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All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Thinking About Mechanisms' and 'Particle Physics'

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29 ideas

7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 2. Processes
Activities have place, rate, duration, entities, properties, modes, direction, polarity, energy and range [Machamer/Darden/Craver]
     Full Idea: Activities can be identified spatiotemporally, and individuated by rate, duration, and types of entity and property that engage in them. They also have modes of operation, directionality, polarity, energy requirements and a range.
     From: Machamer,P/Darden,L/Craver,C (Thinking About Mechanisms [2000], 3)
     A reaction: This is their attempt at making 'activity' one of the two central concepts of ontology, along with 'entity'. A helpful analysis. It just seems to be one way of slicing the cake.
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 2. Powers as Basic
Penicillin causes nothing; the cause is what penicillin does [Machamer/Darden/Craver]
     Full Idea: It is not the penicillin that causes the pneumonia to disappear, but what the penicillin does.
     From: Machamer,P/Darden,L/Craver,C (Thinking About Mechanisms [2000], 3.1)
     A reaction: This is a very neat example for illustrating how we slip into 'entity' talk, when the reality we are addressing actually concerns processes. Without the 'what it does', penicillin can't participate in causation at all.
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 2. Understanding
We understand something by presenting its low-level entities and activities [Machamer/Darden/Craver]
     Full Idea: The intelligibility of a phenomenon consists in the mechanisms being portrayed in terms of a field's bottom out entities and activities.
     From: Machamer,P/Darden,L/Craver,C (Thinking About Mechanisms [2000], 7)
     A reaction: In other words, we understand complex things by reducing them to things we do understand. It would, though, be illuminating to see a nest of interconnected activities, even if we understood none of them.
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / e. Lawlike explanations
The explanation is not the regularity, but the activity sustaining it [Machamer/Darden/Craver]
     Full Idea: It is not regularities that explain but the activities that sustain the regularities.
     From: Machamer,P/Darden,L/Craver,C (Thinking About Mechanisms [2000], 7)
     A reaction: Good, but we had better not characterise the 'activities' in terms of regularities.
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / h. Explanations by function
Functions are not properties of objects, they are activities contributing to mechanisms [Machamer/Darden/Craver]
     Full Idea: It is common to speak of functions as properties 'had by' entities, …but they should rather be understood in terms of the activities by virtue of which entities contribute to the workings of a mechanism.
     From: Machamer,P/Darden,L/Craver,C (Thinking About Mechanisms [2000], 3)
     A reaction: I'm certainly quite passionately in favour of cutting down on describing the world almost entirely in terms of entities which have properties. An 'activity', though, is a bit of an elusive concept.
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / i. Explanations by mechanism
Mechanisms are not just push-pull systems [Machamer/Darden/Craver]
     Full Idea: One should not think of mechanisms as exclusively mechanical (push-pull) systems.
     From: Machamer,P/Darden,L/Craver,C (Thinking About Mechanisms [2000], 1)
     A reaction: The difficulty seems to be that you could broaden the concept of 'mechanism' indefinitely, so that it covered history, mathematics, populations, cultural change, and even mathematics. Where to stop?
Mechanisms are systems organised to produce regular change [Machamer/Darden/Craver]
     Full Idea: Mechanisms are entities and activities organized such that they are productive of regular change from start or set-up to finish or termination conditions.
     From: Machamer,P/Darden,L/Craver,C (Thinking About Mechanisms [2000], 1)
     A reaction: This is their initial formal definition of a mechanism. Note that a mere 'activity' can be included. Presumably the mechanism might have an outcome that was not the intended outcome. Does a random element disqualify it? Are hands mechanisms?
A mechanism explains a phenomenon by showing how it was produced [Machamer/Darden/Craver]
     Full Idea: To give a description of a mechanism for a phenomenon is to explain that phenomenon, i.e. to explain how it was produced.
     From: Machamer,P/Darden,L/Craver,C (Thinking About Mechanisms [2000], 1)
     A reaction: To 'show how' something happens needs a bit of precisification. It is probably analytic that 'showing how' means 'revealing the mechanism', though 'mechanism' then becomes the tricky concept.
Our account of mechanism combines both entities and activities [Machamer/Darden/Craver]
     Full Idea: We emphasise the activities in mechanisms. This is explicitly dualist. Substantivalists speak of entities with dispositions to act. Process ontologists reify activities and try to reduce entities to processes. We try to capture both intuitions.
     From: Machamer,P/Darden,L/Craver,C (Thinking About Mechanisms [2000], 3)
     A reaction: [A quotation of selected fragments] The problem here seems to be the raising of an 'activity' to a central role in ontology, when it doesn't seem to be primitive, and will typically be analysed in a variety of ways.
Descriptions of explanatory mechanisms have a bottom level, where going further is irrelevant [Machamer/Darden/Craver]
     Full Idea: Nested hierachical descriptions of mechanisms typically bottom out in lowest level mechanisms. …Bottoming out is relative …the explanation comes to an end, and description of lower-level mechanisms would be irrelevant.
     From: Machamer,P/Darden,L/Craver,C (Thinking About Mechanisms [2000], 5.1)
     A reaction: This seems to me exactly the right story about mechanism, and it is a story I am associating with essentialism. The relevance is ties to understanding. The lower level is either fully understood, or totally baffling.
14. Science / D. Explanation / 3. Best Explanation / b. Ultimate explanation
There are four types of bottom-level activities which will explain phenomena [Machamer/Darden/Craver]
     Full Idea: There are four bottom-out kinds of activities: geometrico-mechanical, electro-chemical, electro-magnetic and energetic. These are abstract means of production that can be fruitfully applied in particular cases to explain phenomena.
     From: Machamer,P/Darden,L/Craver,C (Thinking About Mechanisms [2000], 7)
     A reaction: I like that. It gives a nice core for a metaphysics for physicalists. I suspect that 'mechanical' can be reduced to something else, and that 'energetic' will disappear in the final story.
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 3. Abstraction by mind
We can abstract by taking an exemplary case and ignoring the detail [Machamer/Darden/Craver]
     Full Idea: Abstractions may be constructed by taking an exemplary case or instance and removing detail.
     From: Machamer,P/Darden,L/Craver,C (Thinking About Mechanisms [2000], 5.3)
     A reaction: I love 'removing detail'. That's it. Simple. I think this process is the basis of our whole capacity to formulate abstract concepts. Forget Frege - he's just describing the results of the process. How do we decide what is 'detail'? Essentialism!
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / e. Character
Virtue comes more from habit than character [Critias]
     Full Idea: More men are good through habit than through character.
     From: Critias (fragments/reports [c.440 BCE], B09), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 3.29.41
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 11. Against Laws of Nature
Laws of nature have very little application in biology [Machamer/Darden/Craver]
     Full Idea: The traditional notion of a law of nature has few, if any, applications in neurobiology or molecular biology.
     From: Machamer,P/Darden,L/Craver,C (Thinking About Mechanisms [2000], 3.2)
     A reaction: This is a simple and self-evident fact, and bad news for anyone who want to build their entire ontology around laws of nature. I take such a notion to be fairly empty, except as a convenient heuristic device.
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / c. Forces
The strong force has a considerably greater range than the weak force [Martin,BR]
     Full Idea: The strong nuclear force has a range of 10^-15 m, considerably larger than the range of the weak force.
     From: Brian R. Martin (Particle Physics [2011], 01)
     A reaction: This is because the bosons transmitting the weak force (W+, W-, W°) are much heavier than the gluons of the strong force.
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 2. Thermodynamics / c. Conservation of energy
If an expected reaction does not occur, that implies a conservation law [Martin,BR]
     Full Idea: If some reaction is not observed when there is apparently nothing to prevent it occurring, it is an indication that a conservation law is in operation.
     From: Brian R. Martin (Particle Physics [2011], 07)
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 2. Electrodynamics / a. Electrodynamics
Electron emit and reabsorb photons, which create and reabsorb virtual electrons and positrons [Martin,BR]
     Full Idea: In QED an electron constantly emits and reabsorbs virtual photons and these photons constantly create and reabsorb pairs of virtual electrons and positrons, and so on.
     From: Brian R. Martin (Particle Physics [2011], 06)
     A reaction: 'And so on'! These virtual particles have energy, and hence mass.
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 2. Electrodynamics / b. Fields
A 'field' is just a region to which points can be assigned in space and time [Martin,BR]
     Full Idea: The word 'field' is simply a shorthand way of saying that a physical property is assigned to the points of space and time in a region.
     From: Brian R. Martin (Particle Physics [2011], 01)
     A reaction: This is disappointing because I had begun to think that fields were foundational for modern ontology. Turns out they are operational abstractions (according to Martin). Note that a field extends over time.
The Higgs field, unlike others, has a nozero value in a state without particles [Martin,BR]
     Full Idea: The Higgs field has the property of having a nonzero value in a state without particles, the vacuum state. Other fields are assumed to have a value zero in a vacuum state.
     From: Brian R. Martin (Particle Physics [2011], 09)
     A reaction: This seems to make a big difference to our concept of a field, since it has a measurable reality even when there are no particles. So it isn't just a geometrical frame for locating particles.
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 2. Electrodynamics / c. Electrons
Many physicists believe particles have further structure, if only we could see it [Martin,BR]
     Full Idea: Although standard particles are assumed to be structureless, many physicists believe that if distances could be probed down to 10^-35 m structures would be discovered.
     From: Brian R. Martin (Particle Physics [2011], 01)
     A reaction: Such probing is said to be probably impossible. And does the division then come to a halt? Aristotle's meditations on this are not irrelevant.
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 2. Electrodynamics / d. Quantum mechanics
Uncertainty allows very brief violations of energy conservation - even shorter with higher energies [Martin,BR]
     Full Idea: The uncertainty principle states that energy conservation can be violated, but only for a limited period of time. As the energy violation increases, the time period within which 'borrowed' energy has to be 'paid back' decreases.
     From: Brian R. Martin (Particle Physics [2011], 01)
     A reaction: This is the only reason modern physicists ever seem to mention the uncertainty principle. You can ask why this debt must be paid, but it seems to be hidden where the laws of physics may not even apply.
The Exclusion Principle says no two fermions occupy the same state, with the same numbers [Martin,BR]
     Full Idea: The 'exclusion principle' initially stated that no two electrons in a system could simultaneously occupy the same quantum state and thus have the same set of quantum numbers. The principle actually applies to all fermions, but not to bosons.
     From: Brian R. Martin (Particle Physics [2011], 02)
     A reaction: This principle is said to be at the root of atomic structure, making each element unique. What exactly is a 'system'? Why does this principle hold? How do you ensure two women don't wear the same dress at a party?
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 4. Standard Model / b. Standard model
The standard model combines theories of strong interaction, and electromagnetic and weak interaction [Martin,BR]
     Full Idea: As presently formulated, the standard model is two theories. One operates in the sector of strong interaction, and the other in the sector of the electromagnetic and weak interactions.
     From: Brian R. Martin (Particle Physics [2011], 01)
     A reaction: The first is Quantum Chomodynamics (QCD). The second is Quantum Electrodynamics (QED). Interesting that the weak interaction is included in the latter, which (I take it) means there is an electro-weak union. Interactions are the heart of the model.
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 4. Standard Model / c. Particle properties
Eletrons don't literally 'spin', because they are point-like [Martin,BR]
     Full Idea: The picture of a particle spinning like a top is sometime useful, but it is not consistent with the idea of the electron being point-like. In fact there is no analogy for spin in non-quantum physics.
     From: Brian R. Martin (Particle Physics [2011], 02)
     A reaction: If we take this stuff literally then it blow traditional metaphysics to bits, because an electron has properties without being a substance. In what sense can an electron 'have' properties if it is a point? In interactions they cease to be points. Eh?
Virtual particles surround any charged particle [Martin,BR]
     Full Idea: A cloud of virtual particles always surrounds a charged particle.
     From: Brian R. Martin (Particle Physics [2011], 06)
     A reaction: Here's a nice fact for aspiring Buddhists to meditate on.
The properties of a particle are determined by its quantum numbers and its mass [Martin,BR]
     Full Idea: In quantum theory, the full set of quantum numbers defines the state of the particle and, along with its mass, determines its properties.
     From: Brian R. Martin (Particle Physics [2011], 02)
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 5. Unified Models / b. String theory
String theory only has one free parameter (tension) - unlike the standard model with 19 [Martin,BR]
     Full Idea: Unlike the standard model, with its 19 free parameters (including the masses of quarks, coupling constants and mixing angles), string theories have a single free paramater: the string tension.
     From: Brian R. Martin (Particle Physics [2011], 10)
     A reaction: This must be one feature in favour of string theory, despite its problems.
27. Natural Reality / F. Chemistry / 2. Modern Elements
An 'element' is what cannot be decomposed by chemistry [Martin,BR]
     Full Idea: In the modern sense 'element' means a substance that cannot be decomposed by the methods of chemistry.
     From: Brian R. Martin (Particle Physics [2011], 01)
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 5. Atheism
Fear of the gods was invented to discourage secret sin [Critias]
     Full Idea: When the laws forbade men to commit open crimes of violence, and they began to do them in secret, a wise and clever man invented fear of the gods for mortals, to frighten the wicked, even if they sin in secret.
     From: Critias (fragments/reports [c.440 BCE], B25), quoted by Sextus Empiricus - Against the Professors (six books) 9.54