5 ideas
| 16634 | I can't be unaware of anything which is in me [Descartes] |
| Full Idea: Nothing can be in me of which I am entirely unaware. | |
| From: René Descartes (Reply to First Objections [1641]), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 08.4 | |
| A reaction: This I take to be a place where Descartes is utterly and catastrophically wrong. Until you grasp the utter falseness of this thought, the possibility of you (dear reader) understanding human beings is zero. Here 'I' obviously means his mind. |
| 7435 | Dispositions are second-order properties, the property of having some property [Jackson/Pargetter/Prior, by Armstrong] |
| Full Idea: It was proposed that dispositions are second-order properties of objects: the property of having some property. | |
| From: report of Jackson/Pargetter/Prior (Three theses about dispositions [1982]) by David M. Armstrong - Pref to new 'Materialist Theory' p.xvii | |
| A reaction: It seems more plausible to say that dispositions are first-order properties - that is, properties are dispositions, which are causal powers. A disposition to smoke is to have a causal power which leads to smoking. |
| 5996 | Critolaus redefined Aristotle's moral aim as fulfilment instead of happiness [Critolaus, by White,SA] |
| Full Idea: Critolaus reformulated Aristotelian theory by defining happiness as a 'fulfilment' (sumplêrôma) of psychic, physical, and external goods, where virtue vastly outweighs the rest. | |
| From: report of Critolaus (fragments/reports [c.170 BCE]) by Stephen A. White - Critolaus | |
| A reaction: The sounds more like an attempt at clarification than a real change of Peripatetic doctrine. Occasionally 'fulfilment' is offered as a translation for eudaimonia. Maybe we should just take up Critolaus' suggestion when we are discussing Aristotle. |
| 3635 | Essence must be known before we discuss existence [Descartes] |
| Full Idea: According to the laws of true logic, we must never ask about the existence of anything until we first understand its essence. | |
| From: René Descartes (Reply to First Objections [1641], 108) |
| 3634 | We can't prove a first cause from our inability to grasp infinity [Descartes] |
| Full Idea: My inability to grasp an infinite chain of successive causes without a first cause does not entail that there must be a first cause, just as my inability to grasp infinite divisibility of finite things does not make that impossible. | |
| From: René Descartes (Reply to First Objections [1641], 106) |