11175
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Logical concepts rest on certain inferences, not on facts about implications [Fine,K]
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Full Idea:
The nature of the logical concepts is given, not by certain logical truths, but by certain logical inferences. What properly belongs to disjunction is the inference from p to (p or q), rather than the fact that p implies (p or q).
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From:
Kit Fine (Senses of Essence [1995], §3)
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A reaction:
Does this mean that Fine is wickedly starting with the psychology, rather than with the pure truth of the connection? Frege is shuddering. This view seems to imply that the truth table for 'or' is secondary.
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11176
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The property of Property Abstraction says any suitable condition must imply a property [Fine,K]
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Full Idea:
According to the principle of Property Abstraction, there is, for any suitable condition, a property that is possessed by an object just in case it conforms to the condition. This is usually taken to be a second-order logical truth.
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From:
Kit Fine (Senses of Essence [1995], §4)
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A reaction:
Fine objects that it is implied that if Socrates is essentially a man, then he essentially has the property of being a man. Like Fine, I think this conclusion is distasteful. A classification is not a property, at least the way most people use 'property'.
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11173
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Being a man is a consequence of his essence, not constitutive of it [Fine,K]
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Full Idea:
If we distinguish 'constitutive' from 'consequential' essence, ..then the essence of Socrates will, in part, be constituted by his being a man. But being a man (or a mountain) will merely be consequential upon, and not constitutive of, his essence.
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From:
Kit Fine (Senses of Essence [1995], §3)
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A reaction:
Yes yes yes. I think it is absurd to say that the class to which something belongs is part of its essential nature, given that it presumably can only belong to the class if it already has a certain essential nature. What did Frankenstein construct?
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11179
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If there are alternative definitions, then we have three possibilities for essence [Fine,K]
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Full Idea:
If there are alternative definitions for an essence, we must distinguish three notions. There is the essence as the manifold (the combined definitions), or as the range of alternative definitions (with component essences), or there is the common essence.
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From:
Kit Fine (Senses of Essence [1995], §8)
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A reaction:
Fine opts for the third alternative (what the definitions all have in common) as the best account. He says (p.68) 'definitive' properties come from one definition, and 'essential' properties from every possible definition.
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4688
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We imagine small and large objects scaled to the same size, suggesting a fixed capacity for imagination [Lavers]
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Full Idea:
If we think of a pea, and then of the Eiffel Tower, they seem to occupy the same space in our consciousness, suggesting that we scale our images to fit the available hardware, just as computer imagery is limited by the screen and memory available.
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From:
Michael Lavers (talk [2003]), quoted by PG - Db (ideas)
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A reaction:
Nice point. It is especially good because it reinforces a physicalist view of the mind from introspection, where most other evidence is external observation of brains (as Nietzsche reinforces determinism by introspection).
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