Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Introduction to 'Properties'', 'Between Facts and Norms' and 'Reply to Hellman'

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6 ideas

2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 6. Ockham's Razor
4037 Ockham's Razor is the principle that we need reasons to believe in entities [Mellor/Oliver]
     Full Idea: Ockham's Razor is the principle that we need reasons to believe in entities.
     From: DH Mellor / A Oliver (Introduction to 'Properties' [1997], §9)
     A reaction: This presumably follows from an assumption that all beliefs need reasons, but is that the case? The Principle of Sufficient Reason precedes Ockham's Razor.
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 6. Categorical Properties
4027 Properties are respects in which particular objects may be alike or differ [Mellor/Oliver]
     Full Idea: Properties are respects in which particular objects may be alike or differ.
     From: DH Mellor / A Oliver (Introduction to 'Properties' [1997], §1)
     A reaction: Note that this definition does not mention a causal role for properties.
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 12. Denial of Properties
4029 Nominalists ask why we should postulate properties at all [Mellor/Oliver]
     Full Idea: Nominalists ask why we should postulate properties at all.
     From: DH Mellor / A Oliver (Introduction to 'Properties' [1997], §3)
     A reaction: Objects might be grasped without language, but events cannot be understood, and explanations of events seem inconceivable without properties (implying that they are essentially causal).
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 2. Self-Evidence
9379 A sentence is obvious if it is true, and any speaker of the language will instantly agree to it [Quine]
     Full Idea: A sentence is obvious if (a) it is true and (b) any speaker of the language is prepared, for any reason or none, to assent to it without hesitation, unless put off by being asked so obvious a question.
     From: Willard Quine (Reply to Hellman [1975], p.206), quoted by Paul Boghossian - Analyticity Reconsidered §III
     A reaction: This comes from someone who is keen to deny a priori knowledge, but what are we to make of the expostulations "It's obvious, you idiot!", and "Now I see it, it's obvious!", and "It seemed obvious, but I was wrong!"?
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 5. Abstracta by Negation
4039 Abstractions lack causes, effects and spatio-temporal locations [Mellor/Oliver]
     Full Idea: Abstract entities (such as sets) are usually understood as lacking causes, effects, and spatio-temporal location.
     From: DH Mellor / A Oliver (Introduction to 'Properties' [1997], §10)
     A reaction: This seems to beg some questions. Has the ideal of 'honour' never caused anything? Young men dream of pure velocity.
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / j. Ethics by convention
15672 Actions norms are only valid if everyone possibly affected is involved in the discourse [Habermas]
     Full Idea: Only those action norms are valid to which all possibly affected persons could agree as participants in rational discourse.
     From: Jürgen Habermas (Between Facts and Norms [1996], p.107), quoted by James Gordon Finlayson - Habermas Ch.6:79
     A reaction: This remark stands somewhere between Kant and Rawls. The Holocaust stands behind Habermas's philosophy. The thought, I suppose, is that it would never have happened if everybody had been fully involved in the original discourse about it.