9 ideas
15661 | Horkheimer's critical theory was interdisciplinary, and aware of its own context and function [Horkheimer, by Finlayson] |
Full Idea: Horkheimer was chiefly responsible for developing 'critical theory' during the 1930s. ...It was interdisciplinary, reflective, dialectical, and critical. It reflected on the social context that gave rise to it, and its own function within that society. | |
From: report of Max Horkheimer (works [1950]) by James Gordon Finlayson - Habermas Ch.1:02 |
14231 | We should always apply someone's theory of meaning to their own utterances [Liggins] |
Full Idea: We should interpret philosophers as if their own theory of the meaning of their utterances were true, whether or not we agree with that theory. | |
From: David Liggins (Nihilism without Self-Contradiction [2008], 8) | |
A reaction: This seems to give legitimate grounds for some sorts of ad hominem objections. It would simply be an insult to a philosopher not to believe their theories, and then apply them to what they have said. This includes semantic theories. |
14232 | We normally formalise 'There are Fs' with singular quantification and predication, but this may be wrong [Liggins] |
Full Idea: It is quite standard to interpret sentences of the form 'There are Fs' using a singular quantifier and a singular predicate, but this tradition may be mistaken. | |
From: David Liggins (Nihilism without Self-Contradiction [2008], 8) | |
A reaction: Liggins is clearly in support of the use of plural quantification, referring to 'there are some xs such that'. |
8568 | A property is merely a constituent of laws of nature; temperature is just part of thermodynamics [Mellor] |
Full Idea: Being a constituent of probabilistic laws of nature is all there is to being a property. There is no more to temperature than the thermodynamics and other laws they occur in. | |
From: D.H. Mellor (Properties and Predicates [1991], 'Props') | |
A reaction: How could thermodynamics be worked out without a prior concept of temperature? I think it is at least plausible to deny that there are any 'laws' of nature. But even Quine can't deny that some things are too hot to touch. |
8564 | There is obviously a possible predicate for every property [Mellor] |
Full Idea: To every property there obviously corresponds a possible predicate applying to all and only those particulars with that property. | |
From: D.H. Mellor (Properties and Predicates [1991], 'Intro') | |
A reaction: This doesn't strike me as at all obvious. If nature dictates the properties, there may be vastly more than any human language could cope with. It is daft to say that a property can only exist if humanity can come up with a predicate for it. |
8566 | We need universals for causation and laws of nature; the latter give them their identity [Mellor] |
Full Idea: I take the main reason for believing in contingent universals to be the roles they play in causation and in laws of nature, and those laws are what I take to give those universals their identity. | |
From: D.H. Mellor (Properties and Predicates [1991], 'Props') | |
A reaction: He agrees with Armstrong. Sounds a bit circular - laws are built on universals, and universals are identified by laws. It resembles a functionalist account of mental events. I think it is wrong. A different account of laws will be needed... |
8565 | If properties were just the meanings of predicates, they couldn't give predicates their meaning [Mellor] |
Full Idea: One reason for denying that properties just are the meanings of our predicates is that, if they were, they could not give our predicates their meanings. | |
From: D.H. Mellor (Properties and Predicates [1991], 'Props') | |
A reaction: Neither way round sounds quite right to me. Predicate nominalism is wrong, but what is meant by a property 'giving' a predicate its meaning? It doesn't seem to allow room for error in our attempts to name the properties. |
14233 | Nihilists needn't deny parts - they can just say that some of the xs are among the ys [Liggins] |
Full Idea: We can interpret '..is a part of..' as '..are among..': the xs are a part of the ys just when the xs are among the ys (though if the ys are 'one' then they would not have parts). | |
From: David Liggins (Nihilism without Self-Contradiction [2008], 9) | |
A reaction: The trouble is that this still leaves us with gerrymandered 'parts', in the form of xs that are scattered randomly among the ys. That's not what we mean by 'part'. No account of identity works if it leaves out coherent structure. |
8567 | Singular causation requires causes to raise the physical probability of their effects [Mellor] |
Full Idea: Singular causation entails physical probabilities or chances. ...Causal laws require causes to raise their effects' chances, as when fires have a greater chance of occurring when explosions do. | |
From: D.H. Mellor (Properties and Predicates [1991], 'Props') | |
A reaction: It seems fairly obvious that a probability can be increased without actually causing something. Just after a harmless explosion is a good moment for arsonists, especially if Mellor will be the investigating officer. |