7 ideas
8828 | Truth is rational acceptability [Putnam] |
Full Idea: Truth, in the only sense in which we have a vital and working notion of it, is rational acceptability. | |
From: Hilary Putnam (Why Reason Can't be Naturalized [1981]) | |
A reaction: I smell a circularity somewhere in there, probably in 'rational', though it could be in 'acceptable'. Putnams's views on truth tend to shift a lot. He denies that evolutionary survival is a criterion. |
8568 | A property is merely a constituent of laws of nature; temperature is just part of thermodynamics [Mellor] |
Full Idea: Being a constituent of probabilistic laws of nature is all there is to being a property. There is no more to temperature than the thermodynamics and other laws they occur in. | |
From: D.H. Mellor (Properties and Predicates [1991], 'Props') | |
A reaction: How could thermodynamics be worked out without a prior concept of temperature? I think it is at least plausible to deny that there are any 'laws' of nature. But even Quine can't deny that some things are too hot to touch. |
8564 | There is obviously a possible predicate for every property [Mellor] |
Full Idea: To every property there obviously corresponds a possible predicate applying to all and only those particulars with that property. | |
From: D.H. Mellor (Properties and Predicates [1991], 'Intro') | |
A reaction: This doesn't strike me as at all obvious. If nature dictates the properties, there may be vastly more than any human language could cope with. It is daft to say that a property can only exist if humanity can come up with a predicate for it. |
8566 | We need universals for causation and laws of nature; the latter give them their identity [Mellor] |
Full Idea: I take the main reason for believing in contingent universals to be the roles they play in causation and in laws of nature, and those laws are what I take to give those universals their identity. | |
From: D.H. Mellor (Properties and Predicates [1991], 'Props') | |
A reaction: He agrees with Armstrong. Sounds a bit circular - laws are built on universals, and universals are identified by laws. It resembles a functionalist account of mental events. I think it is wrong. A different account of laws will be needed... |
8565 | If properties were just the meanings of predicates, they couldn't give predicates their meaning [Mellor] |
Full Idea: One reason for denying that properties just are the meanings of our predicates is that, if they were, they could not give our predicates their meanings. | |
From: D.H. Mellor (Properties and Predicates [1991], 'Props') | |
A reaction: Neither way round sounds quite right to me. Predicate nominalism is wrong, but what is meant by a property 'giving' a predicate its meaning? It doesn't seem to allow room for error in our attempts to name the properties. |
20422 | The experience of expression and communication are intermingled in art [Croce] |
Full Idea: It is very difficult to perceive the frontier between expression and communication in actual fact, for the two processes usually alternate rapidly and are almost intermingled. | |
From: Benedetto Croce (The Essence of Aesthetic [1912]), quoted by Gary Kemp - Croce and Collingwood | |
A reaction: [text unsure] I think he is getting at seeing the painting (or whatever) as a physical object, and seeing it as the experience which results from the object. The alternation of the objective and subjective views. Reminds me of Thomas Nagel. |
8567 | Singular causation requires causes to raise the physical probability of their effects [Mellor] |
Full Idea: Singular causation entails physical probabilities or chances. ...Causal laws require causes to raise their effects' chances, as when fires have a greater chance of occurring when explosions do. | |
From: D.H. Mellor (Properties and Predicates [1991], 'Props') | |
A reaction: It seems fairly obvious that a probability can be increased without actually causing something. Just after a harmless explosion is a good moment for arsonists, especially if Mellor will be the investigating officer. |