31 ideas
21752 | Prior to Gödel we thought truth in mathematics consisted in provability [Gödel, by Quine] |
Full Idea: Gödel's proof wrought an abrupt turn in the philosophy of mathematics. We had supposed that truth, in mathematics, consisted in provability. | |
From: report of Kurt Gödel (On Formally Undecidable Propositions [1931]) by Willard Quine - Forward to Gödel's Unpublished | |
A reaction: This explains the crisis in the early 1930s, which Tarski's theory appeared to solve. |
17835 | Gödel show that the incompleteness of set theory was a necessity [Gödel, by Hallett,M] |
Full Idea: Gödel's incompleteness results of 1931 show that all axiom systems precise enough to satisfy Hilbert's conception are necessarily incomplete. | |
From: report of Kurt Gödel (On Formally Undecidable Propositions [1931]) by Michael Hallett - Introduction to Zermelo's 1930 paper p.1215 | |
A reaction: [Hallett italicises 'necessarily'] Hilbert axioms have to be recursive - that is, everything in the system must track back to them. |
17886 | The limitations of axiomatisation were revealed by the incompleteness theorems [Gödel, by Koellner] |
Full Idea: The inherent limitations of the axiomatic method were first brought to light by the incompleteness theorems. | |
From: report of Kurt Gödel (On Formally Undecidable Propositions [1931]) by Peter Koellner - On the Question of Absolute Undecidability 1.1 |
10071 | Second Incompleteness: nice theories can't prove their own consistency [Gödel, by Smith,P] |
Full Idea: Second Incompleteness Theorem: roughly, nice theories that include enough basic arithmetic can't prove their own consistency. | |
From: report of Kurt Gödel (On Formally Undecidable Propositions [1931]) by Peter Smith - Intro to Gödel's Theorems 1.5 | |
A reaction: On the face of it, this sounds less surprising than the First Theorem. Philosophers have often noticed that it seems unlikely that you could use reason to prove reason, as when Descartes just relies on 'clear and distinct ideas'. |
19123 | If soundness can't be proved internally, 'reflection principles' can be added to assert soundness [Gödel, by Halbach/Leigh] |
Full Idea: Gödel showed PA cannot be proved consistent from with PA. But 'reflection principles' can be added, which are axioms partially expressing the soundness of PA, by asserting what is provable. A Global Reflection Principle asserts full soundness. | |
From: report of Kurt Gödel (On Formally Undecidable Propositions [1931]) by Halbach,V/Leigh,G.E. - Axiomatic Theories of Truth (2013 ver) 1.2 | |
A reaction: The authors point out that this needs a truth predicate within the language, so disquotational truth won't do, and there is a motivation for an axiomatic theory of truth. |
17888 | The undecidable sentence can be decided at a 'higher' level in the system [Gödel] |
Full Idea: My undecidable arithmetical sentence ...is not at all absolutely undecidable; rather, one can always pass to 'higher' systems in which the sentence in question is decidable. | |
From: Kurt Gödel (On Formally Undecidable Propositions [1931]), quoted by Peter Koellner - On the Question of Absolute Undecidability 1.1 | |
A reaction: [a 1931 MS] He says the reals are 'higher' than the naturals, and the axioms of set theory are higher still. The addition of a truth predicate is part of what makes the sentence become decidable. |
10621 | Gödel's First Theorem sabotages logicism, and the Second sabotages Hilbert's Programme [Smith,P on Gödel] |
Full Idea: Where Gödel's First Theorem sabotages logicist ambitions, the Second Theorem sabotages Hilbert's Programme. | |
From: comment on Kurt Gödel (On Formally Undecidable Propositions [1931]) by Peter Smith - Intro to Gödel's Theorems 36 | |
A reaction: Neo-logicism (Crispin Wright etc.) has a strategy for evading the First Theorem. |
10132 | There can be no single consistent theory from which all mathematical truths can be derived [Gödel, by George/Velleman] |
Full Idea: Gödel's far-reaching work on the nature of logic and formal systems reveals that there can be no single consistent theory from which all mathematical truths can be derived. | |
From: report of Kurt Gödel (On Formally Undecidable Propositions [1931]) by A.George / D.J.Velleman - Philosophies of Mathematics Ch.8 |
10072 | First Incompleteness: arithmetic must always be incomplete [Gödel, by Smith,P] |
Full Idea: First Incompleteness Theorem: any properly axiomatised and consistent theory of basic arithmetic must remain incomplete, whatever our efforts to complete it by throwing further axioms into the mix. | |
From: report of Kurt Gödel (On Formally Undecidable Propositions [1931]) by Peter Smith - Intro to Gödel's Theorems 1.2 | |
A reaction: This is because it is always possible to formulate a well-formed sentence which is not provable within the theory. |
3198 | Gödel showed that arithmetic is either incomplete or inconsistent [Gödel, by Rey] |
Full Idea: Gödel's theorem states that either arithmetic is incomplete, or it is inconsistent. | |
From: report of Kurt Gödel (On Formally Undecidable Propositions [1931]) by Georges Rey - Contemporary Philosophy of Mind 8.7 |
9590 | Arithmetical truth cannot be fully and formally derived from axioms and inference rules [Gödel, by Nagel/Newman] |
Full Idea: The vast continent of arithmetical truth cannot be brought into systematic order by laying down a fixed set of axioms and rules of inference from which every true mathematical statement can be formally derived. For some this was a shocking revelation. | |
From: report of Kurt Gödel (On Formally Undecidable Propositions [1931]) by E Nagel / JR Newman - Gödel's Proof VII.C | |
A reaction: Good news for philosophy, I'd say. The truth cannot be worked out by mechanical procedures, so it needs the subtle and intuitive intelligence of your proper philosopher (Parmenides is the role model) to actually understand reality. |
11069 | Gödel's Second says that semantic consequence outruns provability [Gödel, by Hanna] |
Full Idea: Gödel's Second Incompleteness Theorem says that true unprovable sentences are clearly semantic consequences of the axioms in the sense that they are necessarily true if the axioms are true. So semantic consequence outruns provability. | |
From: report of Kurt Gödel (On Formally Undecidable Propositions [1931]) by Robert Hanna - Rationality and Logic 5.3 |
10118 | First Incompleteness: a decent consistent system is syntactically incomplete [Gödel, by George/Velleman] |
Full Idea: First Incompleteness Theorem: If S is a sufficiently powerful formal system, then if S is consistent then S is syntactically incomplete. | |
From: report of Kurt Gödel (On Formally Undecidable Propositions [1931]) by A.George / D.J.Velleman - Philosophies of Mathematics Ch.6 | |
A reaction: Gödel found a single sentence, effectively saying 'I am unprovable in S', which is neither provable nor refutable in S. |
10122 | Second Incompleteness: a decent consistent system can't prove its own consistency [Gödel, by George/Velleman] |
Full Idea: Second Incompleteness Theorem: If S is a sufficiently powerful formal system, then if S is consistent then S cannot prove its own consistency | |
From: report of Kurt Gödel (On Formally Undecidable Propositions [1931]) by A.George / D.J.Velleman - Philosophies of Mathematics Ch.6 | |
A reaction: This seems much less surprising than the First Theorem (though it derives from it). It was always kind of obvious that you couldn't use reason to prove that reason works (see, for example, the Cartesian Circle). |
10611 | There is a sentence which a theory can show is true iff it is unprovable [Gödel, by Smith,P] |
Full Idea: The original Gödel construction gives us a sentence that a theory shows is true if and only if it satisfies the condition of being unprovable-in-that-theory. | |
From: report of Kurt Gödel (On Formally Undecidable Propositions [1931]) by Peter Smith - Intro to Gödel's Theorems 20.5 |
10867 | 'This system can't prove this statement' makes it unprovable either way [Gödel, by Clegg] |
Full Idea: An approximation of Gödel's Theorem imagines a statement 'This system of mathematics can't prove this statement true'. If the system proves the statement, then it can't prove it. If the statement can't prove the statement, clearly it still can't prove it. | |
From: report of Kurt Gödel (On Formally Undecidable Propositions [1931]) by Brian Clegg - Infinity: Quest to Think the Unthinkable Ch.15 | |
A reaction: Gödel's contribution to this simple idea seems to be a demonstration that formal arithmetic is capable of expressing such a statement. |
8747 | Realists are happy with impredicative definitions, which describe entities in terms of other existing entities [Gödel, by Shapiro] |
Full Idea: Gödel defended impredicative definitions on grounds of ontological realism. From that perspective, an impredicative definition is a description of an existing entity with reference to other existing entities. | |
From: report of Kurt Gödel (On Formally Undecidable Propositions [1931]) by Stewart Shapiro - Thinking About Mathematics 5.3 | |
A reaction: This is why constructivists must be absolutely precise about definition, where realists only have to do their best. Compare building a car with painting a landscape. |
13076 | Scholastics treat relations as two separate predicates of the relata [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
Full Idea: The scholastics treated it as a step in the right explanatory direction to analyze a relational statement of the form 'aRb' into two subject-predicate statements, attributing different relational predicates to a and to b. | |
From: Cover,J/O'Leary-Hawthorne,J (Substance and Individuation in Leibniz [1999], 2.2.1) | |
A reaction: The only alternative seems to be Russell's view of relations as pure universals, having a life of their own, quite apart from their relata. Or you could take them as properties of space, time (and powers?), external to the relata? |
13102 | If you individuate things by their origin, you still have to individuate the origins themselves [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
Full Idea: If we go for the necessity-of-origins view, A and B are different if the origin of A is different from the origin of B. But one is left with the further question 'When is the origin of A distinct from the origin of B?' | |
From: Cover,J/O'Leary-Hawthorne,J (Substance and Individuation in Leibniz [1999], 7.4.1) | |
A reaction: There may be an answer to this, in a regress of origins that support one another, but in the end the objection is obviously good. You can't begin to refer to an 'origin' if you can't identify anything in the first place. |
13103 | Numerical difference is a symmetrical notion, unlike proper individuation [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
Full Idea: Scholastics distinguished criteria of numerical difference from questions of individuation proper, since numerical difference is a symmetrical notion. | |
From: Cover,J/O'Leary-Hawthorne,J (Substance and Individuation in Leibniz [1999], 7.4.1) | |
A reaction: This apparently old-fashioned point appears to be conclusively correct. Modern thinkers, though, aren't comfortable with proper individuation, because they don't believe in concepts like 'essence' and 'substance' that are needed for the job. |
13104 | Haecceity as property, or as colourless thisness, or as singleton set [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
Full Idea: There is a contemporary property construal of haecceities, ...and a Scotistic construal as primitive, 'colourless' thisnesses which, unlike singleton-set haecceities, are aimed to do some explanatory work. | |
From: Cover,J/O'Leary-Hawthorne,J (Substance and Individuation in Leibniz [1999], 7.4.4) | |
A reaction: [He associates the contemporary account with David Kaplan] I suppose I would say that individuation is done by properties, but not by some single property, so I take it that I don't believe in haecceities at all. What individuates a haecceity? |
13100 | Maybe 'substance' is more of a mass-noun than a count-noun [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
Full Idea: We could think of 'substance' on the model of a mass noun, rather than a count noun. | |
From: Cover,J/O'Leary-Hawthorne,J (Substance and Individuation in Leibniz [1999], 7.3) | |
A reaction: They offer this to help Leibniz out of a mess, but I think he would be appalled. The proposal seems close to 'prime matter' in Aristotle, which never quite does the job required of it. The idea is nice, though, and should be taken seriously. |
13068 | We can ask for the nature of substance, about type of substance, and about individual substances [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
Full Idea: In the 'blueprint' approach to substance, we confront at least three questions: What is it for a thing to be an individual substance? What is it for a thing to be the kind of substance that it is? What is it to be that very individual substance? | |
From: Cover,J/O'Leary-Hawthorne,J (Substance and Individuation in Leibniz [1999], 1.1.1) | |
A reaction: My working view is that the answer to the first question is that substance is essence, that the second question is overrated and parasitic on the third, and that the third is the key question, and also reduces to essence. |
13069 | The general assumption is that substances cannot possibly be non-substances [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
Full Idea: There is a widespread assumption, now and in the past, that substances are essentially substances: nothing is actually a substance but possibly a non-substance. | |
From: Cover,J/O'Leary-Hawthorne,J (Substance and Individuation in Leibniz [1999], 1.1.2) | |
A reaction: It seems to me that they clearly mean, in this context, that substances are 'necessarily' substances, not that they are 'essentially' substances. I would just say that substances are essences, and leave the necessity question open. |
13072 | Modern essences are sets of essential predicate-functions [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
Full Idea: The modern view of essence is that the essence of a particular thing is given by the set of predicate-functions essential to it, and the essence of any kind is given by the set of predicate-functions essential to every possible member of that kind. | |
From: Cover,J/O'Leary-Hawthorne,J (Substance and Individuation in Leibniz [1999], 1.2.2) | |
A reaction: Thus the modern view has elided the meanings of 'essential' and 'necessary' when talking of properties. They are said to be 'functions' from possible worlds to individuals. The old view (and mine) demands real essences, not necessary properties. |
17080 | Modern essentialists express essence as functions from worlds to extensions for predicates [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
Full Idea: The modern essentialist gives the same metaphysical treatment to every grammatical predicate - by associating a function from worlds to extensions for each. | |
From: Cover,J/O'Leary-Hawthorne,J (Substance and Individuation in Leibniz [1999], 2.2) | |
A reaction: I take this to mean that essentialism is the view that if some predicate attaches to an object then that predicate is essential if there is an extension of that predicate in all possible worlds. In English, essential predicates are necessary predicates. |
13101 | Necessity-of-origin won't distinguish ex nihilo creations, or things sharing an origin [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
Full Idea: A necessity-of-origins approach cannot work to distinguish things that come into being genuinely ex nihilo, and cannot work to distinguish things sharing a single origin. | |
From: Cover,J/O'Leary-Hawthorne,J (Substance and Individuation in Leibniz [1999], 7.4.1) | |
A reaction: Since I am deeply suspicious of essentiality or necessity of origin (and they are not, I presume, the same thing) I like these two. Twins have always bothered me with the second case (where order of birth seems irrelevant). |
13081 | Even extreme modal realists might allow transworld identity for abstract objects [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
Full Idea: It might be suggested that even the extreme modal realist can countenance transworld identity for abstract objects. | |
From: Cover,J/O'Leary-Hawthorne,J (Substance and Individuation in Leibniz [1999], 3.2.2 n46) | |
A reaction: This may sound right for uncontroversial or well-defined abstracta such as numbers and circles, but even 'or' is ambiguous, and heaven knows what the transworld identity of 'democracy' is! |
13071 | We can go beyond mere causal explanations if we believe in an 'order of being' [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
Full Idea: The philosopher comfortable with an 'order of being' has richer resources to make sense of the 'in virtue of' relation than that provided only by causal relations between states of affairs, positing in addition other sorts of explanatory relationships. | |
From: Cover,J/O'Leary-Hawthorne,J (Substance and Individuation in Leibniz [1999], 1.1.2) | |
A reaction: This might best be characterised as 'ontological dependence', and could be seen as a non-causal but fundamental explanatory relationship, and not one that has to depend on a theistic world view. |
3192 | Basic logic can be done by syntax, with no semantics [Gödel, by Rey] |
Full Idea: Gödel in his completeness theorem for first-order logic showed that a certain set of syntactically specifiable rules was adequate to capture all first-order valid arguments. No semantics (e.g. reference, truth, validity) was necessary. | |
From: report of Kurt Gödel (On Formally Undecidable Propositions [1931]) by Georges Rey - Contemporary Philosophy of Mind 8.2 | |
A reaction: This implies that a logic machine is possible, but we shouldn't raise our hopes for proper rationality. Validity can be shown for purely algebraic arguments, but rationality requires truth as well as validity, and that needs propositions and semantics. |
23834 | Friendship is partly universal - the love of a person is like the ideal of loving everyone [Weil] |
Full Idea: Friendship has something universal about it. It consists in loving a human being as we should like to be able to love each soul in particular of all those who go to make up the human race. | |
From: Simone Weil (Friendship [1940], p.288) | |
A reaction: Hm. Would you like your lover to dream of loving the human race, rather than just loving you? Perhaps only a Christian could see friendship in this way? |