16 ideas
22180 | Multiple realisability is said to make reduction impossible [Okasha] |
Full Idea: Philosophers have often invoked multiple realisability to explain why psychology cannot be reduced to physics or chemistry, but in principle the explanation works for any higher-level science. | |
From: Samir Okasha (Philosophy of Science: Very Short Intro (2nd ed) [2016], 3) | |
A reaction: He gives the example of a 'cell' in biology, which can be implemented in all sorts of ways. Presumably that can be reduced to many sorts of physics, but not just to one sort. The high level contains patterns that vanish at the low level. |
22172 | Not all sciences are experimental; astronomy relies on careful observation [Okasha] |
Full Idea: Not all sciences are experimental - astronomers obviously cannot do experiments on the heavens, but have to content themselves with careful observation instead. | |
From: Samir Okasha (Philosophy of Science: Very Short Intro (2nd ed) [2016], 1) | |
A reaction: Biology too. Psychology tries hard to be experimental, but I doubt whether the main theories emerge from experiments. |
22177 | Randomised Control Trials have a treatment and a control group, chosen at random [Okasha] |
Full Idea: In the Randomised Controlled Trial for a new drug, patients are divided at random into a treatment group who receive the drug, and a control group who do not. Randomisation is important to eliminate confounding factors. | |
From: Samir Okasha (Philosophy of Science: Very Short Intro (2nd ed) [2016], 2) | |
A reaction: [compressed] Devised in the 1930s, and a major breakthrough in methodology for that kind of trial. Psychologists use the method all the time. Some theorists say it is the only reliable method. |
22174 | The discoverers of Neptune didn't change their theory because of an anomaly [Okasha] |
Full Idea: Adams and Leverrier began with Newton's theory of gravity, which made an incorrect prediction about the orbit of Uranus. They explained away the conflicting observations by postulating a new planet, Neptune. | |
From: Samir Okasha (Philosophy of Science: Very Short Intro (2nd ed) [2016], 1) | |
A reaction: The falsificationists can say that the anomalous observation did not falsify the theory, because they didn't know quite what they were observing. It was not in fact an anomaly for Newtonian theory at all. |
22175 | Science mostly aims at confirming theories, rather than falsifying them [Okasha] |
Full Idea: The goal of science is not solely to refute theories, but also to determine which theories are true (or probably true). When a scientist collects data …they are trying to show that their own theory is true. | |
From: Samir Okasha (Philosophy of Science: Very Short Intro (2nd ed) [2016], 2) | |
A reaction: This is the aim of 'accommodation' to a wide set of data, rather than prediction or refutation. |
22182 | Theories with unobservables are underdetermined by the evidence [Okasha] |
Full Idea: According to anti-realists, scientific theories which posit unobservable entities are underdetermined by the empirical data - there will always be a number of competing theories which can account for the data equally well. | |
From: Samir Okasha (Philosophy of Science: Very Short Intro (2nd ed) [2016], 4) | |
A reaction: The fancy version is Putnam's model theoretic argument, explored by Tim Button. The reply, apparently, is that there are other criteria for theory choice, apart from the data. And we don't have to actually observe everything in a theory. |
22185 | Two things can't be incompatible if they are incommensurable [Okasha] |
Full Idea: If two things are incommensurable they cannot be incompatible. | |
From: Samir Okasha (Philosophy of Science: Very Short Intro (2nd ed) [2016], 5) | |
A reaction: Kuhn had claimed that two rival theories are incompatible, which forces the paradigm shift. He can't stop the slide off into total relativism. The point is there cannot be a conflict if there cannot even be a comparison. |
22176 | Induction is inferences from examined to unexamined instances of a given kind [Okasha] |
Full Idea: Some philosophers use 'inductive' to just mean not deductive, …but we reserve it for inferences from examined to unexamined instances of a given kind. | |
From: Samir Okasha (Philosophy of Science: Very Short Intro (2nd ed) [2016], 2) | |
A reaction: The instances must at least be comparable. Must you know the kind before you start? Surely you can examine a sequence of things, trying to decide whether or not they are of one kind? Is checking the uniformity of a kind induction? |
22178 | If the rules only concern changes of belief, and not the starting point, absurd views can look ratiional [Okasha] |
Full Idea: If the only objective constraints concern how we should change our credences, but what our initial credences should be is entirely subjective, then individuals with very bizarre opinions about the world will count as perfectly rational. | |
From: Samir Okasha (Philosophy of Science: Very Short Intro (2nd ed) [2016], 2) | |
A reaction: The important rationality has to be the assessement of a diverse batch of evidence, for which there can never be any rules or mathematics. |
541 | Virtue comes more from habit than character [Critias] |
Full Idea: More men are good through habit than through character. | |
From: Critias (fragments/reports [c.440 BCE], B09), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 3.29.41 |
22265 | I can't defend the view that the majority values of a community are thereby right [Sandel] |
Full Idea: Insofar as 'communitarian' is another name for majoritarianism, or for the idea that rights should rest on the values that predominate in any given community at any given time, it is not a view I would defend. | |
From: Michael J. Sandel (The Limits of Communitarianism [1998], 'Where') | |
A reaction: I should hope not. You could soon end up as a good nazi if you follow that route. Sandel defends a critical view of community values (implying a role for philosophy?). The community good must be continually negotiated. Sounds fine to me. |
22268 | If persons define themselves by a group membership, insults to that group are a real harm [Sandel] |
Full Idea: For persons who understand themselves as defined by the ethnic or religious group to which they belong, an insult to the group can inflict a harm as real and as damaging as some physical harms. | |
From: Michael J. Sandel (The Limits of Communitarianism [1998], 'Free speech') | |
A reaction: In Britain many people fully define themselves by their allegiance to a football club. Really! They usually learn to laugh off an insult to their club, but it hurts. Laughing off an insult is an essential modern skill - up to a point. |
22267 | In the liberal view an insult to my group doesn't hurt me, since I'm defined by choices not groups [Sandel] |
Full Idea: By the liberal conception of a person, my dignity could never be damaged by an insult to a group with which I identify, because what matters is not my social role, but my capacity to choose that role. | |
From: Michael J. Sandel (The Limits of Communitarianism [1998], 'Free speech') | |
A reaction: If I'm defined by my capacity to choose, and I choose to join some group, why is an insult to that group not an insult to my capacity to choose? How do you insult a liberal? 'I despise your individual freedom!'. |
22266 | The case for religious liberty depends on the religion contributing to a morally good life [Sandel] |
Full Idea: Unless there were reason to believe that religious beliefs and practices contribute to morally admirable ways of life, the case for a right to religious liberty would be weakened. | |
From: Michael J. Sandel (The Limits of Communitarianism [1998], 'Religious') | |
A reaction: I think many religious people would deny that their religion is primarily moral. (W.Blake: 'If morality is Christianity, then Socrates was the saviour'). Whose concept of a morally good life is Sandel referring to? |
22173 | Galileo refuted the Aristotelian theory that heavier objects fall faster [Okasha] |
Full Idea: Galileo's most enduring contribution lay in mechanics, where he refuted the Aristotelian theory that heavier bodies fall faster than lighter. | |
From: Samir Okasha (Philosophy of Science: Very Short Intro (2nd ed) [2016], 2) | |
A reaction: This must the first idea in the theory of mechanics, allowing mathematical treatment and accurate comparisons. |
542 | Fear of the gods was invented to discourage secret sin [Critias] |
Full Idea: When the laws forbade men to commit open crimes of violence, and they began to do them in secret, a wise and clever man invented fear of the gods for mortals, to frighten the wicked, even if they sin in secret. | |
From: Critias (fragments/reports [c.440 BCE], B25), quoted by Sextus Empiricus - Against the Professors (six books) 9.54 |