes of natural things should be admitted than are both true and sufficient to explain the phenomena. …For nature does nothing in vain, …and nature is simple and does not indulge in the luxury of superfluous causes. | |
From: Isaac Newton (Principia Mathematica [1687], Bk 3 Rule 1) | |
A reaction: This emphasises that Ockham's Razor is a rule for physical explanation, and not just one for abstract theories. This is something like Van Fraassen's 'empirical adequacy'. |
17021 | Natural effects of the same kind should be assumed to have the same causes [Newton] |
Full Idea: The causes assigned to natural effects of the same kind must be, so far as possible, the same. For example, the cause of respiration in man and beast. | |
From: Isaac Newton (Principia Mathematica [1687], Bk 3 Rule 2) | |
A reaction: It is impossible to rule out identical effects from differing causes, but explanation gets much more exciting (because wide-ranging) if Newton's rule is assumed. |
17026 | From the phenomena, I can't deduce the reason for the properties of gravity [Newton] |
Full Idea: I have not as yet been able to deduce from the phenomena the reason for the properties of gravity. | |
From: Isaac Newton (Principia Mathematica [1687], Bk 3 Gen Schol) | |
A reaction: I take it that giving the reasons for the properties of gravity would be an essentialist explanation. I am struck by the fact that the recent discovery of the Higgs Boson appears to give us a reason why things have mass (i.e. what causes mass). |
7357 | People who control others with fluent language often end up being hated [Kongzi (Confucius)] |
Full Idea: Of what use is eloquence? He who engages in fluency of words to control men often finds himself hated by them. | |
From: Kongzi (Confucius) (The Analects (Lunyu) [c.511 BCE], V.5) | |
A reaction: I don't recall Socrates making this very good point to any of the sophists (such as Gorgias). The idea that if you battle or connive your way to dominance over others then you are successful is false. Life is a much longer game than that. |
7358 | All men prefer outward appearance to true excellence [Kongzi (Confucius)] |
Full Idea: I have yet to meet a man as fond of excellence as he is of outward appearances. | |
From: Kongzi (Confucius) (The Analects (Lunyu) [c.511 BCE], IX.18) | |
A reaction: Interestingly, this cynical view of the love of virtue is put by Plato into the mouths of Glaucon and Adeimantus (in Bk II of 'Republic', e.g. Idea 12), and not into the mouth of Socrates, who goes on to defend the possibility of true virtue. |
7362 | Humans are similar, but social conventions drive us apart (sages and idiots being the exceptions) [Kongzi (Confucius)] |
Full Idea: In our natures we approximate one another; habits put us further and further apart. The only ones who do not change are sages and idiots. | |
From: Kongzi (Confucius) (The Analects (Lunyu) [c.511 BCE], XVII.2) | |
A reaction: I find most of Confucius rather uninteresting, but this is a splendid remark about the influence of social conventions on human nature. Sages can achieve universal morality if they rise above social convention, and seek the true virtues of human nature. |
7360 | Do not do to others what you would not desire yourself [Kongzi (Confucius)] |
Full Idea: Do not do to others what you would not desire yourself. Then you will have no enemies, either in the state or in your home. | |
From: Kongzi (Confucius) (The Analects (Lunyu) [c.511 BCE], XII.2) | |
A reaction: The Golden Rule, but note the second sentence. Logically, it leads to the absurdity of not giving someone an Elvis record for Christmas because you yourself don't like Elvis. Kant (Idea 3733) and Nietzsche (Idea 4560) offer good criticisms. |
7359 | Excess and deficiency are equally at fault [Kongzi (Confucius)] |
Full Idea: Excess and deficiency are equally at fault. | |
From: Kongzi (Confucius) (The Analects (Lunyu) [c.511 BCE], XI.16) | |
A reaction: This is the sort of wisdom we admire in Aristotle (and in any sensible person), but it may also be the deepest motto of conservatism, and it is a long way from romantic philosophy, and the clarion call of Nietzsche to greater excitement in life. |
7363 | The virtues of the best people are humility, maganimity, sincerity, diligence, and graciousness [Kongzi (Confucius)] |
Full Idea: He who in this world can practise five things may indeed be considered Man-at-his-best: humility, maganimity, sincerity, diligence, and graciousness. | |
From: Kongzi (Confucius) (The Analects (Lunyu) [c.511 BCE], XVII.5) | |
A reaction: A very nice list. Who could resist working with a colleague who had such virtues? Who could go wrong if they married a person who had them? I can't think of anything important that is missing. |
7361 | Men of the highest calibre avoid political life completely [Kongzi (Confucius)] |
Full Idea: Men of the highest calibre avoid political life completely. | |
From: Kongzi (Confucius) (The Analects (Lunyu) [c.511 BCE], XIV.37) | |
A reaction: Plato notes that such people tend to avoid political life (and a left sheltering, as if from a wild storm!), but he thinks they should be dragged into the political arena for the common good. Confucius seems to approve of the avoidance. Plato is right. |
23393 | Confucianism assumes that all good developments have happened, and there is only one Way [Norden on Kongzi (Confucius)] |
Full Idea: The two major limitations of Confucianism are that it assumes that all worthwhile cultural, social and ethical innovation has already occurred, and that it does not recognise the plurality of worthwhile ways of life. | |
From: comment on Kongzi (Confucius) (The Analects (Lunyu) [c.511 BCE]) by Bryan van Norden - Intro to Classical Chinese Philosophy 3.III | |
A reaction: In modern liberal terms that is about as conservative as it is possible to get. We think of it as the state of mind of an old person who can only long for the way things were when they were young. But 'hold fast to that which is good'! |
6421 | Newton's four fundamentals are: space, time, matter and force [Newton, by Russell] |
Full Idea: Newton works with four fundamental concepts: space, time, matter and force. | |
From: report of Isaac Newton (Principia Mathematica [1687]) by Bertrand Russell - My Philosophical Development Ch.2 | |
A reaction: The ontological challenge is to reduce these in number, presumably. They are, notoriously, defined in terms of one another. |
13470 | Mass is central to matter [Newton, by Hart,WD] |
Full Idea: For Newton, mass is central to matter. | |
From: report of Isaac Newton (Principia Mathematica [1687]) by William D. Hart - The Evolution of Logic 2 | |
A reaction: On reading this, I realise that this is the concept of matter I have grown up with, one which makes it very hard to grasp what the Greeks were thinking of when they referred to matter [hule]. |
17020 | An attraction of a body is the sum of the forces of their particles [Newton] |
Full Idea: The attractions of the bodies must be reckoned by assigning proper forces to their individual particles and then taking the sums of those forces. | |
From: Isaac Newton (Principia Mathematica [1687], 1.II.Schol) | |
A reaction: This is using the parts of bodies to give fundamental explanations, rather than invoking substantial forms. The parts need not be atoms. |
23012 | Newtonian causation is changes of motion resulting from collisions [Newton, by Baron/Miller] |
Full Idea: In the Newtonian mechanistic theory of causation, ….something causes a result when it brings about a change of motion. …Causation is a matter of things bumping into one another. | |
From: report of Isaac Newton (Principia Mathematica [1687]) by Baron,S/Miller,K - Intro to the Philosophy of Time 6.2.1 | |
A reaction: This seems to need impenetrability and elasticity as primitives (which is partly what Leibniz's monads are meant to explain). The authors observe that much causation is the result of existences and qualities, rather than motions. |
17008 | You have discovered that elliptical orbits result just from gravitation and planetary movement [Newton, by Leibniz] |
Full Idea: You have made the astonishing discovery that Kepler's ellipses result simply from the conception of attraction or gravitation and passage in a planet. | |
From: report of Isaac Newton (Principia Mathematica [1687]) by Gottfried Leibniz - Letter to Newton 1693.03.07 | |
A reaction: I quote this to show that Newton made 'an astonishing discovery' of a connection in nature, and did not merely produce an equation which described a pattern of behaviour. The simple equation is the proof of the connection. |
17010 | We have given up substantial forms, and now aim for mathematical laws [Newton] |
Full Idea: The moderns - rejecting substantial forms and occult qualities - have undertaken to reduce the phenomena of nature to mathematical laws. | |
From: Isaac Newton (Principia Mathematica [1687], Preface) | |
A reaction: This is the simplest statement of the apparent anti-Aristotelian revolution in the seventeenth century. |
17023 | I am not saying gravity is essential to bodies [Newton] |
Full Idea: I am by no means asserting that gravity is essential to bodies. | |
From: Isaac Newton (Principia Mathematica [1687], Bk 3 Rule 3) | |
A reaction: Notice that in Idea 17009 he does not rule out gravity being essential to bodies. This is Newton's intellectual modesty (for which he is not famous). |
15866 | Newton reclassified vertical motion as violent, and unconstrained horizontal motion as natural [Newton, by Harré] |
Full Idea: Following Kepler, Newton assumed a law of universal gravitation, thus reclassifying free fall as a violent motion and, with his First Law, fixing horizontal motion in the absence of constraints as natural | |
From: report of Isaac Newton (Principia Mathematica [1687]) by Rom Harré - Laws of Nature 1 | |
A reaction: This is in opposition to the Aristotelian view, where the downward motion of physical objects is their natural motion. |
15958 | Inertia rejects the Aristotelian idea of things having natural states, to which they return [Newton, by Alexander,P] |
Full Idea: Newton's principle of inertia implies a rejection of the Aristotelian idea of natural states to which things naturally return. | |
From: report of Isaac Newton (Principia Mathematica [1687]) by Peter Alexander - Ideas, Qualities and Corpuscles 02.3 | |
A reaction: I think we can safely say that Aristotle was wrong about this. Aristotle made too much (such as the gravity acting on a thing) intrinsic to the bodies, when the whole context must be seen. |
17019 | 3: All actions of bodies have an equal and opposite reaction [Newton] |
Full Idea: Law 3: To any action there is always an opposite and equal reaction; in other words, the action of two bodies upon each other are always equal and always opposite in direction. | |
From: Isaac Newton (Principia Mathematica [1687], Axioms) | |
A reaction: Is this still true if one body is dented by the impact and the other one isn't? What counts as a 'body'? |
17017 | 1: Bodies rest, or move in straight lines, unless acted on by forces [Newton] |
Full Idea: Law 1: Every body perseveres in its state of being at rest or of moving uniformly straight forward, except insofar as it is compelled to change its state by forces impressed. | |
From: Isaac Newton (Principia Mathematica [1687], Axioms) | |
A reaction: This is the new concept of inertia, which revolutionises the picture. Motion itself, which was a profound puzzle for the Greeks, ceases to be a problem by being axiomatised. It is now acceleration which is the the problem. |
20968 | Newton's Third Law implies the conservation of momentum [Newton, by Papineau] |
Full Idea: Newton's Third Law implies the conservation of momentum, because 'action and reaction' are always equal. | |
From: report of Isaac Newton (Principia Mathematica [1687]) by David Papineau - Thinking about Consciousness App 3 | |
A reaction: That is, the Third Law implies the First Law (which is the Law of Momentum). |
17018 | 2: Change of motion is proportional to the force [Newton] |
Full Idea: Law 2: A change in motion is proportional to the motive force impressed and takes place along the straight line in which that force is impressed. | |
From: Isaac Newton (Principia Mathematica [1687], Axioms) | |
A reaction: This gives the equation 'force = mass x acceleration', where the mass is the constant needed for the equation of proportion. Effectively mass is just the value of a proportion. |
17547 | Newton's idea of force acting over a long distance was very strange [Heisenberg on Newton] |
Full Idea: Newton introduced a very new and strange hypothesis by assuming a force that acted over a long distance. | |
From: comment on Isaac Newton (Principia Mathematica [1687]) by Werner Heisenberg - Physics and Philosophy 06 | |
A reaction: Why would a force that acted over a short distance be any less mysterious? |
20966 | Newton introduced forces other than by contact [Newton, by Papineau] |
Full Idea: Newton allowed forces other than impact. All the earlier proponents of 'mechanical philosophy' took it as given that all physical action is by contact. ...He thought of 'impressed force' - disembodied entities acting from outside a body. | |
From: report of Isaac Newton (Principia Mathematica [1687]) by David Papineau - Thinking about Consciousness App 3 | |
A reaction: This is 'action at a distance', which was as bewildering then as quantum theory is now. Newton had a divinity to impose laws of nature from the outside. In some ways we have moved back to the old view, with the actions of bosons and fields. |
20967 | Newton's laws cover the effects of forces, but not their causes [Newton, by Papineau] |
Full Idea: Newton has a general law about the effects of his forces, ...but there is no corresponding general principle about the causes of such forces. | |
From: report of Isaac Newton (Principia Mathematica [1687]) by David Papineau - Thinking about Consciousness App 3 | |
A reaction: I'm not sure that Einstein gives a cause of gravity either. This seems to be part of the scientific 'instrumentalist' view of nature, which is incredibly useful but very superficial. |
16708 | Newton's forces were accused of being the scholastics' real qualities [Pasnau on Newton] |
Full Idea: Newton's reliance on the notion of force was widely criticised as marking in effect a return to real qualities. | |
From: comment on Isaac Newton (Principia Mathematica [1687]) by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 19.7 | |
A reaction: The objection is to forces that are separate from the bodies they act on. This is one of the reasons why modern metaphysics needs the concept of an intrinsic disposition or power, placing the forces in the stuff. |
13153 | I am studying the quantities and mathematics of forces, not their species or qualities [Newton] |
Full Idea: I consider in this treatise not the species of forces and their physical qualities, but their quantities and mathematical proportions. | |
From: Isaac Newton (Principia Mathematica [1687], 1.1.11 Sch) | |
A reaction: Note that Newton is not denying that one might contemplate the species and qualities of forces, as I think Leibniz tried to do, thought he didn't cast any detailed light on them. It is the gap between science and metaphysics. |
12724 | The aim is to discover forces from motions, and use forces to demonstrate other phenomena [Newton] |
Full Idea: The basic problem of philosophy seems to be to discover the forces of nature from the phenomena of motions and then to demonstrate the other phenomena from these forces. | |
From: Isaac Newton (Principia Mathematica [1687], Pref 1st ed), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 4 | |
A reaction: This fits in with the description-of-regularity approach to laws which Newton had acquired from Galileo, rather than the essentialist attitude to forces of Leibniz, though Newton has smatterings of essentialism. |
13593 | Newton showed that falling to earth and orbiting the sun are essentially the same [Newton, by Ellis] |
Full Idea: Newton showed that the apparently different kinds of processes of falling towards the earth and orbiting the sun are essentially the same. | |
From: report of Isaac Newton (Principia Mathematica [1687]) by Brian Ellis - Scientific Essentialism 3.08 | |
A reaction: I quote this to illustrate Newton's permanent achievement in science, in the face of a tendency to say that he was 'outmoded' by the advent of General Relativity. Newton wasn't interestingly wrong. He was very very right. |
20969 | Early Newtonians could not formulate conservation of energy, having no concept of potential energy [Newton, by Papineau] |
Full Idea: A barrier to the formulation of an energy conservation principle by early Newtonians was their lack of a notion of potential energy. | |
From: report of Isaac Newton (Principia Mathematica [1687]) by David Papineau - Thinking about Consciousness App 3 n5 | |
A reaction: Interestingly, the notions of potentiality and actuality were central to Aristotle, but Newtonians had just rejected all of that. |
6470 | Matter is the limit of appearances as distance from the object diminishes [Russell] |
Full Idea: We offer the following tentative definition: The matter of a given thing is the limit of its appearances as their distance from the thing diminishes. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics [1914], §IX) | |
A reaction: This strikes me as empiricism gone mad. Russell is famous for being a 'realist', but you would hardly know it at this point. Personally I put emphasis on 'best explanation', which fairly simply delivers most of our commonsense understandings of reality. |
6468 | There is 'private space', and there is also the 'space of perspectives' [Russell] |
Full Idea: In addition to the private spaces, ..there is the 'space of perspectives', since each private world may be regarded as the appearance which the universe presents from a certain point of view. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics [1914], §VII) | |
A reaction: This replaces his concept of 'public space', which he introduced in 1912. Russell gradually dropped this, but I like the idea that we somehow directly perceive space in two ways simultaneously (which led him to say that space is six-dimensional). |
17013 | Absolute space is independent, homogeneous and immovable [Newton] |
Full Idea: Absolute space, of its own nature without reference to anything external, always remains homogeneous and immovable. | |
From: Isaac Newton (Principia Mathematica [1687], Def 8 Schol) | |
A reaction: This would have to be a stipulation, rather than an assertion of fact, since whether space is 'immovable' is either incoherent or unknowable. |
22915 | Newton needs intervals of time, to define velocity and acceleration [Newton, by Le Poidevin] |
Full Idea: Both Newton's First and Second Laws of motion make implicit reference to equal intervals of time. For a body is moving with constant velocity if it covers the same distance in a series of equal intervals (and similarly with acceleration). | |
From: report of Isaac Newton (Principia Mathematica [1687]) by Robin Le Poidevin - Travels in Four Dimensions 01 'Time' | |
A reaction: [Le Poidevin spells out the acceleration point] You can see why he needs time to be real, if measured chunks of it figure in his laws. |
22893 | Newton thought his laws of motion needed absolute time [Newton, by Bardon] |
Full Idea: Newton's reason for embracing absolute space, time and motion was that he thought that universal laws of motions were describable only in such terms. Because actual motions are irregular, the time of universal laws of motion cannot depend on them. | |
From: report of Isaac Newton (Principia Mathematica [1687]) by Adrian Bardon - Brief History of the Philosophy of Time 3 'Replacing' | |
A reaction: I'm not sure of the Einsteinian account of the laws of motion. |
17012 | Time exists independently, and flows uniformly [Newton] |
Full Idea: Absolute, true, and mathematical time, in and of itself and of its own nature, without reference to anything external, flows uniformly and by another name is called duration. | |
From: Isaac Newton (Principia Mathematica [1687], Def 8 Schol) | |
A reaction: This invites the notorious question of, if time flows uniformly, how fast time flows. Maybe we should bite the bullet and say 'one second per second', or maybe we should say 'this fact is beyond our powers of comprehension'. |
14012 | Absolute time, from its own nature, flows equably, without relation to anything external [Newton] |
Full Idea: Absolute, true, and mathematical time, of itself, and from its own nature, flows equably, without relation to anything external. | |
From: Isaac Newton (Principia Mathematica [1687], I:Schol after defs), quoted by Craig Bourne - A Future for Presentism 5.1 | |
A reaction: I agree totally with this, and I don't care what any modern relativity theorists say. It think Shoemaker's argument gives wonderful support to Newton. |
22954 | Newtonian mechanics does not distinguish negative from positive values of time [Newton, by Coveney/Highfield] |
Full Idea: In Newton's laws of motion time is squared, so a negative value gives the same result as a positive value, which means Newtonian mechanics cannot distinguish between the two directions of time. | |
From: report of Isaac Newton (Principia Mathematica [1687]) by P Coveney / R Highfield - The Arrow of Time 2 'anatomy' | |
A reaction: Maybe Newton just forgot to mention that negative values were excluded. (Or was he unaware of the sequence of negative integers?). Too late now - he's done it. |
17015 | If there is no uniform motion, we cannot exactly measure time [Newton] |
Full Idea: It is possible that there is no uniform motion by which time may have an exact measure. All motions can be accelerated and retarded, but the flow of absolute time cannot be changed. | |
From: Isaac Newton (Principia Mathematica [1687], Def 8 Schol) |
17025 | If a perfect being does not rule the cosmos, it is not God [Newton] |
Full Idea: A being, however perfect, without dominion is not the Lord God. | |
From: Isaac Newton (Principia Mathematica [1687], Bk 3 Gen Schol) |
17024 | The elegance of the solar system requires a powerful intellect as designer [Newton] |
Full Idea: This most elegant system of the sun, planets, and comets could not have arisen without the design and dominion of an intelligent and powerful being. | |
From: Isaac Newton (Principia Mathematica [1687], Bk 3 Gen Schol) |