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All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Transcendence of the Ego' and 'Truth and Truthmakers'

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54 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 5. Metaphysics beyond Science
All metaphysical discussion should be guided by a quest for truthmakers [Armstrong]
     Full Idea: My plea, whatever conclusions are drawn, is to control the metaphysical discussion by continual reference to suggested truthmakers.
     From: David M. Armstrong (Truth and Truthmakers [2004], 08.7)
     A reaction: ...And my plea is to control metaethical discussion by continual reference to value-makers. In general, this is the approach which will deliver a unified account of the world. Truthmakers are the ideal restraint on extravagant metaphysics.
1. Philosophy / H. Continental Philosophy / 2. Phenomenology
Phenomenology assumes that all consciousness is of something [Sartre]
     Full Idea: The essential principle of phenomenology is that 'all consciousness is consciousness of something'.
     From: Jean-Paul Sartre (Transcendence of the Ego [1937], I (B))
     A reaction: This idea is found well before Husserl, in Schopenhauer (Idea 4166). It seems to contradict a thought such as Locke's (Idea 1202), that self-awareness is a separate and distinct criterion for personal identity. Sartre gives a nice account.
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 4. Truthmaker Necessitarianism
Truth-making can't be entailment, because truthmakers are portions of reality [Armstrong]
     Full Idea: Truth-making cannot be any form of entailment. Both terms of an entailment relation must be propositions, but the truth-making term of the truth-making relation is a portion of reality, and, in general at least, portions of reality are not propositions.
     From: David M. Armstrong (Truth and Truthmakers [2004], 02.3)
     A reaction: Along with Idea 18466, that seems to firmly demolish the idea that truth-making is a logical entailment.
Armstrong says truthmakers necessitate their truth, where 'necessitate' is a primitive relation [Armstrong, by MacBride]
     Full Idea: In a bold manouevre Armstrong posited a metaphysically primitive relation of necessitation, and then defined truth-makers in terms of this bridging relation, as a thing that necessitates something being true.
     From: report of David M. Armstrong (Truth and Truthmakers [2004], 02.3) by Fraser MacBride - Truthmakers 1.2
     A reaction: [Not sure of page reference] Spelled out so clearly by MacBride, this sounds dubious. How many truths are necessitated by the City of London? Do truthmakers necessitate the existence of their truths? MacBride says it's a circular theory.
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 6. Making Negative Truths
Negative truths have as truthmakers all states of affairs relevant to the truth [Armstrong]
     Full Idea: Postulate a higher-order state of affairs, of all the states of affairs in which Theaetetus is involved. Is this not a good candidate for a truthmaker for the negative truth that 'Theaetetus is not flying'?
     From: David M. Armstrong (Truth and Truthmakers [2004], 05.2)
     A reaction: It certainly seems extravagant to need the whole universe to make true 'there are no lions in this room'. But for 'there are no unicorns' it is not clear which states of affairs unicorns are involved. (Armstrong is aware of this).
The nature of arctic animals is truthmaker for the absence of penguins there [Armstrong]
     Full Idea: Each of the arctic animals is by its nature different from a penguin, so this general state of affairs seems truthmaker enough for this negative existential. Similarly, the totality of all birds eliminates the phoenix.
     From: David M. Armstrong (Truth and Truthmakers [2004], 06.2)
     A reaction: Why is it 'animals' in one case, and 'birds' in the other? What if there was no life in arctic? Would the snow then do the job? This doesn't seem to work.
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 7. Making Modal Truths
In mathematics, truthmakers are possible instantiations of structures [Armstrong]
     Full Idea: A mathematical entity exists if and only if it is possible that there be instantiations of that structure. This transforms the question of truthmakers for the existence of mathematical entities into a question of truthmakers for certain possibilities.
     From: David M. Armstrong (Truth and Truthmakers [2004], 09.3)
     A reaction: This modal approach to structuralism [for which he endorses Hellman 1989] opens up a modal approach to other truthmakers, which places dispositions at the centre of physical truthmaking. No sets of Meinongian objects?
One truthmaker will do for a contingent truth and for its contradictory [Armstrong]
     Full Idea: It seems reasonable to say that a truthmaker for a contingent truth is also a truthmaker for the truth that the contradictory of that truth is possible.
     From: David M. Armstrong (Truth and Truthmakers [2004], 07.2)
     A reaction: The truthmaker will have to be not only some fact, but also the additional fact that it is contingent, in order to generate the possibility of the contradictory.
The truthmakers for possible unicorns are the elements in their combination [Armstrong]
     Full Idea: The obvious minimal truthmaker for the truth that 'it is possible that a unicorn exists' is combinatorial. The elements of the combination are all that is needed.
     From: David M. Armstrong (Truth and Truthmakers [2004], 07.5)
     A reaction: This seems to imply that there are no possibilities which are not combinations of what currently exists.
What is the truthmaker for 'it is possible that there could have been nothing'? [Armstrong]
     Full Idea: It is possible that there could have been nothing. ...What would be its truthmaker?
     From: David M. Armstrong (Truth and Truthmakers [2004], 07.4)
     A reaction: I suppose the truthmaker here is the whole of reality, with its dispositions and contingencies. But that won't do for 'possibly there might never have been anything'. In such a case there wouldn't be any truths.
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 8. Making General Truths
Necessitating general truthmakers must also specify their limits [Armstrong]
     Full Idea: The mereological sum of what happens to be all the men does not necessitate that it is all the men. So if truthmaking involves necessitation, then this object cannot be the complete truthmaker for .
     From: David M. Armstrong (Truth and Truthmakers [2004], 06.1)
     A reaction: [He invokes Russell has his source] His point is that the truthmaker needs a further fact, beyond the men, which specifies that this is all of them. But only if truthmakers necessitate their truths (as Armstrong claims). I'm sympathetic to both claims.
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 1. Set Theory
The set theory brackets { } assert that the member is a unit [Armstrong]
     Full Idea: The idea is that braces { } attribute to an entity the place-holding, or perhaps determinable, property of unithood.
     From: David M. Armstrong (Truth and Truthmakers [2004], 09.5)
     A reaction: I like this. There is Socrates himself, then there is my concept , and then there is the singleton {Socrates}. Those braces must add something to the concept. You can't add braces to Socrates himself.
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 3. Types of Set / b. Empty (Null) Set
For 'there is a class with no members' we don't need the null set as truthmaker [Armstrong]
     Full Idea: The null class is useful in formal set theory, but I hope that does not require that there be a thing called the null class which is truthmaker for the strange proposition .
     From: David M. Armstrong (Truth and Truthmakers [2004], 09.1)
     A reaction: It is not quite clear why it doesn't, but then it is not quite clear to philosophers what the status of the null set is, in comparison with sets that have members.
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / a. Units
Classes have cardinalities, so their members must all be treated as units [Armstrong]
     Full Idea: Classes, because they have a particular cardinality, are essentially a certain number of ones, things that, within the particular class, are each taken as a unit.
     From: David M. Armstrong (Truth and Truthmakers [2004], 09.1)
     A reaction: [Singletons are exceptions] So units are basic to set theory, which is the foundations of technical analytic philosophy (as well as, for many, of mathematics). If you can't treat something as a unit, it won't go into set theory. Vagueness...
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 6. Fundamentals / d. Logical atoms
Logical atomism builds on the simple properties, but are they the only possible properties? [Armstrong]
     Full Idea: One of the assumptions of logical atomism is that all structural properties, all complex properties, are composed of simple properties and relations. ...But does the totality of the simple properties consist of the only possible simple properties?
     From: David M. Armstrong (Truth and Truthmakers [2004], 07.3)
     A reaction: This refers to what Lewis calls 'alien' properties - possible properties that cannot even be constructed from actual properties. Armstrong's question is about the truthmakers for such things. A bit speculative...
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 5. Naturalism
'Naturalism' says only the world of space-time exists [Armstrong]
     Full Idea: I define 'naturalism' as the hypothesis that the world of space-time is all that there is.
     From: David M. Armstrong (Truth and Truthmakers [2004], 09.1)
     A reaction: This is helpful, because it doesn't mention the nature of the physical matter contained in space-time, leaving theories like panpsychism as possible naturalistic theories. Galen Strawson, for example.
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 9. States of Affairs
Truthmaking needs states of affairs, to unite particulars with tropes or universals. [Armstrong]
     Full Idea: There must exist states of affairs as truthmakers, to get us beyond 'loose and separate' entities. ...They can be bundles of tropes, or trope-with-particular, or bundles of universals ('compresence'), or instantiations. They are an addition to ontology.
     From: David M. Armstrong (Truth and Truthmakers [2004], 04.5)
     A reaction: Armstrong is the great champion of states of affairs. They seem rather vague to me, and disconcertingly timeless.
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 2. Need for Properties
We need properties, as minimal truthmakers for the truths about objects [Armstrong]
     Full Idea: The 'thing itself' seems not be a minimal truthmaker for the thing having its particular mass. ...The thing has a great many other properties. ...It seems entirely reasonable to postulate that the object has properties that are objectively there.
     From: David M. Armstrong (Truth and Truthmakers [2004], 04.2)
     A reaction: This is Armstrong using the truthmaker principle to argue for the existence of properties (as instantiated universals). I like truthmakers, but truths do not have enough precision in their parts for us to read off reality from them.
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 3. Types of Properties
The determinates of a determinable must be incompatible with each other [Armstrong]
     Full Idea: A set of determinates under the one determinable are incompatible by definition. If an object is not one mile in length, then its actual length will be incompatible with being one mile in length.
     From: David M. Armstrong (Truth and Truthmakers [2004], 05.2.1)
     A reaction: This is a much better general version of the standard example 'if it is red it can't be green'. Armstrong uses it to give a more precise account of incompatibility. Useful.
Length is a 'determinable' property, and one mile is one its 'determinates' [Armstrong]
     Full Idea: Length is a 'determinable' property; being some particular length, such as a mile, is one of its 'determinates'.
     From: David M. Armstrong (Truth and Truthmakers [2004], 05.2.1)
     A reaction: The seem to be 'type' and 'token' properties, except that this other vocabulary indicates the link between them.
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / a. Nature of tropes
If tropes are non-transferable, then they necessarily belong to their particular substance [Armstrong]
     Full Idea: 'Non-transferable' theories of tropes hold that the mass is of this stone by necessity. It is an identity condition for the property. Every property then becomes an essential property.
     From: David M. Armstrong (Truth and Truthmakers [2004], 04.3)
     A reaction: [He cites Martin and Heil for this view] It is hard to see in this proposal how the trope is in any way separate from its substance, and hence it seems a bit of a vacuous theory. (The other theories of properties aren't much cop either).
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 5. Powers and Properties
Properties are not powers - they just have powers [Armstrong]
     Full Idea: Properties are not powers. But properties have powers. They bestow powers.
     From: David M. Armstrong (Truth and Truthmakers [2004], 10.4)
     A reaction: I think this is the wrong way round. In this view, powers become extremely vague things, ranging from the fine-grained to the hugely broad. It seems to me that powers are precise and real, but properties are the vague unhelpful things.
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 7. Against Powers
Powers must result in some non-powers, or there would only be potential without result [Armstrong]
     Full Idea: Powers must surely issue in manifestations that are something more than just powers. A world where potency never issued in act, but only in more potency, would be one where one travelled without ever having the possibility of arriving.
     From: David M. Armstrong (Truth and Truthmakers [2004], 10.4)
     A reaction: Tricky. The picture I favour is that the distinction between powers and categorical properties is a misunderstanding. What is fundamental is active and powerful categoricals.
How does the power of gravity know the distance it acts over? [Armstrong]
     Full Idea: If masses are powers, the forces generated between two particulars have to vary inversely with the square of their distance apart. Have not the masses got to 'know' at what distance they are from each other, to exert the right amount of force?
     From: David M. Armstrong (Truth and Truthmakers [2004], 10.4)
     A reaction: This seems like a good warning against a simplistic account of powers doing all the work, but I suspect that more sophisticated physics would offer the fan of powers a solution here. The power is to 'spread' the force around.
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 5. Class Nominalism
The class of similar things is much too big a truthmaker for the feature of a particular [Armstrong]
     Full Idea: For a Class Nominalist 'the class of all 4-kilo objects' is the truthmaker for the truth that the particular has just that mass. Yet this looks far too big! Would not the object still be four kilos even if the other members of the class had never existed?
     From: David M. Armstrong (Truth and Truthmakers [2004], 04.2)
     A reaction: This seems so obvious to me as to be hardly worth saying. To identify redness with the class of red entities just seems crazy. Why do they belong in that class? Armstrong is illustrating the value of the truthmaker idea in philosophy.
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 1. Concept of Identity
When entities contain entities, or overlap with them, there is 'partial' identity [Armstrong]
     Full Idea: There is 'partial identity' where one entity contains another with something to spare, or else where entities overlap each other. ...Extensive quantities, such as length and mass, are the particularly plausible cases.
     From: David M. Armstrong (Truth and Truthmakers [2004], 08.5)
     A reaction: This looks like a very useful concept which deserves wider use. It will help discussions of rivers, statues, intersecting roads etc.
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / e. Against possible worlds
Possible worlds don't fix necessities; intrinsic necessities imply the extension in worlds [Armstrong]
     Full Idea: It seems natural and plausible to say that it is the fact that a necessary truth is itself necessary that determines its truth in all possible worlds. This intension determines its extension across possible worlds.
     From: David M. Armstrong (Truth and Truthmakers [2004], 08.1)
     A reaction: Well said. To me (but not to Armstrong) this implies essentialism, that the necessity arises from the intrinsic natures of the things involved. The whole Lewisian approach of explaining things by mapping them strikes me as wrong.
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 5. Cogito Critique
The Cogito depends on a second-order experience, of being conscious of consciousness [Sartre]
     Full Idea: We must remember that all authors who have described the Cogito have presented it as a reflective operation, i.e. as second-order. This Cogito is performed by a consciousness directed towards consciousness, which takes consciousness as its object.
     From: Jean-Paul Sartre (Transcendence of the Ego [1937], I (B))
     A reaction: Sartre is raising the nice question of whether the Cogito still works for first-order consciousness, which attends totally to external objects. He claims that it doesn't. Contrast Russell, who says (Idea 5380) that it only works when it is first-order!
The consciousness that says 'I think' is not the consciousness that thinks [Sartre]
     Full Idea: The consciousness that says 'I think' is precisely not the consciousness that thinks.
     From: Jean-Paul Sartre (Transcendence of the Ego [1937], I (B))
     A reaction: All parties seem to be agreed that if we are going to introspect in search of our own ego, we must distinguish between the mental act of instrospection and the mental act of applying the mind to the world. Each gives a different result.
Is the Cogito reporting an immediate experience of doubting, or the whole enterprise of doubting? [Sartre]
     Full Idea: When Descartes says 'I doubt therefore I am', is he talking about the spontaneous doubt that reflective consciousness grasps in its instantaneous character, or is he talking of the enterprise of doubting? This ambiguity can lead to serious errors.
     From: Jean-Paul Sartre (Transcendence of the Ego [1937], II (B))
     A reaction: Interesting. The obvious response is that it is about the immediate experience, but that leads to the problem of an instantaneous ego, which can't be justified over time. The 'enterprise' gives an enduring ego, but it is a more intellectual concept.
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / b. Scepticism of other minds
We can never, even in principle, grasp other minds, because the Ego is self-conceiving [Sartre]
     Full Idea: The Ego can be conceived only through itself and this is why we cannot grasp the consciousness of another (for this reason alone, and not because bodies separate us).
     From: Jean-Paul Sartre (Transcendence of the Ego [1937], II (D))
     A reaction: Interesting. This makes telepathy a logical impossibility, and the body the only possible route for the communication between two minds. But, is Sartre is right, how do bodily events penetrate the inturned world of the Ego?
A consciousness can conceive of no other consciousness than itself [Sartre]
     Full Idea: A consciousness can conceive of no other consciousness than itself.
     From: Jean-Paul Sartre (Transcendence of the Ego [1937], Conc (1))
     A reaction: This is why we don't know what it is like to be a bat. This seems right, though it looks like a contingent truth, and yet Sartre seems to offer it as a necessary truth. Can God conceive of my consciousness?
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 5. Unity of Mind
The eternal truth of 2+2=4 is what gives unity to the mind which regularly thinks it [Sartre]
     Full Idea: The unity of the thousand active consciousnesses through which I have added two and two to make four, is the transcendent object '2+2=4'. Without the permanence of this eternal truth, it would be impossible to conceive of a real unity of mind.
     From: Jean-Paul Sartre (Transcendence of the Ego [1937], I (A))
     A reaction: This is the germ of externalism, here presented as a Platonic attitude to arithmetic, rather than being about water or gold. He claims that internalist attitudes to unity are fictions. I am inclined to think he is wrong, and that unity is biological.
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / f. Higher-order thought
Consciousness exists as consciousness of itself [Sartre]
     Full Idea: The existence of consciousness is an absolute, because consciousness is consciousness of itself; the type of existence that consciousness has is that it is consciousness of itself.
     From: Jean-Paul Sartre (Transcendence of the Ego [1937], I (A))
     A reaction: I find this unconvincing. Anyone analysis the nature of the mind should think as much about animal minds as human minds. It seems obvious to me that there is likely to be an animal consciousness which is entirely of environment and its body.
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 2. Unconscious Mind
Since we are a consciousness, Sartre entirely rejected the unconscious mind [Sartre, by Daigle]
     Full Idea: Sartre refused, denied and fought against the unconscious. Since we are consciousness, there cannot be such a thing as unconsciousness.
     From: report of Jean-Paul Sartre (Transcendence of the Ego [1937]) by Christine Daigle - Jean-Paul Sartre 2.1
     A reaction: The modern view is increasingly opposed to this, as neuroscience and psychology uncover hidden motives etc. Sartre's view is still legitimate, though. An unconscious motive is not more my motive than a law of the land is part of me?
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / a. Nature of intentionality
Intentionality defines, transcends and unites consciousness [Sartre]
     Full Idea: Consciousness is defined by intentionality. Through intentionality it transcends itself, it unifies itself by going outside itself.
     From: Jean-Paul Sartre (Transcendence of the Ego [1937], I (A))
     A reaction: The standard view for a hundred years was Brentano's idea that intentionality defines the mind. Qualia are the modern rival. If I had to choose I think I would go for intentionality, but they may be naturally and metaphysically inseparable.
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 5. Generalisation by mind
General truths are a type of negative truth, saying there are no more ravens than black ones [Armstrong]
     Full Idea: General truths are a species of negative truth, 'no more' truths, asserting that there are no more men than the mortal ones, no more ravens than the black ones.
     From: David M. Armstrong (Truth and Truthmakers [2004], 05.1)
     A reaction: He goes on to distinguish between 'absences' and 'limits' in this area.
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 4. Presupposition of Self
If you think of '2+2=4' as the content of thought, the self must be united transcendentally [Sartre]
     Full Idea: It is possible that those who think that '2 and 2 make 4' is the content of my representations may be forced to resort to a transcendental and subjective principle of unification - in other words, the I.
     From: Jean-Paul Sartre (Transcendence of the Ego [1937], I (A))
     A reaction: He suggests that thoughts themselves unite the mind, externally. If you think of thoughts as internal, you must resort to a transcendental fiction to unify the mind. Personally I think the mind is inherently unified by brain structures.
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 6. Self as Higher Awareness
The Ego is not formally or materially part of consciousness, but is outside in the world [Sartre]
     Full Idea: I should like to show here that the Ego is neither formally nor materially in consciousness; it is outside, in the world; it is a being in the world, like the Ego of another.
     From: Jean-Paul Sartre (Transcendence of the Ego [1937], Intro)
     A reaction: This idea is the germ of what has got modern externalists about the mind (see quotations from Mark Rowlands) interested in Sartre. Personally I think he is wrong, and the Ego is a part of consciousness. It doesn't, though, have sharp boundaries.
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 2. Knowing the Self
How could two I's, the reflective and the reflected, communicate with each other? [Sartre]
     Full Idea: If the 'I' is part of consciousness, there will be two I's: the reflective and the reflected. ...but it is unacceptable for any communication to be established between the reflective I and the reflected I, if they are real elements of consciousness.
     From: Jean-Paul Sartre (Transcendence of the Ego [1937], I (B))
     A reaction: If we accept that there are two orders of consciousness (reflective, about itself, and reflected, about the world) it seems reasonable to say that there cannot be an 'I' in both of them. A nice, and intriguing, argument.
Knowing yourself requires an exterior viewpoint, which is necessarily false [Sartre]
     Full Idea: 'To know oneself well' is inevitably to look at oneself from the point of view of someone else, in other words from a point of view that is necessarily false.
     From: Jean-Paul Sartre (Transcendence of the Ego [1937], II (D))
     A reaction: (This is because the Ego cannot be known from the outside). I agree with Russell that the self is most evident when we are engaged with the world, which implies that you can only acquire self-knowledge by studying those engagements.
My ego is more intimate to me, but not more certain than other egos [Sartre]
     Full Idea: My I, in efffect, is no more certain for consciousness than the I of other men. It is only more intimate.
     From: Jean-Paul Sartre (Transcendence of the Ego [1937], p.104), quoted by Christine Daigle - Jean-Paul Sartre 2.1
     A reaction: Not sure how to assess this. Other people seem just as real as I do, when I encounter them, as friend or as foe. And in dealing with them we act as if dealing with their Self (rather than their legs, say). So this idea seems a good one.
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 3. Limits of Introspection
The Ego never appears except when we are not looking for it [Sartre]
     Full Idea: The Ego never appears except when we are not looking for it.
     From: Jean-Paul Sartre (Transcendence of the Ego [1937], II (D))
     A reaction: He denies that we know the Ego when engaged with the world, and agrees with Hume that the ego can't be directly known. All that is left is this, which seems to be introspection 'out of the corner of your eye'. Not persuasive.
When we are unreflective (as when chasing a tram) there is no 'I' [Sartre]
     Full Idea: There is no 'I' on the unreflected level. When I run after a tram, ...there is no I. There is a consciousness of the tram-needing-to-be-caught, and a non-positional consciousness of consciousness.
     From: Jean-Paul Sartre (Transcendence of the Ego [1937], I (B))
     A reaction: Russell (Idea 5380) says exactly the opposite. My sympathies are more with Russell. I don't just focus on the tram, I focus on the relation between myself and the tram, and that includes my need to catch it, as well as my body.
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / a. Memory is Self
It is theoretically possible that the Ego consists entirely of false memories [Sartre]
     Full Idea: One cannot rule out the metaphysical hypothesis that my Ego is not composed of elements that have existed in reality (ten years or one second ago), but is merely constituted by false memories.
     From: Jean-Paul Sartre (Transcendence of the Ego [1937], II (D))
     A reaction: (He mentions the evil demon as a source). The problem that false memories (such as George IV 'remembering' he was at Waterloo, when he wasn't) is well known. But this raises the possibility of all memories being false, yet constituting the person.
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 4. Split Consciousness
If the 'I' is transcendental, it unnecessarily splits consciousness in two [Sartre]
     Full Idea: The superfluous transcendental 'I' is actually a hindrance. If it existed, it would violently separate consciousness from itself, it would divide it, slicing through consciousness like an opaque blade.
     From: Jean-Paul Sartre (Transcendence of the Ego [1937], I (A))
     A reaction: I see no a priori reason why consciousness should not be split in two, if that's how it is. Personally I am happy with a fairly traditional Cartesian view, that the self is the will and understanding, and the rest of consciousness is its working material.
16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 4. Denial of the Self
Maybe it is the act of reflection that brings 'me' into existence [Sartre]
     Full Idea: Might it not be precisely the reflective act that brings the me into being in reflected consciousness?
     From: Jean-Paul Sartre (Transcendence of the Ego [1937], I (B))
     A reaction: He admits some sort of self a second-order entity, but this is 'transcendental', and essentially an illusion. This elimination of the first-order self clears the way for the existential view, that we can create whatever self we want. I disagree.
The Ego only appears to reflection, so it is cut off from the World [Sartre]
     Full Idea: The Ego is an object that appears only to reflection, and is thereby radically cut off from the World.
     From: Jean-Paul Sartre (Transcendence of the Ego [1937], II (D))
     A reaction: This is the culmination of Sartre's attack (in 1937) on the Ego, paving the way for the freedom of existentialism. Personally I don't accept this picture of the Ego as a second-order fiction. My Ego is part of my relationship with the World.
19. Language / D. Propositions / 2. Abstract Propositions / a. Propositions as sense
For all being, there is a potential proposition which expresses its existence and nature [Armstrong]
     Full Idea: The thesis of 'expressibility' says that for all being, there is a proposition (perhaps one never formulated by any mind at any time) that truly renders the existence and nature of this being.
     From: David M. Armstrong (Truth and Truthmakers [2004], 02.3.2)
     A reaction: [He credits Stephen Read 2000:68-9 for this] Armstrong accepts this, but I deny it. I can't make any sense of this vast plethora of propositions, each exactly expressing some minute nuance of the infinity complexity of all being.
A realm of abstract propositions is causally inert, so has no explanatory value [Armstrong]
     Full Idea: We could not stand in any causal or nomic relation to a realm of propositions over and above the space-time world, ...so it is unclear that such a postulation is of any explanatory value.
     From: David M. Armstrong (Truth and Truthmakers [2004], 02.6)
     A reaction: I agree, and I like Armstrong's appeal to explanation as a criterion for whether we should make an ontological commitment here. I am baffled by anyone who thinks reality is crammed full of unarticulated propositions. Only a philosopher....
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / e. Character
Virtue comes more from habit than character [Critias]
     Full Idea: More men are good through habit than through character.
     From: Critias (fragments/reports [c.440 BCE], B09), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 3.29.41
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 4. Naturalised causation
Negative causations supervene on positive causations plus their laws? [Armstrong]
     Full Idea: Is it not very plausible that negative causations supervene on the positive causations together with the laws that govern the positive causations?
     From: David M. Armstrong (Truth and Truthmakers [2004], 05.2.3)
     A reaction: This obviously has a naturalistic appeal, since all causation can then be based on the actual world.
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 3. Parts of Time / e. Present moment
The pure present moment is too brief to be experienced [Armstrong]
     Full Idea: The metaphysical present will be a strict instant, or, if time is not infinitely divisible, the present will be a minimum granule of duration. But strict instants or minimal granules of duration, if these exist, cannot be experienced.
     From: David M. Armstrong (Truth and Truthmakers [2004], 11)
     A reaction: He points out that this is ironic, since Presentism lies on the basic experience of the present.
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 5. Atheism
Fear of the gods was invented to discourage secret sin [Critias]
     Full Idea: When the laws forbade men to commit open crimes of violence, and they began to do them in secret, a wise and clever man invented fear of the gods for mortals, to frighten the wicked, even if they sin in secret.
     From: Critias (fragments/reports [c.440 BCE], B25), quoted by Sextus Empiricus - Against the Professors (six books) 9.54