7 ideas
7822 | A neo-Stoic movement began in the late sixteenth century [Lipsius, by Grayling] |
Full Idea: A neo-Stoic movement began at the end of the sixteenth century, under the inspiration of the Dutch scholar Justus Lipsius. | |
From: report of Justus Lipsius (works [1584]) by A.C. Grayling - What is Good? Ch.5 | |
A reaction: I would take this to be just as much a movement against Christianity as the interest in the less theistic Epicurus. They wanted the virtues of Christianity without the theological trappings. |
4037 | Ockham's Razor is the principle that we need reasons to believe in entities [Mellor/Oliver] |
Full Idea: Ockham's Razor is the principle that we need reasons to believe in entities. | |
From: DH Mellor / A Oliver (Introduction to 'Properties' [1997], §9) | |
A reaction: This presumably follows from an assumption that all beliefs need reasons, but is that the case? The Principle of Sufficient Reason precedes Ockham's Razor. |
4027 | Properties are respects in which particular objects may be alike or differ [Mellor/Oliver] |
Full Idea: Properties are respects in which particular objects may be alike or differ. | |
From: DH Mellor / A Oliver (Introduction to 'Properties' [1997], §1) | |
A reaction: Note that this definition does not mention a causal role for properties. |
4029 | Nominalists ask why we should postulate properties at all [Mellor/Oliver] |
Full Idea: Nominalists ask why we should postulate properties at all. | |
From: DH Mellor / A Oliver (Introduction to 'Properties' [1997], §3) | |
A reaction: Objects might be grasped without language, but events cannot be understood, and explanations of events seem inconceivable without properties (implying that they are essentially causal). |
4691 | If all mental life were conscious, we would be unable to see things, or to process speech [McGinn] |
Full Idea: If there were nothing more to our mind than our conscious awareness, then we would be unable to see anything or to process speech. | |
From: Colin McGinn (The Making of a Philosopher [2002], Ch. 6) | |
A reaction: A vital point. Traditional dualism has left us a simplistic exaggeration of the role of consciousness, and the misapprehension that most of what we do is conscious - which it clearly isn't, once you think about it. |
4039 | Abstractions lack causes, effects and spatio-temporal locations [Mellor/Oliver] |
Full Idea: Abstract entities (such as sets) are usually understood as lacking causes, effects, and spatio-temporal location. | |
From: DH Mellor / A Oliver (Introduction to 'Properties' [1997], §10) | |
A reaction: This seems to beg some questions. Has the ideal of 'honour' never caused anything? Young men dream of pure velocity. |
4690 | If meaning is speaker's intentions, it can be reduced to propositional attitudes, and philosophy of mind [McGinn] |
Full Idea: The importance of Grice's analysis of speaker meaning is that it offers the prospect of analysing the whole phenomenon of linguistic meaning in terms of propositional attitudes… thus turning semantics into a department of the philosophy of mind. | |
From: Colin McGinn (The Making of a Philosopher [2002], Ch. 5) | |
A reaction: Although meaning being truth conditions is the most cited theory, the reduction of semantics to an aspect of mind also seems almost orthodox now. But how do the symbols 'represent' the attitudes? |