Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Substance and Individuation in Leibniz', 'The Problem of the Essential Indexical' and 'Reflections on Liberty and Social Oppression'

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28 ideas

8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 1. Nature of Relations

13076	Scholastics treat relations as two separate predicates of the relata [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
	Full Idea: The scholastics treated it as a step in the right explanatory direction to analyze a relational statement of the form 'aRb' into two subject-predicate statements, attributing different relational predicates to a and to b.
	From: Cover,J/O'Leary-Hawthorne,J (Substance and Individuation in Leibniz [1999], 2.2.1)
	A reaction: The only alternative seems to be Russell's view of relations as pure universals, having a life of their own, quite apart from their relata. Or you could take them as properties of space, time (and powers?), external to the relata?

9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation

13102	If you individuate things by their origin, you still have to individuate the origins themselves [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
	Full Idea: If we go for the necessity-of-origins view, A and B are different if the origin of A is different from the origin of B. But one is left with the further question 'When is the origin of A distinct from the origin of B?'
	From: Cover,J/O'Leary-Hawthorne,J (Substance and Individuation in Leibniz [1999], 7.4.1)
	A reaction: There may be an answer to this, in a regress of origins that support one another, but in the end the objection is obviously good. You can't begin to refer to an 'origin' if you can't identify anything in the first place.

13103	Numerical difference is a symmetrical notion, unlike proper individuation [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
	Full Idea: Scholastics distinguished criteria of numerical difference from questions of individuation proper, since numerical difference is a symmetrical notion.
	From: Cover,J/O'Leary-Hawthorne,J (Substance and Individuation in Leibniz [1999], 7.4.1)
	A reaction: This apparently old-fashioned point appears to be conclusively correct. Modern thinkers, though, aren't comfortable with proper individuation, because they don't believe in concepts like 'essence' and 'substance' that are needed for the job.

9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / d. Individuation by haecceity

13104	Haecceity as property, or as colourless thisness, or as singleton set [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
	Full Idea: There is a contemporary property construal of haecceities, ...and a Scotistic construal as primitive, 'colourless' thisnesses which, unlike singleton-set haecceities, are aimed to do some explanatory work.
	From: Cover,J/O'Leary-Hawthorne,J (Substance and Individuation in Leibniz [1999], 7.4.4)
	A reaction: [He associates the contemporary account with David Kaplan] I suppose I would say that individuation is done by properties, but not by some single property, so I take it that I don't believe in haecceities at all. What individuates a haecceity?

9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / a. Substance

13100	Maybe 'substance' is more of a mass-noun than a count-noun [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
	Full Idea: We could think of 'substance' on the model of a mass noun, rather than a count noun.
	From: Cover,J/O'Leary-Hawthorne,J (Substance and Individuation in Leibniz [1999], 7.3)
	A reaction: They offer this to help Leibniz out of a mess, but I think he would be appalled. The proposal seems close to 'prime matter' in Aristotle, which never quite does the job required of it. The idea is nice, though, and should be taken seriously.

9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / c. Types of substance

13068	We can ask for the nature of substance, about type of substance, and about individual substances [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
	Full Idea: In the 'blueprint' approach to substance, we confront at least three questions: What is it for a thing to be an individual substance? What is it for a thing to be the kind of substance that it is? What is it to be that very individual substance?
	From: Cover,J/O'Leary-Hawthorne,J (Substance and Individuation in Leibniz [1999], 1.1.1)
	A reaction: My working view is that the answer to the first question is that substance is essence, that the second question is overrated and parasitic on the third, and that the third is the key question, and also reduces to essence.

9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / d. Substance defined

13069	The general assumption is that substances cannot possibly be non-substances [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
	Full Idea: There is a widespread assumption, now and in the past, that substances are essentially substances: nothing is actually a substance but possibly a non-substance.
	From: Cover,J/O'Leary-Hawthorne,J (Substance and Individuation in Leibniz [1999], 1.1.2)
	A reaction: It seems to me that they clearly mean, in this context, that substances are 'necessarily' substances, not that they are 'essentially' substances. I would just say that substances are essences, and leave the necessity question open.

9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / a. Essence as necessary properties

13072	Modern essences are sets of essential predicate-functions [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
	Full Idea: The modern view of essence is that the essence of a particular thing is given by the set of predicate-functions essential to it, and the essence of any kind is given by the set of predicate-functions essential to every possible member of that kind.
	From: Cover,J/O'Leary-Hawthorne,J (Substance and Individuation in Leibniz [1999], 1.2.2)
	A reaction: Thus the modern view has elided the meanings of 'essential' and 'necessary' when talking of properties. They are said to be 'functions' from possible worlds to individuals. The old view (and mine) demands real essences, not necessary properties.

17080	Modern essentialists express essence as functions from worlds to extensions for predicates [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
	Full Idea: The modern essentialist gives the same metaphysical treatment to every grammatical predicate - by associating a function from worlds to extensions for each.
	From: Cover,J/O'Leary-Hawthorne,J (Substance and Individuation in Leibniz [1999], 2.2)
	A reaction: I take this to mean that essentialism is the view that if some predicate attaches to an object then that predicate is essential if there is an extension of that predicate in all possible worlds. In English, essential predicates are necessary predicates.

9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 12. Origin as Essential

13101	Necessity-of-origin won't distinguish ex nihilo creations, or things sharing an origin [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
	Full Idea: A necessity-of-origins approach cannot work to distinguish things that come into being genuinely ex nihilo, and cannot work to distinguish things sharing a single origin.
	From: Cover,J/O'Leary-Hawthorne,J (Substance and Individuation in Leibniz [1999], 7.4.1)
	A reaction: Since I am deeply suspicious of essentiality or necessity of origin (and they are not, I presume, the same thing) I like these two. Twins have always bothered me with the second case (where order of birth seems irrelevant).

10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / a. Transworld identity

13081	Even extreme modal realists might allow transworld identity for abstract objects [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
	Full Idea: It might be suggested that even the extreme modal realist can countenance transworld identity for abstract objects.
	From: Cover,J/O'Leary-Hawthorne,J (Substance and Individuation in Leibniz [1999], 3.2.2 n46)
	A reaction: This may sound right for uncontroversial or well-defined abstracta such as numbers and circles, but even 'or' is ambiguous, and heaven knows what the transworld identity of 'democracy' is!

11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / b. Elements of beliefs

12149	Indexicals are a problem for beliefs being just subject-proposition relations [Perry]
	Full Idea: The essential indexical is a problem for the view that belief is a relation between subjects and propositions conceived as bearers of truth and falsity.
	From: John Perry (The Problem of the Essential Indexical [1979], 'Intro')
	A reaction: My immediate reaction would be that it depends on how you conceive of 'propositions'. If they are objective, you have a problem. I take them to be subjective events in brains, and the indexical meaning to be evident within the proposition.

14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / c. Explanations by coherence

13071	We can go beyond mere causal explanations if we believe in an 'order of being' [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
	Full Idea: The philosopher comfortable with an 'order of being' has richer resources to make sense of the 'in virtue of' relation than that provided only by causal relations between states of affairs, positing in addition other sorts of explanatory relationships.
	From: Cover,J/O'Leary-Hawthorne,J (Substance and Individuation in Leibniz [1999], 1.1.2)
	A reaction: This might best be characterised as 'ontological dependence', and could be seen as a non-causal but fundamental explanatory relationship, and not one that has to depend on a theistic world view.

19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 9. Indexical Semantics

12151	If we replace 'I' in sentences about me, they are different beliefs and explanations of behaviour [Perry]
	Full Idea: If I leave a trail of sugar, and realise 'that I am making a mess', ...when we replace the word 'I' with other designations of me, we no longer have an explanation of my behaviour, or an attribution of the same belief, so it is an 'essential indexical'.
	From: John Perry (The Problem of the Essential Indexical [1979], 'Intro')
	A reaction: [compressed] A famous observation of Perry's, which leads him to challenge traditional accounts of belief and of propositions. I don't think I see a problem, if we have a thoroughly non-linguistic account of essentially unambiguous propositions.

18412	Indexicals individuate certain belief states, helping in explanation and prediction [Perry]
	Full Idea: We use sentences with indexicals or relativized propositions to individuate belief states, for the purposes of classifying believers in ways useful for explanation and prediction.
	From: John Perry (The Problem of the Essential Indexical [1979], 'Obvious')
	A reaction: He goes on to apparently connect this with some sort of moral integrity involved in 'owning up' to the fact that the person in question is you (who has spilled the sugar etc.).

19. Language / D. Propositions / 6. Propositions Critique

12150	Indexicals reveal big problems with the traditional idea of a proposition [Perry]
	Full Idea: The problem of the essential indexical reveals that something is badly wrong with the traditional doctrine of propositions.
	From: John Perry (The Problem of the Essential Indexical [1979], 'Prob')
	A reaction: See the reaction to 12149. The traditional view of propositions, or at least Russell's view, seems to be that they are same as facts, which strikes me as daft. I take propositions to be brain events, probably expressed in mentalese.

23. Ethics / A. Egoism / 1. Ethical Egoism

23865	Morality would improve if people could pursue private interests [Weil]
	Full Idea: The common run of moralists complain that man is moved by his private interest: would to heaven it were so!
	From: Simone Weil (Reflections on Liberty and Social Oppression [1934], p.65)
	A reaction: Her point is that currently people have to sacrifice their own interests to communal activities which offer dubious benefits.

24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 1. Social Power

23866	In oppressive societies the scope of actual control is extended by a religion of power [Weil]
	Full Idea: Every oppressive society is cemented by a religion of power, which falsifies all social relations by enabling the powerful to command over and above what they are able to impose.
	From: Simone Weil (Reflections on Liberty and Social Oppression [1934], p.69)
	A reaction: A rather acute and accurate observation, I think. Flashy cars, grand uniforms, lots of medals, rituals of deference….. Sometimes I like the order and security this brings, but Simone Weil could quickly change my view.

24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 4. Changing the State / a. Centralisation

23871	No central authority can initiate decentralisation [Weil]
	Full Idea: It is quite patently impossible for decentralisation to be initiated by the central authority.
	From: Simone Weil (Reflections on Liberty and Social Oppression [1934], p.113)
	A reaction: This is contradicted by the creation of regional parliaments and mayors, but we see nothing beyond that. A state could crumble into small parts if there were'lots of autonomous regional groups. Easier for weird minorities to take control.

24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 4. Changing the State / c. Revolution

23867	After a bloody revolution the group which already had the power comes to the fore [Weil]
	Full Idea: There is no real break in continuity after a bloody struggle for regime change; for the victory just sanctions forces that before the struggle were the decisive factor in community life, patterns which were replacing those of the declining regime.
	From: Simone Weil (Reflections on Liberty and Social Oppression [1934], p.73)
	A reaction: [from Marx] I assume she has in mind the French Revolution, and perhaps the Russian Revolution, though in the latter the new bourgeois leaders also got swept away. So revolutions are not nearly as dramatic as they appear to be.

24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 2. Anarchism

23870	Decentralisation is only possible by co-operation between strong and weak - which is absurd [Weil]
	Full Idea: The only possibility of salvation would lie in a co-operation between weak and strong, with a view to accomplishing a progressive decentralisation of social life; but the absurdity of such an idea strikes one immediately.
	From: Simone Weil (Reflections on Liberty and Social Oppression [1934], p.113)
	A reaction: I take this to be a judgement on the anarchist ideal, rather than a bit of modest devolution. The UK government set up regional parliaments. She says centralisation is remorseless.

24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / b. Liberal individualism

23863	Only individual people of good will can achieve social progress [Weil]
	Full Idea: The enlightened goodwill of men acting in an individual capacity is the only possible principle of social progress.
	From: Simone Weil (Reflections on Liberty and Social Oppression [1934], p.57)
	A reaction: I identify with this. Virtually every admirable institution in a society can be traced back to the initiative of a few individuals. Every helpful technology was someone's brainwave.

24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / d. Liberal freedom

23869	In the least evil societies people can think, control community life, and be autonomous [Weil]
	Full Idea: The least evil society is that in which the general run of men are most often obliged to think while acting, have the most opportunities for exercising control over collective life as a whole, and enjoy the greatest amount of independence.
	From: Simone Weil (Reflections on Liberty and Social Oppression [1934], p.97)
	A reaction: So Simone Weil was a liberal. How do you stop the most dynamic thinkers, social controllers, and exercisers of their own independence from coming to dominate the others? Only liberal institutions, such as the law and education, can do this.

24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 11. Capitalism

23861	Marx showed that capitalist oppression, because of competition, is unstoppable [Weil]
	Full Idea: Marx gives a first-rate account of the mechanism of capitalist oppression; but so good is it that one finds it hard to visualise how this mechanism could cease to function. …The exploitation is the competitive need to expand as rapidly as possible.
	From: Simone Weil (Reflections on Liberty and Social Oppression [1934], p.39)
	A reaction: [Last bit compressed] This pinpoints the main motivation for desiring to overthrow capitalism. Resistance to that view is presumably the fear that an even worse oppression might replace it.

25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 1. Slavery

23868	The pleasure of completing tasks motivates just as well as the whip of slavery [Weil]
	Full Idea: The sight of the unfinished task attracts the free man as powerfully as the over-seer's whip stimulates the slave.
	From: Simone Weil (Reflections on Liberty and Social Oppression [1934], p.94)
	A reaction: This is Weil's key social idea - that freely performed productive work can be, and should be, a joy, as long as it is accompanied by respect and friendship, rather than oppression. Did this idea ever occur to a slave owner?

25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 4. Economic equality

23864	Inequality could easily be mitigated, if it were not for the struggle for power [Weil]
	Full Idea: Inequality could easily be mitigated by the resistance of the weak and the feeling for justice of the strong, …were it not for the intervention of a further factor, namely, the struggle for power.
	From: Simone Weil (Reflections on Liberty and Social Oppression [1934], p.62)
	A reaction: The implication is that many of 'the strong' are inclined to diminish inequality, but find themselves trapped and unable to do so, because of irresistable capitalist forces. Sounds plausible.

27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / c. Tenses and time

15203	Tense is essential for thought and action [Perry, by Le Poidevin]
	Full Idea: Tense plays a crucial role in thought and action.
	From: report of John Perry (The Problem of the Essential Indexical [1979]) by Robin Le Poidevin - Past, Present and Future of Debate about Tense 3 a
	A reaction: This is important, because much of our metaphysics is dominated by a detached 'scientific' description of reality, which is given a rather passive character. If processes take centre stage, which they should, then our own processes are part of it.

15204	Actual tensed sentences cannot be tenseless, because they can cite their own context [Perry, by Le Poidevin]
	Full Idea: In the new tenseless theory, no tensed token sentence can be equivalent to a tenseless token, because the former, unlike the latter, draws attention to the context in which it is tokened.
	From: report of John Perry (The Problem of the Essential Indexical [1979]) by Robin Le Poidevin - Past, Present and Future of Debate about Tense 3 a
	A reaction: So the problem about indexicals was worrying fans of the tenseless B-series view of time (and so it should). I'm inclined to translate sentences containing indexicals into their actual propositions, which tend to avoid them. 'Time/person of utterance'.