8 ideas
15457 | Interdefinition is useless by itself, but if we grasp one separately, we have them both [Lewis] |
Full Idea: All circles of interdefinition are useless by themselves. But if we reach one of the interdefined pair, then we have them both. | |
From: David Lewis (Defining 'Intrinsic' (with Rae Langton) [1998], IV) |
13174 | A piece of flint contains something resembling perceptions and appetites [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: I don't say that bodies like flint, which are commonly called inanimate, have perceptions and appetition; rather they have something of that sort in them, like worms are in cheese. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Johann Bernoulli [1699], 1698.12.17) | |
A reaction: Leibniz is caricatured as thinking that stones are full of little active minds, but he nearly always says that what he is proposing is 'like' or 'analogous to' that. His only real point is that nature is active, as seen in the appetites of animals. |
13175 | Entelechies are analogous to souls, as other minds are analogous to our own minds [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: Just as we somehow conceive other souls and intelligences on analogy with our own souls, I wanted whatever other primitive entelechies there may be remote from our senses to be conceived on analogy with souls. They are not conceived perfectly. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Johann Bernoulli [1699], 1698.12.17) | |
A reaction: This is the clearest evidence I can find that Leibniz does not think of monads as actually being souls. He is struggling to explain their active character. Garber thinks that Leibniz hasn't arrived at proper monads at this date. |
15400 | We must avoid circularity between what is intrinsic and what is natural [Lewis, by Cameron] |
Full Idea: Lewis revised his analysis of duplication because he had assumed that as a matter of necessity perfectly natural properties are intrinsic, and that necessarily how a thing is intrinsically is determined completely by the natural properties it has. | |
From: report of David Lewis (Defining 'Intrinsic' (with Rae Langton) [1998]) by Ross P. Cameron - Intrinsic and Extrinsic Properties 'Analysis' | |
A reaction: [This compares Lewis 1986:61 with Langton and Lewis 1998] I am keen on both intrinsic and on natural properties, but I have not yet confronted this little problem. Time for a displacement activity, I think.... |
15458 | A property is 'intrinsic' iff it can never differ between duplicates [Lewis] |
Full Idea: A property is 'intrinsic' iff it never can differ between duplicates; iff whenever two things (actual or possible) are duplicates, either both of them have the property or both of them lack it. | |
From: David Lewis (Defining 'Intrinsic' (with Rae Langton) [1998], IV) | |
A reaction: This leaves me wondering how one could arrive at a precise definition of 'duplicates'. Can it be done without mentioning that they have the same intrinsic properties? |
15459 | Ellipsoidal stars seem to have an intrinsic property which depends on other objects [Lewis] |
Full Idea: The property of being an ellipsoidal star would seem offhand to be a basic intrinsic property, but it is incompatible (nomologically) with being an isolated object. | |
From: David Lewis (Defining 'Intrinsic' (with Rae Langton) [1998], V) | |
A reaction: Another nice example from Lewis. It makes you wonder whether the intrinsic/extrinsic distinction should go. Modern physics, with its 'entanglements', doesn't seem to suit the distinction. |
13172 | What we cannot imagine may still exist [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: It does not follow that what we can't imagine does not exist. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Johann Bernoulli [1699], 1698.11.18) | |
A reaction: This just establishes the common sense end of the debate - that you cannot just use your imagination as the final authority on what exists, or what is possible. |
13173 | Death is just the contraction of an animal [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: Death is nothing but the contraction of an animal, just as generation is nothing but its unfolding. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Johann Bernoulli [1699], 1698.11.18) | |
A reaction: This is possibly the most bizarre view that I have found in Leibniz. He seemed to thing that if you burnt an animal on a bonfire, some little atom of life would remain among the ashes. I can't see why he would believe such a thing. |