3 ideas
| 16010 | While faith is a passion (as Kierkegaard says), wisdom is passionless [Wittgenstein] |
| Full Idea: Wisdom is passionless. But faith by contrast is what Kierkegaard calls a passion. | |
| From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (Culture and Value [1945], 53e) | |
| A reaction: [Idea from SY] Personally I don't agree that wisdom is passionless. At the very least, Aristotle allows the wise person to be appropriately angry. [PG] |
| 16721 | Changes in secondary qualities are caused by changes in primary qualities [Giles of Orleans] |
| Full Idea: Every alteration in secondary qualities is caused by some alteration made in the primary qualities. | |
| From: Giles of Orleans (On 'Generation and Corruption' [1270], I.6c) | |
| A reaction: Pasnau calls this the 'supervenience' thesis, here with the addition of causation. Was this doctrine retained by Locke and Boyle? |
| 5996 | Critolaus redefined Aristotle's moral aim as fulfilment instead of happiness [Critolaus, by White,SA] |
| Full Idea: Critolaus reformulated Aristotelian theory by defining happiness as a 'fulfilment' (sumplêrôma) of psychic, physical, and external goods, where virtue vastly outweighs the rest. | |
| From: report of Critolaus (fragments/reports [c.170 BCE]) by Stephen A. White - Critolaus | |
| A reaction: The sounds more like an attempt at clarification than a real change of Peripatetic doctrine. Occasionally 'fulfilment' is offered as a translation for eudaimonia. Maybe we should just take up Critolaus' suggestion when we are discussing Aristotle. |