Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Introduction to 'Properties'', 'In Defence of Three-Dimensionalism' and 'External and Internal Relations'

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10 ideas

2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 6. Ockham's Razor

4037	Ockham's Razor is the principle that we need reasons to believe in entities [Mellor/Oliver]
	Full Idea: Ockham's Razor is the principle that we need reasons to believe in entities.
	From: DH Mellor / A Oliver (Introduction to 'Properties' [1997], §9)
	A reaction: This presumably follows from an assumption that all beliefs need reasons, but is that the case? The Principle of Sufficient Reason precedes Ockham's Razor.

8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 2. Internal Relations

21342	A relation is internal if two things possessing the relation could not fail to be related [Moore,GE, by Heil]
	Full Idea: Moore characterises internal relations modally, as those essential to their relata. If a and b are related R-wise, and R is an internal relation, a and b could not fail to be so related; otherwise R is external.
	From: report of G.E. Moore (External and Internal Relations [1919]) by John Heil - Relations 'Internal'
	A reaction: I don't think of Moore as an essentialist, but this fits the essentialist picture nicely, and is probably best paraphrased in terms of powers. Integers are the standard example of internal relations.

8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 6. Categorical Properties

4027	Properties are respects in which particular objects may be alike or differ [Mellor/Oliver]
	Full Idea: Properties are respects in which particular objects may be alike or differ.
	From: DH Mellor / A Oliver (Introduction to 'Properties' [1997], §1)
	A reaction: Note that this definition does not mention a causal role for properties.

8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 12. Denial of Properties

4029	Nominalists ask why we should postulate properties at all [Mellor/Oliver]
	Full Idea: Nominalists ask why we should postulate properties at all.
	From: DH Mellor / A Oliver (Introduction to 'Properties' [1997], §3)
	A reaction: Objects might be grasped without language, but events cannot be understood, and explanations of events seem inconceivable without properties (implying that they are essentially causal).

9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 3. Three-Dimensionalism

12295	3-D says things are stretched in space but not in time, and entire at a time but not at a location [Fine,K]
	Full Idea: Three-dimensionalist think a thing is somehow 'stretched out' through its location at a given time though not through the period during which it exists, and it is present in its entirety at a moment when it exists though not at a position of its location.
	From: Kit Fine (In Defence of Three-Dimensionalism [2006], p.1)
	A reaction: This definition is designed to set up Fine's defence of the 3-D view, by showing that various dubious asymmetries show up if you do not respect the distinctions offered by the 3-D view.

12298	Genuine motion, rather than variation of position, requires the 'entire presence' of the object [Fine,K]
	Full Idea: In order to have genuine motion, rather than mere variation in position, it is necessary that the object should be 'entirely present' at each moment of the change. Thus without entire presence, or existence, genuine motion will not be possible.
	From: Kit Fine (In Defence of Three-Dimensionalism [2006], p.6)
	A reaction: See Idea 4786 for a rival view of motion. Of course, who says we have to have Kit Fine's 'genuine' motion, if some sort of ersatz motion still gets you to work in the morning?

9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 4. Four-Dimensionalism

12296	4-D says things are stretched in space and in time, and not entire at a time or at a location [Fine,K]
	Full Idea: Four-dimensionalists have thought that a material thing is as equally 'stretched out' in time as it is in space, and that there is no special way in which it is entirely present at a moment rather than at a position.
	From: Kit Fine (In Defence of Three-Dimensionalism [2006], p.1)
	A reaction: Compare his definition of 3-D in Idea 12295. The 4-D is contrary to our normal way of thinking. Since I don't think the future exists, I presume that if I am a 4-D object then I have to say that I don't yet exist, and I disapprove of such talk.

18882	You can ask when the wedding was, but not (usually) when the bride was [Fine,K, by Simons]
	Full Idea: Fine says it is acceptable to ask when a wedding was and where it was, and it is acceptable to ask or state where the bride was (at a certain time), but not when she was.
	From: report of Kit Fine (In Defence of Three-Dimensionalism [2006], p.18) by Peter Simons - Modes of Extension: comment on Fine p.18
	A reaction: This is aimed at three-dimensionalists who seem to think that a bride is a prolonged event, just as a wedding is. Fine is, interestingly, invoking ordinary language. When did the wedding start and end? When was the bride's birth and death?

9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 5. Temporal Parts

12297	Three-dimensionalist can accept temporal parts, as things enduring only for an instant [Fine,K]
	Full Idea: Even if one is a three-dimensionalist, one might affirm the existence of temporal parts, on the grounds that everything merely endures for an instant.
	From: Kit Fine (In Defence of Three-Dimensionalism [2006], p.2)
	A reaction: This seems an important point, as belief in temporal parts is normally equated with four-dimensionalism (see Idea 12296). The idea is that a thing might be 'entirely present' at each instant, only to be replaced by a simulacrum.

18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 5. Abstracta by Negation

4039	Abstractions lack causes, effects and spatio-temporal locations [Mellor/Oliver]
	Full Idea: Abstract entities (such as sets) are usually understood as lacking causes, effects, and spatio-temporal location.
	From: DH Mellor / A Oliver (Introduction to 'Properties' [1997], §10)
	A reaction: This seems to beg some questions. Has the ideal of 'honour' never caused anything? Young men dream of pure velocity.