25 ideas
| 8368 | A correct definition is what can be substituted without loss of meaning [Ducasse] |
| Full Idea: A definition of a word is correct if the definition can be substituted for the word being defined in an assertion without in the least changing the meaning which the assertion is felt to have. | |
| From: Curt Ducasse (Nature and Observability of Causal Relations [1926], §1) | |
| A reaction: This sounds good, but a very bland and uninformative rephrasing would fit this account, without offering anything very helpful. The word 'this' could be substituted for a lot of object words. A 'blade' is 'a thing always attached to a knife handle'. |
| 20457 | Zeno assumes collecting an infinity of things makes an infinite thing [Rovelli] |
| Full Idea: One possible answer is that Zeno is wrong because it is not true that by accumulating an infinite number of things one ends up with an infinite thing. | |
| From: Carlo Rovelli (Reality is Not What it Seems [2014], 01) | |
| A reaction: I do love it when deep and complex ideas are expressed with perfect simplicity. As long as the simple version is correct. |
| 20468 | Quantum mechanics deals with processes, rather than with things [Rovelli] |
| Full Idea: Quantum mechanics teaches us not to think about the world in terms of 'things' which are in this or that state, but in terms of 'processes' instead. | |
| From: Carlo Rovelli (Reality is Not What it Seems [2014], 04) |
| 20467 | Quantum mechanics describes the world entirely as events [Rovelli] |
| Full Idea: The world of quantum mechanics is not a world of objects: it is a world of events. | |
| From: Carlo Rovelli (Reality is Not What it Seems [2014], 04) | |
| A reaction: I presume a philosopher is allowed to ask what an 'event' is. Since, as Rovelli tells it, time is eliminated from the picture, events seem to be unanalysable primitives. |
| 5691 | The adverbial account of sensation says not 'see a red image' but be 'appeared to redly' [Shoemaker] |
| Full Idea: Some who reject the act-object conception of sensation favour an 'adverbial' account, where (instead of the act of 'seeing a red image') it is better to speak of 'being appeared to redly'. | |
| From: Sydney Shoemaker (Introspection [1994], p.398) | |
| A reaction: The point is that you couldn't perceive without a colour (or travel without a speed), so the qualifying adverb is intrinsic to the process, not a separate object. The adverbial theory will imply a fairly minimal account of universals. |
| 5687 | For true introspection, must we be aware that we are aware of our mental events? [Shoemaker] |
| Full Idea: Some writers distinguish introspection from a pre-introspective awareness of mental phenomena, saying one is not properly introspecting unless one is not only aware of the phenomena, but aware that one is aware of them. | |
| From: Sydney Shoemaker (Introspection [1994], p.395) | |
| A reaction: The test question might be what we think animals do. I think I agree with the 'writers'. You are either just aware of the contents or qualia or images of thought, which is not introspection, or you become introspectively aware that you are having them. |
| 5688 | Empirical foundationalism says basic knowledge is self-intimating, and incorrigible or infallible [Shoemaker] |
| Full Idea: Foundationalist epistemology takes all empirical knowledge to be grounded in the introspective knowledge each mind has of its own states, …holding that introspective judgements are 'incorrigible' or 'infallible', and mental states are 'self-intimating'. | |
| From: Sydney Shoemaker (Introspection [1994], p.396) | |
| A reaction: Descartes' foundationalist Cogito also seems to be based on introspection, making introspection the essence of all foundationalism. The standard modern view is that introspective states are incorrigible, but not infallible. |
| 20469 | There are probably no infinities, and 'infinite' names what we do not yet know [Rovelli] |
| Full Idea: 'Infinite', ultimately, is the name that we give to what we do not yet know. Nature appears to be telling us that there is nothing truly infinite. | |
| From: Carlo Rovelli (Reality is Not What it Seems [2014], 11) |
| 20461 | The basic ideas of fields and particles are merged in quantum mechanics [Rovelli] |
| Full Idea: The notions of fields and particles, separated by Faraday and Maxwell, end up merging in quantum mechanics. | |
| From: Carlo Rovelli (Reality is Not What it Seems [2014], 04) | |
| A reaction: This sounds to me just like Anaximander's 'apeiron' - the unlimited [Rovelli agrees! p.168]. Anaximander predicted the wall which enquiry would hit, but we now have more detail. |
| 8367 | Causation is defined in terms of a single sequence, and constant conjunction is no part of it [Ducasse] |
| Full Idea: The correct definition of the causal relation is to be framed in terms of one single case of sequence, and constancy of conjunction is therefore no part of it. | |
| From: Curt Ducasse (Nature and Observability of Causal Relations [1926], Intro) | |
| A reaction: This is the thesis of Ducasse's paper. I immediately warm to it. I take constant conjunction to be a consequence and symptom of causation, not its nature. There is a classic ontology/epistemology confusion to be avoided here. |
| 8372 | We see what is in common between causes to assign names to them, not to perceive them [Ducasse] |
| Full Idea: The part of a generalization concerning what is common to one individual concrete event and the causes of certain other events of the same kind is involved in the mere assigning of a name to the cause and its effect, but not in the perceiving them. | |
| From: Curt Ducasse (Nature and Observability of Causal Relations [1926], §5) | |
| A reaction: A nice point, that we should keep distinct the recognition of a cause, and the assigning of a general name to it. Ducasse is claiming that we can directly perceive singular causation. |
| 8369 | Causes are either sufficient, or necessary, or necessitated, or contingent upon [Ducasse] |
| Full Idea: There are four causal connections: an event is sufficient for another if it is its cause; an event is necessary for another if it is a condition for it; it is necessitated by another if it is an effect; it is contingent upon another if it is a resultant. | |
| From: Curt Ducasse (Nature and Observability of Causal Relations [1926], §2) | |
| A reaction: An event could be a condition for another without being necessary. He seems to have missed the indispensable aspect of a necessary condition. |
| 8373 | When a brick and a canary-song hit a window, we ignore the canary if we are interested in the breakage [Ducasse] |
| Full Idea: If a brick and the song of a canary strike a window, which breaks....we can truly say that the song of the canary had nothing to do with it, that is, in so far as what occurred is viewed merely as a case of breakage of window. | |
| From: Curt Ducasse (Nature and Observability of Causal Relations [1926], §5) | |
| A reaction: This is the germ of Davidson's view, that causation is entirely dependent on the mode of description, rather than being an actual feature of reality. If one was interested in the sound of the breakage, the canary would become relevant. |
| 8370 | A cause is a change which occurs close to the effect and just before it [Ducasse] |
| Full Idea: The cause of the particular change K was such particular change C as alone occurred in the immediate environment of K immediately before. | |
| From: Curt Ducasse (Nature and Observability of Causal Relations [1926], §3) | |
| A reaction: The obvious immediately difficulty would be overdetermination, as when it rains while I am watering my garden. The other problem would coincidence, as when I clap my hands just before a bomb goes off. |
| 8371 | Recurrence is only relevant to the meaning of law, not to the meaning of cause [Ducasse] |
| Full Idea: The supposition of recurrence is wholly irrelevant to the meaning of cause: that supposition is relevant only to the meaning of law. | |
| From: Curt Ducasse (Nature and Observability of Causal Relations [1926], §4) | |
| A reaction: This sounds plausible, especially if our notion of laws of nature is built up from a series of caused events. But we could just have an ontology of 'similar events', out of which we build laws, and 'causation' could drop out (á la Russell). |
| 8374 | We are interested in generalising about causes and effects purely for practical purposes [Ducasse] |
| Full Idea: We are interested in causes and effects primarily for practical purposes, which needs generalizations; so the interest of concrete individual facts of causation is chiefly an indirect one, as raw material for generalizations. | |
| From: Curt Ducasse (Nature and Observability of Causal Relations [1926], §6) | |
| A reaction: A nice explanation of why, if causation is fundamentally about single instances, people seem so interested in generalisations and laws. We want to predict, and we want to explain, and we want to intervene. |
| 20462 | Because it is quantised, a field behaves like a set of packets of energy [Rovelli] |
| Full Idea: Since the energy of the electromagnetic field can take on only certain values, the field behaves like a set of packets of energy. | |
| From: Carlo Rovelli (Reality is Not What it Seems [2014], 04) |
| 20463 | There are about fifteen particles fields, plus a few force fields [Rovelli] |
| Full Idea: There are about fifteen fields, whose quanta are elementary particles (electrons, quarks, muons, neutrinos, Higgs, and little else), plus a few fields similar to the electromagnetic one, which describe forces at a nuclear scale, with quanta like photons. | |
| From: Carlo Rovelli (Reality is Not What it Seems [2014], 04) | |
| A reaction: According to Rovelli, this sentence describes the essence of physical reality. |
| 20464 | The world consists of quantum fields, with elementary events happening in spacetime [Rovelli] |
| Full Idea: The world is not made up of fields and particles, but of a single type of entity: the quantum field. There are no longer particles which move in space with the passage of time, but quantum fields whose elementary events happen in spacetime. | |
| From: Carlo Rovelli (Reality is Not What it Seems [2014], 04) | |
| A reaction: If you are not a scientist, there is (I find) a strong tendency to read and digest stuff like this, and then forget it the next day, because it so far from our experience. Folk like me have to develop two parallel views of the nature of reality. |
| 20459 | Electrons only exist when they interact, and their being is their combination of quantum leaps [Rovelli] |
| Full Idea: Electrons don't always exist. They exist when they interact. They materialize when they collide with something. The quantum leap from one orbit to another constitutes their way of being real. An electron is a combination of leaps between interactions. | |
| From: Carlo Rovelli (Reality is Not What it Seems [2014], 04) | |
| A reaction: If a philosopher with an Aristotelian interest in the nature of matter wants to grasp the modern view, the electron looks like the thing to focus on. You can feel Rovelli battling here to find formulations that might satisfy a philosopher. |
| 20460 | Electrons are not waves, because their collisions are at a point, and not spread out [Rovelli] |
| Full Idea: Schrödinger's wave is a bad image for an electron, because when a particle collides with something else, it is always at a point: it is never spread out in space like a wave. | |
| From: Carlo Rovelli (Reality is Not What it Seems [2014], 04 note) | |
| A reaction: And yet there is the diffusion in the two-slit experiment, which Thomas Young discovered for light. I must take Rovelli's word for this. |
| 20466 | Quantum Theory describes events and possible interactions - not how things are [Rovelli] |
| Full Idea: Quantum Theory does not describe things as they are: it describes how things occur and interact with each other. It doesn't describe where there is a particle but how it shows itself to others. The world of existence is reduced to possible interactions. | |
| From: Carlo Rovelli (Reality is Not What it Seems [2014], 04) | |
| A reaction: Fans of 'process philosophy' should like this, though he is not denying that there may be facts about how things are - it is just that this is not mentioned in the theory. There is not much point in philosophers yearning to know the reality. |
| 20465 | Nature has three aspects: granularity, indeterminacy, and relations [Rovelli] |
| Full Idea: I think that quantum mechanics has revealed three aspects of the nature of things: granularity, indeterminacy, and the relational structure of the world. | |
| From: Carlo Rovelli (Reality is Not What it Seems [2014], 04) |
| 20458 | The world is just particles plus fields; space is the gravitational field [Rovelli] |
| Full Idea: The world is made up of particles + fields, and nothing else; there is no need to add space as an extra ingredient. Newton's space is the gravitational field. | |
| From: Carlo Rovelli (Reality is Not What it Seems [2014], 03) | |
| A reaction: I get the impression that particles are just bumps or waves in the fields [yes! Rovelli p.110], which would mean there are fields and nothing else. And no one seems to know what a field is. |
| 20470 | Only heat distinguishes past from future [Rovelli] |
| Full Idea: It is always heat and only heat that distinguishes the past from the future. | |
| From: Carlo Rovelli (Reality is Not What it Seems [2014], 12) | |
| A reaction: I can remember the past but not the future - so can that fact be reduced to facts about heat? |