26 ideas
10775 | The axiom of choice now seems acceptable and obvious (if it is meaningful) [Tharp] |
Full Idea: The main objection to the axiom of choice was that it had to be given by some law or definition, but since sets are arbitrary this seems irrelevant. Formalists consider it meaningless, but set-theorists consider it as true, and practically obvious. | |
From: Leslie H. Tharp (Which Logic is the Right Logic? [1975], §3) |
10766 | Logic is either for demonstration, or for characterizing structures [Tharp] |
Full Idea: One can distinguish at least two quite different senses of logic: as an instrument of demonstration, and perhaps as an instrument for the characterization of structures. | |
From: Leslie H. Tharp (Which Logic is the Right Logic? [1975], §2) | |
A reaction: This is trying to capture the proof-theory and semantic aspects, but merely 'characterizing' something sounds like a rather feeble aspiration for the semantic side of things. Isn't it to do with truth, rather than just rule-following? |
10767 | Elementary logic is complete, but cannot capture mathematics [Tharp] |
Full Idea: Elementary logic cannot characterize the usual mathematical structures, but seems to be distinguished by its completeness. | |
From: Leslie H. Tharp (Which Logic is the Right Logic? [1975], §2) |
10769 | Second-order logic isn't provable, but will express set-theory and classic problems [Tharp] |
Full Idea: The expressive power of second-order logic is too great to admit a proof procedure, but is adequate to express set-theoretical statements, and open questions such as the continuum hypothesis or the existence of big cardinals are easily stated. | |
From: Leslie H. Tharp (Which Logic is the Right Logic? [1975], §2) |
10762 | In sentential logic there is a simple proof that all truth functions can be reduced to 'not' and 'and' [Tharp] |
Full Idea: In sentential logic there is a simple proof that all truth functions, of any number of arguments, are definable from (say) 'not' and 'and'. | |
From: Leslie H. Tharp (Which Logic is the Right Logic? [1975], §0) | |
A reaction: The point of 'say' is that it can be got down to two connectives, and these are just the usual preferred pair. |
10776 | The main quantifiers extend 'and' and 'or' to infinite domains [Tharp] |
Full Idea: The symbols ∀ and ∃ may, to start with, be regarded as extrapolations of the truth functional connectives ∧ ('and') and ∨ ('or') to infinite domains. | |
From: Leslie H. Tharp (Which Logic is the Right Logic? [1975], §5) |
10774 | There are at least five unorthodox quantifiers that could be used [Tharp] |
Full Idea: One might add to one's logic an 'uncountable quantifier', or a 'Chang quantifier', or a 'two-argument quantifier', or 'Shelah's quantifier', or 'branching quantifiers'. | |
From: Leslie H. Tharp (Which Logic is the Right Logic? [1975], §3) | |
A reaction: [compressed - just listed for reference, if you collect quantifiers, like collecting butterflies] |
10777 | Skolem mistakenly inferred that Cantor's conceptions were illusory [Tharp] |
Full Idea: Skolem deduced from the Löwenheim-Skolem theorem that 'the absolutist conceptions of Cantor's theory' are 'illusory'. I think it is clear that this conclusion would not follow even if elementary logic were in some sense the true logic, as Skolem assumed. | |
From: Leslie H. Tharp (Which Logic is the Right Logic? [1975], §7) | |
A reaction: [Tharp cites Skolem 1962 p.47] Kit Fine refers to accepters of this scepticism about the arithmetic of infinities as 'Skolemites'. |
10773 | The Löwenheim-Skolem property is a limitation (e.g. can't say there are uncountably many reals) [Tharp] |
Full Idea: The Löwenheim-Skolem property seems to be undesirable, in that it states a limitation concerning the distinctions the logic is capable of making, such as saying there are uncountably many reals ('Skolem's Paradox'). | |
From: Leslie H. Tharp (Which Logic is the Right Logic? [1975], §2) |
10765 | Soundness would seem to be an essential requirement of a proof procedure [Tharp] |
Full Idea: Soundness would seem to be an essential requirement of a proof procedure, since there is little point in proving formulas which may turn out to be false under some interpretation. | |
From: Leslie H. Tharp (Which Logic is the Right Logic? [1975], §2) |
10763 | Completeness and compactness together give axiomatizability [Tharp] |
Full Idea: Putting completeness and compactness together, one has axiomatizability. | |
From: Leslie H. Tharp (Which Logic is the Right Logic? [1975], §1) |
10770 | If completeness fails there is no algorithm to list the valid formulas [Tharp] |
Full Idea: In general, if completeness fails there is no algorithm to list the valid formulas. | |
From: Leslie H. Tharp (Which Logic is the Right Logic? [1975], §2) | |
A reaction: I.e. the theory is not effectively enumerable. |
10771 | Compactness is important for major theories which have infinitely many axioms [Tharp] |
Full Idea: It is strange that compactness is often ignored in discussions of philosophy of logic, since the most important theories have infinitely many axioms. | |
From: Leslie H. Tharp (Which Logic is the Right Logic? [1975], §2) | |
A reaction: An example of infinite axioms is the induction schema in first-order Peano Arithmetic. |
10772 | Compactness blocks infinite expansion, and admits non-standard models [Tharp] |
Full Idea: The compactness condition seems to state some weakness of the logic (as if it were futile to add infinitely many hypotheses). To look at it another way, formalizations of (say) arithmetic will admit of non-standard models. | |
From: Leslie H. Tharp (Which Logic is the Right Logic? [1975], §2) |
10764 | A complete logic has an effective enumeration of the valid formulas [Tharp] |
Full Idea: A complete logic has an effective enumeration of the valid formulas. | |
From: Leslie H. Tharp (Which Logic is the Right Logic? [1975], §2) |
10768 | Effective enumeration might be proved but not specified, so it won't guarantee knowledge [Tharp] |
Full Idea: Despite completeness, the mere existence of an effective enumeration of the valid formulas will not, by itself, provide knowledge. For example, one might be able to prove that there is an effective enumeration, without being able to specify one. | |
From: Leslie H. Tharp (Which Logic is the Right Logic? [1975], §2) | |
A reaction: The point is that completeness is supposed to ensure knowledge (of what is valid but unprovable), and completeness entails effective enumerability, but more than the latter is needed to do the key job. |
5953 | For the Cyrenaics experience was not enough to give certainty about reality [Aristippus young, by Plutarch] |
Full Idea: The Cyrenaics, placing all experience within themselves, thought such evidence was insufficient warrant for certainty about reality, and withdrew as in a siege from the world, admitting that objects 'appear', but refusing to pronounce the word 'are'. | |
From: report of Aristippus the younger (fragments/reports [c.335 BCE]) by Plutarch - 74: Reply to Colotes §1120 | |
A reaction: This seems to be the most extreme position found in ancient thought. It accompanies their extreme hedonism, based on the reality of experience and lack of interest in anything external. A bit daft, really. |
3023 | Even the foolish may have some virtues [Aristippus young, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: The Cyrenaics say that some of the virtues may exist even in the foolish. | |
From: report of Aristippus the younger (fragments/reports [c.335 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 02.7.8 |
3026 | Actions are influenced by circumstances, so Cyrenaics say felons should be reformed, not hated [Aristippus young, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Cyrenaics say errors should be pardoned, because men do not err intentionally but are influenced by circumstances; one should not hate a person, but only teach him better. | |
From: report of Aristippus the younger (fragments/reports [c.335 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 02.7.9 | |
A reaction: A very appealing suggestion, and rather wonderful for its time. There is still implied agreement about what is 'error', and what counts as 'better'. |
3024 | Cyrenaics teach that honour, justice and shame are all based on custom and fashion [Aristippus young, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: The Cyrenaics taught that there was nothing naturally and intrinsically just, or honourable, or disgraceful; but that things were considered so because of law and fashion. | |
From: report of Aristippus the younger (fragments/reports [c.335 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 02.7.8 | |
A reaction: As we would say now, values and virtues are 'cultural constructs'. This obviously contains a lot of truth, but I don't think our opposition of genocide is just 'fashion'. |
3025 | For a Cyrenaic no one is of equal importance to himself [Aristippus young, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: A Cyrenaic will not consider anyone else of equal importance with himself. | |
From: report of Aristippus the younger (fragments/reports [c.335 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 02.7.9 |
3019 | No one pleasure is different from or more pleasant than another [Aristippus young, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: No one pleasure is different from or more pleasant than another. | |
From: report of Aristippus the younger (fragments/reports [c.335 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 02.7.8 |
3021 | The Cyrenaics asserted that corporeal pleasures were superior to mental ones [Aristippus young, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: The Cyrenaics asserted that corporeal pleasures were superior to mental ones. | |
From: report of Aristippus the younger (fragments/reports [c.335 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 02.7.8 |
541 | Virtue comes more from habit than character [Critias] |
Full Idea: More men are good through habit than through character. | |
From: Critias (fragments/reports [c.440 BCE], B09), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 3.29.41 |
3027 | Cyrenaics say wise men are self-sufficient, needing no friends [Aristippus young, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Cyrenaics say wise men are sufficient to themselves, and so have no need of friends. | |
From: report of Aristippus the younger (fragments/reports [c.335 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 02.7.13 |
542 | Fear of the gods was invented to discourage secret sin [Critias] |
Full Idea: When the laws forbade men to commit open crimes of violence, and they began to do them in secret, a wise and clever man invented fear of the gods for mortals, to frighten the wicked, even if they sin in secret. | |
From: Critias (fragments/reports [c.440 BCE], B25), quoted by Sextus Empiricus - Against the Professors (six books) 9.54 |