27 ideas
10702 | Set theory's three roles: taming the infinite, subject-matter of mathematics, and modes of reasoning [Potter] |
Full Idea: Set theory has three roles: as a means of taming the infinite, as a supplier of the subject-matter of mathematics, and as a source of its modes of reasoning. | |
From: Michael Potter (Set Theory and Its Philosophy [2004], Intro 1) | |
A reaction: These all seem to be connected with mathematics, but there is also ontological interest in set theory. Potter emphasises that his second role does not entail a commitment to sets 'being' numbers. |
10713 | Usually the only reason given for accepting the empty set is convenience [Potter] |
Full Idea: It is rare to find any direct reason given for believing that the empty set exists, except for variants of Dedekind's argument from convenience. | |
From: Michael Potter (Set Theory and Its Philosophy [2004], 04.3) |
13044 | Infinity: There is at least one limit level [Potter] |
Full Idea: Axiom of Infinity: There is at least one limit level. | |
From: Michael Potter (Set Theory and Its Philosophy [2004], 04.9) | |
A reaction: A 'limit ordinal' is one which has successors, but no predecessors. The axiom just says there is at least one infinity. |
10708 | Nowadays we derive our conception of collections from the dependence between them [Potter] |
Full Idea: It is only quite recently that the idea has emerged of deriving our conception of collections from a relation of dependence between them. | |
From: Michael Potter (Set Theory and Its Philosophy [2004], 03.2) | |
A reaction: This is the 'iterative' view of sets, which he traces back to Gödel's 'What is Cantor's Continuum Problem?' |
13546 | The 'limitation of size' principles say whether properties collectivise depends on the number of objects [Potter] |
Full Idea: We group under the heading 'limitation of size' those principles which classify properties as collectivizing or not according to how many objects there are with the property. | |
From: Michael Potter (Set Theory and Its Philosophy [2004], 13.5) | |
A reaction: The idea was floated by Cantor, toyed with by Russell (1906), and advocated by von Neumann. The thought is simply that paradoxes start to appear when sets become enormous. |
10707 | Mereology elides the distinction between the cards in a pack and the suits [Potter] |
Full Idea: Mereology tends to elide the distinction between the cards in a pack and the suits. | |
From: Michael Potter (Set Theory and Its Philosophy [2004], 02.1) | |
A reaction: The example is a favourite of Frege's. Potter is giving a reason why mathematicians opted for set theory. I'm not clear, though, why a pack cannot have either 4 parts or 52 parts. Parts can 'fall under a concept' (such as 'legs'). I'm puzzled. |
10704 | We can formalize second-order formation rules, but not inference rules [Potter] |
Full Idea: In second-order logic only the formation rules are completely formalizable, not the inference rules. | |
From: Michael Potter (Set Theory and Its Philosophy [2004], 01.2) | |
A reaction: He cites Gödel's First Incompleteness theorem for this. |
10703 | Supposing axioms (rather than accepting them) give truths, but they are conditional [Potter] |
Full Idea: A 'supposition' axiomatic theory is as concerned with truth as a 'realist' one (with undefined terms), but the truths are conditional. Satisfying the axioms is satisfying the theorem. This is if-thenism, or implicationism, or eliminative structuralism. | |
From: Michael Potter (Set Theory and Its Philosophy [2004], 01.1) | |
A reaction: Aha! I had failed to make the connection between if-thenism and eliminative structuralism (of which I am rather fond). I think I am an if-thenist (not about all truth, but about provable truth). |
10712 | If set theory didn't found mathematics, it is still needed to count infinite sets [Potter] |
Full Idea: Even if set theory's role as a foundation for mathematics turned out to be wholly illusory, it would earn its keep through the calculus it provides for counting infinite sets. | |
From: Michael Potter (Set Theory and Its Philosophy [2004], 03.8) |
17882 | It is remarkable that all natural number arithmetic derives from just the Peano Axioms [Potter] |
Full Idea: It is a remarkable fact that all the arithmetical properties of the natural numbers can be derived from such a small number of assumptions (as the Peano Axioms). | |
From: Michael Potter (Set Theory and Its Philosophy [2004], 05.2) | |
A reaction: If one were to defend essentialism about arithmetic, this would be grist to their mill. I'm just saying. |
13076 | Scholastics treat relations as two separate predicates of the relata [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
Full Idea: The scholastics treated it as a step in the right explanatory direction to analyze a relational statement of the form 'aRb' into two subject-predicate statements, attributing different relational predicates to a and to b. | |
From: Cover,J/O'Leary-Hawthorne,J (Substance and Individuation in Leibniz [1999], 2.2.1) | |
A reaction: The only alternative seems to be Russell's view of relations as pure universals, having a life of their own, quite apart from their relata. Or you could take them as properties of space, time (and powers?), external to the relata? |
13043 | A relation is a set consisting entirely of ordered pairs [Potter] |
Full Idea: A set is called a 'relation' if every element of it is an ordered pair. | |
From: Michael Potter (Set Theory and Its Philosophy [2004], 04.7) | |
A reaction: This is the modern extensional view of relations. For 'to the left of', you just list all the things that are to the left, with the things they are to the left of. But just listing the ordered pairs won't necessarily reveal how they are related. |
13102 | If you individuate things by their origin, you still have to individuate the origins themselves [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
Full Idea: If we go for the necessity-of-origins view, A and B are different if the origin of A is different from the origin of B. But one is left with the further question 'When is the origin of A distinct from the origin of B?' | |
From: Cover,J/O'Leary-Hawthorne,J (Substance and Individuation in Leibniz [1999], 7.4.1) | |
A reaction: There may be an answer to this, in a regress of origins that support one another, but in the end the objection is obviously good. You can't begin to refer to an 'origin' if you can't identify anything in the first place. |
13103 | Numerical difference is a symmetrical notion, unlike proper individuation [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
Full Idea: Scholastics distinguished criteria of numerical difference from questions of individuation proper, since numerical difference is a symmetrical notion. | |
From: Cover,J/O'Leary-Hawthorne,J (Substance and Individuation in Leibniz [1999], 7.4.1) | |
A reaction: This apparently old-fashioned point appears to be conclusively correct. Modern thinkers, though, aren't comfortable with proper individuation, because they don't believe in concepts like 'essence' and 'substance' that are needed for the job. |
13104 | Haecceity as property, or as colourless thisness, or as singleton set [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
Full Idea: There is a contemporary property construal of haecceities, ...and a Scotistic construal as primitive, 'colourless' thisnesses which, unlike singleton-set haecceities, are aimed to do some explanatory work. | |
From: Cover,J/O'Leary-Hawthorne,J (Substance and Individuation in Leibniz [1999], 7.4.4) | |
A reaction: [He associates the contemporary account with David Kaplan] I suppose I would say that individuation is done by properties, but not by some single property, so I take it that I don't believe in haecceities at all. What individuates a haecceity? |
13100 | Maybe 'substance' is more of a mass-noun than a count-noun [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
Full Idea: We could think of 'substance' on the model of a mass noun, rather than a count noun. | |
From: Cover,J/O'Leary-Hawthorne,J (Substance and Individuation in Leibniz [1999], 7.3) | |
A reaction: They offer this to help Leibniz out of a mess, but I think he would be appalled. The proposal seems close to 'prime matter' in Aristotle, which never quite does the job required of it. The idea is nice, though, and should be taken seriously. |
13042 | If dependence is well-founded, with no infinite backward chains, this implies substances [Potter] |
Full Idea: The argument that the relation of dependence is well-founded ...is a version of the classical arguments for substance. ..Any conceptual scheme which genuinely represents a world cannot contain infinite backward chains of meaning. | |
From: Michael Potter (Set Theory and Its Philosophy [2004], 03.3) | |
A reaction: Thus the iterative conception of set may imply a notion of substance, and Barwise's radical attempt to ditch the Axiom of Foundation (Idea 13039) was a radical attempt to get rid of 'substances'. Potter cites Wittgenstein as a fan of substances here. |
13068 | We can ask for the nature of substance, about type of substance, and about individual substances [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
Full Idea: In the 'blueprint' approach to substance, we confront at least three questions: What is it for a thing to be an individual substance? What is it for a thing to be the kind of substance that it is? What is it to be that very individual substance? | |
From: Cover,J/O'Leary-Hawthorne,J (Substance and Individuation in Leibniz [1999], 1.1.1) | |
A reaction: My working view is that the answer to the first question is that substance is essence, that the second question is overrated and parasitic on the third, and that the third is the key question, and also reduces to essence. |
13069 | The general assumption is that substances cannot possibly be non-substances [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
Full Idea: There is a widespread assumption, now and in the past, that substances are essentially substances: nothing is actually a substance but possibly a non-substance. | |
From: Cover,J/O'Leary-Hawthorne,J (Substance and Individuation in Leibniz [1999], 1.1.2) | |
A reaction: It seems to me that they clearly mean, in this context, that substances are 'necessarily' substances, not that they are 'essentially' substances. I would just say that substances are essences, and leave the necessity question open. |
13041 | Collections have fixed members, but fusions can be carved in innumerable ways [Potter] |
Full Idea: A collection has a determinate number of members, whereas a fusion may be carved up into parts in various equally valid (although perhaps not equally interesting) ways. | |
From: Michael Potter (Set Theory and Its Philosophy [2004], 02.1) | |
A reaction: This seems to sum up both the attraction and the weakness of mereology. If you doubt the natural identity of so-called 'objects', then maybe classical mereology is the way to go. |
13072 | Modern essences are sets of essential predicate-functions [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
Full Idea: The modern view of essence is that the essence of a particular thing is given by the set of predicate-functions essential to it, and the essence of any kind is given by the set of predicate-functions essential to every possible member of that kind. | |
From: Cover,J/O'Leary-Hawthorne,J (Substance and Individuation in Leibniz [1999], 1.2.2) | |
A reaction: Thus the modern view has elided the meanings of 'essential' and 'necessary' when talking of properties. They are said to be 'functions' from possible worlds to individuals. The old view (and mine) demands real essences, not necessary properties. |
17080 | Modern essentialists express essence as functions from worlds to extensions for predicates [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
Full Idea: The modern essentialist gives the same metaphysical treatment to every grammatical predicate - by associating a function from worlds to extensions for each. | |
From: Cover,J/O'Leary-Hawthorne,J (Substance and Individuation in Leibniz [1999], 2.2) | |
A reaction: I take this to mean that essentialism is the view that if some predicate attaches to an object then that predicate is essential if there is an extension of that predicate in all possible worlds. In English, essential predicates are necessary predicates. |
13101 | Necessity-of-origin won't distinguish ex nihilo creations, or things sharing an origin [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
Full Idea: A necessity-of-origins approach cannot work to distinguish things that come into being genuinely ex nihilo, and cannot work to distinguish things sharing a single origin. | |
From: Cover,J/O'Leary-Hawthorne,J (Substance and Individuation in Leibniz [1999], 7.4.1) | |
A reaction: Since I am deeply suspicious of essentiality or necessity of origin (and they are not, I presume, the same thing) I like these two. Twins have always bothered me with the second case (where order of birth seems irrelevant). |
10709 | Priority is a modality, arising from collections and members [Potter] |
Full Idea: We must conclude that priority is a modality distinct from that of time or necessity, a modality arising in some way out of the manner in which a collection is constituted from its members. | |
From: Michael Potter (Set Theory and Its Philosophy [2004], 03.3) | |
A reaction: He is referring to the 'iterative' view of sets, and cites Aristotle 'Metaphysics' 1019a1-4 as background. |
13081 | Even extreme modal realists might allow transworld identity for abstract objects [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
Full Idea: It might be suggested that even the extreme modal realist can countenance transworld identity for abstract objects. | |
From: Cover,J/O'Leary-Hawthorne,J (Substance and Individuation in Leibniz [1999], 3.2.2 n46) | |
A reaction: This may sound right for uncontroversial or well-defined abstracta such as numbers and circles, but even 'or' is ambiguous, and heaven knows what the transworld identity of 'democracy' is! |
13071 | We can go beyond mere causal explanations if we believe in an 'order of being' [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
Full Idea: The philosopher comfortable with an 'order of being' has richer resources to make sense of the 'in virtue of' relation than that provided only by causal relations between states of affairs, positing in addition other sorts of explanatory relationships. | |
From: Cover,J/O'Leary-Hawthorne,J (Substance and Individuation in Leibniz [1999], 1.1.2) | |
A reaction: This might best be characterised as 'ontological dependence', and could be seen as a non-causal but fundamental explanatory relationship, and not one that has to depend on a theistic world view. |
6175 | External identification doesn't mean external location, as with sunburn [Davidson, by Rowlands] |
Full Idea: Davidson observes that the inference from a thought being identified by a relation to something outside the head does not entail that the thought is not wholly in the head, just as sunburn is identified by external factors, but is still in the skin. | |
From: report of Donald Davidson (Knowing One's Own Mind [1987]) by Mark Rowlands - Externalism Ch.8 | |
A reaction: Rowlands (an externalist) agrees, and this strikes me as correct, and it needs to be one of the fixed points in any assessment of externalism. |