19 ideas
| 19740 | A very hungry man cannot choose between equidistant piles of food [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: The man who, though exceedingly hungry and thirsty, and both equally, yet being equidistant from food and drink, is therefore bound to stay where he is. | |
| From: Aristotle (On the Heavens [c.336 BCE], 296b33) | |
| A reaction: This is, of course, Buridan's famous Ass, but this quotation has the advantage of precedence, and also of being expressed in an original quotation (which does not exist for Buridan). |
| 8568 | A property is merely a constituent of laws of nature; temperature is just part of thermodynamics [Mellor] |
| Full Idea: Being a constituent of probabilistic laws of nature is all there is to being a property. There is no more to temperature than the thermodynamics and other laws they occur in. | |
| From: D.H. Mellor (Properties and Predicates [1991], 'Props') | |
| A reaction: How could thermodynamics be worked out without a prior concept of temperature? I think it is at least plausible to deny that there are any 'laws' of nature. But even Quine can't deny that some things are too hot to touch. |
| 8564 | There is obviously a possible predicate for every property [Mellor] |
| Full Idea: To every property there obviously corresponds a possible predicate applying to all and only those particulars with that property. | |
| From: D.H. Mellor (Properties and Predicates [1991], 'Intro') | |
| A reaction: This doesn't strike me as at all obvious. If nature dictates the properties, there may be vastly more than any human language could cope with. It is daft to say that a property can only exist if humanity can come up with a predicate for it. |
| 8566 | We need universals for causation and laws of nature; the latter give them their identity [Mellor] |
| Full Idea: I take the main reason for believing in contingent universals to be the roles they play in causation and in laws of nature, and those laws are what I take to give those universals their identity. | |
| From: D.H. Mellor (Properties and Predicates [1991], 'Props') | |
| A reaction: He agrees with Armstrong. Sounds a bit circular - laws are built on universals, and universals are identified by laws. It resembles a functionalist account of mental events. I think it is wrong. A different account of laws will be needed... |
| 8565 | If properties were just the meanings of predicates, they couldn't give predicates their meaning [Mellor] |
| Full Idea: One reason for denying that properties just are the meanings of our predicates is that, if they were, they could not give our predicates their meanings. | |
| From: D.H. Mellor (Properties and Predicates [1991], 'Props') | |
| A reaction: Neither way round sounds quite right to me. Predicate nominalism is wrong, but what is meant by a property 'giving' a predicate its meaning? It doesn't seem to allow room for error in our attempts to name the properties. |
| 398 | Each thing that has a function is for the sake of that function [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Each thing that has a function is for the sake of that function. | |
| From: Aristotle (On the Heavens [c.336 BCE], 286a08) | |
| A reaction: This is the central idea of Aristotle's Ethics. Did it originate with Plato, or Socrates, the young pupil Aristotle? I suspect the strong influence of Aristotle on later Plato. A major idea. Functions link the facts to life. |
| 541 | Virtue comes more from habit than character [Critias] |
| Full Idea: More men are good through habit than through character. | |
| From: Critias (fragments/reports [c.440 BCE], B09), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 3.29.41 |
| 394 | An unworn sandal is in vain, but nothing in nature is in vain [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: We say of a sandal which is not worn that it is in vain; God and nature, however, do nothing in vain. | |
| From: Aristotle (On the Heavens [c.336 BCE], 271a33) |
| 396 | There has to be some goal, and not just movement to infinity [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: There has to be some goal, and not just movement to infinity. | |
| From: Aristotle (On the Heavens [c.336 BCE], 277a26) |
| 16102 | Aether moves in circles and is imperishable; the four elements perish, and move in straight lines [Aristotle, by Gill,ML] |
| Full Idea: For Aristotle, aether and the four sublunary elements obey different physical laws. Aether moves naturally in a circle and, unlike its lower counterparts, is not a source of perishability. The four sublunary elements move naturally in straight lines. | |
| From: report of Aristotle (On the Heavens [c.336 BCE]) by Mary Louise Gill - Aristotle on Substance Ch.2 | |
| A reaction: I think it is anachronistic for Gill to talk of 'obeying' and 'laws'. She should have said that they have different 'natures'. We can be amused by Greek errors, until we stare hard at the problems they were trying to solve. |
| 17463 | An element is what bodies are analysed into, and won't itself divide into something else [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: An element is a body into which other bodies may be analyzed, present in them potentially or in actuality (which of these is still disputable), and not itself divisible into bodies different in form. That is what all men mean by element. | |
| From: Aristotle (On the Heavens [c.336 BCE], 302a05), quoted by Weisberg/Needham/Hendry - Philosophy of Chemistry 1.1 | |
| A reaction: This is the classic definition of an element, which endured for a long time, and has been replaced by an 'actual components' view. Obviously analysis nowadays goes well beyond the atoms. |
| 8567 | Singular causation requires causes to raise the physical probability of their effects [Mellor] |
| Full Idea: Singular causation entails physical probabilities or chances. ...Causal laws require causes to raise their effects' chances, as when fires have a greater chance of occurring when explosions do. | |
| From: D.H. Mellor (Properties and Predicates [1991], 'Props') | |
| A reaction: It seems fairly obvious that a probability can be increased without actually causing something. Just after a harmless explosion is a good moment for arsonists, especially if Mellor will be the investigating officer. |
| 399 | If the more you raise some earth the faster it moves, why does the whole earth not move? [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: If you raise some earth and release it, it moves and won't stay put, and the more you raise it the faster it moves, so why does the whole earth not move? | |
| From: Aristotle (On the Heavens [c.336 BCE], 294a12) |
| 20918 | Void is a kind of place, so it can't explain place [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: It is absurd to explain place by the void, as though this latter were not itself some kind of place. | |
| From: Aristotle (On the Heavens [c.336 BCE], 309b24) | |
| A reaction: Presumably this is aimed at Democritus. |
| 403 | The earth must be round and of limited size, because moving north or south makes different stars visible [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Clearly the earth is round and not of great size, because when we move north or south we find that very different stars are visible. | |
| From: Aristotle (On the Heavens [c.336 BCE], 297b30) |
| 402 | The Earth must be spherical, because it casts a convex shadow on the moon [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: A lunar eclipse always has a convex dividing line, so, if it is eclipsed by the interposition of the earth, the circumference of the earth, being spherical, is responsible for the shape. | |
| From: Aristotle (On the Heavens [c.336 BCE], 297b29) |
| 1498 | Everyone agrees that the world had a beginning, but thinkers disagree over whether it will end [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: All thinkers agree that the world had a beginning, but some claim that, having come into existence, it is everlasting. | |
| From: Aristotle (On the Heavens [c.336 BCE], 279b12) |
| 395 | It seems possible that there exists a limited number of other worlds apart from this one [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: One might indeed be puzzled whether, just as the world about us exists, nothing prevents there being others as well, certainly more than one, though not an unlimited number | |
| From: Aristotle (On the Heavens [c.336 BCE], 274a26) |
| 542 | Fear of the gods was invented to discourage secret sin [Critias] |
| Full Idea: When the laws forbade men to commit open crimes of violence, and they began to do them in secret, a wise and clever man invented fear of the gods for mortals, to frighten the wicked, even if they sin in secret. | |
| From: Critias (fragments/reports [c.440 BCE], B25), quoted by Sextus Empiricus - Against the Professors (six books) 9.54 |