Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Mad Pain and Martian Pain' and 'The Philosophy of Leibniz'

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6 ideas

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 5. Linguistic Analysis
All philosophy should begin with an analysis of propositions [Russell]
     Full Idea: That all sound philosophy should begin with an analysis of propositions is a truth too evident, perhaps, to demand a proof.
     From: Bertrand Russell (The Philosophy of Leibniz [1900], p.8), quoted by Ray Monk - Bertrand Russell: Spirit of Solitude
     A reaction: Compare Idea 483. The obvious response to Russell is that it must actually begin with a decision about which propositions are worth analysing - and that ain't easy. I like analysis, but philosophy is also a vision of truth.
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 4. Causal Functionalism
Type-type psychophysical identity is combined with a functional characterisation of pain [Lewis]
     Full Idea: The materialist theory Armstrong and I proposed joins claims of type-type psychophysical identity with a behaviourist or functionalist way of characterising mental states such as pain.
     From: David Lewis (Mad Pain and Martian Pain [1980], §III)
     A reaction: Armstrong has backed off from 'type-type' identity, because the realisations of a given mental state might be too diverse to be considered of the same type. Putnam's machine functionalism allows the possibility of dualism.
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
The application of 'pain' to physical states is non-rigid and contingent [Lewis]
     Full Idea: The word 'pain' is a non-rigid designator; it is a contingent matter what state the concept and the word apply to. (Note: so the sort of theory Kripke argues against is not what we propose).
     From: David Lewis (Mad Pain and Martian Pain [1980], §III)
     A reaction: I like the view that a given quale is necessarily identical to a given mental state, but that many mental states might occupy a given behavioural role. The smell of roses might occupy the behavioural role of pain. Frog pain isn't quite like ours.
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability
A theory must be mixed, to cover qualia without behaviour, and behaviour without qualia [Lewis, by PG]
     Full Idea: To pass our test it seems that our theory will have to be a 'mixed' theory, to account for the Madman (whose pain has odd causes, and odd effects) and also for the Martian (who has normal causes and effects, but an odd physical state).
     From: report of David Lewis (Mad Pain and Martian Pain [1980], §II) by PG - Db (ideas)
     A reaction: A statement that 'pain' is ambiguous (qualia/causal role) would help a lot here. Martians have the causal role but no qualia, and the madman has the qualia but lacks the causal role. I say lots of different qualia might have the same causal role.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / e. Character
Virtue comes more from habit than character [Critias]
     Full Idea: More men are good through habit than through character.
     From: Critias (fragments/reports [c.440 BCE], B09), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 3.29.41
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 5. Atheism
Fear of the gods was invented to discourage secret sin [Critias]
     Full Idea: When the laws forbade men to commit open crimes of violence, and they began to do them in secret, a wise and clever man invented fear of the gods for mortals, to frighten the wicked, even if they sin in secret.
     From: Critias (fragments/reports [c.440 BCE], B25), quoted by Sextus Empiricus - Against the Professors (six books) 9.54