Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Introduction to 'Properties'', 'talk' and 'Belief Truth and Knowledge'

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7 ideas

2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 6. Ockham's Razor
4037 Ockham's Razor is the principle that we need reasons to believe in entities [Mellor/Oliver]
     Full Idea: Ockham's Razor is the principle that we need reasons to believe in entities.
     From: DH Mellor / A Oliver (Introduction to 'Properties' [1997], §9)
     A reaction: This presumably follows from an assumption that all beliefs need reasons, but is that the case? The Principle of Sufficient Reason precedes Ockham's Razor.
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 6. Categorical Properties
4027 Properties are respects in which particular objects may be alike or differ [Mellor/Oliver]
     Full Idea: Properties are respects in which particular objects may be alike or differ.
     From: DH Mellor / A Oliver (Introduction to 'Properties' [1997], §1)
     A reaction: Note that this definition does not mention a causal role for properties.
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 12. Denial of Properties
4029 Nominalists ask why we should postulate properties at all [Mellor/Oliver]
     Full Idea: Nominalists ask why we should postulate properties at all.
     From: DH Mellor / A Oliver (Introduction to 'Properties' [1997], §3)
     A reaction: Objects might be grasped without language, but events cannot be understood, and explanations of events seem inconceivable without properties (implying that they are essentially causal).
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 7. Causal Perception
3900 Maybe experience is not essential to perception, but only to the causing of beliefs [Armstrong, by Scruton]
     Full Idea: Armstrong has argued that experience, as normally understood, is not necessary to perception. To perceive is to acquire beliefs, through a causal process.
     From: report of David M. Armstrong (Belief Truth and Knowledge [1973]) by Roger Scruton - Modern Philosophy:introduction and survey 23.4
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 1. External Justification
4253 Externalism says knowledge involves a natural relation between the belief state and what makes it true [Armstrong]
     Full Idea: Externalist accounts of non-inferential knowledge say what makes a true non-inferential belief a case of knowledge is some natural relation which holds between the belief state and the situation which makes the belief true.
     From: David M. Armstrong (Belief Truth and Knowledge [1973], 11.III.6)
     A reaction: Armstrong's concept is presumably a response to Quine's desire to 'naturalise epistemology'. Bad move, I suspect. It probably reduces knowledge to mere true belief, and hence a redundant concept.
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 5. Abstracta by Negation
4039 Abstractions lack causes, effects and spatio-temporal locations [Mellor/Oliver]
     Full Idea: Abstract entities (such as sets) are usually understood as lacking causes, effects, and spatio-temporal location.
     From: DH Mellor / A Oliver (Introduction to 'Properties' [1997], §10)
     A reaction: This seems to beg some questions. Has the ideal of 'honour' never caused anything? Young men dream of pure velocity.
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 5. Culture
21432 Culture is the struggle to agree what is normal [Gibson,A]
     Full Idea: Culture is the struggle to agree what is normal.
     From: Andrew Gibson (talk [2018])
     A reaction: A nice aphorism. Typically the struggle took place in villages, but has now gone global. The normalities of other cultures are beamed into a remote society, and are frequently unwelcome.