Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Merely Possible Propositions' and 'What is an Emotion?'

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4 ideas

9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 4. Impossible objects
Predicates can't apply to what doesn't exist [Stalnaker]
     Full Idea: Nothing can be predicated of something which does not exist.
     From: Robert C. Stalnaker (Merely Possible Propositions [2010], p.28)
     A reaction: [He says he is 'agreeing with Plantinga' on this] This seems very puzzling, as you can obviously say that dragons do not exist, but they breathe fire. Why can't you attach predicates to hypothetical objects?
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / a. Nature of emotions
Rage is inconceivable without bodily responses; so there are no disembodied emotions [James]
     Full Idea: Can one fancy a state of rage and picture no flushing of the face, no dilation of the nostrils, no clenching of the teeth, no impulse to vigorous action? …A purely disembodied human emotion is a nonentity.
     From: William James (What is an Emotion? [1884], p.194), quoted by Peter Goldie - The Emotions 3 'Bodily'
     A reaction: Plausible for rage, but less so for irritation or admiration. Goldie thinks James is wrong. James says if intellectual feelings don't become bodily then they don't qualify as emotions. No True Scotsman!
19. Language / D. Propositions / 3. Concrete Propositions
A 'Russellian proposition' is an ordered sequence of individual, properties and relations [Stalnaker]
     Full Idea: A 'Russellian proposition' is an ordered sequence containing the individual, along with properties and relations.
     From: Robert C. Stalnaker (Merely Possible Propositions [2010], p.22)
     A reaction: Since Russell took properties and relations to be features of reality, this made the whole proposition a feature of reality. This is utterly different from what I understand by the word 'proposition', which is a feature of thought, not of the world.
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / b. Eudaimonia
Critolaus redefined Aristotle's moral aim as fulfilment instead of happiness [Critolaus, by White,SA]
     Full Idea: Critolaus reformulated Aristotelian theory by defining happiness as a 'fulfilment' (sumplêrôma) of psychic, physical, and external goods, where virtue vastly outweighs the rest.
     From: report of Critolaus (fragments/reports [c.170 BCE]) by Stephen A. White - Critolaus
     A reaction: The sounds more like an attempt at clarification than a real change of Peripatetic doctrine. Occasionally 'fulfilment' is offered as a translation for eudaimonia. Maybe we should just take up Critolaus' suggestion when we are discussing Aristotle.