Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Survival and Identity, with postscript' and 'Counterparts and Identity'

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8 ideas

4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 7. Barcan Formula
To say there could have been people who don't exist, but deny those possible things, rejects Barcan [Stalnaker, by Rumfitt]
     Full Idea: Stalnaker holds that there could have been people who do not actually exist, but he denies that there are things that could have been those people. That is, he denies the unrestricted validity of the Barcan Formula.
     From: report of Robert C. Stalnaker (Counterparts and Identity [1987]) by Ian Rumfitt - The Boundary Stones of Thought 6.2
     A reaction: And quite right too, I should have thought. As they say, Jack Kennedy and Marilyn Monroe might have had a child, but the idea that we should accept some entity which might have been that child but wasn't sounds like nonsense. Except as fiction…..
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 4. De re / De dicto modality
De re modal predicates are ambiguous [Lewis, by Rudder Baker]
     Full Idea: Lewis is perhaps the most prominent proponent of the view that de re modal predicates are ambiguous.
     From: report of David Lewis (Survival and Identity, with postscript [1983]) by Lynne Rudder Baker - Why Constitution is not Identity n25
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts
Unlike Lewis, I defend an actualist version of counterpart theory [Stalnaker]
     Full Idea: I defend a version of counterpart theory that is quite different from Lewis's version, as it is tied to actualism (all that exists is part of the actual world) rather than possibilism (possible things may exist without actually existing).
     From: Robert C. Stalnaker (Counterparts and Identity [1987], 1)
     A reaction: This could be the theory I am after. I am sympathetic to both actualism and to counterpart theory. Off to the woodshed….
If possible worlds really differ, I can't be in more than one at a time [Stalnaker]
     Full Idea: Nothing can be in two places at once. If other possible worlds are really other universes, then clearly, you and I cannot be in them if we are here in this one.
     From: Robert C. Stalnaker (Counterparts and Identity [1987], 2)
     A reaction: This can be sensibly expressed without possible worlds. I can't embody my other possibilities while I am embodying this one (I'm too busy). Insofar as possible worlds are a good framework, they are just a precise map of common sense.
If counterparts exist strictly in one world only, this seems to be extreme invariant essentialism [Stalnaker]
     Full Idea: Counterparts involve the thesis that domains of different possible worlds are disjoint: possible individuals exist in at most one possible world. This seems to suggest extreme essentialism, where nothing could differ from how it is.
     From: Robert C. Stalnaker (Counterparts and Identity [1987], 2)
     A reaction: He quotes Salmon (1981:236) as saying counterpart theory is particularly inflexible essentialism. This is a long way from my use of 'essentialism'. The problem is just the extent to which my counterpart is 'the same' as me.
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 8. Possible Worlds Semantics
Extensional semantics has individuals and sets; modal semantics has intensions, functions of world to extension [Stalnaker]
     Full Idea: Semantic values in extensional semantics are extensions, like individuals for terms, and sets for predicates. In modal semantics we have intensions, functions from worlds to appropriate extensions.
     From: Robert C. Stalnaker (Counterparts and Identity [1987], 2)
     A reaction: It seems obvious that the meaning of a word like 'giraffe' must include possible giraffes, as well as actual and deceased giraffes.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / e. Character
Virtue comes more from habit than character [Critias]
     Full Idea: More men are good through habit than through character.
     From: Critias (fragments/reports [c.440 BCE], B09), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 3.29.41
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 5. Atheism
Fear of the gods was invented to discourage secret sin [Critias]
     Full Idea: When the laws forbade men to commit open crimes of violence, and they began to do them in secret, a wise and clever man invented fear of the gods for mortals, to frighten the wicked, even if they sin in secret.
     From: Critias (fragments/reports [c.440 BCE], B25), quoted by Sextus Empiricus - Against the Professors (six books) 9.54