Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Reply to First Objections' and 'fragments/reports'

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12 ideas

7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism
For the Cyrenaics experience was not enough to give certainty about reality [Aristippus young, by Plutarch]
     Full Idea: The Cyrenaics, placing all experience within themselves, thought such evidence was insufficient warrant for certainty about reality, and withdrew as in a siege from the world, admitting that objects 'appear', but refusing to pronounce the word 'are'.
     From: report of Aristippus the younger (fragments/reports [c.335 BCE]) by Plutarch - 74: Reply to Colotes §1120
     A reaction: This seems to be the most extreme position found in ancient thought. It accompanies their extreme hedonism, based on the reality of experience and lack of interest in anything external. A bit daft, really.
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 2. Unconscious Mind
I can't be unaware of anything which is in me [Descartes]
     Full Idea: Nothing can be in me of which I am entirely unaware.
     From: René Descartes (Reply to First Objections [1641]), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 08.4
     A reaction: This I take to be a place where Descartes is utterly and catastrophically wrong. Until you grasp the utter falseness of this thought, the possibility of you (dear reader) understanding human beings is zero. Here 'I' obviously means his mind.
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / b. Intellectualism
Even the foolish may have some virtues [Aristippus young, by Diog. Laertius]
     Full Idea: The Cyrenaics say that some of the virtues may exist even in the foolish.
     From: report of Aristippus the younger (fragments/reports [c.335 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 02.7.8
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / g. Moral responsibility
Actions are influenced by circumstances, so Cyrenaics say felons should be reformed, not hated [Aristippus young, by Diog. Laertius]
     Full Idea: Cyrenaics say errors should be pardoned, because men do not err intentionally but are influenced by circumstances; one should not hate a person, but only teach him better.
     From: report of Aristippus the younger (fragments/reports [c.335 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 02.7.9
     A reaction: A very appealing suggestion, and rather wonderful for its time. There is still implied agreement about what is 'error', and what counts as 'better'.
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / j. Ethics by convention
Cyrenaics teach that honour, justice and shame are all based on custom and fashion [Aristippus young, by Diog. Laertius]
     Full Idea: The Cyrenaics taught that there was nothing naturally and intrinsically just, or honourable, or disgraceful; but that things were considered so because of law and fashion.
     From: report of Aristippus the younger (fragments/reports [c.335 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 02.7.8
     A reaction: As we would say now, values and virtues are 'cultural constructs'. This obviously contains a lot of truth, but I don't think our opposition of genocide is just 'fashion'.
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / b. Eudaimonia
Critolaus redefined Aristotle's moral aim as fulfilment instead of happiness [Critolaus, by White,SA]
     Full Idea: Critolaus reformulated Aristotelian theory by defining happiness as a 'fulfilment' (sumplêrôma) of psychic, physical, and external goods, where virtue vastly outweighs the rest.
     From: report of Critolaus (fragments/reports [c.170 BCE]) by Stephen A. White - Critolaus
     A reaction: The sounds more like an attempt at clarification than a real change of Peripatetic doctrine. Occasionally 'fulfilment' is offered as a translation for eudaimonia. Maybe we should just take up Critolaus' suggestion when we are discussing Aristotle.
23. Ethics / A. Egoism / 1. Ethical Egoism
For a Cyrenaic no one is of equal importance to himself [Aristippus young, by Diog. Laertius]
     Full Idea: A Cyrenaic will not consider anyone else of equal importance with himself.
     From: report of Aristippus the younger (fragments/reports [c.335 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 02.7.9
23. Ethics / A. Egoism / 3. Cyrenaic School
No one pleasure is different from or more pleasant than another [Aristippus young, by Diog. Laertius]
     Full Idea: No one pleasure is different from or more pleasant than another.
     From: report of Aristippus the younger (fragments/reports [c.335 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 02.7.8
The Cyrenaics asserted that corporeal pleasures were superior to mental ones [Aristippus young, by Diog. Laertius]
     Full Idea: The Cyrenaics asserted that corporeal pleasures were superior to mental ones.
     From: report of Aristippus the younger (fragments/reports [c.335 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 02.7.8
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 4. External Goods / d. Friendship
Cyrenaics say wise men are self-sufficient, needing no friends [Aristippus young, by Diog. Laertius]
     Full Idea: Cyrenaics say wise men are sufficient to themselves, and so have no need of friends.
     From: report of Aristippus the younger (fragments/reports [c.335 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 02.7.13
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 5. Existence-Essence
Essence must be known before we discuss existence [Descartes]
     Full Idea: According to the laws of true logic, we must never ask about the existence of anything until we first understand its essence.
     From: René Descartes (Reply to First Objections [1641], 108)
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / a. Cosmological Proof
We can't prove a first cause from our inability to grasp infinity [Descartes]
     Full Idea: My inability to grasp an infinite chain of successive causes without a first cause does not entail that there must be a first cause, just as my inability to grasp infinite divisibility of finite things does not make that impossible.
     From: René Descartes (Reply to First Objections [1641], 106)