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All the ideas for 'The Sayings of Confucius', 'The Nature of Rationality' and 'Davidson on himself'

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29 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 5. Objectivity
Truth and objectivity depend on a community of speakers to interpret what they mean [Davidson]
     Full Idea: The basis on which the concepts of truth and objectivity depend for application is a community of understanding, agreement among speakers on how each is to be understood.
     From: Donald Davidson (Davidson on himself [1994], p.233)
     A reaction: Obviously all understanding is, in practice, an interpretation by a community, but that isn't what 'truth' means. We mean 'true independently of any community'.
There are no ultimate standards of rationality, since we only assess others by our own standard [Davidson]
     Full Idea: It makes no sense to speak of comparing or agreeing on ultimate standards of rationality, since it is our own standards in each case to which we must turn in interpreting others. This is not a failure of objectivity, but where 'questions come to an end'.
     From: Donald Davidson (Davidson on himself [1994], p.232)
     A reaction: This seems wrong, given the commitment to truth and charity in interpretation. He could have said the same about perception, but I doubt if he would.
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 3. Value of Truth
I do not care if my trivial beliefs are false, and I have no interest in many truths [Nozick]
     Full Idea: I find that I do not mind at all the thought that I have some false beliefs (of US state capitals), and there are many truths I do not care to know at all (total grains of sand on the beach).
     From: Robert Nozick (The Nature of Rationality [1993], p.67)
     A reaction: A useful corrective to anyone who blindly asserts that truth is the supreme human value. I would still be annoyed if someone taught me lies about these two types of truth.
3. Truth / E. Pragmatic Truth / 1. Pragmatic Truth
Maybe James was depicting the value of truth, and not its nature [Nozick]
     Full Idea: We might see William James's pragmatic view that truth is what works as depicting the value of truth, and not its nature.
     From: Robert Nozick (The Nature of Rationality [1993], p.68)
     A reaction: James didn't think that he was doing this. He firmly says that this IS truth, not just the advantages of truth. Another view is that pragmatists are giving a test for truth.
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / a. Mind
There are no such things as minds, but people have mental properties [Davidson]
     Full Idea: There are no such things as minds, but people have mental properties.
     From: Donald Davidson (Davidson on himself [1994], p.231)
     A reaction: I think this is right. It fits with Searle's notion of consciousness as a property, like the liquidity of water. I don't panic if I think "I have no mind, but I have extraordinary properties".
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 1. Reductionism critique
If the mind is an anomaly, this makes reduction of the mental to the physical impossible [Davidson]
     Full Idea: If there are no strict psychophysical laws, this rules out reductionism, either by definition of mental predicates in physical terms, or by way of bridging laws.
     From: Donald Davidson (Davidson on himself [1994], p.231)
     A reaction: But it is by no means clear that there are no psycho-physical laws. How could this be known a priori?
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 2. Anomalous Monism
Obviously all mental events are causally related to physical events [Davidson]
     Full Idea: All mental events are causally related to physical events. ..This seems obvious.
     From: Donald Davidson (Davidson on himself [1994], p.231)
     A reaction: All mental events are physically caused. Some bodily physical events result from mental events. Probably all mental events have some effect of other mental events (all of which are in some sense physical).
There are no strict psychophysical laws connecting mental and physical events [Davidson]
     Full Idea: There are no strict psychophysical laws (that is, laws connecting mental events under their mental descriptions with physical events under their physical descriptions).
     From: Donald Davidson (Davidson on himself [1994], p.231)
     A reaction: This is clearly open to question. It may be just that no human mind could ever grasp such laws, given their probable complexity.
Mental entities do not add to the physical furniture of the world [Davidson]
     Full Idea: Mental entities do not add to the physical furniture of the world.
     From: Donald Davidson (Davidson on himself [1994], p.231)
     A reaction: This seems to me clearly true, however we propose to characterise mental events.
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 3. Property Dualism
The correct conclusion is ontological monism combined with conceptual dualism [Davidson]
     Full Idea: My basic premises lead to the conclusion of ontological monism coupled with conceptual dualism (like Spinoza, except that he denied mental causation).
     From: Donald Davidson (Davidson on himself [1994], p.231)
     A reaction: 'Conceptual dualism' implies no real difference, but 'property dualism' is better, suggesting different properties when viewed from different angles.
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / a. Rationality
Absence of all rationality would be absence of thought [Davidson]
     Full Idea: To imagine a totally irrational animal is to imagine an animal without thought.
     From: Donald Davidson (Davidson on himself [1994], p.232)
     A reaction: This wouldn't be so clear without the theory of evolution, which suggests that only the finders of truth last long enough to breed.
In the instrumental view of rationality it only concerns means, and not ends [Nozick]
     Full Idea: On the instrumental conception of rationality, it consists in the effective and efficient achievement of goals, ends, and desires. About the goals themselves it has little to say.
     From: Robert Nozick (The Nature of Rationality [1993], p.64)
     A reaction: [He quotes Russell 1954 p.viii as expressing this view] A long way from Greek logos, which obviously concerns the rational selection of right ends (for which, presumably, reasons can be given). In practice our ends may never be rational, of course.
Is it rational to believe a truth which leads to permanent misery? [Nozick]
     Full Idea: If a mother is presented with convincing evidence that her son has committed a grave crime, but were she to believe it that would make her life thereafter miserable, is it rational for her to believe her son is guilty?
     From: Robert Nozick (The Nature of Rationality [1993], p.69)
     A reaction: I assume there is a conflict of rationalities, because there are conflicting ends. Presumably most mothers love the truth, but most of us also aim for happy lives. It is perfectly rational to avoid discovering a horrible family truth.
Rationality needs some self-consciousness, to also evaluate how we acquired our reasons [Nozick]
     Full Idea: Rationality involves some degree of self-consciousness. Not only reasons are evaluated, but also the processes by which information arrives, is stored, and recalled.
     From: Robert Nozick (The Nature of Rationality [1993], p.74)
     A reaction: I defend the idea that animals have a degree of rationality, because they can make sensible judgements, but I cannot deny this idea. Rationality comes in degrees, and second-level thought is a huge leap forward in degree.
Rationality is normally said to concern either giving reasons, or reliability [Nozick]
     Full Idea: The two themes permeating the philosophical literature are that rationality is a matter of reasons, or that rationality is a matter of reliability.
     From: Robert Nozick (The Nature of Rationality [1993], p.64)
     A reaction: Since a clock can be reliable, I would have thought it concerns reasons. Or an unthinking person could reliably recite truths from memory. There is also the instrumental view of rationality.
18. Thought / C. Content / 6. Broad Content
Our meanings are partly fixed by events of which we may be ignorant [Davidson]
     Full Idea: What we mean by what we say is partly fixed by events of which we may be ignorant.
     From: Donald Davidson (Davidson on himself [1994], p.235)
     A reaction: There is 'strict and literal meaning', which is fixed by the words, even if I don't know what I am saying. But 'speaker's meaning' is surely a pure matter of a state of mind?
19. Language / D. Propositions / 6. Propositions Critique
Propositions explain nothing without an explanation of how sentences manage to name them [Davidson]
     Full Idea: The idea of a proposition is unhelpful, until it is explained how exactly the words in the contained sentence manage to name or describe a proposition (which even Frege failed to achieve).
     From: Donald Davidson (Davidson on himself [1994], p.232)
     A reaction: It seems obvious to me that there are brain events best labelled as propositions, even if their fit with language is puzzling.
19. Language / F. Communication / 1. Rhetoric
People who control others with fluent language often end up being hated [Kongzi (Confucius)]
     Full Idea: Of what use is eloquence? He who engages in fluency of words to control men often finds himself hated by them.
     From: Kongzi (Confucius) (The Analects (Lunyu) [c.511 BCE], V.5)
     A reaction: I don't recall Socrates making this very good point to any of the sophists (such as Gorgias). The idea that if you battle or connive your way to dominance over others then you are successful is false. Life is a much longer game than that.
19. Language / F. Communication / 4. Private Language
Thought is only fully developed if we communicate with others [Davidson]
     Full Idea: We would have no fully-fledge thoughts if we were not in communication with others.
     From: Donald Davidson (Davidson on himself [1994], p.233)
     A reaction: This seems a plausible empirical observation, though I would doubt any a priori proof of it. If animals could speak, they would become intellectuals?
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / c. Principle of charity
There is simply no alternative to the 'principle of charity' in interpreting what others do [Davidson]
     Full Idea: The 'principle of charity' is a misleading term, since there is no alternative if we want to make sense of the attitudes and actions of the agents around us.
     From: Donald Davidson (Davidson on himself [1994], p.233)
     A reaction: I suppose so, but only with a background of evolutionary theory. I would necessarily assume charity if a robot spoke to me.
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / h. Against ethics
All men prefer outward appearance to true excellence [Kongzi (Confucius)]
     Full Idea: I have yet to meet a man as fond of excellence as he is of outward appearances.
     From: Kongzi (Confucius) (The Analects (Lunyu) [c.511 BCE], IX.18)
     A reaction: Interestingly, this cynical view of the love of virtue is put by Plato into the mouths of Glaucon and Adeimantus (in Bk II of 'Republic', e.g. Idea 12), and not into the mouth of Socrates, who goes on to defend the possibility of true virtue.
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
Humans are similar, but social conventions drive us apart (sages and idiots being the exceptions) [Kongzi (Confucius)]
     Full Idea: In our natures we approximate one another; habits put us further and further apart. The only ones who do not change are sages and idiots.
     From: Kongzi (Confucius) (The Analects (Lunyu) [c.511 BCE], XVII.2)
     A reaction: I find most of Confucius rather uninteresting, but this is a splendid remark about the influence of social conventions on human nature. Sages can achieve universal morality if they rise above social convention, and seek the true virtues of human nature.
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 2. Golden Rule
Do not do to others what you would not desire yourself [Kongzi (Confucius)]
     Full Idea: Do not do to others what you would not desire yourself. Then you will have no enemies, either in the state or in your home.
     From: Kongzi (Confucius) (The Analects (Lunyu) [c.511 BCE], XII.2)
     A reaction: The Golden Rule, but note the second sentence. Logically, it leads to the absurdity of not giving someone an Elvis record for Christmas because you yourself don't like Elvis. Kant (Idea 3733) and Nietzsche (Idea 4560) offer good criticisms.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / f. The Mean
Excess and deficiency are equally at fault [Kongzi (Confucius)]
     Full Idea: Excess and deficiency are equally at fault.
     From: Kongzi (Confucius) (The Analects (Lunyu) [c.511 BCE], XI.16)
     A reaction: This is the sort of wisdom we admire in Aristotle (and in any sensible person), but it may also be the deepest motto of conservatism, and it is a long way from romantic philosophy, and the clarion call of Nietzsche to greater excitement in life.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
The virtues of the best people are humility, maganimity, sincerity, diligence, and graciousness [Kongzi (Confucius)]
     Full Idea: He who in this world can practise five things may indeed be considered Man-at-his-best: humility, maganimity, sincerity, diligence, and graciousness.
     From: Kongzi (Confucius) (The Analects (Lunyu) [c.511 BCE], XVII.5)
     A reaction: A very nice list. Who could resist working with a colleague who had such virtues? Who could go wrong if they married a person who had them? I can't think of anything important that is missing.
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 2. Leaders / d. Elites
Men of the highest calibre avoid political life completely [Kongzi (Confucius)]
     Full Idea: Men of the highest calibre avoid political life completely.
     From: Kongzi (Confucius) (The Analects (Lunyu) [c.511 BCE], XIV.37)
     A reaction: Plato notes that such people tend to avoid political life (and a left sheltering, as if from a wild storm!), but he thinks they should be dragged into the political arena for the common good. Confucius seems to approve of the avoidance. Plato is right.
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 3. Conservatism
Confucianism assumes that all good developments have happened, and there is only one Way [Norden on Kongzi (Confucius)]
     Full Idea: The two major limitations of Confucianism are that it assumes that all worthwhile cultural, social and ethical innovation has already occurred, and that it does not recognise the plurality of worthwhile ways of life.
     From: comment on Kongzi (Confucius) (The Analects (Lunyu) [c.511 BCE]) by Bryan van Norden - Intro to Classical Chinese Philosophy 3.III
     A reaction: In modern liberal terms that is about as conservative as it is possible to get. We think of it as the state of mind of an old person who can only long for the way things were when they were young. But 'hold fast to that which is good'!
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / c. Teaching
Without a teacher, the concept of 'getting things right or wrong' is meaningless [Davidson]
     Full Idea: Without a 'teacher', nothing would give content to the idea that there is a difference between getting things right and getting them wrong.
     From: Donald Davidson (Davidson on himself [1994], p.234)
     A reaction: Seems right. A group of speculators with no one in the role of 'teacher' would seem to be paralysed with uncertain (except where judgements are very obvious).
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / b. Nomological causation
Cause and effect relations between events must follow strict laws [Davidson]
     Full Idea: If two events are related as cause and effect, there is a strict law under which they may be subsumed.
     From: Donald Davidson (Davidson on himself [1994], p.231)
     A reaction: Davidson admits that this is open to challenge (though Hume and Kant supported it). It does seem to be central to our understanding of nature.