16 ideas
7719 | European philosophy consists of a series of footnotes to Plato [Whitehead] |
Full Idea: The safest general characterization of the European philosophical tradition is that it consists of a series of footnotes to Plato. | |
From: Alfred North Whitehead (Process and Reality [1929], p.39) | |
A reaction: Outsiders think this is a ridiculous remark, but readers of Plato can only be struck by what a wonderful tribute Whitehead has come up with. I would say that at least 80% of this database deals with problems which were discussed at length by Plato. |
7548 | Classes, grouped by a convenient property, are logical constructions [Russell] |
Full Idea: Classes or series of particulars, collected together on account of some property which makes it convenient to be able to speak of them as wholes, are what I call logical constructions or symbolic fictions. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Ultimate Constituents of Matter [1915], p.125) | |
A reaction: When does a construction become 'logical' instead of arbitrary? What is it about a property that makes it 'convenient'? At this point Russell seems to have built his ontology on classes, and the edifice was crumbling, thanks to Wittgenstein. |
10656 | With 'extensive connection', boundary elements are not included in domains [Whitehead, by Varzi] |
Full Idea: In Whitehead's theory of extensive connection, no boundary elements are included in the domain of quantification. ...His conception of space contains no parts of lower dimensions, such as points or boundary elements. | |
From: report of Alfred North Whitehead (Process and Reality [1929]) by Achille Varzi - Mereology 3.1 | |
A reaction: [Varzi says we should see B.L.Clarke 1981 for a rigorous formulation. Second half of the Idea is Varzi p.21] |
15389 | In Whitehead 'processes' consist of events beginning and ending [Whitehead, by Simons] |
Full Idea: There are no items in Whitehead's ontology called 'processes'. Rather, the term 'process' refers to the way in which the basic things - which are still events - come into existence and cease to exist. Whitehead called this 'becoming'. | |
From: report of Alfred North Whitehead (Process and Reality [1929]) by Peter Simons - Whitehead: process and cosmology 'The mature' |
7545 | Visible things are physical and external, but only exist when viewed [Russell] |
Full Idea: I believe that common sense is right in regarding what we see as physical and (in one of several possible senses) outside the mind, but is probably wrong in supposing that it continues to exist when we are no longer looking at it. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Ultimate Constituents of Matter [1915], p.123) | |
A reaction: This remark (in 1915) is a bit startling from a philosopher well known for his robustly realist stance. Just one of his phases! It seems very counterintuitive - that objects really exist externally, but only when viewed. Schrödinger's Cat? |
7553 | Sense-data are purely physical [Russell] |
Full Idea: Sense-data are purely physical, and all that is mental in connection with them is our awareness of them. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Ultimate Constituents of Matter [1915], p.138) | |
A reaction: Once this account of sense-data becomes fully clear, it also becomes apparent what a dualist theory it is. The mind is a cinema, I am the audience, and sense-data are the screen. There has to be a big logical gap between viewer and screen. |
7549 | If my body literally lost its mind, the object seen when I see a flash would still exist [Russell] |
Full Idea: My meaning may be made plainer by saying that if my body could remain in exactly the same state in which it is, though my mind had ceased to exist, precisely that object which I now see when I see a flash would exist, though I should not see it. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Ultimate Constituents of Matter [1915], p.126) | |
A reaction: Zombies, 70 years before Robert Kirk! Sense-data are physical. It is interesting to see a philosopher as committed to empiricism, anti-spiritualism and the priority of science as this, still presenting an essentially dualist picture of perception. |
7546 | A man is a succession of momentary men, bound by continuity and causation [Russell] |
Full Idea: The real man, I believe, however the police may swear to his identity, is really a series of momentary men, each different one from the other, and bound together, not by a numerical identity, but by continuity and certain instrinsic causal laws. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Ultimate Constituents of Matter [1915], p.124) | |
A reaction: This seems to be in the tradition of Locke and Parfit, and also follows the temporal-slices idea of physical objects. Personally I take a more physical view of things, and think the police are probably more reliable than Bertrand Russell. |
7550 | We could probably, in principle, infer minds from brains, and brains from minds [Russell] |
Full Idea: It seems not improbable that if we had sufficient knowledge we could infer the state of a man's mind from the state of his brain, or the state of his brain from the state of his mind. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Ultimate Constituents of Matter [1915], p.131) | |
A reaction: This strikes me as being a very good summary of the claim that mind is reducible to brain, which is the essence of physicalism. Had he been born a little later, Russell would have taken a harder line with physicalism. |
541 | Virtue comes more from habit than character [Critias] |
Full Idea: More men are good through habit than through character. | |
From: Critias (fragments/reports [c.440 BCE], B09), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 3.29.41 |
15247 | Whitehead held that perception was a necessary feature of all causation [Whitehead, by Harré/Madden] |
Full Idea: On Whitehead's view, not only is a volitional sense of 'causal power' projected on to physical events, but 'perception in the causal mode' is literally ascribed to them. | |
From: report of Alfred North Whitehead (Process and Reality [1929]) by Harré,R./Madden,E.H. - Causal Powers 3.II | |
A reaction: This seems to be a close relative of Leibniz's monads. 'Perception' is a daft word for it, but in some way everything is 'responsive' to the things adjacent to it. |
7551 | Matter is a logical construction [Russell] |
Full Idea: We must regard matter as a logical construction. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Ultimate Constituents of Matter [1915], p.132) | |
A reaction: A logical construction is a fancy way of saying a best explanation (but with Ockham's Razor hanging over it). A key component missing from Russell's account is that we can directly experience matter, because we are made of it. |
7547 | Matter requires a division into time-corpuscles as well as space-corpuscles [Russell] |
Full Idea: A true theory of matter requires a division of things into time-corpuscles as well as space-corpuscles. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Ultimate Constituents of Matter [1915], p.125) | |
A reaction: The division of matter in space seems decidable by physicists, but the division in time seems a bit arbitrary (unless it is quanta of time?). Russell focuses on observable qualities, but are there also intrinsic qualities? |
7552 | Six dimensions are needed for a particular, three within its own space, and three to locate that space [Russell] |
Full Idea: The world of particulars is a six-dimensional space, where six co-ordinates will be required to assign the position of any particular, three to assign its position in its own space, and three to assign the position of its space among the other spaces. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Ultimate Constituents of Matter [1915], p.134) | |
A reaction: Not a proposal that has caught on. One might connect the idea with the notion of 'frames of reference' in Einstein's Special Theory. Inside a frame of reference, three co-ordinates are needed; but where is the frame of reference? |
16962 | Whitehead replaced points with extended regions [Whitehead, by Quine] |
Full Idea: Whitehead tried to avoid points, and make do with extended regions and sets of regions. | |
From: report of Alfred North Whitehead (Process and Reality [1929]) by Willard Quine - Existence and Quantification p.93 |
542 | Fear of the gods was invented to discourage secret sin [Critias] |
Full Idea: When the laws forbade men to commit open crimes of violence, and they began to do them in secret, a wise and clever man invented fear of the gods for mortals, to frighten the wicked, even if they sin in secret. | |
From: Critias (fragments/reports [c.440 BCE], B25), quoted by Sextus Empiricus - Against the Professors (six books) 9.54 |