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All the ideas for 'Substance and Individuation in Leibniz', 'Equality and Partiality' and 'Aristotle on Matter'

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25 ideas

2. Reason / D. Definition / 4. Real Definition
12302 Definitions formed an abstract hierarchy for Aristotle, as sets do for us [Fine,K]
     Full Idea: For us it is sets which constitute the most natural example of a hierarchical structure within the abstract realm; but for Aristotle it would have been definitions, via their natural division into genus and differentia.
     From: Kit Fine (Aristotle on Matter [1992], §1 n4)
     A reaction: I suppose everyone who thinks about reality in abstraction ends up with a hierarchy. Compare the hierarchy of angelic hosts, or Greek gods. Could we get back to the Aristotelian view, instead of sets, which are out of control at the top end?
2. Reason / D. Definition / 5. Genus and Differentia
14266 Aristotle sees hierarchies in definitions using genus and differentia (as we see them in sets) [Fine,K]
     Full Idea: For us, sets constitute the most natural example of a hierarchical structure within the abstract realm. But for Aristotle it would have been definitions, via their natural division into genus and differentia.
     From: Kit Fine (Aristotle on Matter [1992], 1 n4)
     A reaction: Genus and differentia are only part of the story in Aristotle, and this remarks strikes me as perceptive. It is precisely the mapping of the explanatory hierarchy which Aristotle seeks in a good definition.
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / c. Grounding and explanation
14268 Maybe bottom-up grounding shows constitution, and top-down grounding shows essence [Fine,K]
     Full Idea: It may be that the two forms of grounding have a different source; the one from the bottom up is required for the constitution of the thing to be intelligible; the one from the top down is required for the essence of the thing to be intelligible.
     From: Kit Fine (Aristotle on Matter [1992], 2)
     A reaction: [He cites Aristotle Met. 1019a8-10 in support] Close reading of Fine would be needed to elucidate this properly, but it is a suggestive line of thought about how we should approach grounding.
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 1. Nature of Relations
13076 Scholastics treat relations as two separate predicates of the relata [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
     Full Idea: The scholastics treated it as a step in the right explanatory direction to analyze a relational statement of the form 'aRb' into two subject-predicate statements, attributing different relational predicates to a and to b.
     From: Cover,J/O'Leary-Hawthorne,J (Substance and Individuation in Leibniz [1999], 2.2.1)
     A reaction: The only alternative seems to be Russell's view of relations as pure universals, having a life of their own, quite apart from their relata. Or you could take them as properties of space, time (and powers?), external to the relata?
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
13102 If you individuate things by their origin, you still have to individuate the origins themselves [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
     Full Idea: If we go for the necessity-of-origins view, A and B are different if the origin of A is different from the origin of B. But one is left with the further question 'When is the origin of A distinct from the origin of B?'
     From: Cover,J/O'Leary-Hawthorne,J (Substance and Individuation in Leibniz [1999], 7.4.1)
     A reaction: There may be an answer to this, in a regress of origins that support one another, but in the end the objection is obviously good. You can't begin to refer to an 'origin' if you can't identify anything in the first place.
13103 Numerical difference is a symmetrical notion, unlike proper individuation [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
     Full Idea: Scholastics distinguished criteria of numerical difference from questions of individuation proper, since numerical difference is a symmetrical notion.
     From: Cover,J/O'Leary-Hawthorne,J (Substance and Individuation in Leibniz [1999], 7.4.1)
     A reaction: This apparently old-fashioned point appears to be conclusively correct. Modern thinkers, though, aren't comfortable with proper individuation, because they don't believe in concepts like 'essence' and 'substance' that are needed for the job.
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / d. Individuation by haecceity
13104 Haecceity as property, or as colourless thisness, or as singleton set [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
     Full Idea: There is a contemporary property construal of haecceities, ...and a Scotistic construal as primitive, 'colourless' thisnesses which, unlike singleton-set haecceities, are aimed to do some explanatory work.
     From: Cover,J/O'Leary-Hawthorne,J (Substance and Individuation in Leibniz [1999], 7.4.4)
     A reaction: [He associates the contemporary account with David Kaplan] I suppose I would say that individuation is done by properties, but not by some single property, so I take it that I don't believe in haecceities at all. What individuates a haecceity?
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / a. Substance
13100 Maybe 'substance' is more of a mass-noun than a count-noun [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
     Full Idea: We could think of 'substance' on the model of a mass noun, rather than a count noun.
     From: Cover,J/O'Leary-Hawthorne,J (Substance and Individuation in Leibniz [1999], 7.3)
     A reaction: They offer this to help Leibniz out of a mess, but I think he would be appalled. The proposal seems close to 'prime matter' in Aristotle, which never quite does the job required of it. The idea is nice, though, and should be taken seriously.
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / c. Types of substance
13068 We can ask for the nature of substance, about type of substance, and about individual substances [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
     Full Idea: In the 'blueprint' approach to substance, we confront at least three questions: What is it for a thing to be an individual substance? What is it for a thing to be the kind of substance that it is? What is it to be that very individual substance?
     From: Cover,J/O'Leary-Hawthorne,J (Substance and Individuation in Leibniz [1999], 1.1.1)
     A reaction: My working view is that the answer to the first question is that substance is essence, that the second question is overrated and parasitic on the third, and that the third is the key question, and also reduces to essence.
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / d. Substance defined
13069 The general assumption is that substances cannot possibly be non-substances [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
     Full Idea: There is a widespread assumption, now and in the past, that substances are essentially substances: nothing is actually a substance but possibly a non-substance.
     From: Cover,J/O'Leary-Hawthorne,J (Substance and Individuation in Leibniz [1999], 1.1.2)
     A reaction: It seems to me that they clearly mean, in this context, that substances are 'necessarily' substances, not that they are 'essentially' substances. I would just say that substances are essences, and leave the necessity question open.
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 6. Constitution of an Object
14267 There is no distinctive idea of constitution, because you can't say constitution begins and ends [Fine,K]
     Full Idea: If the parts of a body can constitute a man, then why should men not constitute a family? Why draw the line at the level of the man? ...Thus the idea of a distinctive notion of constitution, terminating in concrete substances, should be given up.
     From: Kit Fine (Aristotle on Matter [1992], 1)
     A reaction: This is in the context of Aristotle, but Fine's view seems to apply to Rudder Baker's distinctive approach.
14264 Is there a plausible Aristotelian notion of constitution, applicable to both physical and non-physical? [Fine,K]
     Full Idea: There is a question of whether there is a viable conception of constitution of the sort Aristotle supposes, one which is uniformly applicable to physical and non-physical objects alike, and which is capable of hierarchical application.
     From: Kit Fine (Aristotle on Matter [1992], 1)
     A reaction: This is part of an explication of Aristotle's 'matter' [hule], which might be better translated as 'ingredients', which would fit non-physical things quite well.
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / a. Essence as necessary properties
13072 Modern essences are sets of essential predicate-functions [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
     Full Idea: The modern view of essence is that the essence of a particular thing is given by the set of predicate-functions essential to it, and the essence of any kind is given by the set of predicate-functions essential to every possible member of that kind.
     From: Cover,J/O'Leary-Hawthorne,J (Substance and Individuation in Leibniz [1999], 1.2.2)
     A reaction: Thus the modern view has elided the meanings of 'essential' and 'necessary' when talking of properties. They are said to be 'functions' from possible worlds to individuals. The old view (and mine) demands real essences, not necessary properties.
17080 Modern essentialists express essence as functions from worlds to extensions for predicates [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
     Full Idea: The modern essentialist gives the same metaphysical treatment to every grammatical predicate - by associating a function from worlds to extensions for each.
     From: Cover,J/O'Leary-Hawthorne,J (Substance and Individuation in Leibniz [1999], 2.2)
     A reaction: I take this to mean that essentialism is the view that if some predicate attaches to an object then that predicate is essential if there is an extension of that predicate in all possible worlds. In English, essential predicates are necessary predicates.
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 12. Origin as Essential
13101 Necessity-of-origin won't distinguish ex nihilo creations, or things sharing an origin [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
     Full Idea: A necessity-of-origins approach cannot work to distinguish things that come into being genuinely ex nihilo, and cannot work to distinguish things sharing a single origin.
     From: Cover,J/O'Leary-Hawthorne,J (Substance and Individuation in Leibniz [1999], 7.4.1)
     A reaction: Since I am deeply suspicious of essentiality or necessity of origin (and they are not, I presume, the same thing) I like these two. Twins have always bothered me with the second case (where order of birth seems irrelevant).
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / a. Transworld identity
13081 Even extreme modal realists might allow transworld identity for abstract objects [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
     Full Idea: It might be suggested that even the extreme modal realist can countenance transworld identity for abstract objects.
     From: Cover,J/O'Leary-Hawthorne,J (Substance and Individuation in Leibniz [1999], 3.2.2 n46)
     A reaction: This may sound right for uncontroversial or well-defined abstracta such as numbers and circles, but even 'or' is ambiguous, and heaven knows what the transworld identity of 'democracy' is!
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / c. Explanations by coherence
13071 We can go beyond mere causal explanations if we believe in an 'order of being' [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
     Full Idea: The philosopher comfortable with an 'order of being' has richer resources to make sense of the 'in virtue of' relation than that provided only by causal relations between states of affairs, positing in addition other sorts of explanatory relationships.
     From: Cover,J/O'Leary-Hawthorne,J (Substance and Individuation in Leibniz [1999], 1.1.2)
     A reaction: This might best be characterised as 'ontological dependence', and could be seen as a non-causal but fundamental explanatory relationship, and not one that has to depend on a theistic world view.
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 5. Action Dilemmas / c. Omissions
6479 Noninterference requires justification as much as interference does [Nagel]
     Full Idea: Noninterference requires justification as much as interference does.
     From: Thomas Nagel (Equality and Partiality [1991], Ch.10)
     A reaction: I'm not convinced by this, as a simple rule. If I spend my whole life doing just the minimum for my own survival, I don't see why I should have to justify that, and I don't see a state is obliged to justify it either.
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / a. Preconditions for ethics
6450 Morality must be motivating, and not because of pre-moral motives [Nagel]
     Full Idea: My own view is that moral justification must be capable of motivating, but not in virtue of reliance on pre-moral motives.
     From: Thomas Nagel (Equality and Partiality [1991], Ch.5)
     A reaction: This may well be the core and essence of Kantian moral theory. I'm inclined to think of it as 'Kant's dream', which is of ultra-rational beings who are driven by pure rationality as a motivator. People who fit this bill tend to be academics.
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 6. Game Theory
6447 Game theory misses out the motivation arising from the impersonal standpoint [Nagel]
     Full Idea: I do not favour the route taken by Hobbes's modern descendants, using game theory, since I believe the impersonal standpoint makes an essential contribution to individual motivation which must be addressed by any ethically acceptable theory.
     From: Thomas Nagel (Equality and Partiality [1991], Ch.4)
     A reaction: The assumption of self-seeking at the core of game theory seems very bizarre, and leads to moral approval of free riders. Nagel offers the best response, which is the Kantian impersonal view. Nagel may be optimistic about motivation, though.
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 3. Universalisability
6446 In ethics we abstract from our identity, but not from our humanity [Nagel]
     Full Idea: In pursuit of the kind of objectivity needed in the physical sciences, we abstract even from our humanity; but nothing further than abstraction from our identity (that is, who we are) enters into ethical theory.
     From: Thomas Nagel (Equality and Partiality [1991], Ch.2)
     A reaction: The 'brief' summary of this boils down to a nice and interesting slogan. It epitomises the modern Kantian approach to ethics. But compare Idea 4122, from Bernard Williams.
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 4. Categorical Imperative
6477 I can only universalise a maxim if everyone else could also universalise it [Nagel]
     Full Idea: It is implicit in the categorical imperative that I can will that everyone should adopt as a maxim only what everyone else can also will that everyone should adopt as a maxim.
     From: Thomas Nagel (Equality and Partiality [1991], Ch.5)
     A reaction: This is a nice move, because it shifts the theory away from a highly individualistic Cartesian view of morality towards the idea that morality is a community activity.
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / c. Liberal equality
6448 A legitimate system is one accepted as both impartial and reasonably partial [Nagel]
     Full Idea: A legitimate system is one which reconciles the two universal principles of impartiality and reasonable partiality so that no one can object that his interests are not being accorded sufficient weight or that the demands on him are excessive.
     From: Thomas Nagel (Equality and Partiality [1991], Ch.4)
     A reaction: This seems an appealing principle, and a nice attempt at stating the core of Kantian liberalism. It is obviously influenced by Scanlon's contractualist view, in the idea that 'no one can object', because everyone sees the justification.
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 2. Political equality
6478 Democracy is opposed to equality, if the poor are not a majority [Nagel]
     Full Idea: As things are, democracy is the enemy of comprehensive equality, once the poor cease to be a majority.
     From: Thomas Nagel (Equality and Partiality [1991], Ch.9)
     A reaction: This is obvious once you think about it, but it is well worth saying, because it is tempting to think that we live in an 'equal' society, merely because we are equal in things such as voting rights and equality before the law.
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / a. Greek matter
14265 The components of abstract definitions could play the same role as matter for physical objects [Fine,K]
     Full Idea: If one considers Aristotle's standard example of a definition, then it is plausible that its defining terms ('plane figure' in the case of a circle) should be constitutive of it in the same general way as physical matter constitutes something physical.
     From: Kit Fine (Aristotle on Matter [1992], 1)
     A reaction: It strikes me that an appropriate translation for the Greek 'hule' might be the English 'ingredients', since Fine seems to be right about the broad application of hule in Aristotle.