72 ideas
6887 | Linguistic philosophy approaches problems by attending to actual linguistic usage [Mautner] |
Full Idea: Linguistic philosophy gives careful attention to actual linguistic usage as a method of dealing with problems of philosophy, resulting in either their solution or dissolution. | |
From: Thomas Mautner (Penguin Dictionary of Philosophy [1996], p.318) | |
A reaction: This approach is now deeply discredited and unfashionable, and, I think (on the whole), rightly so. Philosophy should aim a little higher in (say) epistemology than merely describing how people use words like 'know' and 'believe' and 'justify'. |
6881 | Analytic philosophy studies the unimportant, and sharpens tools instead of using them [Mautner] |
Full Idea: Critics of analytic philosophers accuse them of excessive attention to relatively unimportant matters, and of being more interested in sharpening tools than in using them. | |
From: Thomas Mautner (Penguin Dictionary of Philosophy [1996], p.111) | |
A reaction: The last part is a nice comment. Both criticisms seem to me to contain some justice, but recently things have improved (notably in the new attention paid by analytical philosophy to metaphysics). In morality analytic philosophy seems superior. |
5439 | The 'hermeneutic circle' says parts and wholes are interdependent, and so cannot be interpreted [Mautner] |
Full Idea: The 'hermeneutic circle' consists in the fact that an interpretation of part of a text requires a prior understanding of the whole, and the interpretation of the whole requires a prior understanding of its parts. | |
From: Thomas Mautner (Penguin Dictionary of Philosophy [1996], p.247) | |
A reaction: This strikes me as a benign circle, solved the way Aristotle solves the good man/good action circle. You make a start somewhere, like a child learning to speak, and work your way into the circle. Not really a problem. |
24084 | Seeing with other eyes is more egoism, but exploring other perspectives leads to objectivity [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Wanting to know things as they are - that alone is the good inclination: not seeing ..with other eyes; that would be merely a change of place of egoistic seeing. …Practise at seeing with other eyes, and without human relationships, hence objectively! | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1881-82 [1882], 11[013]) | |
A reaction: That Nietzsche thinks we should try to see things objectively will come as a bit of a shock to those who have him catalogued among the relativists. It's clear from other writings that he thinks (rightly) that perfect objectivity is unattainable. |
9959 | 'Real' definitions give the essential properties of things under a concept [Mautner] |
Full Idea: A 'real definition' (as opposed to a linguistic one) is a statement which gives the essential properties of the things to which a given concept applies. | |
From: Thomas Mautner (Penguin Dictionary of Philosophy [1996], 'definition') | |
A reaction: This is often seen as old-fashioned, Aristotelian, and impossible to achieve, but I like it and aspire to it. One can hardly be precise about which properties are 'essential' to something, but there are clear cases. Your 'gold' had better not be brass. |
9961 | 'Contextual definitions' replace whole statements, not just expressions [Mautner] |
Full Idea: Usually in a definition the definiens (definition) can replace the definiendum (expression defined), but in a 'contextual definition' only the whole statement containing the definiens can replace the whole statement containing the definiendum. | |
From: Thomas Mautner (Penguin Dictionary of Philosophy [1996], 'definition') | |
A reaction: These definitions are crucial to Frege's enterprise in the 'Grundlagen'. Logicians always want to achieve definition with a single neat operation, but in ordinary language we talk around a definition, giving a variety of possibilities (as in teaching). |
9958 | Recursive definition defines each instance from a previous instance [Mautner] |
Full Idea: An example of a recursive definition is 'y is an ancestor of x' is defined as 'y is a parent of x, or y is a parent of an ancestor of x'. | |
From: Thomas Mautner (Penguin Dictionary of Philosophy [1996], 'definition') | |
A reaction: From this example I guess that 'ancestor' means 'friend'. Or have I misunderstood? I think we need to define 'grand-parent' as well, and then offer the definition of 'ancestor' with the words 'and so on...'. Essentially, it is mathematical induction. |
9960 | A stipulative definition lays down that an expression is to have a certain meaning [Mautner] |
Full Idea: A stipulative definition lays down that a given linguistic expression is to have a certain meaning; this is why they cannot be said to be correct or incorrect. | |
From: Thomas Mautner (Penguin Dictionary of Philosophy [1996], 'definition') | |
A reaction: These are uncontroversial when they are explicitly made in writing by a single person. The tricky case is where they are implicitly made in conversation by a community. After a century or two these look like facts, their origin having been lost. |
9957 | Ostensive definitions point to an object which an expression denotes [Mautner] |
Full Idea: Ostensive definitions explain what an expression means by pointing to an object, action, event, etc. denoted by the expression. | |
From: Thomas Mautner (Penguin Dictionary of Philosophy [1996], 'definition') | |
A reaction: These will need some context. If I define 'red' simply by pointing to a red square, you might conclude that 'red' means square. If I point to five varied red objects, you have to do the work of spotting the common ingredient. I can't mention 'colour'. |
6219 | The fallacy of composition is the assumption that what is true of the parts is true of the whole [Mautner] |
Full Idea: The fallacy of composition is an inference relying on the invalid principle that whatever is true of every part is also true of the whole; thus, we cannot assume that because the members of a committee are rational, that the committee as a whole is. | |
From: Thomas Mautner (Penguin Dictionary of Philosophy [1996], p.102) | |
A reaction: This is a very common and very significant fallacy, which is perpetrated by major philosophers like Aristotle (Idea 31), unlike most of the other informal fallacies. |
24092 | I tell the truth, even if it is repulsive [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: As a man I tell the truth, even the repulsive ones. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1881-82 [1882], 12[86]) | |
A reaction: I wonder if even Nietzsche had his limits. He is quite coy about sexual matters, for example, before Freud and various sexual revolutions. To ruthlessly tell difficult truths strikes me as a scientific approach to the world. |
24114 | The pain in truth is when it destroys a belief [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: The truth hurts because it destroys a belief: not in itself. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1881-82 [1882], 9[48]) | |
A reaction: There are hideous events, about which it can be dreadful to learn the truth, but the unpleasantness is in the fact, not in the truth of the fact. So, yes. |
24104 | We don't create logic, time and space! The mind obeys laws because they are true [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: That which is logical, time, space would have to be produced by us: nonsense! When the mind obeys its own laws, this because they are actually true, true in themselves! …An error with respect to these truths avenges itself. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1881-82 [1882], 7[023]) | |
A reaction: So much for those who see Nietzsche as the embodiment of relativism. This is Nietzsche standing up to what I increasingly see as the pernicious influence of Kant. I agree with Nietzsche. Relations with the world keep our logic honest. |
6888 | Fuzzy logic is based on the notion that there can be membership of a set to some degree [Mautner] |
Full Idea: Fuzzy logic is based upon fuzzy set-theory, in which the simple notion of membership of a set is replaced by a notion of membership to some degree. | |
From: Thomas Mautner (Penguin Dictionary of Philosophy [1996], p.214) | |
A reaction: The idea that something could be to some degree a 'heap of sand' sounds plausible, but Williamson and Sorensen claim that the vagueness is all in us (i.e. it is epistemological), and not in the world. This will scupper fuzzy logic. |
6877 | Entailment is logical requirement; it may be not(p and not-q), but that has problems [Mautner] |
Full Idea: Entailment is the modern word saying that p logically follows from q. Its simplest definition is that you cannot have both p and not-q, but this has the problem that if p is impossible it will entail every possible proposition, which seems unacceptable. | |
From: Thomas Mautner (Penguin Dictionary of Philosophy [1996], p.169) | |
A reaction: The word 'entail' was introduced by G.E. Moore in 1920, in preference to 'imply'. It seems clear that we need terms for (say) active implication (q must be true if p is true) and passive implication (p must be false if q is false). |
6880 | Strict implication says false propositions imply everything, and everything implies true propositions [Mautner] |
Full Idea: Strict implication [not(p and not-q)] carries the paradoxes that a false proposition (p) implies any proposition (q), and a true proposition (q) is materially implied by any proposition (p). | |
From: Thomas Mautner (Penguin Dictionary of Philosophy [1996], p.270) | |
A reaction: This seems to show that we have two drastically different notions of implication; one (the logician's) is boring and is defined by a truth table; the other (the ordinary interesting one) says if you have one truth you can deduce a second. |
6879 | 'Material implication' is defined as 'not(p and not-q)', but seems to imply a connection between p and q [Mautner] |
Full Idea: 'Material implication' is a term introduced by Russell which is defined as 'the conjunction of p and not-q is false', but carries a strong implication that p implies q, and so there must be some kind of connection between them, which is misleading. | |
From: Thomas Mautner (Penguin Dictionary of Philosophy [1996], p.270) | |
A reaction: Mautner says statements of the form 'if p then q' are better called 'conditionals' than 'material implications'. Clearly there is a need for more precise terminology here, as the underlying concepts seem simple enough. |
6878 | A person who 'infers' draws the conclusion, but a person who 'implies' leaves it to the audience [Mautner] |
Full Idea: 'Implying' is different from 'inferring', because a person who infers draws the conclusion, but a person who implies leaves it to the audience to draw the conclusion. | |
From: Thomas Mautner (Penguin Dictionary of Philosophy [1996], p.279) | |
A reaction: I had always taken it just that the speaker does the implying and the audience does the inferring. Of course a speaker may not know what he or she is implying, but an audience must be aware of what it is inferring. |
6889 | Vagueness seems to be inconsistent with the view that every proposition is true or false [Mautner] |
Full Idea: Vagueness is of great philosophical interest because it seems to be inconsistent with the view that every proposition is true or false. | |
From: Thomas Mautner (Penguin Dictionary of Philosophy [1996], p.585) | |
A reaction: This would explain why Williamson and Sorensen are keen to argue that vagueness is an epistemological (rather than ontological) problem. In ordinary English we are happy to say that p is 'sort of true' or 'fairly true'. |
6890 | Quantifiers turn an open sentence into one to which a truth-value can be assigned [Mautner] |
Full Idea: In formal logic, quantifiers are operators that turn an open sentence into a sentence to which a truth-value can be assigned. | |
From: Thomas Mautner (Penguin Dictionary of Philosophy [1996], p.464) | |
A reaction: The standard quantifiers are 'all' and 'at least one'. The controversy is whether quantifiers actually assert existence, or whether (as McGinn says) they merely specify the subject matter of the sentence. I prefer the latter. |
24112 | To think about being we must have an opinion about what it is [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: We are in the process of figuring out the being of things: consequently we must already have an opinion as to what being is. This can be an error! E.g., I. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1881-82 [1882], 9[41]) | |
A reaction: The point of 'I' is that we unquestioningly think the self is a given aspect of being, as in Descartes. |
24089 | Essences are fictions needed for beings who represent things [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: The true essence of things is a fiction of representing being, without which being is unable to represent. 11[330] Thinking must assert substance and identity because a knowing of complete flux is impossible. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1881-82 [1882], 11[329]) | |
A reaction: I have defended (in my PhD) the thesis that the concept of essence is required for explanation. Do animals need the concept of essence in order to represent? I think people and animals ascribe essential natures to most things. |
6886 | Counterfactuals are not true, they are merely valid [Mautner] |
Full Idea: One view of counterfactuals says they are not true, but are merely valid. | |
From: Thomas Mautner (Penguin Dictionary of Philosophy [1996], p.114) | |
A reaction: This makes counterfactuals a branch of logic rather than of metaphysics. I find the metaphysical view more exciting as they are part of speculation and are beyond the capacity of computers (which I suspect they are). |
6885 | Counterfactuals are true if in every world close to actual where p is the case, q is also the case [Mautner] |
Full Idea: Another view of counterfactuals (Lewis, Pollock, Stalnaker) is that they are true if at every possible world at which it is the case that p, and which is otherwise as similar as possible to the actual world, it is also the case that q. | |
From: Thomas Mautner (Penguin Dictionary of Philosophy [1996], p.114) | |
A reaction: This seems a good way if putting if, like Lewis, you actually believe in the reality of possible worlds, because then you are saying a counterfactual is made true by a set of facts. Otherwise it is not clear what the truth-maker is here. |
6884 | Counterfactuals say 'If it had been, or were, p, then it would be q' [Mautner] |
Full Idea: A counterfactual conditional (or 'counterfactual') is a proposition or sentence of the form 'If it had been the case that p, then it would have been the case that q', or 'If it were the case that p, then it would be the case that q'. | |
From: Thomas Mautner (Penguin Dictionary of Philosophy [1996], p.114) | |
A reaction: The first statement refers to the past, but the second (a subjunctive) refers to any situation at any time. We know more about inferences that we could have made in the past than we do about what is inferable at absolutely any time. |
6883 | Maybe counterfactuals are only true if they contain valid inference from premisses [Mautner] |
Full Idea: One view of counterfactuals (Chisholm, Goodman, Rescher) is that they are only true if there is a valid logical inference from p and some other propositions of certain kinds (controversial) to q. | |
From: Thomas Mautner (Penguin Dictionary of Philosophy [1996], p.115) | |
A reaction: The aspiration that counterfactual claims should reduce to pure logic sounds a bit hopeful to me. Logic is precise, but assertions about how things would be is speculative and imaginative. |
6882 | Counterfactuals presuppose a belief (or a fact) that the condition is false [Mautner] |
Full Idea: A conditional is called counterfactual because its use seems to presuppose that the user believes its antecedent to be false. Some insist that the antecedent must actually be false. | |
From: Thomas Mautner (Penguin Dictionary of Philosophy [1996], p.114) | |
A reaction: I am inclined to favour the stricter second version. "If I am on Earth then I have weight" hardly sounds counterfactual. However, in "If there is a God then I will be saved" it is not clear whether it is counterfactual, so it had better be included. |
5449 | Essentialism is often identified with belief in 'de re' necessary truths [Mautner] |
Full Idea: Many writers identify essentialism with the belief in 'de re' necessary truths | |
From: Thomas Mautner (Penguin Dictionary of Philosophy [1996], p.179) | |
A reaction: I like essentialism, but I cautious about this. If I accept that I have an essential personal identity as I write this, but that it could change over time, the same principle might apply to other natural essences. |
6898 | Fallibilism is the view that all knowledge-claims are provisional [Mautner] |
Full Idea: Fallibilism is the view, proposed by Peirce, and found in Reichenbach, Popper, Quine etc that all knowledge-claims are provisional and in principle revisable, or that the possibility of error is ever-present. | |
From: Thomas Mautner (Penguin Dictionary of Philosophy [1996], p.194) | |
A reaction: I think of this as footnote to all thought which reads "Note 1: but you never quite know". Personally I would call myself a fallibilist, and am surprise at anyone who doesn't. The point is that this does not negate 'knowledge'. I am fairly sure 2+3=5. |
6452 | 'Sense-data' arrived in 1910, but it denotes ideas in Locke, Berkeley and Hume [Mautner] |
Full Idea: The term 'sense-data' gained currency around 1910, through writings of Moore and Russell, but it seems to denote at least some of the things referred to as 'ideas of sense' (Locke), or 'ideas' and 'sensible qualities' (Berkeley), or 'impressions' (Hume). | |
From: Thomas Mautner (Penguin Dictionary of Philosophy [1996], p.518) | |
A reaction: See also Hobbes in Idea 2356 for an even earlier version. It looks as if the concept of sense-data is almost unavoidable for empiricists, and yet most modern empiricists have rejected them. You still have to give an account of perceptual illusions. |
24115 | There is no proof that we forget things - only that we can't recall [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: That forgetting exists has never yet been demonstrated, but only that many things do not occur to us when we want them to. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1881-82 [1882], 12[1]123) | |
A reaction: There is now quite a lot of evidence that there innumerable memories buried in that mind that we seem unable to directly recall. He is right that we can hardly demonstrate this negative fact. |
4783 | Observing lots of green x can confirm 'all x are green' or 'all x are grue', where 'grue' is arbitrary [Mautner, by PG] |
Full Idea: Observing green emeralds can confirm 'all emeralds are green' or 'all emeralds are grue', where 'grue' is an arbitrary predicate meaning 'green until t and then blue'. Thus predictions are arbitrary, depending on how the property is described. | |
From: report of Thomas Mautner (Penguin Dictionary of Philosophy [1996], p.225) by PG - Db (ideas) | |
A reaction: This increasingly strikes me as the sort of sceptical nonsense that is concocted by philosophers who are enthralled to language instead of reality. It does draw attention to an expectation of stability in induction, both in language and in nature. |
4782 | 'All x are y' is equivalent to 'all non-y are non-x', so observing paper is white confirms 'ravens are black' [Mautner, by PG] |
Full Idea: If observing a white sheet of paper confirms that 'all non-black things are non-ravens', and that is logically equivalent to 'all ravens are black' (which it is), then the latter proposition is confirmed by irrelevant observations. | |
From: report of Thomas Mautner (Penguin Dictionary of Philosophy [1996], p.105) by PG - Db (ideas) | |
A reaction: This seems to me more significant than the 'grue' paradox. If some observations can be totally irrelevant (except to God?), then some observations are much more relevant than others, so relevance is a crucial aspect of induction. |
24090 | Our inclinations would not conflict if we were a unity; we imagine unity for our multiplicity [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: How is it that we satisfy our stronger inclinations at the expense of our weaker inclinations? - In itself, if we were a unity, this split could not exist. In fact we are a multiplicity that has imagined a unity for itself. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1881-82 [1882], 12[35]) | |
A reaction: Plato had the same thought, but stopped at three parts, rather than a multiplicity. What Nietzsche fails to say, I think, is that this 'imagined' unity of the mind is not optional, and obviously has a real link to the one body and the one life. |
24099 | We contain many minds, which fight for the 'I' of the mind [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Many minds are housed within humans like creatures of the sea - they battle one another for the mind 'I'. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1881-82 [1882], 4[207]) | |
A reaction: I am happy to use the word 'I' for the sense of central control of focus and choice, but there doesn's seem to be an actual organ of the Self, so it is a fiction, but one which reflects the general picture of what happens. I can pick a drive to foster. |
24102 | Thoughts are signs (just as words are) [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Thoughts are merely signs, as words are signs for thoughts. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1881-82 [1882], 5[1]272) | |
A reaction: The obvious question he invites is 'signs of what?'. His point must be that most thinking is both non-verbal and non-conscious, which he took to be true even of intellectual thought. I sympathise with his view. |
6899 | The references of indexicals ('there', 'now', 'I') depend on the circumstances of utterance [Mautner] |
Full Idea: Indexicals are expressions whose references depend on the circumstances of utterance, such as 'here', 'now', 'last month' 'I', 'you'. It was introduced by Peirce; Reichenbach called them 'token-reflexive', Russell 'ego-centric particulars'. | |
From: Thomas Mautner (Penguin Dictionary of Philosophy [1996], p.272) | |
A reaction: Peirce's terminology seems best. They obviously create great problems for any theory of reference which is rather theoretical and linguistic, such as by the use of descriptions. You can't understand 'Look at that!' without practical awareness. |
24120 | Great orators lead their arguments, rather than following them [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: For me there are no true orators and super-orators unless they can convince the arguments themselves to run after them. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1881-82 [1882], 22[01]) | |
A reaction: I translate this as great orators generating the mere appearance of good arguments. Both reason and feeling must be irrationally swept along. Nice. |
24097 | The pragmatics of language is more comprehensible than the meaning [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: The most comprehensible part of language is not the word itself, but rather tone, force, modulation, tempo, with which a series of words is spoken. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1881-82 [1882], 3[296]) | |
A reaction: He exaggerates. If you watch someone talking vociferously in an unknown foreign language, the feeling of the exchange is obvious, but the content is quite unknown. I see his point that we underestimate body language etc. |
24108 | Actions are just a release of force. They seize on something, which becomes the purpose [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: What is the source of actions? For what purpose? …People do not act for happiness, utility or pleasure. Rather, a certain amount of force is released. Seizes on something on which it can vent itself. 'Goal' and 'purpose' are the means for this process. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1881-82 [1882], 7[077]) | |
A reaction: Surprised at how little Nietzsche is discussed in modern theoretical accounts of action. I'm not sure what the evolutionary value might be of a blind force that produces action before its purpose has been decided. Not convinced. What triggers the force? |
24105 | Drives make us feel non-feelings; Will is the effect of those feelings [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: 'Drive' is only a translation from the language of nonfeeling into the language of feeling. 'Will' is what is communicated to our feelings as a result of that process - in other words an effect, and not the beginning and cause. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1881-82 [1882], 7[025]) | |
A reaction: This shows the link between his central idea of 'drives' in psychology, and the actions that result. Effectively this makes all our actions arise from the unconscious. Intention and choice are effectively epiphenomena. |
24117 | We need lower and higher drives, but they must be under firm control [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: All lower drives must be present and have fresh force if the highest ones want to exist and exist in abundance: but control of the whole must be in firm hands! otherwise the danger is too great. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1881-82 [1882], 14[03]) | |
A reaction: This is unusual, because he speaks of the Self as little more than the currently dominant drive, but here he postulates a controller of the drives, a ringmaster. A-krasia means lack of control. Nietzsche wants en-krateia. |
24113 | Our motives don't explain our actions [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Human actions can in no way be explained by reference to human motives. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1881-82 [1882], 9[43]) | |
A reaction: He takes motives to come after the event. His view seems to be that our actions are deeply inexplicable. But if we explain why we performed some action, are we all and always lying? We give reasons, even if we don't know the source of the reasons. |
6896 | Double effect is the distinction between what is foreseen and what is intended [Mautner] |
Full Idea: The doctrine of double effect is that there is a moral distinction between what is foreseen by an agent as a likely result of an action, and what is intended. | |
From: Thomas Mautner (Penguin Dictionary of Philosophy [1996], p.150) | |
A reaction: Abortion for a pregnancy threatening the mother's life. What always intrigues me is the effects which you didn't foresee because you couldn't be bothered to think about them. How much obligation do you have to try to foresee events? |
6897 | Double effect acts need goodness, unintended evil, good not caused by evil, and outweighing [Mautner] |
Full Idea: It is suggested the double effect act requires 1) the act is good, 2) the bad effect is not intended, and is avoided if possible, 3) the bad effect doesn't cause the good result, 4) the good must outweigh the bad side effect. | |
From: Thomas Mautner (Penguin Dictionary of Philosophy [1996], p.151) | |
A reaction: It is suggested that these won't work for permissibility of an action, but they might be appropriate for blameworthiness. Personally I am rather impressed by the four-part framework here, whatever nitpicking objections others may have found. |
24087 | People who miss beauty seek the sublime, where even the ugly shows its 'beauty' [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Whoever does to achieve the beautiful seeks the wildly sublime, because there even the ugly can show its 'beauty'. Likewise we seek the wildly sublime morality. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1881-82 [1882], 11[049]) | |
A reaction: Is the 'we' here Nietzsche, or the herd? The former, I guess, since some the values he likes seem rather ugly to me. He is a fan of war, for example. I'm guessing that massive destruction is sublime but ugly. |
24091 | The sublimity of nature which dwarfs us was a human creation [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: This beauty and sublimity of nature, before which every human being seems small, was first imposed on nature by us. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1881-82 [1882], 12[38]) | |
A reaction: I was struck when I was 10 with how indifferent to a landscape I was, when my mother told me it was 'beautiful'. Five years later I saw it differently. I assume nature is not intrinsically sublime. Dwarfed by our own concept is a bit odd. |
24093 | We can aspire to greatness by creating new functions for ourselves [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: To see the new greatness not above oneself, not outside oneself, but to make a new function from it. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1881-82 [1882], 13[19]) | |
A reaction: Thus we might combine the Aristotelian and the existentialist views! Do we discover our function or invent it? Anyone who acquires an expertise is creating a new function for themselves, presumably with a high value. |
24121 | Greeks might see modern analysis of what is human as impious [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Perhaps a Greek would experience the way we have delved deeply in uncovering what is human to be an impiety against nature, a shameless act. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1881-82 [1882], 34[01]) | |
A reaction: Three instances come to mind: Vesalius, Kant and Darwin. That is, anatomical dissection, deep and critical introspection, and natural selection. Human dissection was certainly a Greek taboo. |
24107 | Once a drive controls the intellect, it rules, and sets the goals [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Once it has taken control of the intellect, every single human drive probably demands to be recognised as the ultimate lord and goal-setter of all human matters. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1881-82 [1882], 7[057]) | |
A reaction: This is the best line of attack against the view I like, that human values arise out of the central functions of human nature. It is roughly the existential objection. Is all intellect controlled by some drive, or can intellect seize control of a drive? |
5452 | 'Essentialism' is opposed to existentialism, and claims there is a human nature [Mautner] |
Full Idea: In philosophical anthropology, the view that there is a human nature or essence is called 'essentialism'. It became current in 1946 as a contrast to Sartre's existentialist view. | |
From: Thomas Mautner (Penguin Dictionary of Philosophy [1996], p.179) | |
A reaction: Being a fan of Aristotle, I incline towards the older view, but you cannot get away from the fact that the human brain has similarities to a Universal Turing Machine, and diverse cultures produce very different individuals. |
24085 | For absolute morality a goal for mankind is needed [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: I deny absolute morality because I do not know an absolute goal of mankind. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1881-82 [1882], 11[037]) | |
A reaction: Christianity dreams of union of souls with God (clustering around God like goldfish to food, according to Dante). That is an absolute goal, justifying an absolute morality. If Aristotelians could identify human nature, its flourishing might be absolute. |
24101 | We always assign values, but we may not value those values [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: It is impossible to live without assigning value: but it is possible to live without assigning value to what you value. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1881-82 [1882], 5[1]186) | |
A reaction: True. In my terminology, we can't live without thinking some things are more important than others. But that is compatible with not assigning much importance to anything. |
24094 | Humans are vividly aware of short-term effects, and almost ignorant of the long-term ones [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: How weakly human beings feel responsible for their indirect and distant effects! And how cruelly and exaggeratedly the closest effect that we exert pounces on us - the effect we see, for which our myopic vision is still just sharp enough! | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1881-82 [1882], 15[11]) | |
A reaction: This strikes me as both accurate and important, because consequentialist ethics is largely committed to judging by a very distorted image of their own objective. |
24111 | Happiness is the active equilibrium of our drives [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Happiness would be the equilibrium of the triggering activities of all the drives. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1881-82 [1882], 7[260]) | |
A reaction: For Nietzsche, only the 'highest' sort of human being could achieve such happiness. I can certainly see that there is happiness when a person is fully focused on something that seems worth doing. |
24109 | Actual morality is more complicated and subtle than theory (which gets paralysed) [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Actual morality is infinitely more subtle, more complicated, more thoughtful than theoretical morality: the latter still stands awkward and embarrassed at the starting point. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1881-82 [1882], 7[202]) | |
A reaction: Glad to find an explicit endorsement of particularism in Nietzsche, since so much of his discussion points that way. |
541 | Virtue comes more from habit than character [Critias] |
Full Idea: More men are good through habit than through character. | |
From: Critias (fragments/reports [c.440 BCE], B09), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 3.29.41 |
24110 | Some things we would never do, even for the highest ideals [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: There are actions that we will never allow ourselves to engage in, not even as a means to the noblest end e.g., betraying a friend. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1881-82 [1882], 7[241]) | |
A reaction: Jean Genet made a point of betraying his friends. I wonder why Nietzsche thinks we should not betray our friends? Being Nietzsche, he will certainly have asked the question. |
24103 | You should not want too many virtues; one is enough [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: You should not want to have too many virtues. One virtue is already a lot of virtue. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1881-82 [1882], 5[18]) | |
A reaction: A typically challenging thought from the great maverick of philosophy. Which virtue would you choose? Do some virtues entail further virtues? |
24106 | Talk of 'utility' presupposes that what is useful to people has been defined [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: All this chat about 'utility' already presupposes that what is useful to people has been defined: in other words, useful for what! i.e. the people's purposes are already taken for granted. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1881-82 [1882], 7[030]) | |
A reaction: When they stopped talking about utility they talked instead about 'benefit', but the same objection applies. This is the problem of paternalism in Utilitarianism, which leads to Preference Utilitarianism, which probably doesn't help. |
24086 | The goal is to settle human beings, like other animals, but humans are still changeable [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Obviously the goal is to make human beings as steady and firm as most animal species; they have adapted to the conditions of the earth etc. and do not change essentially. The human being is still changeable - is still becoming. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1881-82 [1882], 11[044]) | |
A reaction: I favour an Aristotelian view, based on the flourishing of human nature, but this thought obviously challenges such a view. Great changes to a culture can make some difference to the apparent nature of people. |
24123 | My eternal recurrence is opposed to feeling fragmented and imperfect [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: I held up eternal recurrence against the numbing feeling of general disintegration and imperfection. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1881-82 [1882], 24[28]) | |
A reaction: I've heard people say that they think Nietzsche was a nihilist. This is nonsense. His whole career was an opposition to nihilism. His excitement over the idea of recurrence is that he sees a real answer to nihilism. You have to value a recurring life. |
24088 | See our present lives as eternal! Religions see it as fleeting, and aim at some different life [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Let us press the image of eternity on our life! This thought contains more than all religions that despise this life as fleeting and taught us to look toward an unspecified different life. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1881-82 [1882], 11[159]) | |
A reaction: This is the best statement of the idea of eternal recurrence I have so far found. His ideal is to design a life for ourselves which we would be happy to see endlessly repeated. A lot of thought would have to go into that! |
24119 | The eternal return of wastefulness is a terrible thought [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: The most terrible thought of an eternal return of wastefulness. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1881-82 [1882], 20[02]) | |
A reaction: This illuminates quite well his notion of eternal recurrence. Not only what you would do in an eternally recurring life, but what you would avoid. |
24116 | Justice says people are not equal, and should become increasingly unequal [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: People are not equal: thus speaks justice. …Humans should keep becoming ever more unequal. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1881-82 [1882], 12[43]) | |
A reaction: Important to add a little dash of Nietzsche to the widespread modern mantras about equality. We must at least question the extent to which equality should be our aim. (Personally I am an egalitarian liberal). |
24098 | Reasons that justify punishment can also justify the crime [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: The reasons used to justify the punishment for a crime can also be used to justify the crime. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1881-82 [1882], 3[312]) | |
A reaction: A splendid observation, even if it is not wholly true. The justification of capital punishment appeals in some way to the whole of society, but a murderer could hardly do that. |
24118 | Do away with punishment. Counter-retribution is as bad as the crime [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: My programme: do away with punishment: for us. Counter-retribution is nonsense. (If something is evil, then whoever performs the counter-retribution is certainly committing the same evil). | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1881-82 [1882], 16[17]) | |
A reaction: Note that he seems to have a perfectly orthodox concept of 'evil' here. I don't think he ever suggested a strategy to replace punishment. |
24100 | If you don't want war, remove your borders; but you set up borders because you want war [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: You are waging war? You fear your neighbour? So remove the border markers: then you will have no more neighbours. But you want war: and that's why you set up the border markers in the first place. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1881-82 [1882], 5[1]145) | |
A reaction: The only reason to demarcate some territory is to keep other people out of it, which is a first act of gentle hostility. The European Union is trying to gradually dismantle the borders. Nietzsche had a creepy liking for war. |
24095 | Our growth is too subtle to perceive, and long events are too slow for us to grasp [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: The slowness of the events in the history of human beings is not suited to the human sense of time - and the subtlety and smallness of all growth defies human vision. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1881-82 [1882], 15[41]) | |
A reaction: The only way we can study history is by 'periods'. It is as if English history has its slate wiped clean in 1066, 1485, 1603 and 1689. All historians know that the reality of it all is totally beyond our grasp. |
24096 | Unlike time, space is subjective. Empty space was assumed, but it doesn't exist [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Space, like matter, is a subjective form. Time is not. Space first emerged through the assumption of empty space. This doesn't exist. Force is everything. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1881-82 [1882], 1[003]) | |
A reaction: I would think modern physics endorses his opinion of space. The original atomists proposed a 'void', to prevent traffic jams of atoms. Now we see space as fields, so it is never empty. |
24122 | Life is forces conjoined by nutrition, to produce resistance, arrangement and value [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: A multiplicity of forces, conjoined through a common nutritive process, is what we call 'life'. All so-called feeling, representing, thinking is part of this nutritive process to enable resistance to other forces, and arrangement, and an evaluation. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1881-82 [1882], 24[14]) | |
A reaction: [compressed at the end] Since no one else seems able to define life, this is quite a good attempt. Life is certainly a sort of unification of active energies, which than share goals. |
542 | Fear of the gods was invented to discourage secret sin [Critias] |
Full Idea: When the laws forbade men to commit open crimes of violence, and they began to do them in secret, a wise and clever man invented fear of the gods for mortals, to frighten the wicked, even if they sin in secret. | |
From: Critias (fragments/reports [c.440 BCE], B25), quoted by Sextus Empiricus - Against the Professors (six books) 9.54 |