Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'talk' and 'works'

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3 ideas

17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 2. Reduction of Mind
We imagine small and large objects scaled to the same size, suggesting a fixed capacity for imagination [Lavers]
     Full Idea: If we think of a pea, and then of the Eiffel Tower, they seem to occupy the same space in our consciousness, suggesting that we scale our images to fit the available hardware, just as computer imagery is limited by the screen and memory available.
     From: Michael Lavers (talk [2003]), quoted by PG - Db (ideas)
     A reaction: Nice point. It is especially good because it reinforces a physicalist view of the mind from introspection, where most other evidence is external observation of brains (as Nietzsche reinforces determinism by introspection).
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / b. Eudaimonia
Critolaus redefined Aristotle's moral aim as fulfilment instead of happiness [Critolaus, by White,SA]
     Full Idea: Critolaus reformulated Aristotelian theory by defining happiness as a 'fulfilment' (sumplêrôma) of psychic, physical, and external goods, where virtue vastly outweighs the rest.
     From: report of Critolaus (fragments/reports [c.170 BCE]) by Stephen A. White - Critolaus
     A reaction: The sounds more like an attempt at clarification than a real change of Peripatetic doctrine. Occasionally 'fulfilment' is offered as a translation for eudaimonia. Maybe we should just take up Critolaus' suggestion when we are discussing Aristotle.
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 1. Ideology
Ideology is 'socially necessary illusion' or 'socially necessary false-consciousness' [Adorno, by Finlayson]
     Full Idea: Adorno defines ideology as 'socially necessary illusion' or 'socially necessary false-consciousness' (and the young Habermas accepted something like this definition).
     From: report of Theodor W. Adorno (works [1955]) by James Gordon Finlayson - Habermas Ch.1:11
     A reaction: The marxism seems to reside in the view that such things are always 'false'. If they gradually became 'true', would they cease to be ideology? Is it impossible for widespread beliefs to be 'true'?