6 ideas
4037 | Ockham's Razor is the principle that we need reasons to believe in entities [Mellor/Oliver] |
Full Idea: Ockham's Razor is the principle that we need reasons to believe in entities. | |
From: DH Mellor / A Oliver (Introduction to 'Properties' [1997], §9) | |
A reaction: This presumably follows from an assumption that all beliefs need reasons, but is that the case? The Principle of Sufficient Reason precedes Ockham's Razor. |
4027 | Properties are respects in which particular objects may be alike or differ [Mellor/Oliver] |
Full Idea: Properties are respects in which particular objects may be alike or differ. | |
From: DH Mellor / A Oliver (Introduction to 'Properties' [1997], §1) | |
A reaction: Note that this definition does not mention a causal role for properties. |
4029 | Nominalists ask why we should postulate properties at all [Mellor/Oliver] |
Full Idea: Nominalists ask why we should postulate properties at all. | |
From: DH Mellor / A Oliver (Introduction to 'Properties' [1997], §3) | |
A reaction: Objects might be grasped without language, but events cannot be understood, and explanations of events seem inconceivable without properties (implying that they are essentially causal). |
16721 | Changes in secondary qualities are caused by changes in primary qualities [Giles of Orleans] |
Full Idea: Every alteration in secondary qualities is caused by some alteration made in the primary qualities. | |
From: Giles of Orleans (On 'Generation and Corruption' [1270], I.6c) | |
A reaction: Pasnau calls this the 'supervenience' thesis, here with the addition of causation. Was this doctrine retained by Locke and Boyle? |
5210 | We could know what a lion thinks by mapping both its brain patterns and its experiences [Douglas,A] |
Full Idea: In principle, it seems possible to monitor both the brain activity and the external experiences of a lion cub from birth, and by extensive mapping of one against the other to work out fairly accurately what a lion is thinking. | |
From: Andy Douglas (talk [2003]) | |
A reaction: This has limitations (e.g. we could monitor the external events, but not the way the lion experiences them), but it seems to me to offer a real theoretical possibility of breaching the mental privacy of an inarticulate creature. |
4039 | Abstractions lack causes, effects and spatio-temporal locations [Mellor/Oliver] |
Full Idea: Abstract entities (such as sets) are usually understood as lacking causes, effects, and spatio-temporal location. | |
From: DH Mellor / A Oliver (Introduction to 'Properties' [1997], §10) | |
A reaction: This seems to beg some questions. Has the ideal of 'honour' never caused anything? Young men dream of pure velocity. |