11 ideas
| 3745 | Must sentences make statements to qualify for truth? [O'Connor] |
| Full Idea: Maybe a sentence is not a candidate for truth until it is used to make a statement. | |
| From: D.J. O'Connor (The Correspondence Theory of Truth [1975], Ch.6) |
| 3742 | Beliefs must match facts, but also words must match beliefs [O'Connor] |
| Full Idea: Our beliefs must claim a correspondence with facts, and then the verbal expression of the belief must correspond to the belief itself. | |
| From: D.J. O'Connor (The Correspondence Theory of Truth [1975], Ch.4) |
| 3744 | The semantic theory requires sentences as truth-bearers, not propositions [O'Connor] |
| Full Idea: The Semantic Theory of truth requires that sentences are truth-bearers (rather than statements, or propositions). | |
| From: D.J. O'Connor (The Correspondence Theory of Truth [1975], Ch.6) |
| 3749 | What does 'true in English' mean? [O'Connor] |
| Full Idea: We do not seem to have any use in ordinary discourse for phrases like 'true in English', 'false in German'. | |
| From: D.J. O'Connor (The Correspondence Theory of Truth [1975], II.1) |
| 3746 | Logic seems to work for unasserted sentences [O'Connor] |
| Full Idea: If sentences can have truth-values only when they occur as asserted, it would be impossible to have a truth-functional basis to logic. | |
| From: D.J. O'Connor (The Correspondence Theory of Truth [1975], Ch.6) |
| 12221 | 'Corner quotes' (quasi-quotation) designate 'whatever these terms designate' [Quine] |
| Full Idea: A 'quasi-quotation' [corner quotes, Quine quotes] designates that (unspecified) expression which is obtained from the contents of the corners by replacing the Greek letters by the (unspecified) expressions which they designate. | |
| From: Willard Quine (Mathematical Logic (revised) [1940], 1.6) | |
| A reaction: Filed under 'variables', as they seem to be variables that can refer to actual expressions, like algebra. Quine was determined to distinguish clearly between 'mention' and 'use'. 'Half-hearted substitutional quantification', says Fine. |
| 19321 | We might do without names, by converting them into predicates [Quine, by Kirkham] |
| Full Idea: Quine suggests that we can have a language with just predicates and no names. Thus for 'Ralph is red' we say 'x Ralphises and x is red'. | |
| From: report of Willard Quine (Mathematical Logic (revised) [1940]) by Richard L. Kirkham - Theories of Truth: a Critical Introduction 5.6 | |
| A reaction: Kirkham discusses this as a way of getting round the lack of names in Tarski's theory of truth (which just uses objects, predicates and quantifiers). Otherwise you must supplement Tarski with an account of what the names refer to. |
| 3747 | Events are fast changes which are of interest to us [O'Connor] |
| Full Idea: The standard cases of events are physical changes which happen sufficiently fast to be observed as changes, and which are of sufficient interest to us to be noticed or commented on. | |
| From: D.J. O'Connor (The Correspondence Theory of Truth [1975], Ch.7) |
| 3743 | We can't contemplate our beliefs until we have expressed them [O'Connor] |
| Full Idea: It is only when beliefs are given some symbolic expression that they acquire the precision and stability that enables us to entertain them. | |
| From: D.J. O'Connor (The Correspondence Theory of Truth [1975], Ch.5) |
| 3748 | Without language our beliefs are particular and present [O'Connor] |
| Full Idea: Without language we would be restricted to particular beliefs about the here and now. | |
| From: D.J. O'Connor (The Correspondence Theory of Truth [1975], Ch.8) |
| 12702 | Causes can be inferred from perfect knowledge of their effects [Leibniz] |
| Full Idea: Whoever understands some effect perfectly will also arrive at the knowledge of its cause. | |
| From: Gottfried Leibniz (Meditatio de principio individui [1676], A6.3.490), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 2 | |
| A reaction: This sounds highly improbable, given that you would have thought that there could be lots of ways to bring about the same effect. Predicting effects is rather more plausible. I suppose if you can record all the ripples in the pond before they fade... |